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Doktora Tezi olarak sunduğum "Gertrude Stein's Cognitive Poetics: The Deconstruction of Self and Time" adlı çalışmanın, tarafımdan, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve bunu onurumla doğrularım.

03/06/2010

Arsev Ayşen ARSLANOĞLU

ÖZET

Doktora Tezi

Gertrude Stein'in Bilişsel Poetikası: Kendilik ve Zamanın Yapıbozumu

Arsev Ayşen Arslanoğlu

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
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Amerikan modernist yazınının önde gelen isimlerinden Gertrude Stein, ondokuzuncu yüzyıldan yirminci yüzyıla geçiş döneminde kendisini modernist kanonun en önemli isimleri arasında konumlandırır. Yirminci yüzyıl edebiyatının daha farklı bir yönde gelişmesi gerekliliğini savunarak kendi yazınsal yaklaşımını oluşturur. Bu yaklaşım, temel olarak, ondokuzuncu yüzyılın erkek egemen sosyal geleneklerinden ve yerleşik yazınsal yaklaşımlardan kopuşu içerir. Bu tez çalışmasında yazarın iki otobiyografisi, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* ve *Everybody's Autobiography*, ve baş yapıtı, *The Making of Americans*, ele alınmakta ve psikanalizin kurucusu Sigmund Freud'un İngiliz Nesne İlişkileri Okulu'nun önemli temsilcilerinden Melanie Klein ve D.W.Winnicott'un teorik görüşleri çerçevesinde incelenmektedir.

Gertrude Stein'in yeni bir yazın anlayışı oluşturma çabasında ön plana çıkan kendisini yazını ile ilişkilendirme ve tanımlama çabasıdır. Burada yazarın bu yöndeki çabası D.W.Winnicott'un geçiş nesneleri ve potansiyel alanlar kavramları açısından ele alınarak yazının yazarın yaşamındaki konumu incelenmektedir. Gerçek kendiliğin oluşturulması sürecinde yazınsal arayışların önemi sorgulanarak bu durumun Gertrude Stein romanının deneysel yapısına ne ölçüde etki ettiği irdelenmektedir.

Tez çalışmasında otobiyografilerin incelenmesinde özellikle yazarın yaşamında yer alan ve yazınsal kimliğini etkileyen geçmiş yaşantılar üzerinde durulmaktadır. Nesne ilişkileri kuramına göre öteki ile ilişkinin kendiliği şekillendirmesi üzerinden yola çıkarak kendilik ve zamansallık algısının oluşumu ve sürekli değişime uğramasının yansımaları *The Making of Americans* romanında incelenmektedir.

ABSTRACT

Doctoral Thesis

Gertrude Stein's Cognitive Poetics: The Deconstruction of Self and Time

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Gertrude Stein, one of the prominent authors in American modernist literature, positions herself among the most important figures in the modernist canon in the transition period from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. She establishes her literary approach by arguing that the twentieth century literature should develop in a different direction. This approach mainly includes the rupture from the patriarchal conventions and the traditional literary methods of the nineteenth century. In this dissertation, the author's two autobiographies, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and *Everybody's Autobiography*, and her magnum opus, *The Making of Americans*, are addressed within this framework and examined in terms of object relations theory.

The prominent issue in Gertrude Stein's effort to form an innovative writing is her attempt at relating and defining herself in relation to writing. The position of writing in the the author's life is examined by focusing on her effort in terms of D.W. Winnicott's concepts of "transitional objects" and "potential spaces". After questioning the importance of the literary searches in the formation of true self, how this affects the experimental structure of Gertrude Stein's novel is discussed.

In the dissertation, the past histories taking place in the author's life and affecting her identity as an author it is focused on while examining the autobiographies,. After discussing how the sense of temporality and selfhood is formed and goes under continuous transformation in terms of the relation with other selves within the framework of object relations theory, the reflections of these issues in *The Making of Americans* are examined.

CONTENTS

GERTRUDE STEIN'S COGNITIVE POETICS: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND TIME

CHAPTER III

AN INVESTIGATION INTO SELF AND TEMPORALITY IN *THE MAKING OF AMERICANS*

INTRODUCTION

Jane Platini Bowers defines the characteristics of Stein's writing by the verbs "to question", "to confront", "to investigate", "to explore", "to push", "to defy", and "to challenge" (153). These verbs apply to the readers' experience as well. Such acts seem to be the only way for the reader to reach the *sense* in *non-sense*. Bowers draws attention to the fact that these characteristics of Stein's writing and its demands from the readers place her somewhere outside that of such other modernists as Virginia Woolf, T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, and Ezra Pound: "Although the writing of these modernists represents fragmentation, alienation, and moral relativity of their time, it also expresses their yearning for abiding and sustaining structures —myth, tradition, art" (154). While these prominent authors try to restore the structures of myth, tradition and art, Stein celebrated the chaos of the twentieth century, which resulted in her being considered as an anomaly within the modernist tradition. Interestingly, it is also the same characteristics that make Gertrude Stein a precursor for today's language poets such as Robert Creeley, Robert Duncan, Bruce Andrews, David Antin, Charles Bernstein to name the most prominent ones. These authors focus on the materiality of language by breaking the conventional reading process through fracturing regular patterns of the written text just as Gertrude Stein does. Today Stein is a well-known figure within literary circles whose name is mentioned near the most significant authors in the Anglo-American modernist tradition where she was once seen as an anomaly.

Bettina L. Knapp sees Gertrude Stein as "an era unto herself — unforgettable, spectacular, revolutionary in every sense of the word" (7). Stein's departure from the nineteenth century conventions, which resulted in a new approach to literature, is closely associated with her own life story. Stein was born on February 3, 1874 of a wealthy German-Jewish family in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. Shortly after her birth, the Steins move to Austria, then to France. During these years, Stein learns German and French along with English. The Steins return to the United States in 1879 and settle in East Oakland in search for

a better life. After her parents' death, the eldest brother, Michael, assumes the guardianship of Gertrude Stein and her brother Leo and moves the family to San Francisco in 1891. Next year, Stein goes to Baltimore to live with her mother's sister. She entered Radcliffe College in 1893; during her years at College, she develops a strong interest in the work of psychologist William James. In addition to her studies on psychology with William James, she studies composition with William Vaughn Moody, philosophy with George Santayana and Josiah Royce, and psychology with Hugo Münsterberg (Stein *Writings 1903-1932* 828). She gets her B.A. from Radcliffe in 1898 after belatedly passing required Latin examination.

Stein goes to Paris with her brother Leo Stein, who is also a writer. There she starts one of Europe's most celebrated salons. She dedicates a significant part of her time to the cultivation of artists such as Picasso, Matisse, Braque, and Cezanne. During these years, she becomes an influential figure on such prominent American authors as Ernest Hemingway, Sherwood Anderson and F. Scott Fitzgerald (Abney 318). In 1910, Stein invites Alice B. Toklas to Paris to live with her as her companion and secretary. Toklas lives with her until Stein's death[1] in 1946 and is buried in the same tomb with Stein when she dies in 1967 (Stein *Writings 1903-1932* 837).

Gertrude Stein gets great reception from the readers and the critics during her lifetime and after her death. While she is seen as a "literary genius" by her admirers such as Sherwood Anderson, Carl Van Vechten to name just a few, her work is seen by her detractors outside the conventional literary patterns and it is presumed that her work does not have any social value and is inaccessible. She is even described as a "literary idiot" by some such as the Marxist critic Michael Gold (Hoffman 1). Between these opposite responses especially towards her experimental works, Gertrude Stein has gained considerable public reputation with works such as *Q.E.D.*, *Three Lives*, and *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas.* The readers and critics of these works evaluated them as strong pieces of

[1] Stein dies of stomach cancer on July 27, 1946. Although she has been urged that she is too weak for an operation, she insists on it. She dies the same day after operation.

realism (Abney 321) but Stein's experimental works, among which *The Making of Americans*, *Tender Buttons*, *Stanzas In Meditation*, *Patriarchal Poetry* can be mentioned, remained mostly unattended by these readers. However, Stein mentions in her autobiographical work *Everybody's Autobiography* that these experimental works play a significant role in her being recognized as a famous author:

> "… anyway I was very much interested in what is good publicity and what is not. Harcourt was very surprised when I said to him on first meeting him in New York remember this extraordinary welcome that I am having does not come from the books of mine that they do understand like the Autobiography but the books of mine that they did not understand and he called his partner and said listen to what she says and perhaps after all she is right. (8)

Such a public reception led many critics to examine the literary career of the author by dividing into periods or by classifying as "difficult" and "simple" ones and to place the works where she focused on language and the mechanics of prose and poetry in the category of "difficult" pieces.

No matter how controversial the critics' views on the experimental or difficult texts of Gertrude Stein, it is sure that the author's name has begun to be mentioned near the famous voices in modernist literature. The public history of Stein criticism begins on 18 December 1909 with an anonymous review of *Three Lives* in the *Kansas City Star*. In this review, the author, who considers the work as a masterpiece of realism, draws attention to the originality of narrative form. The next review[2], which is also anonymous, compares *Three Lives* to the realist stories in the Russian literature and argues that the work has "extraordinary vitality conveyed 'in a most eccentric and difficult form'" ([*Three Lives*] 27). Michael J. Hoffman sees both reviewers "limited in their ability to cope with Stein's experimentation by the dominant paradigm of realism" (4). With the creation of modernist consciousness, Stein's name was linked with such painters as Pablo Picasso and Henri Matisse. In this period, Stein's work is considered as the application of innovative techniques in painting to literature. During World

[2] Published in the *Nation* on 20 January 1910.

War I, Stein's literary productivity decreased since she was involved in the war as a resident of Paris. Therefore, she received little response in this period; however, her career as an author was already secure by that time.

The critics have adopted mainly two different attitudes toward Gertrude Stein's works: They either relate the author's works to her life and her relations or define her works as the sign of a great literary talent but as inaccessible and difficult to understand. Despite many negative responses about the inaccessibility of her work in the early years, Stein received many appreciative reviews and essays even at that time. The serious assessments of such poets and critics such as Edmund Wilson, Kenneth Burke, Wyndham Lewis, and William Carlos Williams show that the importance of Gertrude Stein increases slowly but securely in these years. Michael J. Hoffman sees Kenneth Burke as the first person who writes a serious assessment of Stein's works (6). In his article "Engineering with Words", Burke reads Stein in the context of John Milton and concludes that her method is one of subtraction by focusing on the relation between the significant form and the subject matter (42-43). Besides Burke, such contemporary poets of Stein as Laura Riding, Wyndham Lewis, and William Carlos Williams have written serious assessments of the author's works. While most of these names give positive responses to Stein's writing, Wyndham Lewis, who has spared four chapters to Gertrude Stein in his work *Time and the Western Man*, seems to get furious by Stein. He sees Stein as an author who is "too cunning a stammerer to be easily unmasked", who is a "homologue of the false-blind" and who is "unable to tell anything clearly and simply" (53). Differing from Lewis, other critics and poets have evaluated Stein's writing as a general attack on the scholastic forms of literature and appreciated such a strategy.

Today many critics see Stein's power in the techniques she uses in her works. For instance, a notable Stein critic Richard Kostelanetz finds Stein's power and success in her re-inventing English: "Thanks to her attitude toward the mechanics of prose, she created not one original style but a succession of styles, all of which are highly personal and thus eventually inimitable. What all her

departures ultimately accomplish is a reinvention of English" (*Gertrude Stein Advanced: An Anthology of Criticism* 411). Bob Perelman, who discusses the notion of literary genius in his book *The Trouble with Genius*, draws attention to the interesting point that Stein's works were written to be masterpieces like the ones written by Ezra Pound, Louis Zukofsky, and James Joyce:

> Although differing more widely than the blanket "modernism" would suggest, these works share a common root: *The Cantos*, *Ulysses*. *"A"*, and Stein's books were written to be masterpieces —bibles, permanent maps or X rays of society, blueprints for a new civilization, or demonstrations of the essence of human mind.
> However, the social narratives by which these displays of genius were to communicate their values, not only their often-minute audiences but beyond to society at large, were difficult to follow. Being difficult to follow is central to genius. (3)

Stein's comparing her masterpiece *The Making of Americans* with *In Search of Lost Time (A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu)* by Marcel Proust and *Ulysses* by James Joyce ("Portraits and Repetition" 287-312) and her insistence on her being a genius (*Everybody's Autobiography*) suggest that her experimental or difficult works are parts of her conscious writing project aimed at establishing her reputation as a literary genius. "Being difficult to follow", which Perelman sees as central to genius, is the most basic characteristic of Stein's works. The reprocessing and recycling of a limited vocabulary and "forcing semantic production to the surface of her text in new meanings and combinations of words" in many of her works gives the reader the feeling that he/she is reading the text as if for the first time (Rieke 60). Lack of grammar in some texts or juxtaposition of grammaticality with ungrammatically in some others lead one to a point where it is hard to cope with Stein's insistent repetitions. That is also the point where not only the common reader but also the Stein critics feel the need to give a meaning to the text and to solve the puzzling mechanic under the textual body.

It is no doubt that Stein herself is the most important critic on her own work. From the beginning of her literary career, she explains what she is doing with words in her theoretical writings, which are examples of her distinctive style

as well. For instance, in her nonfiction work *How To Write*, which is composed between 1927 and 1931, Stein presents her thoughts and feelings on words, sentences, paragraphs and narrative. Gertrude Stein explains what she has discovered in this book in her lecture "Plays":

> In a book I wrote called *How To Write* I made a discovery which I considered fundamental, that sentences are not emotional and that paragraphs are. I found about language that paragraphs are emotional and sentences are not and I found something else about it. I found out that this difference was not a contradiction but a combination and that this combination causes one to think endlessly about sentences and paragraphs because the emotional paragraphs are made up of unemotional sentences. (*Writings 1932-1946*, 244)

It is observed that Gertrude Stein's experimentation with words and her views on sentences and paragraphs have changed and developed throughout her life. Her early works such *Q.E.D.*, *Three Lives*, and *The Making of Americans* carry the influence of William James' views in psychology. In these works, Stein tries to define various "types" of people; she gives what concerns her most in this period very precisely in her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*": "[H]ow everybody was telling everything that was inside them that made them that one, that the passion for knowing the basis of existence in each one was in me to help them change themselves to become what they should become" (271). Stein's focus on "types" has led her to question the problems of sameness and difference as she has realized that everybody says the same thing over and over again. It can indeed be said that this realization is the beginning of Stein's thinking on grammar:

> [I] found myself getting deeper and deeper into the idea of describing really describing every individual that could exist.
> While I was doing all this all unconsciously at the same time a matter of tenses and sentences came to fascinate me (276).

Gertrude Stein tells what she has achieved in her writing by relating her experimentation to the development of English literature. She places herself within the canon but frequently mentions that she is the author of the twentieth

century, which she sees as the period of paragraphs ("What Is English Literature" 219). She starts breaking down the paragraphs; then, she reaches the most basic unit by breaking down paragraphs into sentences and sentences into words. Stein's perception and use of words forms the basis of her argument in her book *How To Write*. Her explanation of the argument mainly presented in this book and in her lectures can be considered as the sign of the importance Stein attributes to her statements in the work. The author's insistence on her argument may seem obsessive at the first glance; however, it is seen that she is also constructing and deconstructing her "self" as she diagrams sentences or as sentences diagram themselves: "I like the feeling the everlasting feeling of sentences as they diagram themselves. In that way one is completely possessing something and incidentally one's self" ("Poetry and Grammar" 314).

In this dissertation, I focus on the construction and deconstruction of selfhood and temporality in Stein's three texts, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, *Everybody's Autobiography* and *The Making of Americans* within the framework of the object relations school. As the main concern of the British Object School is to conclude what selfhood is, I try to reach a comprehensive view of the concept. My aim in such an effort is to provide a ground where I can discuss the views of various psychoanalysts such as Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, and D. W. Winnicott. This ground also helps to understand both the topographical model Freud establishes in the early years of his career and Klein's development of Freud's views in a way that leads to the emergence of object relations. After this short review, I discuss the construction of selfhood in Winnicott's concepts of "transitional space" and "play". Since Winnicott sees culture as a transitional space and as an extension of play, his views on culture provides a theoretical background to discuss literary works as well. Besides, his theory helps to grasp the continuous construction and deconstruction of selfhood by Gertrude Stein since her works which are discussed in this dissertation are autobiographical in nature and self is not a static concept but constructed and reconstructed continuously.

After giving theoretical background that will help the reader about where to place writing in relation to selfhood in the light of these three psychoanalysts' views, I discuss the problematic nature of autobiography as a genre, which results from the difficulties in giving a clear definition of selfhood and in making sure the reliability of memory. In the second chapter, I address the author's two autobiographies, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and *Everybody's Autobiography*, and pose the question whether it is possible for an author to reflect himself or herself objectively while perceiving oneself is almost always subjective. In addition to this question that is valid in autobiographical writings, Gertrude Stein's challenge to autobiography as a genre makes the matter more complicated. I attempt at discussing her challenge both in a third person autobiography, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, and a first person autobiography, *Everybody's Autobiography*. In the final chapter of the dissertation, I examine the autobiographical nature *The Making of Americans* in connection with this question and deal with Gertrude Stein's own relation to existence, temporality, and writing in this work. Arguing that the intense use of repetition and the present tense is an extension of the fact that present is a constructed memory, which is also valid for autobiography as a genre, I analyze how Stein tries to verbalize her own memory. Related to this argument, I analyze the way Stein's writing changes in character as the work develops and as her rupture from the nineteenth century conventions becomes more apparent. As Gertrude Stein pushes the limits of language further in her magnum opus, her analysis of self and temporality becomes increasingly experimental. I address to her play with language in terms of D.W.Winnicott's concept "transitional space" and assess Stein's experimentation with language as an extension of play, which Winnicott sees as the origin of culture. Focusing on Gertrude Stein's transition from defining every kind of individual to analyzing the individual's relation with his/her self and the temporal dimension he/she lives in, I discuss her writing strategies in terms of her de/construction of self and time.

CHAPTER I

Object Relations in Psychoanalysis

Since Sigmund Freud founded the essential concepts of psychoanalysis, the questions regarding the nature of self have been a major concern. Freud suggests that the psyche is largely affected by individual instincts and drives. However, the relation of the psyche to significant others around it has attracted the attention of many theorists, including Freud himself, since drive can basically become known through objects. The interest in the relation of the psyche to significant others caused the emergence of two main approaches within the psychoanalytic field: drive-oriented theories and person-oriented theories. While drive-oriented theories put the emphasis on the individual psyche and suggest that every human instinct can be reduced to instinctual drives, person-oriented theories envision a self grounded in person's relation with significant others. Keeping the basic characteristic of drive that it can manifest itself through object in mind, it is reasonable to claim that psychoanalytic knowledge should start with self's relation to others. Yet, this premise is not sufficient to establish a unity among different schools of thought in person-oriented models.

Since it is very hard to make a clear-cut division between drive-oriented and person-oriented theories, the problem of defining one's stance in regard to them arises, which results in the formation of many different views in turn. The fact that there is a broad spectrum of theoretical positions forms one of the basic problems in object relations because communication among them is very limited. For this reason, Greenberg and Mitchell define object relations as problematic field in their work *Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory*:

> We refer to object relations as a common "problem" because there is no consensus within the current psychoanalytic literature concerning their origins, their meanings, or the major patterns of their transformations. (1)

Despite the lack of consensus, it is seen that truth regarding the nature of self appears to exist somewhere between drive-oriented and person-oriented

models. However, the realization of this truth does not solve the problem but causes another major one: To whom should one turn in order to find a unified theory of self? Or is it possible to form a unified theory? The fact that there is no agreement on the fundamental matters of object relations and that the terms being suspect and indefinite brings the need to make a selection. Such a selection carries utmost importance since it will determine one's theoretical stance in regard to both drive-oriented and person-oriented models. The problematic nature of making a distinction and a selection is expressed as "the problem of finding the right balance" by Robert Rogers. He refers specifically to how much emphasis should be placed on the "inner world" and the "outer world" (4-5). Such a vast variety within person-oriented theories and specifically object relations school leads to reassessing the views of different theorists at "finding the right balance" in Roger's terms. In this dissertation, the term object relations will be used in its broadest sense by referring to the theoretical views of Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, and D.W. Winnicott. In order to make a definition that does not contradict these theorists' use of the term, Otto Kernberg's formulation which he suggests in *Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis* is preferred:

> [I]n broadest terms, psychoanalytic object relations theory represents the psychoanalytic study of the nature and origin of intrapsychic structures deriving from, fixating, modifying, and reactivating past internalized relations with others in the context of present interpersonal relations. (56)

Another significant issue in determining one's theoretical position in object relations is how s/he defines the term "object". In his article "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes", Freud defines object as "[one] in or through which [the instinct] can achieve its aim" (87). The fact that this is a very broad definition causes controversy on what "object" is among various schools. Since "object" covers a great range of concepts such as internal objects, part-objects, introjects, etc., the term "mental objects" is used here to cover a group of concepts used by different theorists. In this context, mental objects will "refer to various mental organizations, structures, processes and capacities in an individual which relate his or her perception, attitude, relationships with and memories of other people" (Perlow 1). Considering the emphasis of object relations on the relational matrix

formed by the individual's interaction with the objects around, how different theorists see the origin of the mental object, its status and position in relation to self is discussed in this chapter.

1.1. Theoretical Views of Sigmund Freud

Psychoanalysis is a unique way for understanding man in terms of its defining an entirely new method to analyze the human condition. Psychoanalysis can be said to be developed by one person, Sigmund Freud, although he began shaping his theory with a method borrowed from the studies of Josef Breuer on hysteria and his familiarity with neurology, philosophy, and psychology affected the development of his theoretical views to a great extent. Freud continued his studies alone for ten years until he was joined by some colleagues who had similar views. This makes psychoanalysis unique among other disciplines since "by the time Freud's work was 'discovered' and he acquired coworkers, he had evolved a fully articulated (though by no means final) vision of his creation" (Greenberg and Mitchell 21).

The new method proposed by Sigmund Freud is considered to be a drive/structure model since its core concept is the idea of drive. Freud drew on biological metaphors; yet, this does not mean that the drive/structure model completely discards interpretation. As Greenberg and Mitchell point out in their work *Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory*, "the drives are not only mechanisms of the mind, they are also its contents" (23). Transformation of the content of the drive under certain circumstances and the effect of the drive on individual's relations with others form the bridge between the biological basis and the interpretive character of psychoanalysis. Freud's drive/structure model, where drive is seen as an energy source which activates the psychic apparatus was elaborated over the course of his writings.

The topographical model contained the basic premises of the Freudian theory. In this model, the mind is divided into three different parts, each of which

represents a different part of psychic functioning: the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. Freud defined the "conscious" as the conception present to consciousness and of which the individual is aware. He saw unconsciousness as a "regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our mental activity" ("A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis" 53). Freud claimed that every mental act begins as an unconscious one; it is only afterwards that some remains unconscious and some develops into consciousness. The final division Freud made was between the preconscious and the unconscious: While the preconscious activity passes into consciousness without any difficulty, the unconscious activity seems to cut off from consciousness. In addition to the topographical model, our broad areas seem to be most representative among the wide range of topics. Freud discussed in his writings that the reality principle; changes in the approach to the nature of drive and the constancy regulating drive discharge; the corresponding change in the affect theory; and the evolution of the drive/structure model with its refinements in the approach to the role of object relations in normal and pathological development (Greenberg and Mitchell 52).

Reality factors are assigned a central psychodynamic role in the early Freudian theory. Freud sets clear limits on the power of the reality principle. These limits are more apt to self-preservative drives than the sexual drives because the period of latency interrupts sexual development while the establishment of the reality principle is being consolidated. Sexual impulses remain outside the reality principle; they are more closely tied to primary processes and phantasy. Introduction of the reality principle makes the external world regain some of its status; yet, it is still secondary. Reality arises from the frustration of the infant whose needs are not satisfied. If the need is satisfied then reality carries little importance since the infant will not be in search for the satisfaction of his/her needs in external world. Freud places the perception of and the reaction towards the reality within the framework of the drive/structure model. However, he does not provide the compatibility between reality and the demands of id, ego, and superego completely. With his increasing interest paid to reality, Freud becomes convicted of the role of objects in reality as forces in psychic

structure formation: “He referred to the inner world of normal and neurotic people as a 'copy of the external world,' and said that the superego retained essential features of the introjected persons —their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish” (Greenberg and Mitchell 56).

A series of theoretical modifications have made a decreasing emphasis on drive processes as the sole determinant. Freud's approach to the constancy and drive processes leaves a gap which can be filled by external circumstances. In the early years, Freud considered the constancy principle identical with the pleasure principle. He claimed that the individual will attempt at discharging any internal pressure and that such a discharge determines the direction of his/her behavior. The tie between two principles was broken in his paper “The Economic Problem of Masochism” written in 1924. The element of quantity was replaced by quality, so pleasure became a more complex concept. In this paper, Freud posed the question “If pleasure is central to human motivation and if the nature of pleasure is not spelled out in clear quantitative terms, where are we to look for this most important aspect of our mental lives?” (Greenberg and Mitchell 58). The revision of the pleasure principle in the light of this question shifted the focus on the drives to interpersonal context.

Narcissism is another important concept in the Freudian theory since he theorized the structure of the ego as he developed his views on narcissism. Freud briefly defines narcissism as the concept that forms an intermediate state between autoeroticism and object love: “The libido withdrawn from the outer world has been directed on the ego, giving rise to a state which we may call narcissism” (“On Narcissism” 57). Freud sees a reciprocity between ego-libido and object-libido and considers the highest level of development of which object-libido is capable to be in the state of love where the individual seems to give up all his/her personality in favor of object-cathexis. Freud's views on narcissism are closely related to his libido theory. Freud considers libido as the major source of psychic energy. In Freud’s theory, an important aspect of libido theory is that “object choice or interpersonal relations result from the transformation of the libido.

Objects are needed by the individual to gratify libidinal drives" (Myers 23-24). In Freud's libido theory, it is the drive that determines the object, and the personality development is seen as the result of the interplay of drives and instincts. Here lies an ambiguity in the Freudian theory: the cathexis of the ego on object brings the necessity to describe the nature and role of the object; the status of the ego needs elaboration in this process as well. Narcissism is indeed a movement from the external object to the ego or the self. The ego is capable of using the energy that it invests or takes from other objects. Freud tries to overcome the ambiguity mentioned above by clarifying the nature of the instinctual drive. Together with the revision of his theory on instincts and drives[3], he put emphasis on the relation between the libidinal and self-preservative drives —which means both drives can work together. The most significant aspect of the revision of the Freudian theory is that the early relations with objects gains considerable importance while they are negligible once and the emphasis is entirely on the biologically determined drives.

In order to clarify the nature of the instinctual drive, Freud primarily focuses on the sexual drives. When he proposes his theory of the sexual drives, he distinguishes between the aim of the instinct and its object. He repeats and develops this definition of the object used within this context in this study "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes": "The object of the instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim" (Freud 87). Here it seems as if "objects" include only the actual objects in Freud's use; however, it is seen that the term is expanded to cover the mental images of the objects when the development of the Freudian theory is followed. Freud's views regarding the mental images of the objects are first reflected in his theory of the Oedipal phase. During this phase, the child's Oedipal wishes towards the mother and aggressive wishes against the father are hidden in relation to how the mental image of the mother is formed within the child's unconscious. Another key step in the progress

[3] The word "instinct" is the translation of the German word "trieb". However, the word "drive" is used more frequently as the translation of "trieb" in order to distinguish Freud's idea of instincts from the instincts of animals (Thurschwell 80).

of Freud's ideas on the mental images of objects is related to the development of his theory on phantasy:

> After exploring phenomena such as dreams (1900a), parapraxes (1901b) and humour (1905c), Freud turned to explore phantasies. In contrast to the subjects mentioned above, phantasy was very closely related for Freud to the central question which interested him —the development of neurosis. After the presentation of his theory of libido and its development of neurosis (1905d), Freud turned to the concept of phantasy to account for the libido and its frustration on the one hand, and neurotic symptoms on the other (Freud 1908a, 1910j). He further developed a general view of mental functioning according to which phantasy constituted an alternative in the engagement of reality, an area of mental life still under the sway of the pleasure principle, which guided the functioning of the drives , and was not yet controlled by the reality principle (Freud 1911b, 1916x). (Perlow 12)

As understood from the above quotation, phantasy takes place somewhere between the discharge of the libidinal energy and the reality principle. This intermediate area, where phantasy is placed, both affects and is affected by the mental images of the objects. This line of thought extends to the formation of the superego and of the "internal object" —the mental image of the object as it is internalized by the individual. Such a development within the Freudian theory suggests that the significance of the object increases in time:

> It has been widely noted that the role of the "object" was relatively minor in Freud's theory of the drives, as merely an aspect of the drive it was considered to be the aspect that was least important (Freud 1915c:122). However, as Freud progressed from a theory of drives to a more general theory of the structure of the personality, especially in the structural model (Freud 1923b), the concept of the "object", especially as it is embedded in the concept of the superego as an "internal object", became a major aspect of the personality. (Perlow 22)

The affect theory, like Freud's theory on narcissism, is another fundamental stage in the development of the structural model. The value and nature of affect in regard to pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings are determined by the situation where one finds himself/herself and by the ego structure. Thus, affect is the chief determining factor in repression and the formation of neurotic

symptoms. However, as it is seen in nearly all of Freud's concepts, affect theory undergoes a revision and it somehow becomes secondary as the emphasis is put on the libidinal force which gives way to affect and repression. Anxiety holds a significant place among affects since “it is an almost universal symptom of neurotic disorders” (Greenberg and Mitchell 65). Anxiety as such leads Freud to import his affect theory from his approach to actual neurosis. Anxiety is seen to result not from instincts and drives but repression. Thus, the decreasing significance of drives remains unchanged in the revised version of affect theory.

However, the most radical change in Freud's revision is that he reverses the relationship between anxiety and repression. While it is repression that is considered to cause anxiety earlier, it is claimed that repression is a way of avoiding anxiety in the revised version:

> When the ego senses that a dangerous instinctual impulse is on the verge of breaking through to consciousness, it can summon up a small dose of the relevant mnemic image and, by doing so, calls to its aid the pleasure principle. With the pleasure principle, the ego has the strength to instigate the repression of the threatening impulse. Anxiety is thus used by the ego as a signal to initiate defensive activity. (Greenberg and Mitchell 65-66).

With the development of the late affect theory, the reader's attention turns to external circumstances once again. The increasing importance of reality in the ego structure results in an interest in object relations within the drive/structural model, which supports that Freud has legacy in the perspective of object relations school. Robert Rogers points out Freud’s legacy in his work *Self and Other: Object Relations in Psychoanalysis and Literature*: “While it is true that Freud conceptualizes the 'introjection of the object into the ego' as 'a substitute for a libidinal object-tie' (1921, 108), one has only to replace 'libidinal' by 'emotional' for such a passage to be harmonious with a person-oriented perspective” (9).

After Freud’s death, many theoretical views were proposed by different theorists such as Jung, Adler, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott. Although there are certain differences among these views, the major shift was from drive-oriented

theories towards person-oriented theories . Among the theorists within this shift, Melanie Klein —whose work represents a clear rupture from Freudian theory— has an important place as the founder of the object relations school.

1.2 Melanie Klein and the Object Relations

Before Melanie Klein's first psychoanalytic study published in 1919, "no psychoanalyst had attempted to apply the techniques of psychoanalysis to children, either to ameliorate difficulties in living or to test out Freud's developmental theories firsthand" (Greenberg and Mitchell 119). Klein started to apply psychoanalytic techniques to children upon the suggestion of Sandor Ferenczi, under whose guidance she went under analysis (Kristeva 26). Afterwards, Klein went analysis with Karl Abraham and Ernest Jones. Upon the pure approach in Klein's work, Ernest Jones "invited Klein to spend a year in England analyzing her own children" (Kristeva 31). Shortly after spending some time in England, Klein settled in England.

Klein claims that she introduced a new approach to the theory of psychoanalysis, especially to the unconscious, without challenging the basic premises of the Freudian thought. Her basic formulations on the nature of drives, and on the nature of objects are her major contributions in the psychoanalytic field (Myers 63). Although Klein presents her work as an extension of the Freudian thought, her views have some significant divergences from the orthodox psychoanalytic views. Despite her denial of these divergences for some time, Klein's views results in the foundation of object relations theory in that she puts the concept of "internal objects" into the center of the psychoanalytic theory. Considering this fact, Robert Rogers expresses the position of Melanie Klein as somewhere between the Freudian thought and the object relations: "[Klein] may be thought as an amphibian, a creature who swims in the great sea of Freudian instinct theory but travels as well on the solid land of object relations" (10). There is no doubt it is the concept of "internal objects" —which is one of the major Kleinian concepts— that placed Klein "on the solid land of object relations".

However, it is also one of Klein's major concepts which caused many misunderstandings and controversy.

Klein does not devote herself to the conventional meanings of the terms used in the traditional psychoanalytic approach; rather, she relies on the implicit meanings of her terms assuming that they can be understood within the present psychoanalytic circle:

> This tendency is, of course, problematic, especially because the theories propounded by Melanie Klein are very different from many others in the psychoanalytic literature, leading to new meanings for old terms. The fact that the newness of these meanings is not always acknowledged leads to a certain extend of conceptual confusion. (Perlow 33)

This results in a problematic situation since her use of concepts differs from her predecessors and contemporaries to a great extent. Among all her concepts, the term "object" is the one that creates significant conceptual confusion. Klein's usage of this term means the basic constituents of the mind; however, the phenomena referred to by the followers of Klein under this term is diverse, so it is very hard to reach a consensus on the definition of the term "object". Although it is impossible to end the ongoing controversy on the Kleinian concepts, the meanings of these concepts may be clarified by elaborating the general theoretical framework within which they are included.

Klein's ideas can be reviewed in four developmental phases. In the first phase, her focus is entirely on the libidinal issues: "The most striking feature of the early papers is their exclusive focus on libidinal issues, even more so than Freud's own work, where with his proclivity for balanced dualistic formulations, psychosexuality is always juxtaposed with other motivational themes" (Greenberg and Mitchell 121). Klein relates libidinal drive to the child's need to know. The child develops fantasies related to the mother's body —what is inside the mother's body. It should be noted here that the mother's body represents the outer world for the child: "The outer world stands for the mother's body, and Klein portrays the young child as an intense and eager explorer" (Greenberg and Mitchell 122). At

this point, the differences between the ideas of Freud and Klein arise in terms of dating: “Whereas Freud viewed the Oedipus complex as the culmination of the infantile sexuality, arising only after the sequential unfolding of earlier, pregenital organizations, Klein's data suggested a much earlier onset of oedipal interests and phantasies” (Greenberg and Mitchell 122).

Freud's and Klein's ideas differs on the formation of the superego as well. Klein interpreted Freud's views in the way that superego can function as a substitute for external objects: “[T]he child's most important relationships could be conceived as being with his imagos, rather than with his real parents” (Perlow 35). She considers the small child's phantasies regarding the interaction with fantastic figures to be the beginning of the superego formation. She argues that phantasies come and go, but superegos exist. At this period, Klein starts to discuss her clinical material in the terms Freud proposed. She argues that there is an early stage of mental development at which sadism becomes active at all the various sources of libidinal development (Klein “The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego” 219). The dominant aim at this period is to possess the contents of the mother's body (or the introjected mother) and to destroy her by all the weapons the child has. The fear of punishment leads to the formation of the superego. Besides, Klein disagrees with Freud on the onset of the formation of the superego. While Freud notes that superego formed at the end of childhood, Klein mentions about much earlier superego formations during her study with children. The fantastic objects broadened into the conceptualization of internal objects afterwards.

During the second phase of Klein's developmental ideas, the focus is directed from the libidinal issues to aggressive issues. Previously, Klein saw the nature of the Oedipus complex as a struggle over pleasure and as the fear of punishment; however, in the second phase, she considers the origins of libidinal drives as “a struggle for power and destruction and the fear of retaliation” (Greenberg and Mitchell 123). This shift in the focus from libidinal issues to aggression issues leads Klein to analyze and review the formation of phantasy and

the concept of internal objects. In Freudian thought, fantasy is a specific mental process, which occurs as a result of frustration. When some thoughts and feelings are repressed or cause frustration in some way, the person fantasizes. Therefore, fantasy and gratification are alternative channels in Freud's thought. Klein extends the Freudian understanding of phantasy in such a way that phantasy forms the basic substance of all mental processes from the beginning of life:

> Infantile feelings and phantasies leave, as it were, their imprints on the mind, imprints which do not fade away but get stored up, remain active, and exert a continuous and powerful influence on the emotional and intellectual life of the individual. The earliest feelings are experienced in connection with external and internal stimuli. (Klein "Weaning" 290)

Julia Kristeva presents a detailed description of fantasy in her work *Melanie Klein*, mentioning that the "Kleinian fantasy is at the heart of psychoanalysis for both the analyst and the patient":

> The Kleinian fantasy (as the Kleinians spell the word), which consists of drives, sensations, and acts as well as words, and that is manifested just as much in a child at play as in an adult who describes his drives and sensations from the analytic couch using a discourse bereft of any motor manifestations, is a veritable incarnation, a carnal metaphor, what Proust would call a transubtantiation. [. . .][A]ll of our author's notion prove to be ambiguous, ambivalent, and reflective of logical processes that are more circular than dialectical. (13)

The second Freudian concept expanded by Klein is that of "internal objects". The development of the concept of "internal objects" is related to the process during which Klein becomes aware of the central significance of infantile phantasies. She defines the mental life of the child during the oedipal period as full of "mostly sadistic phantasies concerning his parents" (Greenberg and Mitchell 124). Later, as she progresses her theory, she puts more emphasis on the effect of the internal world on emotional experience and she defines more complex phantasies on the mother's side. She comes to a conclusion that "the impulse to attack the contents of the mother's body preceded even the anal-sadistic phase and that its origins were to be found in the oral-sadistic phase" (Perlow 37). Due to the complexity of the child's phantasies, it takes some time for the child to

differentiate between good and bad, inside and outside, and to form ambivalence. Analyzing the introduction of characters in the child's play and deciding on how this is interdependent with wish-fulfillment, she elaborates on the complex nature of phantasies. Depending on her analysis with three children, Klein concludes that "the operation of imagos, with phantastically good and phantastically bad characteristics, is a general mechanism in adults as well as in children" ("Personification in the Play of Children" 203). She draws attention to the fact that the superego is tyrannical in nature at the onset of the Oedipus conflict and at the start of its formation. There is an evolution of the superego towards geniality at this stage which depends on oral fixation. Klein claims that the imagos in the early phase of the ego development carry the traces of pregeniality although they are constructed on the basis of objects during the Oedipal phase. During its formation, the ego devours various identifications with or introjections of objects; however, if the synthesis of these identifications cannot be achieved, it becomes impossible to form the necessary balance between the superego and the ego. Hence, Klein sees introjection or identification[4] and splitting the good and bad characteristics as two important mechanisms of personification in the child's play. Reviewing the relationship between these imagos and reality, she argues that a better relationship with reality can be established when imagos approximate to the real objects ("Personification in the Play of Children" 207). Thus, it may be proposed that the internal object is an end-product of introjections and projections as well as phantasies, differing from Freud's notion of phantasy:

> [Internal object] is also made up of substantive and sensorial elements: good or bad "bits" of the breast are situated within the ego or expelled from it into the mother's breast. Nourishing substances such as the mother's milk or excremental substances such as urine and feces are projected and introjected. Klein's internal object is an amalgam of representations, sensations, and substances —in a word, it is a diverse array of heterogenous internal objects. (Kristeva 63-64)

The third phase in Klein's work is marked by the shift from aggression issues to libidinal issues again. Klein develops her theory in a way to deal with the questions involved in the concept of internal objects. The basics of her theory are

[4] Klein uses these terms interchangeably in the early years of her career.

the depressive and the paranoid positions. In her article “The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego”, Klein drew attention to the anxiety resulting from the sadistic impulses of the child. Klein defines the nature of the child's basic fears arising at this stage as paranoid: “[T]he child attempts to ward off the dangers of bad objects, both internal and external, largely by keeping images of them separate and isolated from the self and the good objects” (Greenberg and Mitchell 125). Klein calls this period as “paranoid position”. She proposes that the infant develops the capacity for internalizing whole objects in the second quarter of the first year. At this point, the infant realizes that there is only one mother and this mother includes both good and bad features: “The transition to the level of whole-objects involved development in these two areas: the capacity to perceive the mother as a whole person, and the capacity to experience her as both good and bad” (Perlow 49).

Klein terms the dread felt in relation to the whole object as “depressive position”. She considers that depression which is experienced at this stage may depend upon two reasons. First, she mentions that identification with the object is not possible when it is only a part-object. The capacity to identify with the whole object may not occur and such a condition results in depression due to the loss of the loved object. Second, the child attacks the whole object he loves as well because feelings of destruction and love are experienced towards the same object at the same time: “It is his beloved mother, both as external, real figure and mirrored as an internal object, whom the child destroys in an orgy of malevolent phantasies during periods of frustration and anxiety, which Klein links particularly to frustrations in weaning” (Greenberg and Mitchell 125). Since depressive position occurs only when the individual can establish a relation with the whole object, it is seen as an achievement during the development of the individual. The transition to the level of whole-objects includes perceiving the mother as a whole person and experiencing her both good and bad. The child tries to come over the depressive position through reparation. He attempts at creating what he has destroyed; this forms the base of love and reparation. At this point, Klein's motivational system goes under shift:

> In the first place the pursuit of sexual pleasure and knowledge is the central focus; in the second, the attempt to master persecutory anxiety situations, to gain reassurance against the dangers of destruction and retaliation takes on preeminent importance. In this third phase, crucial in Klein's transition from drive/structure model to relational/structure model, anxiety about the fate of the object and attempts to restore it, to make it whole again through love, become the driving force within the personality. (Greenberg and Mitchell 126)

In this phase, Klein's emphasis on the influence of the internal objects on emotional development grows and forms her theory of the relationship between internal and external reality in regard to the paranoid position. Starting from 1932, Klein reformulates her own view of the internal object and suggests that the phantasy of object is present within the individual's body and that it is a basic aspect of all oral wishes. However, this conceptualization gives rise to a confusion of the nature of internal objects, which combines self and object. The Kleinian concept of the internal objects relies on the bodily-based phantasy aspect. Yet, it is the introjection of the actual objects at the same time. Therefore, the concept of the internal objects seems to include perceptions and memories. The blurred distinction between introjection and these perceptions and memories presents a difficulty in that the ambiguity here raises the question where the internal objects are in relation to self.

The fourth and the final phase of Klein's work is an attempt to review and expand her earlier work on depression and reparation. In this phase, she sees splitting good and bad, internal and external is a feature of the ego because the splits in objects correspond to the splits in the ego as well. She adds the term “schizoid” to what was previously described as “paranoid position” and formed the term “paranoid-schizoid position”. She uses the term “paranoid-schizoid” to describe the experience pervaded by persecutory anxiety.

The final concept in this final phase is “envy”. Klein formulates that the origins of envy are in the roots of aggression: “She suggests that early, primitive envy represents a particularly malignant and disastrous form of innate aggression.

All other forms of hatred in the child are directed toward the bad objects" (Greenberg and Mitchell 128). While hatred is directed toward the bad objects, envy, by contrast, is directed towards good objects. The child experiences goodness and nurturance in his/her relation with the mother but finds them insufficient and develops a kind of aggression towards the mother. As a direct extension of such an aggression, the child cannot tolerate any goodness outside his/her control. In this way, Klein separates envy from hatred and jealousy, and posits it as the opposite of gratitude.

In this phase, Melanie Klein comes to see psychic conflict in terms of the battle between hate and love, between sadistic impulses to destroy the object and the reparative tendencies to preserve and revive it. She expressed this conflict in terms of the concepts of the life and death instincts. Here, the death instinct implies an aggression directed towards the self. According to the clinical views of Klein on the death instinct, "aggression was not primarily directed outwards, towards the object, and only later, due to various processes of introjection, redirected towards the self" ("The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego" 221). As a consequence of the aggression directed towards the self, the individual starts to feel persecutory anxiety, felt in the paranoid position, within which the dynamics of the death instinct operate in relation to the sense of self. This step in the Kleinian theory brings a new perspective on the relationship between the internal objects and the instincts: The death and life instincts were in a higher level of abstraction and "the instincts [in general] were experienced as phantasies (as internal objects); attacking the individual (the death instinct) or loving and giving life (the life instinct) from within" (Perlow 45). Elaborating on the death and life instincts, Klein focuses her interest on the relationship between the sadistic tendencies, internal objects and persecutory anxiety.

As seen in four developmental phases of the Kleinian thought, she shapes her basic premises around the concept of the internal object rather than merely analyzing drives and instincts. What is important is the relationship of the internal

object with instincts and phantasies. Besides her developing some basic concepts in the psychoanalytic field, she is deeply interested in the formation of feeling. The capacity to create new meanings or symbolism comes to be the foundation of all phantasy and sublimation and forms the basis of the individual's relation to external world and to reality in general; thus, it becomes a major component in the formation of selfhood. In this context, sadistic phantasies directed towards the mother constitute the first and basic relation to reality. As the ego develops, a true relation, which is not limited to the mother, is established gradually. As new meanings are created during the development of the individual, he/she begins to define his/her identity in terms of self-other relations and to have experiences that function like poetic structures.

1.3. D.W. Winnicott and the Significance of Transitional Objects in the Formation of Self

D. W. Winnicott was a prominent pediatrician before and throughout his career as a psychoanalyst. His work with children shaped his views to a great extent. He went under analysis in the supervision of first James Strachey, then Joan Riviere; he was finally under the supervision of Melanie Klein whom he considered to be one of his predecessors. During this supervision, he realized that his concerns and those of Melanie Klein overlapped to a significant degree: “Klein's depiction of early fantasies, anxieties, and primitive object relations spoke directly to Winnicott's earliest concerns” (Greenberg and Mitchell 190). Winnicott claimed that he had derived most of his concepts from those of Freud and Klein; yet, “his formulations on the emergence of self provided a basis for developmental theory which was completely different from his predecessors.

Winnicott presents his central themes in a playful language, which includes paradoxes. Nearly all his psychoanalytic study focuses on the struggle of the self to be an individual. Another characteristic of Winnicott's writing is his unique way to posit himself within the psychoanalytic tradition. Despite his claim that Freud and Klein are his predecessors, he uses their theoretical views in the

way as he wants them to be, rather than as they are. Greenberg and Mitchell explains this feature of Winnicott's writing by a quotation from the dialogue between Winnicott and Masud Khan:

> [The] tendency to absorb and rework the concepts of others is reflected in Khan's description of Winnicott's impatience with reading: "'It is no use, Masud, asking me to read anything! If it bores me I shall fall asleep in the middle of the first page, if it interests me I will start re-writing it by the end of that page'" (1975, p.xvi). (189).

Winnicott's most significant contribution to psychoanalysis is that he draws attention to the fact that the patient is a person and cannot be evaluated isolated from his environment. His emphasis on the fact that he hoped not to fall into "the error of thinking that an individual can be assessed from his or her place in society" ("The Concept of a Healthy Individual" 22) supports the statement that his approach which broadened into a developmental theory is a relational/structure model. In 1945, he began a series of papers which shows his gradual departure from the theoretical views of Freud and Klein. Almost all of his papers from 1945 to his death in 1960 concern the conditions of making the child's awareness of himself or herself separate from other people possible. As an extension of this concern, Winnicott mainly focuses on the relation between the child and the environment, and questions how self develops in this relation.

When the infant is born, the mother is the one who provides everything he needs and the environment he lives in. The mother devotes herself to the infant and his or her needs —the state which Winnicott defined as "primary maternal occupation" in order to express a higher degree of adaptation to the infant's needs ("The Concept of a Healthy Individual 22). At this stage of development, all needed by the infant is provided by the mother, who "enables the infant to have the illusion that objects in external reality can be real to the infant" ("The Fate of Transitional Object" 54). Since the infant gets everything he wishes without any difficulty, he does not experience any frustration, and thinks that he is the creator of the objects around him. Winnicott called this state, during which the infant experiences himself as omnipotent, "the moment of illusion". In "the moment of

illusion", the infant's hallucinations and the objects provided to him by the mother are identical. Hence, the child sees himself/herself as the omnipotent creator, who can do anything he/she wants. Winnicott claims that the mother's adaptation to the infant's needs, which makes "the moment of illusion" possible, should continue until the infant becomes able to make a differentiation between me and not-me, and to assess the external reality because the sense of omnipotence in "the moment of illusion" is the core of the healthy development of the sense of self.

Integration is the key term which characterizes the early development of person in Winnicott's theory. Integration carries the individual to being a person, being "I", and makes it possible for the developed sense of being, "I am", to give meaning to the action, "I do"; that is, integration is the key in not only the infant's sense of being but his or his/her capability of acting as well. The successful completion of the integration process lies in the mother's adaptation to the infant; hence, the mother should prepare the ground where the child develops his/her capacity to be alone. At the beginning, in "the moment of illusion", the mother serves as a mirror that reflects and meets the infant's needs and gestures. The failure of the mother to meet the infant's needs as time passes undercuts the infant's sense of hallucinatory omnipotence. However, while the mother meets the infant's needs and gestures, she should provide a nondemanding presence so that the infant can develop his capacity to be alone. When the infant is nondemanding, the mother should stay away and let the infant discover his/her own solitude and selfhood. This capacity becomes central in the development of a stable and healthy self:

> Once hallucinatory omnipotence is firmly established, it is necessary for the child to learn the reality of the world outside his control and to experience the limits of his powers. What makes this learning possible is the mother's failure, little by little, to shape the world according to the infant's demands. (Greenberg and Mitchell 193)

However, this period when the infant realizes that he/she is not omnipotent and that he/she cannot get all the things he/she wishes does not always pass without any trouble. There may be maternal failures, which result in disintegration

and schizoid personality pattern, and the infant sense of self may not develop in a healthy way. Since this is the period when the infant faces the reality principle that breaks the illusion of omnipotence, it carries utmost importance in terms of the infant's forming his/her relation with objects. Yet, there are two kinds of maternal failures —inability to actualize the hallucinatory creations and needs of the infant when he/she is in excited states and interference with the infant's formlessness and unintegration when he/she is in quiscent states— and both of these states result in the infant's "annihilation of self" (Winnicott "Primary Maternal Reoccupation" 304).

The mother serves as a medium between the infant's omnipotence and the formlessness he/she experiences in this period. Any failure of the mother is experienced as an "impingement" (Greenberg and Mitchell 194). The outer world is making demands on the infant; in case of mother's failure, the infant cannot develop a healthy self. He/she accepts the demands made on him/her and tries to respond to them. Such an adaptation results in the splitting between the "true self" and the "false self":

> [The terms "true self" and "false self"] are used in description of a defensive organization in which there is a premature taking over of the mother, so that the infant or child adapts to the environment while at the same time protecting and hiding the true self or the source of personal impulses. (Winnicott "Ideas and Definitions" 43)

The focus of Winnicott's paper on transitional objects lies "between baby and mother in the form of an object that is both created and discovered, which is the characteristic that yields freedom and joy to babies and all who were once babies" (Winnicott *Playing and Reality* xi-xii). In order to clarify the development process and the importance of transitional objects in the formation of self, Winnicott distinguishes between the "subjective object" and the "object objectively perceived"; he examined the formation of "true self" and "false self" in the "intermediate area of experience"[5]. The "subjective object" may be described as person's perception of an object under the impression of his/her inner

[5] Winnicott named the intermediate area between complete subjectivity and complete objectivity as potential space. He argued that art and aesthetic experience occur in this potential space.

reality. By means of healthy maternal care, the child passes from perceiving objects subjectively to perceiving them objectively: "What Winnicott was striving to explore was the transition from a subjective object, to a relationship in which the individual recognizes and relates to the object as an "other-than-me" entity" (Perlow 115). Here, it is also understood that "transitional object" is not an internal object in Kleinian terms but it is rather an object which is no longer a part of the individual although it still belongs to him. Winnicott considers that the infant's development is related to recognize "other-than-me". However, he does not see this period of recognition as a period to be passed through. Rather, he claimed that transitional object gives place to ever-widening range of concepts and to whole cultural life.

> He also considered cultural activity —art, religion, and so on— to be related to an intermediate area between subjective and objective reality. He emphasized that what is involved in this intermediate area is an experience of "illusion" which is not yet a symbol. Transitional phenomena constitute the "root of symbolism" (Winnicott 1953:234), without achieving the level of symbolism proper. Whereas symbolism implies the capacity to distinguish "between fact and phantasy, between inner objects and external objects, between primary creativity and perception" (ibid.: 233), transitional phenomena constitute the beginning of the development of this capacity. (Perlow 114)

According to Winnicott, play is the key term in analyzing how the intermediate area between subjective and objective reality is related to cultural activity. To be able to grasp this relation, Winnicott's views on the idea of play should be examined. According to Winnicott, the intermediate area where the child plays cannot be easily left and cannot accept intrusions from the external world. He sees a "direct development from transitional phenomena to playing, from playing to shared playing, and from this to cultural experiences" (Winnicott *Playing and Reality* 69).

Play is an expression in terms of external materials of inner relationships and anxieties as well as being a creative activity in regard to actual objects and the trusted good-enough object (Winnicott "Notes on Play" 60). Winnicott argues that the child or adult is free to be creative only in playing. Playing and cultural

experience can be located in the potential space between inner reality and external reality. The potential space originally lies between the mother and the infant. The healthy relation between the mother and the infant results in the formation of "true self". For Winnicott, play involves the capacity to experience self as subject. However, the individuals who have true selves need not necessarily be creative or the individuals who are creative do not always have true selves; they may become creative during their search for their true selves: "In a search for the self, the person concerned may have produced something valuable in terms of art, but a successful artist may be universally acclaimed, and yet failed to find the self he or she is looking for" (Winnicott *Playing and Reality* 73).

Winnicott sees the origin of creativity in the formation of selfhood and in the idea of playing. Creativity is "the doing that arises out of being. It indicates he, who is, is alive. Impulse may be at rest , but when the word 'doing' becomes appropriate, then already there is creativity" ("Living Creatively" 39). Since creativity is a consequence of being and feeling alive, it is universal. Besides, these features bring the necessity to evaluate creativity in terms of how the individual responds to external reality. The formation of creativity in a healthy individual is related to three lives of the individual: the life in the world with interpersonal relations, the life of the personal psychical reality, and the area of cultural experience. Winnicott considers the cultural area as the most important bonus which health brings among these three lives.

Cultural experience starts as play and leads on to the whole area that includes art. After mentioning that there is a close relation between playing and the idea of phantasy and dream, Winnicott poses the question "if play is neither inside nor outside, where is it?" ("The Location of Cultural Experience" 129). He claims that an infant's use of transitional object is the child's first use of a symbol or the first experience of play. Like in his argument on playing, he places cultural experience in the potential space as well; but, the characteristics of this space change from individual to individual according to the quality of his relation to the external reality. For Winnicott, the intermediate area has to do with living

experience which is neither dream nor object-relating; rather, it is both at the same time:

> Art provides a lifelong refuge to which we can turn as we negotiate our precarious oscillations between illusion and reality. Art, like play, must be situated in both a temporal and a spatial dimension, as Winnicott does with his concepts of transitional objects and potential space. (Rudnytsky xiii)

When the whole of Winnicott's theory is reviewed, it is seen that the main question Winnicott poses is "what life is about". Starting from the formation of self to the location of cultural experience, he focuses on some basic concepts such as "transitional object", "potential space", "true self", and "false self". First, he discusses the position of the infant in the transition period from illusionary omnipotence to the understanding of the presence of others around him. A good maternal care is necessary in this period so that the infant can develop a "true self". The intermediate area where the infant places himself between inner reality and outer world is called the "potential space". It is important to note that "potential space" does not disappear when the infant grows up. Rather, the playing and cultural activity take their place in this potential space.

CHAPTER II

Two Autobiographies:

The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas and *Everybody's Autobiography*

Gertrude Stein's first autobiographical work, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, was excerpted in *Atlantic Monthly* and then published by Harcourt Brace in September in 1932 (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 835). It immediately became a bestseller and opened the path for Gertrude Stein to become a celebrity. However, becoming a celebrity and earning a substantial amount of money both depressed her. In her essay "What Are Master-pieces and Why Are So Few of Them" she mentions how dull and lifeless expository writing is and that such works are never master-pieces:

> Any of you when you write you try to remember what you are about to write and you will see immediately how lifeless the writing becomes that is why expository writing is so dull because it is all remembered, that is why illustration is so dull because you remember what somebody looked like and you make your illustration look like it. The minute your memory functions while you are doing anything it may be very popular but actually it is dull. And that is what a master-piece is not, it may be unwelcome but it is never dull. (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 359)

Keeping the above words in mind and remembering that Gertrude Stein struggles for creating master-pieces in her former works, the question "what motivated Gertrude Stein to write an —indeed, two autobiographies with *Everybody's Autobiography*— autobiography" comes into mind. When it is thought that *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is defined as mere "chit-chat" or gossip by some Stein critics such as B.L.Reid and neglected or rejected by some others (Breslin 149), the above question gains more importance and becomes increasingly interesting. It should be noted here that the two autobiographies, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and *Everybody's Autobiography*, are not works where Stein merely submits to the conventions of autobiography as a genre but these are the works where she struggles with them in a creative way.

In this chapter, which consists of three parts, Gertrude Stein's creative struggle with the conventions of autobiography will be discussed by examining her two autobiographical works. First, the definition and conventions of autobiography will be given. In the second and third parts, how the author tells her life story and how she struggles not only with the conventions of the genre but also fulfilling self-realization and reaching her "true self" will be analyzed. Meanwhile, how Gertrude Stein presents significant events in her life and how these events affect her writing process as well as self-formation will be examined from the perspective of object relations theory within psychoanalysis.

2.1. The Problematics of Autobiography

In Greek, autos signifies "self," bios "life," and graphe "writing" (Smith 1). Taken together in this order, these words mean "self life writing", which can be considered as the brief definition of autobiography. Autobiography has been recognized as a literary genre since the eighteenth century and it has been an important ground for discussions on autorship, selfhood, subjectivity, memory, and the division between fact and reality (Anderson 1-2).

The main problematic in autobiography is that the concept of the author is hard to define in this genre. The author, the narrator, and the protagonist are all the same person. Linda Anderson expresses this condition by taking a quotation from Philippe Lejeune: "According to Lejeune, the author of an autobiography implicitly declares that he is the person he says he is and that the author and the protagonist are the same (Lejeune 1982: 202); but have we necessarily believed all subjects in the same way?" (Anderson 3). Another significant question raised within this context is "Is it possible for the author to represent his/her self?" and "How reliable is the author's representation of his/her life story?". Here, the author is both the observing subject and the observed object; therefore, it is not possible to make a clear-cut distinction. The author sees himself/ herself from both inside and outside. In a way, autobiographical works can be considered as

those where external and internal reality intersect. In this sense, self is described as some kind of internalized object, in Kleinian terms, by the author.

Another significant problematic in autobiography is related to memory and experience. In autobiographical narratives, the author presents the events in her life as the real or true ones; but, the fact that the events presented by the author are absolutely real or true ones is questionable because all this process is indeed based on the act of remembering. The author of autobiography tries to persuade the reader that his/her version of the story is true. However, it is not easy to claim that the truth presented by the author to the readers is the absolute one: "What is the truth status of autobiographical disclosure? How do we know whether and when a narrator is telling the truth or lying? And what difference would that difference make? These questions often perplex readers of autobiographical texts" (Smith 12).

When the idea that the act of writing autobiography is closely related to the act of remembering considered, two important concepts come to the scene: memory and experience. Remembrance is based on memory and the author of autobiographical work claims that he/she provides an access to his/her memory. In autobiographical works, the author tells a narrative of the past and situates himself/herself in the present with regard to the experiential history he/she is telling. In this sense, "[m]emory is thus both source and authenticator of autobiographical acts" (Smith 16). Memory stimulated while writing autobiography is not only related to the remembrance of past events but to the time of writing and to the context of telling as well. Thus, memory cannot be evaluated as an isolatable fact and thus autobiographical works should be examined in the intersection of past events and present conditions.

Experience, which the person obtains through his/her past, and the experiential realm where he/she situates himself/herself at the present are very significant while reading autobiographical works. Sidonie Smith defines experience as "the very process through which a person becomes a certain kind of

subject owning certain identities in the social realm, identities constituted through material, cultural, economic, and interpsychic relations" (25). Based on this definition, it will not be wrong to say that the personal experiences of the author are also closely related to the formation of subjectivity and that the author is the sole authority to decide on the truth of his/her experiences and to what degree he/she will present them to the reader. It is important at this point to see that the formation of subjectivity —in the way, the reader sees in autobiographical works — depends on how the author presents her past experiences and how he/she places them within the present. When the relativity of the whole process is considered, it is seen how hard it is to accept the autobiographical narratives as absolutely true.

Despite the above mentioned problematic points, the readers of traditional autobiography tend to read such works as mere truth. It is a general tendency or wish to think that human beings are the agents of their own lives; however, it is seen that this is not always the case when the factors of autorship, memory, experience, and the formation of subjectivity as well as identity are taken into consideration. Since it is not possible to make an exact measurement of what truth is on any narrative, these problems seem to continue. While some authors of autobiography act as if these points did not exist, some tend to question and struggle with these problems in their works.

2.2.*The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*

The 1930s were very successful years for Gertrude Stein as an author and it was also these years when she became a celebrity. Three of her works were published between 1930 and 1934, *How To Write* by Plain Edition in 1932, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* —which was excerpted in Atlantic Monthly— by Harcourt Brace in 1933, and *The Making of Americans* in an abridged French translation edited by the author herself and Bernard Faÿ (Stein, Writings 1932-1946 834). Among these works, it was *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* that received great public reception. It is by the publication of this work that Gertrude

Stein gained reputation and earned significant amount of money. However, the most notable point about *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is that it shows a turn in Stein's literary career. Such a turn can be seen as the author's way to situate herself in literary circles so that she could continue earning money, but it should also be noted that Stein did not intend for her work to be only moneymaker. In *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, the author questions the norms of conventional autobiography while seeming to write a traditional one.

The most widely recognition of the work by the public is indeed related to the fact that the reader evaluates *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* as a traditional example of the genre. Linda Wagner-Martin suggests that the ordinary reader has read the book for its gossip, while relating the success of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* to its recreation of the author's friends and their times: "Although other writers were fascinated with Stein's ability to achieve a sense of unstudied voice and bemused by the flamboyance of her narrative experiment, the reading public read the book for its gossip" (201). It is of course impossible to interpret *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* as a mere "chit-chat" or gossip and it is necessary to examine the work by considering Stein's deeper concerns during her writing process. The discussion will be focused on how Stein's voice changes in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and how Stein problematizes selfhood and identity during her writing in this part.

Stein's former works before *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* are mostly neglected by the public; the author did not even have chance to get them published by major publishing companies. *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* was the first work that got great reception and that was published by a publishing company other than the Plain Edition —which was established by Alice B. Toklas. In this sense, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* can be considered as the first work of Stein that has commercial value. Due to the wide recognition and the commercial value of the work, Stein considers that *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*' becoming a best seller is the beginning of her success. However, this situation makes the author both depressed and happy at the same time. Things

begin to change and a lot of things seem to be out of her control: "After the Autobiography was printed different people were interested to see me and I found different ones of them interesting. Of course once you have written everything about anything it is out of your system and you do not have to see them again" (Stein, *Everybody's Autobiography* 91). Her literary and commercial achievement make her happy, on the one hand, and the fact that she cannot control her social life worries her on the other.

Gertrude Stein mainly received two sorts of criticism during her life time on *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas.* Some critics saw the autobiography as a great literary achievement and some others considered the work as deviating from Stein's literary style and written just for commercial concerns. In his article "A Rose is a Rose", Bernard Faÿ expresses how *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* proves Stein is not a prisoner of her "queer" technique:

> During many years she wrote books of great daring and value that seemed mysterious to a large part of the public; people spoke of her as a witch. And generally one had the idea that she was the prisoner of her queer technique, that it had destroyed in her all other possibilities. The Autobiography proves, on the contrary, that she was never abler to write a more fresh, pure, and acute English than she is now. It seems as if all her work, all her experiments and trials had stirred up in her a more precise appreciation of all the qualities of all the possibilities of the English language. (62-63)

Similar to Faÿ's approach, Louis Bromfield considers *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* as a work where Stein struggles with words and where she creates actuality through this struggle in his essay "Gertrude Stein, Experimenter with Words"[6] (Curnutt 65). While Faÿ and Bromfield focus on Stein's use of English language and her experimentation with words, there are such critics as William Troy[7] who reads *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* as a conventional example of autobiography:

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[6] Originally published in *The Saturday Review of Literature* on September 2, 1933.
[7] Originally published in *The New York Herald-Tribune Books* on September 3, 1933.

> It must be recognized, first of all, that Miss Stein's new work is the most "comprehensible" and therefore, in a sense, the least characteristic work of hers that has appeared. The reason for this is twofold: it is presumably not her book at all, but the autobiography of her secretary-companion, Miss Toklas; and its subject matter is of a traditional kind. (66-67)

Here, William Troy shows a similar approach to that of ordinary reader. Although Gertrude Stein mentions clearly that she is the author of the autobiography, Troy doubts that some parts of the book may have been written by Alice B. Toklas. In this respect, it can be said that Troy does not realize the challenge of Stein against the conventional use of the personal pronoun "I" in the work. Another critic Ulla E. Dydo situates the use of the third person instead of first person in a different context. He sees "the context of the making of the Autobiography in the growing need for success and fame, which the Plain Edition and the great labor of Toklas had not succeeded in satisfying" (535). He considers that the book is an offering to Toklas "with credit for its fame and success going to Toklas, not Stein" (536). It is worth noting that Dydo also mentions Gertrude Stein's writing *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* in the third person is made out of the need to find her own voice in this kind of writing which is indeed new for her.

While the critics at Stein's time generally focused on the reason why the author had written such an autobiography and whether it was beyond being gossip about the modernist circle in Paris, contemporary critics question how Gertrude Stein challenges the rules of traditional autobiography. Within this context, they examine the problematic points of autobiography such as autorship, selfhood, subjectivity, memory, and the division between fact and reality. For instance, in her work *Reading Gertrude Stein*, Lisa Ruddick focuses on the moments of self-discovery and integration in Stein's psychic life (10-11). There, she raises the question about how it will become possible to follow the traces of the formation of a cohesive self while Gertrude Stein is continuously experimenting with a textuality that challenges all conventional forms of literature. She claims that "her experimental practice shatters the unitary "person" through polysemy, mobility, everything that comes under the term jouissance" (11). From this perspective, *The*

Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas can be interpreted as the author's first attempt to present a cohesive self to her readers.

Another critic, George B. Moore, examines *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* in relation to her earlier work, especially *The Making of Americans* by mentioning the autobiographical characteristic of the work. In this context, he mentions that *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* deals with the problems of human identity by focusing on sameness and difference among human characters:

> It is perhaps no surprise that the sudden interest in Gertrude Stein generated by *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* in 1934 inspired a renewal for her first and career-long concerns with the problems of human identity. For Stein, language was always a medium only in its connection to human activity. In following the movements of her thinking through manifestations of different styles in the works, it is important to realize the consistent re-emergence of these notions of identity and human difference. (197-98)

2.2.1.The Use of the Third Person in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*

The use of personal pronouns in autobiographical texts is closely related to the pact between the author and the reader, the author's use of his/her voice in the text, and from which perspective he/she presents events. These are important elements that help the author establish his/her identity in the text. Lejeune mentions that the reading contract will define the genre and establish the relations of identity "which direct our unraveling both of the personal pronouns and of the enunciation" (28). In autobiography, the fact that the author, the narrator, and the character are the same person and that the knowledge given by the author or the narrator is true raise the question how one can be sure that the knowledge claimed to be true is actually so. At this point, it should be noted that it is impossible for one to write an autobiography without constructing a point of view towards oneself. Here, the position of the self that tells about itself forms the main problematic.

The person may speak about her/himself as if another person is speaking about him/her. This use of the the third person is more complicated than the naïve use of the first person. At first glance, it seems that another person rather than the author himself/herself is more reliable; however, it should not be forgotten that this other person who is speaking is indeed the author. While the use of the first person conceals the gap between the author and the narrator, the third person autobiographies remove the indirect existence of the third person in the first person texts and admits the presence of this indirect existence.

> The first person, then, always conceals a hidden third person, and in this sense every autobiography is by definition indirect. But in the third-person autobiographies . . ., this indirectness is admitted, is boldly proclaimed. The procedure is felt to be artificial because it destroys that illusory effect of the first person which makes us take the indirect for the direct. And also because explicitation of the third person leads to the eclipsing of the real narrator, who now becomes implicit or is replaced by a figurative or even a fictive narrator. (Lejeune 32)

Lejeune proposes that "as if" used in this strategy and the destruction of "the illusory effect of the first person" in autobiographical texts are still subject to the pact between the author and the reader and that it concerns only the enunciation: "[T]he statement is still subject to the strict and distinct rules of the autobiographical contract" (29). Therefore, the reader knows the rules of such a procedure and takes the indirect for the direct.

Another strategy used in different presentations of personal pronouns is the fictive witness. This strategy requires the construction of a witness character and the invention of a perspective for that character. The author thinks how another person will tell his/her life and presents another perspective on himself/herself. Here, it is again the author who tells the whole story. However, the construction of fictive witness gives the author the chance to limit the field of vision and not to be obliged to talk of what another does not see. Lejeune considers *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* as the canonical example for the fictive witness in autobiography (42). In this work, Gertrude Stein imagines how a close friend may tell her life story and writes her autobiography as if this close

friend —in this case Alice B. Toklas— is the author of the work. Despite the humorous and playful character of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, Gertrude Stein remains faithful to the autobiographical pact between herself and the readers and admits that she is the author of the autobiography on the last page of her work:

> About six weeks ago Gertrude Stein said, it does not look to me as if you were going to write that autobiography. You know what I am going to. I am going to write it for you. I am going to write it as simply as Defoe did the autobiography of Robinson Crusoe. And she has and this is it. (342)

While Lejeune sees Stein's tactic as a double game, which has a novelistic aspect and the construction of "fictive witness", Sidonie Smith evaluates the position of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* as "a more extreme case of the issue of who claims the authority to tell the story of a loved one". She questions whether the work is an act of ventriloquism of Alice B. Toklas' voice or a presentation of a shared subjectivity or it provides the presentation of Stein's life to the degree she wishes through the voice of Alice B. Toklas but under her absolute authorial authority:

> The case of Gertrude Stein's *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* offers a more extreme case of the issue of who claims the authority to tell the story of a loved one. In The Autobiography, Stein writes in the voice of her lifelong lover and friend Alice, but primarily in celebration of the brilliance and accomplishments of Stein and their expatriate circle in Paris of the 1920s and '30s. Some critics have suggested that this might be a fraudulent act, an act of ventriloquism of Alice's voice. Is it parasitic, an act of appropriation of Alice's experience? Or is it an act of dedicated speaking through the other that commingles the boundaries of identity into a shared subject? For Stein, whose response to publishers' requests for her autobiography was "not possibly," writing "that autobiography" in which "I" and "you," "eye" and "other" become indistinguishable, authorizes a subject that is irreducible to either "Gertrude" or "Alice." (31)

On the other hand, Cynthia Merrill claims that *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is both the autobiography of Alice B. Toklas and that of Gertrude Stein in her article "Mirrored Image: Gertrude Stein and Autobiography" (11). She sees the work as one where complexity is born out of simplicity and where Stein

makes mockery of the genre. By using the fictive witness as a tactic and by blurring the distinction related to whether the work is the autobiography of Alice B. Toklas or that of her own, she leads the reader to face the identity problem in autobiography.

In *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, Stein explores the mechanisms of voice —through a playful use of the point of view— and narrative time. The book subjects daily life to a linear narrative of meetings, gatherings, gossip, and renewals in Paris salon, Rue de Fleurus 27. When telling about daily life, Gertrude Stein does not give all the details in her life. Through the voice of Alice B. Toklas, she tells about her life to a degree she wishes to be known. At the beginning of the book, Alice B. Toklas is presented as the author: "Before I decided to write this book my twenty-five years with Gertrude Stein, I had often said that I would write, The wives of geniuses I have sat with" (18). Gertrude Stein gives all the information, which she wishes to give, about her life as if it were the interpretation of Alice B. Toklas. This seems to enhance the reliability of the information in the work. Stein continues her playful use of authorial confusion even on the last pages of her book: "For some time now many people, and publishers, have been asking Gertrude Stein to write her autobiography and she had always replied, not possibly" (341).

The seemingly interpretations of Alice B. Toklas reflect what Stein thinks about her identity, her writing and her life in general. It is significant that she continuously emphasizes her being American although she lived in Paris quite a long time. The expression "I did not realise then how completely and entirely american was Gertrude Stein" (20) is indeed an invitation to the reader to realize the American character of Gertrude Stein. Her consistent emphasis on the fact that her métier is writing and her language is English through the voice of Alice B. Toklas can be interpreted as related her insistence that she is the only one in English literature in her time (103). Bob Perelman draws attention to the point that Stein's writing reflects the unique relation between her and Alice B. Toklas:

> Stein's writing insists on and is based in part on the uniqueness that her relationship with Toklas created and reaffirmed, a difference that was both sexual and creative: Toklas was the first to recognize her genius. But while Toklas was one culminating expression of their private union, it was also the vehicle with which she succeeded in reaching and conquering the public. . . (146)

It is considerable that Gertrude Stein's interpretations of herself in a third person autobiography show how she forms her self and identity. It is also through Alice B. Toklas' perspective that Stein celebrates but also objectifies, publicizes and alienates herself in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. The use of authorial confusion in the work reveals such problems as self and other, internal and external, and autobiographical identity.

Gertrude Stein's exploration and creative use of narrative time is also crucial in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. She is aware of the problems related to memory, thus remembering and she says it is hard to remember what happened in the past exactly: “We were, in these days as I look back at them, constantly seeing people. It is a confused memory those first years after the war and very difficult to think back and remember what happened before or after something else” (262). Gertrude Stein's awareness about the problematic nature of memory ends in her play with past, present, and future. Bob Perelman's explanation of this play by referring to the last line of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* can be read as a summary of Gertrude Stein's use of perspective and narrative time in the work:

> [T]he space of literature that Stein maps out is still complex: the book ends with the narrator revealing herself to be Stein writing as Toklas in the same way as Defoe wrote as Crusoe: [. . .] This says it is simple, and its surface can give that impression, especially at the end: “And she has and this is it.” However, the handling of time here creates a mysterious world. There is the past, “about six weeks ago”; there is the future that Stein spoke of then, “I am going to write it”; there is the more immediate past, “and she has”; and finally, an assertion of the present, “and this is it.” (146-47)

2.2.2.The Problematization of Identity in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*

One of the most significant differences of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* from the earlier works of Gertrude Stein is that the author needs to find a voice through which she can tell the events in her life. Although it seems that Alice B. Toklas is the author and the narrator of the work, it is Stein's voice that the reader hears from the beginning. In *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, Stein tells about the events in Paris, which affected her to a significant degree. The book seems to tell merely the events in Stein's life on the surface but, at a deeper analysis, it can easily be seen that Stein gives important clues about her formation of self and identity throughout the work. However, it becomes difficult for the reader to follow these clues when it is thought that the identity a person presents is not identical to the person who presents it: "Whatever particular role or identity is assumed by a person, this identity is never identical to the person who has assumed it" (Atwood and Stolorow 24).

In *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, Gertrude Stein tells the past events whereas she talks about present in *Everybody's Autobiography*. While talking about past events can be thought as some kind of a discovery and as clarification of the past experience, such an action is significant in terms of "the development of symbolic experience that leads to the development of a new psychological entity, the person as subject" according to the Kleinian approach (Newirth 41). Another psychoanalyst, D. W. Winnicott, establishes two person theory in which the person experiences the world as both a subject and an object. When this is evaluated in terms of object relations theory, that the person does not experience the world only as a subject where he/she interacts with actual others is seen. According to Greenberg and Mitchell, "people react to and interact with not only an actual other but also an internal other, a psychic representation of a person which in itself has the power to influence both the individual's affective states and his overt behavioral reactions" (10). Examined within this framework, it will not be misleading to argue that *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* reflects

Gertrude Stein's interaction with internal other as well as her relations with the people around her in Paris.

The use of Alice B. Toklas' voice in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is a cunning strategy for Gertrude Stein since she gets the chance to reflect only the events she wishes to tell. In this sense, the work is some kind of transitional space in Winnicottian terms. Writing is a sort of transitional object for the author to create a potential space where the experience between self and other is realized. Here, Gertrude Stein presents her relation with others as a relation between the writing/creating subject and others who begin to realize her creativity at a considerably late time. It is worth noting at this point that the author does not use a circular time where there are flashbacks; rather, she tells the events in a linear time. On the one hand, she relates the creativity with existence; on the other hand, she denies the existence of time and identity. This is one of the significant moments when she makes temporality and identity most problematic for the reader: "And do you create yes if you exist but time and identity do not exist. We live in time and identity but as we are we do not know time and identity everybody knows that quite simply" (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 356).

In the linear time Gertrude Stein prefers using her relations with significant others such figures as Matisse, Picasso, Picabia, just to mention a few This kind of narration seems to be a simple telling of events of a certain period. While the use of linear time in the work simplifies it for the reader, it raises the question whether it is possible to exist without time and identity. Starting from this point, it can be argued that Gertrude Stein reflects the problems in her formation of her self and identity as an author by proposing that "[w]e live in time and identity but as we are we do not know time and identity everybody knows that quite simply" (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 356). Throughout *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, Gertrude Stein presents herself as a person deeply involved in the process of writing and in the matter of internal and external. Her insistence on her claim that she is a genius gives the impression that she can overcome all the problematics which are caused by the process of writing and the matter of internal

and external. However, it is seen that the questions related to these matters remain unanswered in the work[8].

Gertrude Stein gives considerable space to the planning and writing her magnum opus, *The Making of Americans*, in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. The planning and writing of this work starts one of the most important struggles in Gertrude Stein's life: the struggle for sentences. In *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, she mentions that not only words but sentences have always been her life long passion (55). Her struggle with sentences —as well as her insistence on being a genius— seems to penetrate all daily activities of the author:

> During these long poses and these long walks Gertrude Stein meditated and made sentences. She was then in the middle of her negro story Melanctha Herbert, the second story of Three Lives and the poignant incidents that she wove into the life of Melanchta were often these she noticed in walking down the hill from the rue Ravignan. (66)

Despite her long meditations on sentences, Gertrude Stein does not give any exact answer about what a sentence is. In her work *How To Write* where she spares considerable space to her views on sentences, she mentions how miserable she is about sentences (30) and that she has not formulated what a sentence is yet: "What is a sentence. I have not decided if a sentence is better or is more or is best or is only most most and best" (149). Interestingly, Gertrude Stein sees her struggle with sentences also as a struggle for passing from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. She finds a parallelism between Pablo Picasso's passing from Harlequin to the period which ends in cubism and her writing *Three Lives*, her first published work, which she considers as the first definite step from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century (*The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* 72). The struggle with sentences and the endless experimentation with words are parts of being a genius for Gertrude Stein. In her opinion, the struggle, even fight, within oneself is necessary for innovation and progress. Her dialogue with Henri

[8] Gertrude Stein's other works such as *How To Write*, lectures, *A Novel of Thank You*, and *The Making of Americans* also deal with these problematics. In this sense, it will not be wrong to claim these are life long problematics for Gertrude Stein.

Matisse about his becoming famous and being followed by many people reflects this opinion strikingly: “Matisse intimated that Gertrude Stein had lost interest in his work. She answered him, there is nothing within you that fights itself and hitherto you have had the instinct to produce antagonism in others which stimulated you to attack. But now they follow”(88).

Gertrude Stein believes in the importance of métier: “She is passionately addicted to what the french call métier and she contends that one can only have one métier as one can only have one language. Her métier is writing and her language is english” (103). At this point, it is interesting that an author who lives in Paris for a quite long time claims that her language is only English.

> But do you never read french, I as well as many other people asked her. No, she replied, you see I feel with my eyes and it does not make any difference to me what language I hear, I don't hear a language, I hear tones of voice and rhythms, but with my eyes I see words and sentences and there is for me only one language and that is english. (94)

Another very important point in Stein’s literary career is that she saw English as her only medium. She focuses on the materiality of language rather than meaning and she tries to go beyond the conventional norms of grammaticality. She uses simple vocabulary rather than complex word structures, focuses on normal instead of abnormal; and surprisingly, creates the complexity of her texts out of these strategies: “Though she was personally literate, her language is kept intentionally unliterary and unconnotative. Her diction is mundane, though her sentence structure is not, for it was her particular achievement to build a complex style out of purposely limited vocabulary” (Kostelanetz xiv).

Although Gertrude Stein wrote about her ideas about writing in her earlier works, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is the first work where she mentions she was the only one in English literature in her time. The expression “she has always known it and now she says it” (103) can be evaluated as a start for her to announce that she is a genius and that she is unique. Bob Perelman proposes that

the “I” embodies the problematics of Stein’s career: “her seemingly endless output was not selfless meditation: she insisted on its value as masterpiece and her own value as genius (130). Stein’s words in her essay “What are Masterpieces and Why are So Few of Them” seem to support Perelman’s emphasis on Stein’s insistence on her value as a genius: “. . . I have said the essence of being a genius is to be able to talk and listen to listen while talking and talk while listening but and this is very important very important indeed talking has nothing to do with creation” (355). Here, talking and listening can be thought as means to express one’s own experience and to grasp other’s experiences at the same time. Marion Milner argues that the scientist and the artist are more aware than the average man of the gap between what is experienced, what is talked about, and what others experience:

> I suggested that both the artist and the scientist are more acutely aware than the “average” man of the inadequacies of what Caudwell calls “the common ego”, the commonly accepted body of knowledge and ways of thinking about and experiencing experience, more sensitive to the gap between what can be talked about and the actuality of the experience. (Rudnytsky 37)

Gertrude Stein’s awareness of the gap between the actuality of the experience and talking about this experience is one of the most significant factors that affect her relationship with others. Stein’s relation with Leo Stein and Pablo Picasso —two important figures in her life— is shaped by this awareness to a degree. While Stein and her brother have had some kind of symbiotic relation since their childhood, their perspectives toward life and their experience change in time. Leo Stein acts as if he were the one who is intellectually superior and gifted. On the other hand, Gertrude Stein begins to realize her potential as a genius and starts sharing less with her brother. In this period, Leo Stein is “the commonly accepted body of knowledge and ways of thinking about and experiencing experience”:

> That evening Gertrude Stein's brother took out portfolio after portfolio of japanese prints to show Picasso, Gertrude Stein's brother was fond of japanese prints. Picasso solemnly and obediently look at print after print

> and listened to the descriptions. He said under his breath to Gertrude Stein, he is very nice, your brother, but like all americans, like Haviland, he shows you japanese prints Moi j'aime pas ça, no I don't care for it. As I say Gertrude Stein and Pablo Picasso immediately understood each other. (61)

In the above quotation, Leo Stein's being similar to other Americans and having no authenticity is what attracts Pablo Picasso's —whom Gertrude Stein defines as a genius— attention. Leo Stein's experience is a common one and can be easily talked about. In this case, there is no gap between what is experienced and what is talked about. On the other hand, Picasso's words "moi j'aime pas ça, no I don't care for it" show his distance from this ordinariness. The immediate understanding between Picasso and Stein can be interpreted as a shared experience between two geniuses and as a result of their awareness between the common and unique experience.

Stein's growing distance from her brother is an important part of her differentiation and self development process. Subjectivity can be conceptualized "as a function of an inevitable, dialectic struggle for power over and recognition by the other" (Newirth 219). The silence and lessening share of experience between Stein and her brother results from Stein's need for power and struggle for recognition. It is natural at this point that her brother, whom she is most dependent on, is the person by whom she wants to be recognized. Jessica Benjamin "sees the individual's need for recognition as the most vulnerable aspect of the differentiation and development, involving the paradoxical need for acknowledment of independence from those whom the individual is most dependent on" (Newirth 219).

Gertrude Stein's interest in the characters and experiences of people results in a gradual change in her style. She becomes more and more interested in the insides of people and tries to define what is inside and what is outside, in other terms, what is internal and what is external: "She always was, she always is, tormented by the problem of the external and the internal" (161). In *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, Gertrude Stein gives how she approaches to

external and internal reality and the effect of this approach on her writing as following:

> Gertrude Stein, in her work, has always been possessed by the intellectual passion for exactitude in the description of inner and outer reality. She has produced a simplification by this concentration, and as a result the destruction of associational emotion in poetry and prose. She knows that beauty, music, decoration, the result of emotion should never be the cause, even events should not be the cause of emotion nor should they be material of poetry or prose. Nor should emotion itself be the cause of poetry or prose. They should consist of an exact reproduction of either an outer or an inner reality. (286)

Inner and outer reality or internal and external should not be taken in a reductive way here. How these are perceived is closely related to how the person internalizes objects and how he/she creates meanings and symbols:

> [The] intersubjective sequence of projective identification, enactment, reverie, symbolization, interpretation, and internalization allows the patient to integrate disowned aspects of the self and to become fully alive —in contact with a generative unconscious in which personal meanings are created and symbolized. (Newirth xv)

According to Winnicott, the intersubjective sequence of projective identification, enactment, reverie, symbolization, interpretation, and internalization is never fully completed (*Playing and Reality* 18). He mentions that no human being is free from the problem of inner and outer reality and relief from this problem can be found in an intermediate area, which is also called potential space. Literature is one of these potential spaces and the aesthetic frame in a work of literature constitutes "the subject's manner of holding and transforming internal and external realities. In literature, the aesthetic frame is the poetic of the text; in life, it is the aesthetic of being" (Rudnytsky 48). When the aesthetic frame is taken to be the aesthetic of being, the text and how the author deals with internal and external in the text become part of the author's formation of her self. However, this is not a process that only concerns the author. He needs recognition by others in this process. Gertrude Stein's hopelessness that pervades her life from time to time is a result of her need for recognition: "Gertrude Stein

was in those days a little bitter, all her unpublished manuscripts, and no hope of publication or serious recognition" (267). Since each unpublished manuscript is a sign of lessening hope for recognition, her hope for the recognition of her self and identity gradually decreases. In the light of these views, the underlying motive behind writing *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* can be said to be Stein's need for recognition since such a recognition will not only be the approval of her work but the acceptance of her self as well. In this respect, the work is not simply where Stein tells her life but it is a work where she problematizes her formation of self as a genius and her getting recognition from others.

2.3. Everybody's Autobiography

Everybody's Autobiography (1937) is Gertrude Stein's second autobiography where she responds to the demand of public for the meaning of her earlier works. While Stein tells what happens in her previous autobiography, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, she talked about what happened then in this second autobiography. Meyerowitz, who writes an introduction to *How To Writ*e, defines *Everybody's Autobiography* as "a combination of writing as a description of thinking that was done before the writing and of the thinking and writing that went together as it was being written. (*How To Write* x). Differing from the first autobiography, Gertrude Stein questioned her being celebrity and the concepts of identity, recognition, genius, inside and outside in this work.

Everybody's Autobiography starts with the sentence "Alice B. Toklas did hers and now everybody will do theirs" (3). On later pages, she mentions that autobiography is easy for any one and this work will be everybody's autobiography. The collective words "everybody" or "we" which she uses for herself and Alice B. Toklas make the second autobiography more general and inclusive than the first one and show the validity of the concepts discussed in the work. Gertrude Stein first questions her becoming a celebrity after the publication of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. Although she likes being a celebrity, she is still critical towards this change:

> Harcourt was very surprised when I said to him on first meeting him in New York remember this extraordinary welcome does not come from the books of mine that they do understand like The Autobiography but the books of mine that they did not understand and he called his partner and said listen to what she says and perhaps after all she is right. (8)

Gertrude Stein's critical stance towards her reception in the United States results from her belief that her writing is indeed not understood by the public: "It always did bother me that American public were more interested in me than in my work" (8). She has no doubt that writing is what belongs to her and that she is the most important writer in the twentieth century. At this point, it will be useful to review Stein's past experiences and her career as a writer and to discuss the effect of her nonrecognition on her for a quite long time.

One of the most significant figures in Stein's life is her brother, Leo. They spend most of the time together and Leo has been the dominant figure since the beginning. Their mother's death at an early age strengthens the bond between them. This is such a close relationship that it will not be wrong to define it as some kind of symbiosis. Gertrude Stein describes the period she spends with her brother as one when she is silent and sitting around silent and doing nothing. However, this should not be interpreted as her complete submission to Leo's paternalistic authority. Her silence is indeed a meditation period when she develops her writing and her idea that she is a genius. This period is very critical in terms of Gertrude Stein's differentiation process from her brother and her formation of selfhood and identity. Stein summarizes the end of this period as follows: "At any rate by that time I was writing and arguing was no longer to me really interesting. Nothing needed defending and it did was no use defending it. Anyway that was the beginning of my writing and by that time my brother had gotten to be very hard of hearing" (73). Brenda Wineapple explains how sharp and radical this separation is as following:

> But for three decades she and Gertrude Stein lived at 27 rue de Fleurus without Leo and without, they said, any mention of him. He was persona non grata, the "one we don't see!" Gertrude Stein was given to dismissing

> things —and people. [. . .] But nothing was as complete, unremitting, or profound as her separation from a once beloved Leo. (2)

Stein's feeling power in herself to dismiss people and things, especially Leo,is the result of the completion of her separation and individuation process. In this separation and individuation process, Stein defines herself with her writing and writing becomes a potential space for her. She claims her stake on writing which is an action that takes place of transitional objects:

> Things belong to you and writing belonged to me, there is no doubt about it writing belonged to me. I know writing belongs to me. I am quite certain and nobody no matter how certain you are about anything belonging to you if you hear that somebody says it belongs to them it gives you a funny feeling. (15)

Considering that writing belongs only to herself, she creates an area where she can be free and where she can express her creativity. This transitional experience, in Winnicottian terms, also includes the process of symbol formation. Winnicott relates the development of the capacity for transitional experience to the development of the capacity for creativity and sense of feeling alive. During symbol formation, the person develops two parallel forms of meaning: "the first representing external or objective reality reflecting the concept of discursive symbols, and the second representing subjective meanings incorporating the concept of presentational symbols" (Newirth 13). According to Winnicott, symbol formation is also a process that regularizes the subjective and intersubjective meanings and relations. Such a process is one that forms the individual's relation to the external world and that makes it possible to experience oneself not as an extension of other but as a subject:

> In describing this developmental process, Target and Fonagy turn the more traditional relationship between psychic and material reality on its head, suggesting that the young child initially experiences the self as an extension of the other, of the external world, as an object, and it is only the development of play in the pretend mode that the child can begin to experience the self as a subject. (Newirth 56)

In this framework, Gertrude Stein's insistence on her being a genius and "the creative literary mind of the twentieth century" (21-22) can be evaluated as her completed individuation process where her complete break up with her brother is a meaningful signifier.

In *Everybody's Autobiography,* the author discusses how *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* affected her life and "what her writing meant in relation to the world of work" (Wagner-Martin 227). There are two significant changes in Stein's life after the publication of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. One of these changes is that she enters into the world of work with this work with which she earned money for the first time. Before the publication of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, 27 Rue de Fleurus —where Gertrude Stein lived in Paris— was one of the most important salons which people visited. In this period, people came to see the author but she rarely visited them. However, she became a celebrity after *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and went out more and visited some of the people in the literary salons of Paris (32). Another reason for the changes in her social life may be claimed to be her dismissing her brother, Leo. Though invisible at a first glance, Leo had a paternalistic authority over the author's life and this made him more dominant and determining figure in social relations. However, Stein gains power to shape her relations after becoming celebrity since becoming celebrity means the recognition of her identity by other.

However, Stein who lived on her family's money up to that time became a best-seller author after the publication of *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. At the beginning, this change made her feel freer and confident. She told her excitement on earning money as following:

> Well anyway it was a beautiful autumn in Bilignin and in six weeks I wrote *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and it was published and it became a best seller and first it was printed in the Atlantic Monthly and there is a nice story about that but first I bought myself a new eight cylinder Ford car and the most expensive coat made to order by Hermes and fitted by the man who makes horse covers for race horses for Basket the white poodle and two collars studded for Basket. I had never made any money before in my life and I was most excited. (40)

However, after her first excitement, Gertrude Stein questioned the concept of money and the effects of becoming a bestseller on the reception of her work. Since her work remained unrecognized for a long time, becoming a celebrity was closely related to the recognition of her identity. This relation made the commercial value of her work closely associated with other people's acceptance and shaping of her character. This is what establishes the relation between money and identity. Because of the reflection of her identity in her work, commercial value a work gains, means the acceptance of identity as well. She describes the time when her work had no reception and thus commercial value and the present time as following:

> Yes of course it did because suddenly it was all different, what I did had a value that made people ready to pay, up to that time everything I did had a value because nobody was ready to pay. It is funny about money. And it is funny about identity. You are you because your little dog knows you, but when your public knows you and does not want to pay for you and when your public knows you and does want to pay for you, you are not the same you. (44-45)

Gertrude Stein is deeply interested in whether her writing is understood correctly or not because correct understanding of her work means the recognition of her identity correctly. This deep concern about the reception and shaping of her identity raises the question of outside and inside or external and internal: “The thing is like this, it is all the question of identity. It is all a question of the outside being outside and the inside being inside” (47).

The reception of her work is very important for Gertrude Stein since writing is a means to enter into the external world. Winnicott's idea that the origin of creativity lies in the formation of selfhood and that creativity may be evaluated according to how the person responds to external reality helps to understand the close and complex relation among writing, commercial value, and identity. One reason for the fact that the relation among these is complex and problematic for Gertrude Stein is that writing is a potential space which she shares with nobody at the beginning. Since writing is related to identity, its reception becomes

associated with how one presents oneself to others. However, there is a trap one may fall into at this point: The natural wish to be recognized may cause the formation of "false self" and this condition makes recognition the enemy of artistic creation. Gertrude Stein is aware of this fact and mentions her worry about falling into false selfhood in *Everybody's Autobiography*:

> I began to worry about identity. I had always been I because I had words that had to be written inside me and now any word I had inside could be spoken it did not need to be written. I am I because my little dog knows me. But was I I when I had no written word inside me. (64)

Gertrude Stein assumes that her real self is only present when she has words inside her to write. On the one hand, she wants to be recognized by the external world, her writing *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* is a proof of this wish. On the other hand, she worries about losing her true self in this process. She writes about this paradox in her essay "What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them":

> Identity is recognition, you know who you are because you and others remember anything about yourself but essentially you are not that when you are doing anything. I am I because my little dog knows me but, creatively speaking the little dog knowing that you are you and your recognising that he knows, that is what destroys creation. (Stein, Writings 1932-1946 355)

Identity lies in recognition but this relation is problematic because one loses one's identity in recognition at the same time. The presentation of oneself to others is always different from one's real self since there is a wish to be recognized and accepted in everyone. Gertrude Stein is aware of this condition and considers recognition equal to losing her identity: "If you see them whether it is yourself or any other one and so the identity consists in recognition and in recognising you lose identity because after all nobody looks as they look like, they do not look like that we all know that of ourselves and of anyone" (363). While Gertrude Stein considers that identity is closely related to recognition, she is prudent about such a recognition because it may result in the formation of "false self" and become the enemy of artistic creation. She also analyzes the relation

among losing identity, remembrance, and the problematics of autobiography as a genre:

> It is funny this knowing being a genius, everything is funny.
> And identity is funny being yourself is funny as you are never yourself to yourself except as you remember yourself and then of course you do not believe yourself. That is really the trouble with an autobiography you do not of course you do not really believe yourself why should you, you know so well so very well that it is not yourself, it could not be yourself because you cannot remember right and if you do remember right it does sound right and of course it does not sound right because it is not right. You are of course never yourself. Well anyway I did tell all about myself, telling about my brother was telling about myself being a genius and it was a natural thing to tell it all to Seabrook. (68-69)

Gertrude Stein's expression "identity is funny" leads one to question why she finds identity funny. This expression reveals that it is very hard to be sure of one's identity although no one seems to doubt about his/her identity. While the concept of identity is always already problematic, its relation to remembrance and autobiography complicates the problem.

The perception of one's self by the person lies in how one remembers and sees his/her self. However, it is always questionable whether one's remembrance is true since memory is unreliable. Stein's sentence "You are of course never yourself" should be interpreted within this context. False memory may result from the fact that no "true self" exists in the person or that "true self" turns into "false self" while it is being presented to the external world. The significant place of memory in autobiography leads one to examine the true presentation of identity in this genre. Gertrude Stein overcomes this dilemma by arguing that she is a genius. Although her claiming that she is a genius seems a narcissistic trait at a first glance, this attitude is an instinctive way of preserving her "true self".

Besides the concern for the preservation of her identity, her feeling that she is a genius and that she has the power to express this means leaving the "moment of illusion"and coming face to face with external reality. This transition period is very complicated in Stein's life because of her long lasting close relation

with her brother. Leo undertook the role of mother due to the early death of their mother. However, he became the dominant paternalistic figure at the same time. This close but confining relation between two siblings makes Stein's leave from the "moment of illusion" late but conclusive. The separation process ends in her complete break up from her brother. This process begins with Gertrude Stein's increasing involvement in writing. Writing as a potential space is where she has absolute authority and where she can express herself freely by her creativity. This is also the period when she develops her idea that she is a genius. She defines the development process of her idea of being genius as following: "It takes a lot of time to be a genius, you have to sit around so much doing nothing, really doing nothing" (70). The end of this separation process is the moment when Stein claims that she begins to present her "true self" and that she is a genius by overcoming her projective identification with Leo. The separation becomes inevitable because of the authority which being genius brings to her and of getting over the feeling of two-ness:

> The only thing about it was that it was I who was the genius, there was no reason for it but I was, and he was not there was a reason for it but he was not and that was the beginning of the ending and we always had been together and now we were never at all together. Little by little we never met again. (77)

Although Gertrude Stein is sure of being a genius, she still questions why it is her, not Leo, who is the genius. However, she gets over her doubts about the subject and becomes sure of the validity of her idea. This radical rupture in her relation with her brother changes the way she remembers —or restructures— her past. Unlike Leo who always tells how unhappy his childhood is, Gertrude Stein puts forward a different view: "Gradually I was writing. About an unhappy childhood well I never had an unhappy anything. What is the use of having and unhappy anything" (75). The point to be considered here is that Stein always relates being genius to the act of writing. This shows the significance of writing in the development process of her selfhood as a transitional object. However, Stein is also skeptical about this relation: "If you stop writing if you are a genius and you have stopped writing are you still one if you have stopped writing. I do wonder

about that thing" (85). Despite such a worry, she considers that being genius is related to writing in her other works.

Defining herself as a genius is not only determining in Stein's relation with her brother but the development of her writing as well. Winnicott's differentiation between the "subjective object" and the "object objectively perceived" is at work here. The "subjective object", which can be described as person's perception of an object under the impression of his/her inner reality, seems to be dominant in the period before Gertrude Stein becomes a bestseller. The formation of "true self" in the "intermediate area of experience", which is writing, parallels to the formation of Gertrude Stein as an author and a genius since this intermediate area where playing and cultural experience can also be located inthe place between internal and external reality or between the "subjective object" and the "object objectively perceived". Winnicott's view that all of creative life belongs to the "intermediate area of experience" explains the close relation between the formation of selfhood and the development of writing. Gertrude Stein explains her experimentation with external reality and why such an experimentation is no longer interesting to her:

> *The Making of Americans* is a very important thing and everybody ought to be reading at it or it, and now I am trying to do it again to say everything about everything, only then I was wanting to write a history of every individual person who ever is or was or shall be living and I was convinced it could be done as I still am but now individual anything as related to every other individual is to me no longer interesting. (99)

On the one hand, the wish to tell everything about everything and to write a history of every living being can be seen as a motive to write a detailed history; on the other hand, what Stein does in *The Making of Americans* can be analyzed in terms of how she evaluates external reality in the "intermediate area of experience". This is not only related to Gertrude Stein's relation to external reality; it is rather related to the general matter of inside and outside or internal and external. Stein's such an effort is an extension of her own experience of coming face to face with external reality. After her complete break up with her brother and her becoming a celebrity, Gertrude Stein does not give up observing

and experimenting. What is interesting for her is that what remains unrecognized for a long time is now recognizable with no precondition. In addition to her works which can be understood easily by the public, she writes many experimental works in this period. These experimental works such as *Stanzas in Meditation* form the point where Stein attempts to go beyond the limits of language. As an experimenter, she not only becomes a master over language but forms a new framework for understanding writing and self.

CHAPTER III

An Investigation into Self and Temporality in *The Making of Americans*

The Making of Americans, published in 1925, is Gertrude Stein's monumental work which was written and revised over nine years and remained unpublished for a further fourteen years. It can be called an epic in terms of its length, which is nine hundred and twenty five pages, and the author's intention to write the history of a family and its progress and to define what is inside every living human being. On the surface, the novel is a family saga where the author tells about certain families, the Herslands and the Dehnings. However, at a deeper analysis, the novel is seen to be an examination of the nature of being in general. The dynamics of human natures create a space for the author to describe different kinds of people and to test whether she can achieve what she intended at the beginning —to define every living being. In her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*", Stein defines the work as an experiment into being existing in everyone. Since this is Stein's first systematic work to discover human differences, she seeks the limits of language and form as well. By construction and deconstruction of beings in individuals and of their relations to each other, the author analyzes the nature of Being. Apart from the concern to define every human being in relation to each other, *The Making of Americans*, as a work of the author's early period, is the process of Stein's discovering and defining her relation to her writing. Stein's interest in human differences and in the ways to express these differences make her writing as a period of modernization itself.

Stein claims the work to be her magnum opus, which is also one of the most important works of the twentieth century. Despite such an importance given to the work by the author, *The Making of Americans* got very little criticism compared to such modernist texts as James Joyce's *Ulysses* and Marcel Proust's *A La Recherché du Temps Perdu* (In Search of Lost Time). As it is for many of her works, Gertrude Stein is the main critic on *The Making of Americans* as well. In her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*", Gertrude Stein explains that she means by the word "gradual" "the way the preparation was made

inside of her" while writing the novel (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 270). At this period, her main concern is the sameness and difference among human beings and what human nature actually is. She believed that she could achieve defining human types if she spared enough time to observe: "I began to be sure that if I could go on long enough and talk and hear and look and see and feel enough and long enough I could finally describe really describe every kind of human being that ever was or is or would be living" (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 274). The gradual writing of the novel and the constant observation of other people bring a temporal dimension to the work since observing people is observing their life span as well. Gertrude Stein is well aware of the relation between existence and temporality and uses grammatical structures in such a way that reflects this awareness. Her interest in and fascination with expressing the relation between existence and temporality result in her increased attention to the structure of English grammar. After such a determination about English grammar, she summarizes how she used —indeed, played with— the English grammar while writing *The Making of Americans* in her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*":

> In The Making of Americans I tried it in a variety of ways. And my sentences grew longer and longer, my imaginary dependent clauses were constantly being dropped out, I struggled with relations between they them and then, I began with a relation between tenses and sometimes almost seemed to do it. And I went on and on and then one day after I had written a thousand pages, this was in 1908 I just did not go on any more. (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 278)

The continuous extension of the present throughout the book serves two purposes. First, it allows the author to prolong what is existing in everything and to give a complete description of them. Second, it provides her the chance to include everything and make general claims on self and time. In her essay "Composition as Explanation", Gertrude Stein draws attention to this point while commenting on the time of composition:

> The time of the composition is the time of the composition. It has been at times a present thing it has been at times a past thing it has been at times a

> future thing it has been at times an endeavour at parts or all of these things. In my beginning it was a continuous present a beginning again and again and again and again, it was a series it was a list it was a similarity and everything different it was a distribution and an equilibration. That is all of the time some of the time of the composition. (Stein, *Writings 1903-1922* 528)

Gertrude Stein's views on the time of composition raises the question how long present can be. When the text is read in detail, it is realized that Stein's insistent use of present continuous helps her write the history of a family throughout time in which the present is connected to both past and future. Stein positions the reader and herself as the narrator in the present tense just at the beginning of the novel: "Yes; we, who are always all our lives, to ourselves grown young men and women, when we think back to them who make for us a beginning, it is always as grown old men and women or as little children that we feel them, such as them whose lives we have just been thinking" (5). What connects the people living now to the past is the former generation and the novel starts with the description of these people, who are related to the next generation as well. This gives the reader the opportunity to write a novel that includes all the times. By this way, the reader is given the chance to trace past, present, and future at the same time, which thus allows a deeper analysis of temporality in the work.

The novel's first sentences "Once an angry man dragged his father along the ground through his own orchard. 'Stop!' cried the groaning old man at last, 'Stop! I did not drag my father beyond this tree'" (3) are quite complex to interpret when the rest of the novel is considered because the reader does not know who these "angry man" and "old man" are and where this anger comes from. However, it is a very significant part since it sets the tone and authorial point of view of the novel. In her book *Reading Gertrude Stein*, Lisa Ruddick claims that this part is especially important in terms of its being the place where Gertrude Stein finds her voice which is different from the one in her earlier works. She achieves this by placing her elders in the past and positioning herself in the present: "Stein diminishes her elders in phantasy in order to make room for herself: she announces a plan to portray her parents and grandparents either in

their infancy or in their old age, reserving the strong role of "young and grown men and women" for herself and her friends" (60). From another point of view, it can be proposed that this part is not only where Stein spares a space for herself as a woman and as an author but where she starts excluding the effects of her mentor William James and her brother Leo Stein as well. In this way, she makes an impressing start and shows how assured she is in locating herself in a place where her own self and subjectivity are on the foreground. This decisiveness of the author also gives clues that this work will be an experimental text since it will be a deeper investigation into the selfhood of the author. In his book *Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans*, George B. Moore draws attention to the point that such an investigation is also the author's moving away from the social and literal conventions of the nineteenth century: "Her experience in writing was the process of modernization itself, a stripping away of the narrative conventions that preceded her to a point where every word became a new step, often in an unknown direction" (3). As understood from the close analysis of Gertrude Stein's first sentences, *The Making of Americans* is not a mere history of a family's progress but an exploration into selfhood, writing, and the conventions.

After a brief and general statement about the novel's structure, Gertrude Stein starts the history of families —the Herslands and the Dehnings— by describing the first generation. Since the first generation comes from the Old World to America, Stein puts forth at the beginning of her description how she sees the new identity, being an American, and how important Americanness is for her: "It has always seemed to me a rare privilege, this, of being an American, a real American, one whose tradition it has taken scarcely sixty years to create. We need only realise our parents, remember our grandparents and know ourselves and our history is complete" (3). Her reference to being an American and her insistence that *The Making of Americans* is an American book in her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*" may be considered as her belief in the distinct character provided by being an American: "I felt this thing, I am an American and I felt this thing, and I made a continuous effort to create this thing in every paragraph that I made in The Making of Americans. And that is why after

all this book is an American book an essentially American book . . " (Stein, *Writings 1932-1946* 286).

Following her emphasis on the significance of these shared characteristics, she starts describing the individual natures of every individual. What is striking here is the author's emphasis on the relations in the family. While life is already hard for every individual in terms of ontological concerns, their relations with each other complicate the matter. The first family that the author describes is the Dehnings, which is made of a father and a mother and three children. The older generation in the family —the grandparents— does not have striking features apart from their immigration from the Old World to America; the description of the second generation, on the other hand, shows the roles of man and woman, and gives the reader the chance to examine the gap and struggle between the parents and the children. Henry Dehning's father is defined as a "good enough old ordinary man" who is not needed much by the world or by his children. One of the reasons why the father is depicted so passive is that the new generation has its own way of doing things, which excludes him from their life to a significant degree. Contrary to the depiction of the old man, Henry Dehning is shown as a rich and grown man as well as his being a representative of powerful and authoritative fathers in the male-dominated society. His gaze which indeed defines the other —in this case, his wife and his children— is a glance that makes fathers so fearful and aged from children's perspective (8). In contrast to this powerful father, his wife seems to devote herself to her children, which her husband finds spoiling:

> Miss Jenny is the best girl I know, she is too good to you that's all, she spoils all you children the way it always is with a woman giving you all what will never help to make you good for something in any kind of a way to earn a living, what, all right, I say to you, you children have an easy time of it now always doing nothing. (10)

Gertrude Stein gives a traditional description of the roles of man and woman in the first two generations, she presents the changing picture in the third generation. She also starts her criticism of the patriarchal system of the period

through a detailed portrayal of Julia Dehning. Differing from the women of the first two generations, Americanness and the individual sense of freedom are emphasized in the description of Julia Dehning. It is striking at this point that the family accepts the wishes of their daughter, for instance, her marrying a man whom they do not approve, and they also admire her despite their disagreement on such a crucial matter for the family: "I was for nothing she was a crude domineering virgin. And she was strong in the success she knew always that she had inside her, and the family always admired and followed after" (18). When considered in terms of Gertrude Stein's concerns, the end of the description of the Dehning family with the powerful Julia is to be seen as the author's rupture from the patriarchal conventions of the nineteenth century.

Another important point that draws attention is that Gertrude Stein gives an introduction into the ontological character of the book through the portrayal of Henry Dehning. The presence of many lives in him can be generalized to every individual and such a presence is one of the ways to "bridge the gulf between the concrete particularity of an individual life and the experience of being human in universal terms" (Atwood and Stolorow 7):

> Nay for a man to have it in a single life time all so different for him is more strange than being born and being then a baby and then a child and then a young grown man and then old like a man grown old and then dead and so no more of living, it is more strange because it makes so many lives in this one living. Each one of these lives that he forgets or remembers only as a dim beginning is a whole life to us in our thinking, and so Henry Dehning has had many lives in him to our feeling. (13-14)

Gertrude Stein's emphasis on the presence of many lives in Henry Dehning is her introduction into the structure of selfhood. As object relations theorists point out, the ego is a structure where internal and external interplay with each other. It is also this interaction that constitutes the main element of ego development. Hence, such a start through the portrayal of Henry Dehning allows the author to analyze other characters within the framework of these interactions between the internal and external reality.

After a relatively conventional portrayal of a family, especially the portraits of Henry Dehning and Julia Dehning, Gertrude Stein feels the need to get into the novel as an author and speaks to her readers in order to explain what her aim is and what she is doing:

> Bear it in your mind my reader, but truly I never feel it that there ever can be for me any such a creature, not it is this scribbled and dirty and lined paper that is to be to me always my receiver,--but anyhow reader, bear it in your mind —will there be for me ever such a creature— what I have said always before to you, that this that I write down, a little each day here on my scraps of paper for you is *not just an ordinary kind of novel with a plot and conversations to amuse you, but a record of a decent family progress*[9] respectably lived by us and our fathers and our mothers, and our grand-fathers, and grand-mothers, and this is by me carefully each day to be written down here; and so my reader arm yourself in every kind of a way to be patient and to be eager, for you must always have it now before you to hear much more of these many kinds of decent ordinary people. . . And so listen while I tell you all about us, and while I hasten slowly forwards, and love, please, this history of this decent family's progress. (33-34)

It is after thirty pages that Gertrude Stein explains her readers what to expect from this massive work, which is meaningful in terms of its teaching them to be patient. She invites the readers to an experimental adventure which will progress slowly and draws attention to the developmental nature of the novel. Besides, the emphasis on every kind of ordinary people exposes that this is a work about every living being and exposes all the combinations and variations of human character through a descriptive analysis. While such an emphasis results in the intense use of repetition in the novel, it is also significant in terms of the analysis of the structure of personal and interpersonal subjectivity. Although the continuous use of repetition and the use of limited vocabulary give the impression that there is some kind of narratorial amnesia in the work, it is indeed a tactic that allows the author to analyze the common nature of human beings.

One of the elements of the novel that Gertrude Stein feels the need to draw attention is her interest in the middle class tradition. She tells about characters who have middle class values and warns the reader to take the middle class

[9] Italics are mine.

tradition into consideration while trying to understand the dynamics in the novel: "You see, it is just an ordinary middle class tradition we must use to understand this family's progress. . . . I believe in simple middle class monotous tradition, in a way in honest enough business methods"(34). Gertrude Stein's interest in the middle class tradition focuses on how middle class shapes the characters and moral values of people. An example of the shadow of the middle class values over the individual first shows itself in how the Dehning family reacts to the will of Julia to marry Alfred Hersland. The family members except Julia evaluate Alfred within the limits of their middle class values and disapprove him since he does not conform to the conventions of this class: "Of the family about her, it was only Julia who found him worthy to be so important to her. The cousins and the uncles, the men who could make for her the sane and moral background that would give a whole middle class condition always to her, they did not like much that Hersland was now so important for her" (23). What attracts attention here is that the moral values are also shaped by the middle class tradition. When the fact that the moral values of the persons form an important part of their personality is kept in mind, it can be claimed that the author's interest in the middle class is a significant part of her analysis of the moral values as well.

3.1. The Herslands and the Introduction of the Bottom Nature

The deep analysis of human nature starts with the marriage of David Hersland and Fanny Hissen. The description of the Hersland family parallels the picture of Gertrude Stein's own family, who came from the old world to America and Stein reflects her observation that the effective figures in the family are the second generation in the depiction of the Hersland family. It is through the Hersland family that the author starts her investigation into what she calls "bottom nature" in individuals as well as in her own family. This similarity between the two families in terms of family structure and of their immigration from Europe to America provides Stein a space where she can create new meanings, which she will elaborate on throughout the novel, in the Kleinian terms.

The significance of the autobiographical nature of the novel, which plays an important role in the creation of meanings, is grasped better when the fact that the novel is experimental in character, that it is a rupture from the conventions of the nineteenth century and that Gertrude Stein finds her authorial voice in this work are considered. In a sense, Stein creates a potential space where she can reach her true self by reviewing her past experiences. Experience is a key term in the work since the true self represents meanings that the individual creates from his/her own experience. In his work *Between Emotion and Cognition: The Generative Unconscious*, Joseph Newirth draws attention to the significance of experience in the creation of meaning as following:

> This third area of experience, the area of transitional experiences, is related to Winnicott's (1960; see also Khan 1974) differentiation of the false self and the true self, in which the false self represents the individual's incorporations of the meanings of the other while the true self represents meanings that the individual creates from his/her own experience. (12-13)

The autobiographical character of the novel helps the reader follow how the formation of the author's self is shaped and how the interaction among the characters can be considered as a clue to evaluate her relation with others. Her position as both the subject and the object —the one who is writing and the one who is indirectly written about— supports the validity of such an analysis. The intersubjective relation between individuals makes it possible to examine the subjectivity of each one as well. Besides, it becomes possible here to investigate not only the subjective characteristics of the individual but his/her cultural life as well.

Gertrude Stein's portrayal of the Hersland family starts with the first generation which corresponds to her paternal grandparents, Michael and Hannah Stein. Similar to Stein's own family, David Hersland is depicted as a passive and ineffective man who obeys the wishes of his wife while the woman is portrayed as a figure who is powerful and who leads the whole family in the novel. What is interesting in the description of the first generation is that the woman does not get angry with her husband despite his passive character as exemplified in the below

quotation: “She told the children to keep on slowly as they were going and she would go back and find him . . .. She found him before she had gotten back yet to where he could see all he was going to leave behind him. She walked faster than he and had caught him” (41). The realization of being an American and the ambition to become dominant are the features that attract attention in the portrayal of the second generation, which consists of the parents and three children. David Hersland is a typical example of a powerful father figure in addition to his description as a successful man at his work. While he is defined as “a big man”, his wife is characterized to be “the little mother”. The analysis of the members of the Hersland family is crucial in order to understand their self formation and the effect of their relations upon the self formation process. Such a portrayal of this family carries great significance since it is through the depiction of this family that Gertrude Stein begins defining every kind of living being and the mixture of natures in them.

In her autobiographical work *Everybody’s Autobiography*, Gertrude Stein makes it clear that she is writing about her family and that David and Fanny Hersland represent her parents: “In The Making of Americans I tell about it all and it was all like that, East Oakland is Gossols and the place we lived on Thirteenth Avenue and Twenty-fifth Street was like that” (71). This explanation is particularly important for the development of the novel since it clarifies that the Herslands and the Steins are identical. Another significant point to be considered here is that Gertrude Stein forms the identity of the family members in relation to the addresses they live in because she believes that the address one lives in is one of the essential factors that forms his/her identity. She shows the importance of an address one lives in as describing it as some kind of feeling; this approach also allows the reader to see how the family members internalize the effects of the place they live:

> For the children it was in the beginning really country living, for the mother it was always rich city house living. For the people around them in Mrs.Hersland then it was rich country house living, in Mr.Hersland city being, in the three Hersland children each one a mixed thing in them of the three ways of feeling, rich city country house being country being and city

> being, and the mixtures of these three feelings in each one of the three of them to the people in the small houses near them is part of the history of each one of the three of them. (132)

Besides forming an essential part in the history of each family member, the sense of belonging to a place brings together the sense of belonging to the class that the place is identified with. In this respect, it can be claimed that the place where the Herslands live is one of the most important factors that shape their middle class values.

At first glance, Gertrude Stein's choice in telling about a family in detail seems to result from her will to explain every kind of being in each individual. However, her establishing parallelism between the Herslands and her own family gives the reader the chance to analyze Stein's interpretation of past experiences and of the significant others around her. In his book *The Shadow of the Object: The Psychoanalysis of Unthought Known*, Christopher Bollas expresses that the interpretation of being is closely related to the interaction with the environment: "The subject arrives on the scene rather late in the day. By the time we are capable of a meaningful interpretation of our existence, and the meaningful presence of others, we have already been constituted via the ego's negotiation with the environment"(8). It is possible to claim that the development of the members of the Hersland family is also the process during which Gertrude Stein interprets her own existence in relation to her environment. Stein seems to tell the history of a traditional middle class family on the surface but she begins the analysis of the human nature through the description of the Hersland family —especially through the relations among the family members. In the beginning of her description, Stein discusses the natures of the family members by the analysis of the sameness and difference among them.

The life of the Hersland family —especially the lives of the children, Martha, Alfred, David— is shaped by the characters of the father and the mother. The father is described as "a big man" and the children are depicted as "three big struggling children"; on the other hand, the mother is given as a figure who is lost

between the father and the children. The dominance of the father and the unimportance of the mother not only shape the family relations but effect the character's development of sense of self as well. Throughout the novel, Gertrude Stein continuously mentions that mixing up of characters is important in the formation of one's important feeling —which can be called as sense of self. Accordingly, David Hersland's being a mixture of his mother and his father is told just before the detailed discussion of the Hersland family as well as the fact that his children are mixtures of the natures of him and his wife. The mixture of natures in children are given special importance because it is the nature in one that determines sameness or difference. Besides, the nature in a person is his/her hereditary bond with the former generation; therefore, such a bond is one of the elements that form his/her history: “It was one of these cheerful little Hissen people that David Hersland married there in Bridgepoint and then took to Gossols with him. And now he with all the mixed up father and the strong mother in him...” (44)

David Hersland as a powerful man gets what he wants under every condition. Although it may be thought at the beginning that he has a well-developed personality and sense of self, it is understood in time that his character is hard to understand when the mood swings and the queer ways in him are taken into consideration. As opposed to the powerful and authoritative father figure, the mother —Fanny Hersland— is described as a person “who is unimportant to her husband and her children and who is simply accustomed to a well to do middle class living” (53). This description of the Herslands is valid for the Steins as well. However, there is a point to be considered here: despite the exact resemblances between the two families, *The Making of Americans* is not an autobiography but a novel. In *Everybody’s Autobiography*, Stein takes the attention of the reader to this fact and feels the need to explain what she is doing as an author once more:

> I have told about [my mother] in The Making of Americans but that is a story and after all what is the use of its being a story. If it is real enough what is the use of its being a story, and anyway The Making of Americans is not really a story it is a description of how every one who ever lived eats and drinks and loves and sleeps and talks and walks and wakes and forgets

> and quarrels and likes and dislikes and works and sits, and a naturally longer description of some than of others and a very long description of my mother and my father. (138)

In order to reach her aim, Gertrude Stein defines all characters in terms of their sense of self, which she calls as “important feeling” or “bottom nature”. This approach of the author gives the reader the opportunity to trace how the characters internalize their environment and how the environmental elements affect their self formation since “people react to and interact with not only an actual other but also an internal other, a psychic representation of a person which in itself has the power to influence both the individual's affective states and his overt behavioral reactions” (Greenberg and Mitchell 10). Although Gertrude Stein makes references to the natures and mix-up natures of the individuals, she continuously mentions that the detailed descriptions of the Hersland family members and the people around them will come out slowly and she postpones the story consciously since such a postponement allows her to describe the way the “bottom nature” shows itself in the individuals better in more detail.

Here the Hersland family will be considered as a micro-cosmos and the generalizations made through them will be applied to other individuals. On the surface, Mr. and Mrs.Hersland seem to fulfill the traditional male and female roles in the society; however, it will be reductive to limit their characters to these traditional roles since each of them develops their own sense of self free from these conventional roles to some degree at the same time. While David Hersland is a man for whom there is “no difference between himself and everything existing” (70), Fanny Hersland is described as a wife who does not even exist for her husband most of the time. The children do not feel her existence as a powerful entity and she is “a little unimportant mother always to them” (53). Then, the question “how is the important feeling formed within her?” comes into mind. This question finds the answer in Mrs. Hersland's power relations with the people around her:

> And so visiting and being, well to do living and her children, these never gave her a strong feeling of being important inside her through them, it

> was only through them, it was only through her husband and the governess and seamstresses and servants and dependents that she could ever have an individual kind of feeling. (55)

Mrs. Hersland lives in the space spared for her and does not have any concern for more freedom; there is no clue in the novel about her struggle for fulfilling free self formation. Neither her husband nor her children are not important for her apart from the importance given to family members in the traditional sense. Similarly, her husband and children do not give her any importance. That is an interesting determination about the mother when the autobiographical nature of the novel is taken into consideration. In her book *Sister Brother: Gertrude and Leo Stein*, Brenda Wineapple presents a quite different picture of Mrs. Stein and argues that the portrayal of the mother in *The Making of Americans* is an exaggeration to lessen the distress which the disease and the death of the mother cause. The exaggeration of the insignificance of Mrs. Hersland in the work supports Wineapple's argument: "Gertrude may have resented sharing her mother's attentions, her stories, and her affections, but that Milly Stein was "never important to her children excepting to being them" is an exaggeration constantly modifies by Stein's reiteration of it in *The Making of Americans*" (24). The difference between the real picture of the mother and her depiction in the novel may be interpreted as Stein's denial of death, which is ironically one of the most essential concepts in the novel. The reaction of the children to their mother's relation with one of the governesses, Madeleine Wyman, seems to support Wineapple's proposition:

> Mrs. Hersland was never important to her children excepting to begin them. She was never, even to them, important to their being, they had later a sore feeling in them because Madeleine Wyman owned their mother and a little their father, entirely their mother later to them, they had a sore feeling in them, not because their mother was ever important to them, but she had made them, so she belonged to them, she was so part of the personal being of each of them. (254)

The fact that it is only through her husband and the dependents that the mother feels her sense of individual being directs attention to how her relations with others are structured. Her not being aware that she was not important to her

children and that her individual kind of feeling results from the relations with the governess, seamstresses, servants, and dependents show that she is indeed living in an illusory space where she feels omnipotent. This observation may be interpreted in terms of Winnicott's views. In his work *Playing and Reality*, Winnicott proposes that the task of reality-acceptance continues until the end of life and the person's freedom from the strain of relating inner and outer reality can only be provided by an intermediate area of experience (18). Mrs. Hersland's unawareness or the reluctance to see that the she is not needed by her children and her formation of selfhood is realized only through the dependents suggest that her solution of the paradox in Winnicott's proposition leads to false self organization. People with such a kind of self organization are called "dependent independent" types— the people who somehow own the ones they need to love them (165). Stein explains the characteristics of dependent independent and independent dependent types in detail and classifies people mainly under these two categories throughout the novel:

> There are always some then of the many millions of the first kind of them the independent dependent kind of them who never have it in them to have any such attacking in them, who have very little in them of the scared weakness in them, there are some of them who have in them such a weakness as meekness in them, some of them have this in them as gentle pretty young innocence inside them, there are all kinds of mixtures in them then in the many millions of this kind of them in the many kinds of living they have in them. In the second kind of them the dependent independent kind of them who have too all through their living servant girl nature in them, in this kind of them there are many of them who have this submission as a patient meekness in them, they have not it in them many such of them to ever choose their own way in living, to choose their own loving, to choose their own existing at any moment in their living, sometimes sometime some of such ones of them have resisting in them, sometimes this is in them a stubborn way they have in them, sometimes it is from to much directing of them and then they have resisting in them, sometimes from some one around them dependent on them, sometimes from feeling sometime in their living, feeling themselves inside them. (177)

The most significant characteristics of the dependent independent type are that the people of this type have "servant girl nature" and do not choose their own way of living, loving, and existing. These characteristics help the reader

understand why Mrs. Herland's life is shaped in relation to those who are dependent on her. The two exceptions of this condition are Mrs. Hersland's meeting two families: the one composed of the mother and the sisters Pauline and Sophie Shilling and the other composed of the parents and the sisters Anna, Cora and Bertha. It is through the Shillings that Mrs. Hersland gets first important feeling. This first important feeling is described as "a sense of new power that was apart in her from the dignity of right being that she had always had around her" (56). One of the most striking points about Mrs. Hersland's change is that her new sense of power does not come from "right being", which can indeed be understood as the feeling coming from "right" middle class family feeling. While it may be thought that marriage is a turning point in one's feeling of importance, Mrs. Hersland's leaving the Hissens, whose feelings of individual being do not come from inside, and marrying David Hersland, a man with traditional middle class values, do not make a significant change in her life and in her perception of herself. Her marriage is just a passing from the rules of her father to those of her husband. On the other hand, her relation with the Shillings provides her a starting point:

> Perhaps the sister Sophie that never really came to be a feeling inside her, even to the end of her knowing her she always felt for her, but, more and more it came to her that she was not sure of what she felt about her or about the mother or the sister Pauline Shilling and so it came to be that there commenced inside her, from not being certain of the judgment which was natural to her, there came to be inside her a beginning of an almost individual feeling. (81)

What takes attention here is that the individual feeling comes when the "natural judgments" become questionable. This means not only an important step in the process of individuation but getting out of the middle class values as well. Similarly, the family composed of the parents and the sisters Anna, Cora, and Bertha leads a life outside the conventions of the patriarchal middle class society. Although the family seems to live together, there exists no presence of the father and it is the mother who has existence in her: "The mother had existence in her in this she was different from the man who was a husband to her. She had existence in her, there was real existence to her, more than just enough to know she was a

woman creature, . . .” (100). An important difference is realized when the structure of these families and the Hersland family are closely examined: women are dominant in both families. Although the women have a sense of self to some degree, the father in the second family has no existence: “Nobody ever thought about the father. No one thinks about him and the family is known to be one of of women” (100). By the description of two different families, Gertrude Stein presents different ways of living and different degrees of feeling of importance. Mrs.Hersland’s relation to these two families shapes her understanding of selfhood as well; therefore, they have a significant effect on her. However, the effects of these two families on Mrs. Hersland are short-termed and do not change her

The reason why the two families make short-termed effects on Mrs. Hersland's feeling of self can be explained by the penetration of the family way of living into her. Despite the significant differences between the way of living in her own family, the Hissens, and that in the Hersland family, both families have the same influence on Mrs. Hersland in that her sense of being is shaped by the family's way of living. As the object relation theorists argue, one's sense of self cannot develop free from the interaction with others; in this sense, what is told about Mrs. Hersland above seems to be a normal stage in her life. However, what is unusual in this case is that she does not have any sense of self inside her. While Mrs. Hersland is living according to her father's rules before, she tries to do whatever pleases her husband after she gets married. Her finding herself in a dilemma about whose way she is going to choose is the most significant result of the lack of her sense of self at a quite late age:

> It came one day to a very great division between her husband's way of thinking and feeling in religion and her father's ways.
> [. . .]
> She wrote to him and asked him, she had her husband wanted her to go with him and it was not as she had been taught by him her father, she did not feel it wrong to do this thing but she could not do it without asking her father, who had never let his children do any such thing when they were shut in with him . . . (61-62)

Apart from giving the chance to make observations on the development of selfhood, Mrs. Hersland's dilemma shows the position of women in the patriarchal society. Although Mrs. Hersland's marriage is defined as a transition from the family way of living to the individual way of living, it should not be missed that the individual way of living mentioned here is shaped under the authority of her husband. The characteristics that Mr. Hersland demands from a wife show how strong the patriarchal structure is in the Hersland family: “He needed such a woman as his sister Martha had found for him, a woman who was to him, inside him and appealing, whose power over him was never more than a joke to him, . . ., whom often one could forget that she was existing . . .” (87). Gertrude Stein's insistent repetition that Mrs. Hersland does not exist for her husband and that she is never an important being for her children strengthens the perception that Mrs. Hersland has really no being inside her, independent of the others. The weak existence of the mother in the family is one of the most significant shaping factors in the development of the children's sense of self and of their relations with the father.

What is continuously mentioned throughout the book is that Mrs. Hersland is lost between the children and the father despite her unimportance for them. Besides, her children are never part of her important feeling. The interaction between the mother and the children is established when Mrs. Hersland takes them to the rich part of Gossols when they were little. As they grow older and begin to be self-conscious, they reject going with the mother, which is the only activity they make together. The relation between the children and the mother breaks radically when she gets ill and there never appears a “real” interaction between them since then:

> Later they were further apart from her, she was a little one and she was lost to herself and they were away from her inside her, then she had a scared feeling in her, then they sometimes would be good to her. Now when she was younger and the important feeling was beginning to form in her they were of her as if they were still inside her, they were apart from her for they were any part of the important feeling that was now beginning to come together inside her. (92)

The lack of communication between them increases the involvement of the father —who is already a dominant figure— in the lives of the children. The father is characterized to be "as big as the world around him" and to be "full of impatient feeling". Related to these characteristics, the strongest thing in him initiated due to his courage and impatience. The character of the father makes him a weird and an unstable man as well as his being scaring for the children. The influence of the father's character shows differences on each child but what is common is the fear which is given by the father in his voice, in his movements, and in his sudden outbursts (118). The fear from the father and the unimportance of the mother make it easier but also more complex for the children develop their own sense of self. From this point on, Gertrude Stein makes generalizations about human types and tries to achieve what she aimed at the beginning of the work —to define every living being. She continuously focuses on the individuation and differentiation processes of individuals but always postpones the story of the characters or leaves their stories uncompleted. The expression "as it will come out slowly as it is written down" is one of the most frequently used expressions in the text and a strategy used by the author to discuss the similarities and the differences among individuals.

Having given a detailed description of especially Mr. and Mrs. Hersland on the first pages of the book, which indeed covers hundred and fifty pages but which could be considered relatively short for a nine-hundred-page-long book, Gertrude Stein starts analyzing human natures —which she collects under the general term "bottom nature". At this point, she gives special importance to the mixtures in individuals because the mixture in a person includes the effects of the parents on him/her. Moreover, by focusing on "bottom nature", she creates a space where she can discuss human types:

> A man in his living has many things inside him. He has in him this feeling important to himself inside him, he has in him his way of beginning; this can come too from a mixture in him, from the bottom nature of him, from the nature or natures in him more or less mixed up with the bottom in him. . . . (150).

Stein's choice to discuss the general concept "bottom nature" through the depiction of many different individuals is a conscious strategy since the formation of "bottom nature" is mainly dependent on the individual's relation with others. The distinctive structure of personal meanings appear as a result of the intersubjective process which involves a dialogue between two personal universes, self and other. When different lives such as those of the Hersland family are described in detail, such descriptions are indeed microcosmoses including the basic elements of the macrocosmos, which is the "bottom nature" in this case:

> Many things then come out in the repeating that make a history of each one for any one who always listens to them. Many things come out of each one and as one listens to them listens to all the repeating in them, always this comes to be clear about them, the history of them of the bottom nature in them, the nature or natures mixed up in them to make the whole of them in anyway it mixes up in them. Sometime there will be a history of every one. (183)

According to Stein, the repetition in the behaviors of the individuals is what makes them clear and what forms the basic structure of the "bottom nature". She continuously makes repetitions throughout the novel in order to show that the "bottom nature" and repetition are inseparable parts of being. Starting from this point, Stein follows a different method in the novel. On the one hand, she divides the "bottom nature" into small units and describes people in terms of these units; on the other hand, she generalizes what is repeated in every one and discusses the nature of being in general.

Stein examines the "bottom nature" by discussing the feelings and natures —which are the units of the "bottom nature"— in every one. The way one prefers using while doing things is seen to result from the "bottom nature". The "mixing-up", which is an important Steinian term in the novel, occurs as the result of the nature's interaction with other natures. Stein makes a division between feelings and types here. While the most significant feelings are the individual or important feeling and the lonesome feeling, both of which define the existential stance of the individual, the basic types are independent dependent and dependent independent

ones. In Stein's words, the independent dependent type is defined as a feature of those who somehow own the ones they need to love and the dependent independent type is a characteristic of those who have it in them to love only those who need them. Although there exists a division between feelings and types as well as a division within types, these are indeed the complementary parts of being and affect the structure of each other. However, Stein argues that they are two formations opposite to each other despite the inevitable togetherness of the important feeling and the lonesome feeling,: "The important feeling of one's self to one inside one in one's living is to have in one then not anything of such a lonesome feeling" (160). Under this general opposition, Stein defines the types as opposed to each other as well. However, inbetweenness seems to be neglected by the author in such a presentation.

While the important feeling is seen to be a proof of the existence of the individual feeling in one, for instance as it is in David Hersland, the lonesome feeling is described as one which exists in the individuals who cannot bear the existential burden of life. It is the lonesome feeling that gives uneasiness to the individuals so they try to escape from this feeling through a variety of ways —the most essential of which is religion. When the feelings are left aside and it is focused on the types, there occur two major types as mentioned above. After a general description of types, Stein starts grouping people according to feelings and types and discussing "how in each part of their living their being shows itself in them, of the feeling in each kind of them and how it shows in each one their kind of them, how it comes out in each one in every part of their living from the beginning to their ending" (185). Stein argues that repeating one's feeling and type is what forms his/her history; and tells the story of particularly servants within this framework in order to show the diversity among "bottom natures". For this purpose, Stein gives a detailed picture of the three servants of the Hersland family. She aims at giving all kinds of "women nature", on one hand, and at elaborating the character of Mrs. Hersland, on the other hand. Mrs. Hersland is given as a figure who is lost between her children and her husband in the previous parts. Different from the previous parts where Mrs.Hersland was depicted as a

figure lost between her children and her husband, she is posited in this part as a lady of house at home and her dialogue with other people are discussed in detail: "Mrs. Hersland got her important feeling of herself to herself from all of them from all the servants she ever had working for her or doing something for her in her living, Mrs. Hersland got her important feeling of herself to herself from all of them" (187).

What attracts attention here is that Mrs. Hersland's real relations are only established through the dependents on her. However, Gertrude Stein does not present her as a superior figure; instead, she evaluates her character as an example of women nature. Such an approach brings her to the matter of repeating since every one is repeating nearly the same personality structures. Before starting the story of Lilian Rosenhagen who makes dresses for Mrs. Hersland, Stein explains the difference between repeating and the individual's copying his/her repeating:

> Many go on all their life copying their own kind of repeating, many go on all their life copying some one else or some other kind of men or women's kind of repeating, some kind of being that they have not in them. Every one mostly has in them their own repeating sometime in their living, this is real being in them, many millions are always all through their living copying their own repeating, some have this in them because they are indolent in living, it is easier for such of them just to go on with automatic copying of their own repeating rather than really live inside them their repeating. This is now a history of such a one. (192)

Separating repeating and copying repeating is particularly considerable to follow the discussion on authentic and inauthentic being. The question that arises from the great similarity between repeating and copying repeating is how to differentiate two when they are so alike. The matter of sameness and difference gains importance at this point. Gertrude Stein defines repeating as the whole of life but she points out the differences in sameness by the close descriptive analysis of the individuals: "Repeating is the whole of living and by repeating comes understanding, and understanding is to some the most important part of living" (221). Within this framework, the members of the Hersland family become

individuals who show similarities through their constant repetitions and who are different at the same time in terms of their way of understanding such repetitions.

Focusing on repeating brings the reader a new perspective in the evaluation of the characters. Up to that point in the book, the reader is invited to see characters within their family relations. From now on, the characters are presented in their relation with other people; thus, it becomes possible to observe how their individual feelings are formed and affected when others come to the scene. The author's frequent use of the expression "as this will come out later" shows her intention to describe each kind of individual and the "bottom nature" in them. She makes a "conceptualization of the intersubjective field which is in part an attempt to lift the self object to a higher and more inclusive level of generality" (Atwood and Stolorow 68). Through generalizations and the description of the outside world around the individual, Stein questions what is inside individuals and tries to group people according to the structuralization of their inner worlds or personalities. This approach of the author may seem just to make a descriptive analysis of different egoes; however, she tells how the aesthetic of being develops and how she forms the aesthetic frame of her work through the discussion on being in general. Since the discussion on being requires the analysis of individuals in their intrasubjective spaces, Stein expands the space around the Hersland family and examines their stance in relation to the dependents around them.

Considering what is discussed up to this point, it is possible to argue that the author presents the detailed description of the three servants of the Hersland family in order to determine their position in the intrasubjective space, to describe the difference in sameness, and to show how repeating is one of the most significant factors to discuss "bottom nature" in individuals. Although Mrs. Hersland's relations with the servants and other dependents are kept in the foreground, the relations of the other family members are also given in detail in order to show how they position themselves in relation to external reality. It seems somehow strange at this point that the author does not begin the detailed explanation of the individuals although she constantly mentions she is going to

tell about them. When the rest of the book is taken into consideration, it may be argued that she extends the present time just before the story of the people and that she creates a space where she can also discuss the story and "bottom nature" of any one as well. Her admission that this is indeed a long history of many people supports this argument: "Mostly then the history of any one as it slowly comes out of them will be a long one, this is a long history now of many of them" (184).

After reminding the reader once more time that this is a long story, Gertrude Stein starts telling about the servants. She gives their stories in a way that reflects their relations with the Hersland family. Through such a description, the author creates a space for herself where she can both discuss different human types and discuss the relations of the Hersland family members with these different types. Since the people whose stories are given are dependents and it has always been mentioned up to that point that Mrs. Hersland establishes her sense of self through them, it may first be thought that mainly Mrs. Hersland's relations with the servants will be discussed; however, it becomes possible to know more about how Mr. Hersland defines himself as well so long as the description of the servants continues. Before starting the story of the first servant, Gertrude Stein draws attention to the importance of knowing what is inside in every one: "It is very important to know it in each one which part in them, which kind of feeling in them is connected with stupid being in them" (236). The author's utterance at this point adds a new category to be used in describing what is inside each one: stupid being. Despite using this concept as a criterion to group the servants, Gertrude Stein never explains what she means by it clearly throughout her work.

What Stein mentions about the first servant in the beginning is that she is a foreign woman and a real governess —according to Mr. Hersland— with German and French background. This woman who is also a good musician is employed by him especially for the education of the children's education. However, she does not become a significant person for Mr. Hersland since she has "no existence in her" (239). Despite the insignificance of the first servant, Stein discusses her

nature in detail in the framework of her project to define every living being. She focuses on the stupid being in this foreign woman even before discussing whether she is an independent dependent type or a dependent independent type. What is interesting here is that she has no doubt about the presence of the stupid being in every individual; she just finds it difficult to know where stupid being is in this particular woman: ". . . it was hard to know the stupid being that was surely somewhere in her. It was hard to know her enough to know where to find it in her" (236).

The reason why the author has no doubt about the presence of the stupid being in every one is discovered on the following pages: Gertrude Stein thinks that the stupid being in a person is connected with which kind of feeling he/she has in him/her; therefore, the presence of the stupid being is inevitable in every one. Although the author spares a considerable space to the discussion on the stupid being, she mentions the difficulty of finding the stupid being and just leaves the matter aside: "It is then very interesting always to know the stupid being in each one. It was hard to see it in this one. It was hard even to see it in her living with her sister and in this way it often comes out in women" (237).

Introducing the concept of the stupid being, Gertrude Stein focuses on the independent dependent and dependent independent types. While these two types have always been defined as opposite to each other, the first servant is characterized to be one who has these two types in a well-balanced way. The author does not develop the character of the first servant any more but she finds it enough to mention that she is one of many millions who are made just like her. Thus, it can be claimed that the story of the first servant is mainly told in order to introduce a new aspect of being —the stupid being— into the author's discussion on different types and to present the option that the independent dependent and dependent independent types may be well-balanced. Another significant issue is that Gertrude Stein gives special importance to the reasons behind the Herslands' choosing servants not only because of their representing different types but also their revealing different aspects of the personalities of Mr. and Mrs. Hersland.

The two points, which determine Mr. Hersland's choice of servants, are his ideas on education and "Americanness". The first servant's employment results from Mr. Hersland's belief in the necessity and superiority of the European way of education. This way education requires knowing several languages and being interested in fine arts. These requirements are just those that can be provided by the first servant. However, her employment is terminated regardless of her personal traits when Mr. Hersland's theory of education changes. One may ask how Mr. Hersland changes his theories so easily; this condition is indeed related to two of the most dominant aspects of Mr. Hersland's personality —his strength in beginning and his being full of impatient feeling. The frequent changes in his theory of education are mainly dependent on his personality and it has little to do with the benefits the children can get from such kind of education: "Mr. David Hersland had in him a feeling of being as big as all the world around him. He had his ideas of educating children" (244). Mr. Hersland's choice of the second governess is a result of a new beginning in him. Now he wants the children to forget German and French and to get American way of education. This governess is depicted as a woman who has a passive stupid sense that pervades all her being. Such a radical difference between two governesses provides Gertrude Stein the chance to present a new type of the stupid being, on the one hand; it shows how strong the beginning is in Mr. Hersland, on the other hand. An important question comes into the reader's mind here: While it is Mrs. Hersland who gets her sense of self from the dependents around her and it is the children who are affected by the radical changes in their education, why is it Mr. Hersland that chooses the governesses?

This question may be answered from three different points of view. First, as it is continuously mentioned, this work is Gertrude Stein's greatest effort to define every living being. Accordingly, she chooses types as different as possible and makes it easier to make generalizations through these different types. Second, the attitude of Mr. Hersland is a typical depiction of the male attitude in the nineteenth century. In this respect, Mr. Hersland represents the patriarchal

dominance that still continues in the twentieth century and patriarchy is what Gertrude Stein confronts throughout her work. Finally, Gertrude Stein confronts not only patriarchy, in general, but also her father who is a representative of this order, in particular, when the autobiographical nature of the novel is taken into consideration. The order of the servants with different natures corresponds to the changes in Daniel Stein's opinions on education and Americanness. Brenda Wineapple's description of a new phase in the children's education in her work *Sister Brother: Gertrude Stein* shows how similar the figure of David Hersland in *The Making of Americans* to Daniel Stein in the real life is:

> Daniel embraced him, as he did all his enthusiams, to the hilt. His new passions were physical culture and American living. "His father having taken his children to Europe so that they might have the benefit of a european education," Gertrude Stein wrote of Daniel," [he] now insisted that they should forget their french and german so that their american english would be pure." He was a man who believed in America now, in wide open spaces, in success, and of course hard work. . . (21)

However, it should be noted here that Gertrude Stein's confrontation is not only with her father's patriarchal power but with his character that affects his children deeply as well. After Gertrude Stein makes generalizations about stupid being and repeating, she begins telling about Madeleine Wyman —the third governess who has a profound effect on both Mr. and Mrs. Hersland.

The third governess, Madeleine Wyman, is the first one who starts the beginning in Mrs. Hersland. Gertrude Stein evaluates the relation between two in terms of resisting, attacking, stupid being, and important being. Such an evaluation brings an analysis of types once again together with itself; however, Stein includes the concept of love in her discussion on the story of Mrs. Hersland with Madeleine Wyman. She mentions what she is telling about is how Madeleine Wyman owns Mr. Hersland's early being and how Mrs. Hersland comes to have in her her most important being. The inclusion of love concept in this story makes it more suitable for an analysis in terms of Winnicott's views on the relation between mother and child. The concept of love is associated with ownership in the relation between Mrs. Hersland and Madeleine Wyman: "Some women have it in

them to love others because they need them, because these somehow are important to them, because somehow these they have for loving belong to them, many of such of them subdue the ones they need for loving, . . . and they own them. . .” (248). Moreover, Stein expresses several pages later that this is a relation of ownership rather than that of a friendship or employer and employee relation: “This is now a history of how they owned each other” (253).

When the reasons why it is this relation, not any other one, are questioned, that Mrs. Hersland gets her most important individual feeling, the most significant reason seems to be the fact that Madeleine Wyman does not constitute any threat to the potential space where Mrs. Hersland lives throughout her life. Her having power over Madeleine Wyman strengthens her sense of omnipotence. Although she has power over some other people such as former servants, this is the first time when she has power over someone from outside: “. . . it was then the strongest in her and came out in her with the governess Madeleine Wyman who was for her the one who in all her living was the one whom she had power over, not as part of her, as her children were to her, but as outside of her” (249). The fact that Mrs. Hersland feels power over Madeleine Wyman on the one hand and that this third servant is someone from outside on the other hand make Mrs. Hersland feel her as some kind of object. This feeling is so strong in her that she gets clear of all other feelings and concentrates on only her being:

> [Mrs. Hersland] had never then at any time in her living so completely to herself then a realization, a feeling of herself to herself, a being in herself to her own feeling important in her being, not from doing, not from feeling, not from being, not from having, not from anything in her living or her being but from being to herself in herself then an important person as she had then in her middle living with the third governess in the house with them. Some one needed her, not for their living or feeling, but needed her for their self-creation. And so, it was in her middle living with Madeleine Wyman in the house with them that she had in her really individual being. (259-60)

Mr. Hersland’s sense of individual being is in some way related to her passing from an environment which ignores her presence to an environment where she feels present. The effects of being lost after passing from the family way of living

to the individual way of living are eliminated to some degree by this new relation. The most important factor here is that Madeleine Wyman is the first person who really listens to her. Passing from being a woman who is lost between her husband and her children to being a person who is worth listening to plays a significant role in her development of sense of self and individual feeling.

Considering the nature of the relation between Madeleine Wyman and Mrs. Hersland, it will not be wrong to argue that Madeleine Wyman serves as a kind of transitional object for Mrs. Hersland. She gives her sense of omnipotence and security and thus helps her feel existing. At first glance, it may be thought that this relation will help Mrs. Hersland form her sense of true self. However, the relation between her and Madeleine Wyman cannot substitute for the genuine relation between the mother and the child at the beginning of life. Though Mrs. Hersland cannot reach her true self as a result of this relation, it provides her a "third area of experience" where she can take breath and express herself. Winnicott mentions that the third area of experience is a location where the individual gets the ability to express personal and subjective meanings and starts experiencing relations of love, hate, and personal ideals (Newirth 12). In Mrs. Hersland's case, she achieves forming her personal meanings —thus, she feels herself existing and gets her first individual feeling— but she cannot generalize these meanings to other relations in her life. As a result, the individual sense of self Mrs. Hersland feels in this relation makes a significant change in her perception of self but does not change the other people's perceptions of her. Therefore, it becomes impossible for Mrs. Hersland to form true self which represents meanings that she creates from her experience because this relation remains as a particular case, which cannot be generalized to all her life. Gertrude Stein defines this relation as one between two who are dependent independent types with different fashions and she reminds the reader that the detailed description of the relation between Mrs. Hersland and Madeleine Wyman is a means to present different types, which is her real aim in this work.

3.2. Martha Hersland and the Essence of Repeating and Being

After the detailed description of Mr. and Mrs. Hersland, there comes the chapter on Martha Hersland, which Gertrude Stein promises to do from the beginning of the book —to tell the stories of other people at some point on the forthcoming pages. This chapter, which is expected to be a mere story of Martha Hersland, is the most important part of the work since it is in this part that Gertrude Stein explains the motives behind her writing in addition to her opinions on the general categories, which have been defined in relation to certain characters up to this point, in her life. Here, the author does not feel the need to explain these generalizations in a fictionalized way. The chapter begins with the sentence, which has become the most frequenly used quotation and which is considered to define Gertrude Stein's authorial identity: "I am writing for myself and strangers" (289). This sentence has become some kind of motto for many people in the literary circles but the major question to be asked is mostly neglected: "Why does one write for himself/herself and strangers?".

Gertrude Stein, herself, answers the question posed above in the coming sentences of the first paragraph: "I am writing for myself and strangers. This is the only way that I can do it. Everybody is a real one to me, everybody is like some one else too to me. No one of them that I know can want to know it and so I am writing for myself and strangers" (289). These sentences, which give the impression that they come all of a sudden in the work, are indeed consistent with the development of the author's writing. Her views in her nonfictional works such as "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*" support this proposition. The fact that Stein's works are experimental in character and remain unrecognized even for the people who are close to her —for instance, her brother Leo Stein— for a quite long time explains the reason why she chooses to write for herself and strangers: she is the "only" one who understands what is being done in the work and yet there is always the possibility that there is someone outside who can understand her writing. Stein's expression that this is the only way that she can writebecomes meaningful when it is remembered that *The Making of Americans* is one of her early works and the views of William James have still profound effects

on her. She has an education that emphasizes the inevitable necessity of observation so she defines everything through observation. In her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*", Stein explains that she reaches the conclusion on the "bottom nature" of the individual by experiments, the results of which she expresses in the report of this specific experiment: "In these descriptions it will be readily observed that habits of attention are reflexes of the complete character of the individual" (*Writings 1932-1946*, 271-72). Finally, there comes the last sentence which is a reaction to the people's reluctance to understand what she is saying. Gertrude Stein is there as an author, she knows what she is doing, and even if the people around her are reluctant to understand or do not understand what she is doing, she does not give up and writes for herself and strangers. Besides, Stein is not only decisive on her choices but also hopeful about being recognized one day; thus, she elaborates on her writing so the readers, who are strangers, can understand it:

> I want readers so strangers must do it. Mostly no one knowing me can like it that I love it that every one is a kind of men and women, that always I am looking and comparing and classifying of them, always I am seeing their repeating. Always more and more I love repeating, it may be irritating to hear from them but always more and more I love it of them. More and more I love it of them, the being in them, the mixing in them, the repeating in them, the deciding the kind of them every one is who has human being. (289)

The above lines do not only express the author's hope that the readers so strangers can understand her writing but also gives the essential concerns in the work: observation, comparison, classification, and repetition. It will not be wrong to argue that these essential concerns serve the author's basic aim, which is to define being in human, in the work. Gertrude Stein's essential concerns also become tools for her to describe human types. These tools are indeed categories that Stein uses to define different aspects of being. In the following pages, it will be discussed how the author achieves defining being while she is giving theoretical views about the tools she is using —observation, comparison, classification, and repetition— at the same time.

The first pages of the "Martha Hersland" chapter no doubt form the most significant part in the whole work in terms of its clarifying Gertrude Stein's relation to her writing as an author. As she mentions in her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*", this work is created in time. This gradual creation is related to not only the long time that observation and classification require but also Gertrude Stein forms herself both as an individual and an author during the writing process. She starts writing *The Making of Americans* mainly because of her interest in defining human types but the work increasingly becomes a realm where she defines herself and finds her voice. This new direction in which Gertrude Stein finds herself starts a new journey for her into the depths of writing and selfhood. She mentions her belief that she can describe "every individual human being that could possibly exist" (*Writings 1932-1946*, 275) but it should be noted that she is also included in the description of every individual being as an individual. For this reason, the work will be read not only to see how the author defines other human beings but to see how she defines herself as well.

The Making of Americans carries the deep effect of William James on Gertrude Stein. Although this is a work where Stein confronts her mentor, it is her studies with William James that determine the main method in the work. The author summarizes this method in her essay "The Gradual Making of *The Making of Americans*"as following:

> When I was working with William James I completely learned one thing, that science is continuously busy with the complete description of something, with ultimately the complete description of anything with ultimately the complete description of everything. (*Writings 1932-1946*, 283)

As Stein continues writing, she forms new ways but she never gives up her occupation with the complete description of every living being. Besides, she becomes occupied with describing herself as well as others in time. Differing from the description of other people, the description of self requires having knowledge about oneself. Starting from this point, Stein delves into the meaning of the sense of self and existence and the work becomes a frame in which she

shapes her relation to her "self" and external reality from a continuously changing perspective.

When the reader considers *The Making of Americans* as a journey in the framework of the above argument, he/she gets the chance to follow how Gertrude Stein creates new personal meanings. From the perspective of British Object Relations School, creating meaning is a fundamental step in the development of self since the person realizes the presence of people other than himself/herself and this realization starts the formation of interpretation on external reality. While the Kleinians argue that the concept of interpretation and symbolic thought are essential in the creation of meaning, the neo-Kleinians go a step further and argue that these are not only essential elements in the creation of meaning but also formative elements in one's conceptualization of himself/herself as a subject. Based on the views of the Kleinians and the neo-Kleinians, it is meaningful to propose that *The Making of Americans* is a work during the writing process of which Gertrude Stein creates her personal meanings and discovers new aspects in regard to the nature of selfhood and subjectivity. In other words, she discovers the cognitive dimensions of how an individual comes to know the world and experience it. Such an experience involves the dual structure of being both an object and a subject, the reflections of which are seen throughout the work. This experience also affects one's forming relationships in addition to its determining the perception of selfhood and identity. Since it is language that shapes the perception of selfhood and identity during the process of writing, the written text becomes a realm where Stein lives this experience. This realm also provides a space for the author to organize relations among individuals. The author's organization of relations can be explained in terms of Winnicott's views who suggests that relationships can be organized within four categories which reflect whether the person is experiencing himself/herself as a subject or an object: object-object, subject-object, object-subject, subject-subject. As the dialectical relationship between Stein's experiencing herself as a subject and as an object develops, her description of the characters comes to include their relations with themselves in addition to their relations with other characters. From this point on,

the character not only represents different types but reflects different structures of subjectivity as well.

Thus far the first pages of “Martha Hersland” chapter have been interpreted in terms of their providing clues to define the text as a journey into the nature of selfhood. At this point, the tools —observation, comparison, classification, and repetition— are used by the author during the writing process. For instance, the author uses these four tools to define types, which she names as independent dependent and dependent independent, on the previous pages. Gertrude Stein introduces a new tool, repeating, here and discusses this new tool in detail. She questions how repeating exists in the human nature and continuously points out the fact that repeating is closely related to being in people.

Throughout her discussion on repeating, Gertrude Stein emphasizes that her relation to repeating is a love relation. Her insistent repetition on the fact that she loves repeating clarifies why this work is mainly dependent on the continuous repetitions. Stein argues that repeating exists in every one and all living is actually repeating. Her mentioning that repeating becomes a conscious feeling in herself in time shows the close relation between repeating and being, on the one hand, and makes the interpretation that the book has also become a space where she reaches her idea on repeating gradually during the writing process, on the other hand. If the argument is carried to one further step, it will not be wrong to argue that Stein reaches not only her understanding of repeating but that of being in her as well. Besides, her elaboration of the meaning of repeating gives her the opportunity to classify people according to this new criterion. Once she gets this chance at some point, she mentions that she will make specific description of the characters; however, she pretends to forget her promise as an author immediately and turns back to her own views on the relation between being and repeating.

Her sentences where she mentions that it is not characters but actual people she is talking about strengthen the impression that she is slowly starting a detailed argument on selfhood and being in addition to her argument on repeating:

"Everybody is a real one to me, everybody is like some one else too to me. This is always there in me this and loving repeating being, always, in me" (305). In the light of this impression, it will be reasonable to suggest that Stein's specific descriptions of characters at this point are substeps of her discussion on being since it becomes apparent in this second part of the work that she is trying to focus on the nature and structure of being. It is also worth noting that she reveals out her perception of her "self" in this discussion because she considers such a revelation as necessary for understanding the selfhood of other people: "Thinking one's self good is very important to understand in each one" (360). However, Stein is wise enough to know that there are no certain answers in ontological subjects and remarks that her desperate but still hopeful position makes her feel insufficient and unhappy in her major act of thinking, writing: "I am all unhappy in this writing. I know very much of the meaning of the being in men and women. I know it and feel it and I am always learning more of it and now I am telling it and I am nervous and driving and unhappy in it. Sometimes I will be all happy in it" (348).

Only after explaining her own views on being and repeating, Stein turns back to her basic argument that there is a bottom nature in everyone; however, she puts the emphasis on the sameness and difference among individuals this time.

> There are many that I know and always more and more I know it. They are all of them sometime *a whole one to me*[10]. More and more I understand it. They are all of them repeating and I hear it, they are all of them always repeating the whole of them and always more and more I know them. There are many that I know and they know it. They are all of them always repeating the whole of them and I understand it. They are, each one of them sometime a whole one to me, they are all of them, always then, repeating the whole of them and I know it and I understand it. I know it and I tell it. Always sometime I tell it. Mostly always when it is complete in me I tell it. (322)

The above quotation is very significant in terms of its being a kind of the summary of how Stein is developing her argument and writing. Her manifestation that she sees each one as a whole one and her intense use of the words —many,

[10] Italics are mine.

each, one— supports the proposition that Stein is not speaking about only specific characters but she is telling the story of every individual, including herself. Her return to Martha Hersland whose name is given to the chapter is through a new concept, beginning: "Sometime perhaps it will be clear to every one the whole being of some one. Sometime perhaps it will be clear to some one the being in any one. This is then a beginning" (332). The beginning she mentions is both the beginning of a deeper investigation into the nature of being and that of the story of Martha Hersland, which she postpones continuously. Here the reader gets the impression that the author will discuss the being which is common in everybody after this point in the book but she immediately emphasizes that each person is different and whole to her, thus makes it clear for the reader that she will continue her discussion on being through the description of the individuals —mainly, the members of the Hersland family. She also warns the reader that this is not only a pure description of different persons but the description of types in them as well: "Every one has their own being in them. Every one is of a kind in men and women. Each one has a bottom nature in them, this nature is of a kind of nature that makes a kind in men and women. . ." (356)

From this point on, Gertrude Stein reveals and explains one aspect of being through the description of each one. As she argues from the beginning, it is possible to categorize people according to types, which have been discussed up to this point, and to reach the bottom nature in them through the analysis of these types. She takes the types in people, eg. the attacking and resisting types, as subcategories to make a further discussion on aspects of being. It is as if the description of characters is a means for her to take one more step in her journey of learning being in general. Her repeating she will explain what she learns as a result of the description of each one shows the validity of this argument: "Now I will finish up this one. Now I will tell of my learning this one, of this one coming to be a whole one to me" (370-371). She also reminds by the words "every one is a whole one to me" once more that it is mainly the general nature of being, which interests her, rather than beings in particular.

Following the argumentation on being and repeating, Gertrude Stein returns to the description of Martha Hersland again. However, it is instantly understood that this return is also a transition to a new stage in her discussion on being. She tells an event, which seems weird at first glance, in Martha Hersland's childhood and starts discussing being in children then:

> This one, and the one I am now beginning describing is Martha Hersland and this is a little story of the acting in her of her being in her very young living, this one was a very little one then and she was running and she was in the street and it was a muddy one and she had an umbrella that she was dragging and she was crying. "I will throw the umbrella in the mud," she was saying, she was very little then, she was just beginning her schooling, "I will throw the umbrella in the mud" she said and no one was near her and she was dragging the umbrella and bitterness possessed her, "I will throw the umbrella in the mud" she was saying and nobody heard her, the others had run ahead to get home and they had left her, "I will throw the umbrella in the mud," and there was desperate anger in her; "I have throwed the umbrella in the mud" burst from her, she had thrown the umbrella in the mud and that was the end of it all in her. She had thrown the umbrella in the mud and no one heard her as it burst from her, "I have throwed the umbrella in the mud," it was the end of all that to her. (388)

This paragraph on Martha Hersland tells an event which can be experienced by any child, indeed. Martha's repeating the sentence "I will throw the umbrella in the mud" is in some way a cry for communication and care in the world of the adults who are indifferent to her. This event or any other such event is common in the life of any child so it is hard, even impossible, to come to an understanding about being in that child merely through the analysis of this event. Stein mentions that "children are confusing and deceiving to many" (392). When the reason behind this statement is questioned, it can be argued that there exists the purest form of being in them since they have not been shaped by the conventional values of the society yet so they do not feel the necessity to repress their feelings and thoughts. It is this difference between the adults and the children that makes children so confusing for adults. There is "real" being —the purest form of being — in children but many adults cannot comprehend the reflections of this "real" being in them: "In some men, in some women, this shows real nature in them, in some it is just that nature is in them in beginning, and so children are very

confusing to the understanding" (393). By reaching this conclusion, Stein ends her discussion on being and repeating in children and returns to Martha Hersland once again.

In the rest of the chapter, Stein tells the story of Martha Hersland starting from her childhood. Stein also creates a space for herself to discuss the family members' perception of the being in Martha Hersland; she also discusses the being in other family members as well as other people in Martha Hersland's life in this space. In this way, the rest of the chapter becomes an area where the author questions the fundamental character of everyone, the bottom natures in people, the other natures in them, the mixtures of natures in them. When these are considered to be fundamental elements in the structure of self, it is seen that the author takes a step further in her investigation into the nature of being. Gertrude Stein includes her most striking determination on how any person feels about death and existence just at the beginning of the description of Martha Hersland. By this way, she gets the chance to discuss the meaning of death and life, absence and presence, on the forthcoming pages:

> When [Martha Hersland] was a very little one sometimes she wanted not to be existing. This is a very common thing in mostly every one in the beginning of their living. This is a very common thing in mostly every one in the beginning of their living. Many want then not any longer to be existing, mostly never come into existing, they have not then any such a feeling, they often say then I wish I had died when I was a little baby and had not any feeling, I would not then have to be always suffering, I would not then have to think of being frightened by dying, I wish I had been dead when I was a very little one and was not knowing anything. It is very interesting the way anybody feels about dying, about not existing, about everything, about every one. Always more and more this is very interesting. (399)

This passage is very significant in Stein's discussion on existence since the author explains the reflections of the birth trauma on individuals so explicitly for the first time. As Otto Rank suggests, the infant leaves the secure and warm environment in the mother's womb and faces a new world where he/she does not know what to do. In this case, the child wishes not to be existing although he/she does not have

any certain idea of death; his/her wish results from his/her hopeless position in an unknown world. The traumatic leave from the secure environment of the womb brings the strong wish not to be existing because existing means suffering in this case. There is no return once one is born and "there exists no cure for existence in the drugstores" as Cioran puts it (32). Stein herself is aware of the hopeless position of the individual in his/her existence and that is the reason why she explains this common experience of man before the specific description of Martha Hersland. It is this experience, as she also expresses, that makes everything increasingly interesting: Every person is imprisoned in existence which basically means suffering from unexpected events in an unknown environment.

After this passage, Stein mentions that she is going to tell about the whole being in everyone and she does not return to the experience of suffering as a dimension of being. Stein tries to achieve defining "whole being" by describing certain actions and thoughts of Martha Hersland; however, she realizes that it is almost impossible to reach her aim by this way so she includes other people's views about Martha Hersland in order to present a more detailed picture of the whole being in her. However, it is understood shortly after that she is classifying Martha Hersland as a type and that she is not really interested in her. Martha Hersland is just a representative of her type: "She was as I was saying of one kind of independent dependent being and all her living there was about the same concentration to her, the same relation of attacking and succeeding and failing and nervous feeling and stupid being and understanding and tired feeling in her . . " (400)

Stein retells the events in the life of the Hersland family in order to support her views on the type of being in Martha. At this point, she warns the reader that Martha is just one of the many kinds of people and there will be descriptions of those kinds as well. Stein continuously mentions that "there will be more description and this will become clearer" (422); however, no event reveals the nature of the whole being in Martha Hersland. What attracts attention in this part is the author's insistent use of the expression "as I was saying". Stein starts nearly every sentence with this expression and tries to show the validity of her argument

that every person is repeating the whole being inside him/her. It is at the end of the chapter that Stein expresses her realization on the fact that no one can know the whole being and complete history of every one. Although Stein cannot define what "whole being" is as she promises at the beginning, she explains its most important characteristic, repeating and she does not hesitate to argue that repeating is the essence of being and it is through repeating that individuals form their sense of self and their history.

3.3. Disillusionment in Living

Gertrude Stein starts the chapter "Alfred Hersland and Julia Dehning" by expressing her wish "to understand every kind of way any one can have the feeling of being distinguished by the virtue they have in them" (479). She mentions that her main effort will be to understand what distinguishes one person from others just at the beginning of this chapter. She defines herself as the author of the typology; however, she is hesitant about a knowledge of other people and questions whether she can achieve writing the history of everyone throughout the chapter. She knows there is always something missing in her knowledge of other people, which causes a feeling of insufficiency in her. Such an insufficiency results in uncertainty, which Stein sees as a reason for her unhappiness:

> It makes me a little unhappy that every one sometime is a queer one to me. It does make me sometime a little uncertain, it does sometimes make me very uncertain about everything and always then it is perplexing what is certain what is not certain, who is a queer one, what is a funny thing for someone to be wanting or not wanting or doing or not doing or thinking or not thinking or believing or not believing. (482)

Stein's realization about the uncertain nature of being is not the only reason for the unhappiness mentioned above. In this part, she evaluates the position of the individual, specifically her own position both as an individual and an author, among other people and reaches the idea of disillusionment, which she defines as the realization that "no one can agree with one since they cannot change" (485). Stein's writing for herself and strangers results from such disillusionment, which

is indeed a symbolic trauma of birth. The individual realizes that he/she is other than the people around him/her and he/she is all alone. Disillusionment is the price of being an individual, which Stein considers equal to her being accepted as an author. Any person feels no longer united with other people; thus, the illusion that he/she is in a secure environment completely breaks down all of a sudden and the realization that one has to confront life and his/her existence comes to the scene. Stein argues that this symbolic trauma of birth, disillusionment, is what leads to kinds in men and women. Similar to her writing strategy in the previous chapters, Stein chooses certain characters here, namely Albert Hersland and Julia Dehning, and develops her discussion on types through the description of these characters. Stein explains her main focal point as understanding being in all kinds of individuals.

It is observed throughout the chapter that Stein's interest is rather on the individual's relation to his/her existence than his/her certain actions and that she tries to figure out this relation by examining goodness, religion, sensitiveness, feeling, loving, realising, understanding, thinking, doing, and knowing. She collects these under the general name "virtuous feeling". The main forms of having virtuous feeling are "thinking what any one is doing is only a habit in them" and "having the sense of being oneself inside one" (503). It seems that Stein will describe the being in Alfred Hersland and Julia Dehning only after she establishes the main framework for her discussion. However, she postpones the description of the character here again as she usually does throughout the work.

Stein is well aware that it is impossible to define complete being in any person but she does not give up her desire to get a complete understanding of human nature and assures the reader that one day she is going to tell the history of Alfred Hersland and Julia Dehning. Unlike the previous chapters, Stein explains the reason behind her continuous postponement. She expresses that Alfred Hersland is in fragments inside herself as an author so she has to wait for getting a feeling of whole being in him: "Pieces in being, whole ones in being, words saying what I am wanting, words having existence in them to my feeling, Alfred

Hersland and the being in him and the kind her was of men and women all these things will come soon to be more completely in me, that is certain" (541). This waiting period leads Stein realize that the characters cannot be simply classified under certain types. There is always more than such a classification, which can be briefly defined as "understanding a genuine feeling of individuality" in other people. From this point on, what Stein writes parallels to what she learns as her writing develops: "I am writing everything as I am learning anything" (540). The act of writing gains its power in this learning/writing process and opens a space where Stein starts a journey into the essence of being.

Although Stein expresses that she is going to give a detailed history of Alfred Hersland, she cannot overcome the difficulties of describing the complete being in a person. She learns in this process that being is not static and manifests itself in different forms at different times. Stein concludes that each person is of a kind and this is what concerns her at that point of writing: "I am living, I am certain, I am important in me in my realising that each is themselves inside them that each one is of a kind in men and women, I have very often a very pleasant feeling" (584). Stein considers kinds as different manifestations of being and tries to reach the nature of being through them. At this point, she observes that being is continuously repeating itself through different manifestations. As she writes what she learns —the different manifestations of being— her narration becomes highly repetitive and her writing comes to be a reflection of the character of being. In his work *Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans*, George B. Moore claims that it is the nature of being that brings Gertrude Stein to the matter of repetition and adds that repetition leads her to question her own idea of being as well. Moore draws attention to the new dimension that this condition brings to Stein's writing: "[Gertrude Stein] is drawn further into narrative by the need to have a viable relationship to the experience of "being". She must finally establish her own sense of self at the core of the narrative in order to understand this phenomenon in others" (134). Stein's observation that each one is repeating his/her own life throughout years leads her to the question of the meaning of being. She presents different events in characters' lives in order to reveal the relationship of that

particular character to the generalized concept of being. Based on her writing experience up to that point, she knows very well that it is impossible to reach the complete being in any person so she changes her focal point and starts examining the sense for living in characters: "Some [women and men] have sense for living and are not succeeding, have not been succeeding, will not be succeeding in living. I will tell something now about sense for living in women and in men" (673).

Stein seems to be sure that she can tell "sense for living" in women and men so she focuses on "one being living" in the rest of the chapter. She questions not only the characters' relation but her own relation to the general concept of existence as well. However, as she continues, she realizes that she is not ready to talk about the sense for living for either herself or characters. This is the final point where she faces the disillusionment: She wants to figure out the meaning of the person's existence in the world but all she finds out is that each one is repeating some part of life over and over again. Stein expresses explicitly that she wants to be right about every one (574) but she finds herself wrong, thus in a suffering position, despite all her efforts in the end. She voices her disappointment resulting from the disillusionment in a very striking way: "When I have not been right there must be something wrong" (573).

Stein's words reflect the traumatic effect of her being born both as an individual and an author. Her method based on the observation does not work any more in this part of the work. It is impossible to reach a decisive opinion on being by observing other people. No sooner than Stein realized this fact than she directs her attention to develop a general discussion on the nature of being; however, the impossibility of formulating being leaves her on a ground where she has no other way than experimenting in order to progress. Her focus on "being one being living" brings her into the center of ontological questioning. It is possible to read the phrase "being one being living" as "being any individual continuing existing"; when read in this way, the phrase reveals Stein's concerns in the chapter very clearly: the question of existence, which brings out the question of death, and

continuity. Although Stein cannot give any exact answer on the question of existence as she wishes to do, she reveals the most striking fact about living that being living is getting knowledge of death and waiting for death. The large space she spares for death and the people's understanding of death makes it clear for the reader that the discussion of death is as important as that of life for Gertrude Stein since the understanding of death is one of the most determining factors in one's idea of life:

> There are some who naturally are knowing dead is dead but these are not then certain that to be dead is to be a dead one. There are many who are saying to be dead is to be a dead one but these then are not very certain that to be death is to be really a dead one. There are some who are practically speaking completely certain that to be dead is to be a really dead one but always these then are afraid in living and always these then are a little afraid of being a dead one, some then are very completely afraid of becoming a really dead one some of these then are thinking feeling when they are being completely afraid of being a completely dead one when they will be dead ones that perhaps then to be dead is not to be really a dead one, . . . (510)

Stein finds herself on a real experimentation ground. Her basic tool, observing and telling what is observed, is not sufficient any more so Stein feels the need to redefine herself as both an individual and an author in accordance with her changing relationship to the essence of being. The start of such a redefinition marks her final rupture from the conventional figures and their effects in her life and a growth towards independence, which will become more apparent in the "David Hersland" chapter.

3.4. David Hersland and a Further Step into the Depths of Existence

The "David Hersland" chapter differs from the previous ones in the novel in that Gertrude Stein leaves her understanding of personality based on ideal types, which supports the results of her observations and starts concerning more about feelings and thoughts than actions. Firstly, she focuses on "sentimental

feeling" as a way of people's getting sure of anything: "I want to know sometime all about sentimental feeling. I want to know sometime all the different kinds of ways people have it in them to be certain of anything" (480). Although she does not elaborate on what she means by "sentimental feeling" on the forthcoming pages, Gertrude Stein uses this feeling as a criterion to classify people under certain categories as she used to do. What is striking here is the remarkable space she gives to "certainty". She tells the reader that she is going to tell the history of David Hersland but she starts telling what she is believing about living immediately after and mentions that she is not certain about many things:

> What am I believing about living. [. . .] I am believing that I am not certain being being loving in one is in one then meaning what that one is then saying. I am believing that I am not certain that being is not in one meaning what that one being then being loving is saying. What is it I am knowing about living, I certainly am not knowing that I am not knowing everything about being in living. I am not certain that I am not knowing everything about being living. I am not certain that I am knowing everything about being living. (723-24)

Gertrude Stein's emphasis on certainty is the result of her questioning on existence. She depicts David Hersland as a man who is trapped in his loneliness and in his intellectual struggle for grasping the meaning of life and death. This depiction allows Stein to make a further investigation into the human psychology and the nature of Being. Unlike other characters who are described mainly in terms of their social interactions, David Hersland is examined in terms of his intellectual struggle for attaining more knowledge on existence —which is Stein's own intellectual struggle as well. In this sense, he can be seen as the representative of all in an existential search.

Leaving strict categorization aside and depicting David Hersland in deep occupation with his existence, Gertrude Stein opens a realm for ontological inquiry. The most fundamental question of philosophy as suggested by Martin Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being, becomes the central concern for the author. If Stein's concern for defining every kind of being is considered to grasp different modes of existence through its different manifestations up to the

present, then it may well be argued that the abstraction through generalization in this chapter shows a shift in her intellectual search. She is not satisfied with single beings so poses the question what the essential character of beings is. Since it is phenomena around one that goes to make up the world for them, it becomes necessary to examine these phenomena as well. It is useful to remind the distinction between being and Being here in order to prevent future confusion. While "being" refers to single beings or entities, "Being" means the essential nature of being in these entities in Heideggerian terms. The effort for the examination of different phenomena around one can only be achieved through the comprehension of significant others around: "Being is not a being, not a particular phenomenon we encounter in our active engagement with the world; rather, we arrive at our concept of it by progressive abstraction from our encounters with specific beings" (Mulhall 8). In this sense, the capacity to grasp the Being of beings is related to the individual's understanding the essence of self and his/her environment. David Hersland's wish to be at different ages can be seen as his need and wish to get exact knowledge about existence (817). Stein is interested in how David Hersland experiences being. It is worth noting here that being becomes so important that the distinction between self and others, David Herslands and others including Gertrude Stein, blurs and the text becomes an area of investigation on being.

When the reader attempts at placing David Hersland in the writing project of Gertrude Stein, he/she will immediately realize that he is more than a character who is aware of his existence. There is no doubt that his growing awareness of existence is essential for the development of Stein's discussion; however, the most important point is that Stein tries to tell his story without classifying him under the ideal types she uses for describing other characters. Leaving her basic tool — classification according to the results of observation— provides a space for Stein where she can experiment and explore freely. This freedom makes the "David Hersland" chapter as a transitional space where she can express and define her "self" in relation to existence and writing. On the one hand, she tries to get an understanding of the nature of being through the intellectual struggle of David

Hersland; on the other hand, she struggles to find ways of expressing such an understanding.

The significant change in Gertrude Stein's tone as an author marks her journey into an ontic search. She is no more interested in specific entities but in the Being of beings. However, this does not mean that Being can be understood separate from entities around; on the contrary, it is only through phenomena and entities around to grasp the meaning of Being: "Being is not a being, but Being is not encounterable otherwise than by encounters with beings" (Mulhall 8). In this respect, Gertrude Stein's structuring the novel parallels her search for the meaning of Being and self. The greatest problem in such a search is that the question concerning the meaning of Being is neither an unanswerable question nor a question possessing a simple, self-evident answer; therefore, questioning Being is a theoretical investigation. The ongoing character of this questioning can best be explained by Heidegger's term "dasein". Heidegger sees Dasein, which means "being there" or "being in the world", as the pre-ontological understanding of Being (35) and claims that "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence" (67). Therefore, one expresses not "what" of Dasein but its Being or its becoming Being.

In this chapter, Gertrude Stein spends effort for not only expressing Being but selfhood as well. The struggle for expression gives the text the characteristics of play in Winnicottian terms. Stein gets the opportunity to develop her symbolic thinking and to experience herself as a subject. Being no more shaped by any convention, she struggles for finding "her" language. Here she starts finding words to speak self which marks the aesthetic moment and constitutes the deep rapport between the author and her writing. In his article "The Aesthetic Moment and the Search for Transformation", Christopher Bollas mentions that the aesthetic frame is the poetic of text in literature and the aesthetics of being in life (48). What is striking in the "David Hersland" chapter is that Stein struggles for expressing the aesthetics of being in the poetic of text. Therefore, it may well be claimed that Stein defines the aesthetics of her text as well as Being and her self

rather than focusing the character of David Hersland, who seems to represent any individual in existential quest in this chapter. The final chapter of the novel, "The History of A Family's Progress", forms the first example of the new Steinian style where the author forces the limits of language and where she places the aesthetics of being within that of the text.

3.5. The History of a Family's Progress: From Birth to Death

The final part of *The Making of Americans* differs entirely from the previous ones in that Gertrude Stein no longer deals with the Herslands and the Dehnings but writes about any/every/each person who was living/is living/will be living. Rather than focusing on specific characters, the author both starts a discussion on the experience of being-in-the-world and questions the possibility of such a discussion within the limits of language. The most striking point in Stein's discussion and questioning is the intense use of the present compared to the previous four chapters. It seems as if Gertrude Stein is trying to create *pure* present, which is a futile effort indeed since generating the present, even in its purest form, is based on new versions of the past (Canestri and Fiorini xxix). In this respect, this chapter can be claimed to be a temporal construction of subjectivity which is characterized by the cosubstantiality of being and time.

It is through repetitions that Gertrude Stein tries to create present and to express the experience of being existent. Repetitions seems as if they were signifiers without signifieds, at first glance. This condition, which leads many readers and critics to consider this chapter falsely as merely nonsense, results from the individual's difficulty in comprehending the temporal dimension of his/her existence and from the fact that creation of the present, the perception of the created present, so the reconstruction of past should be considered as closely related because these three form a representative sphere in the shadow of the unrepresentable. While analyzing the nature of this sphere, the question "Of the individual's history, what is recovered and expressed?" should be posed since it becomes meaningful in the light of this question to consider this final chapter as

the verbalization of the author's memory and to claim that not only this chapter but the whole text as well is a reconstruction of past by Gertrude Stein.

Within this framework, "The History of a Family's Progress: From Birth to Death" should be evaluated as Stein's brainstorming on the intellectual matters which David Hersland struggles with in the previous chapter. Her striking start with the sentence "Any one has come to be a dead one" invites the reader to an awareness on existence and death. Once the reader is attracted into the vital questioning coming out of existential awareness, different manifestations of consciousness about existence are presented by the author:

> Some are certain that any one is one being living. Some are knowing only this thing about everything, that any one is one being living. Some are knowing that not any one is one being living. Some are knowing that any one who is one being living is one knowing something of this thing. [. . . .] Some are ones knowing what some are coming to be understanding. Some are saying something about any one understanding something. Some are saying something about any one not understanding something. [. . .] Some are not saying anything about any one being an old one. Some are certain about understanding something being a thing that is coming to be interesting in being something any one being one being living will be coming to be thinking about doing. . . . (908-909)

Repetition, which is one of the main techniques in the work from the beginning, becomes highly convulsive here and "the compulsion to repeat takes the place of remembering" (Green 6). Hence, it becomes impossible to get an idea about what is recovered of the author's individual history. Instead, the attention is drawn to the consciousness about existence and the experience related to such consciousness.

Although the experience on being is indeed unique to the individual, Stein does not give up emphasizing the kinds in men and women. However, she does not and cannot classify people under certain categories according to the feeling of being in them as she does in the previous chapters. As she develops this final part, she seems to go into a realm which becomes increasingly experimental. Stein's language takes its most repetitive form; Stein draws attention to the problematic

of expressing "existence" or "being whose nature cannot be completely expressed" successfully by constant references to the materiality of language through these repetitions. The reader finds himself/herself in a position where he/she questions both being and the possibility of expressing being in language. The place where the reader is led to at the end of the novel is indeed where Stein stands just from the beginning. Besides telling the stories of the Herslands and the Dehnings, Stein decomposes her method and language as the novel develops. The last part is the ultimate point where it is realized that language is also an "other" for the individual. Gertrude Stein's destructing the ordinary and usual understanding of language creates the externality of language and leads one to define himself/herself in relation to language.

As already mentioned, *The Making of Americans* is the work where Gertrude Stein defines her selfhood in relation to the act of writing. Although the traces of her effort are seen throughout the work, her struggle for self definition in relation to language and writing becomes most obvious in the final part. Evaluated in terms of Winnicott's views on art as a potential space, it can be said that Stein's experimentation in writing is closely associated with the act of playing which has a shaping role in the individual's definition of external and internal reality:

> It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience (cf. Riviere, 1936) which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is "lost" in play. (Winnicott *Play and Reality*18)

Reality-acceptance originally includes the infant's growing awareness that he/she is not omnipotent and that he/she has to adapt to the environment. Although the individual seems to accept this condition, he/she still insists on controlling what us outside his/her control. The child uses play where he/she is freer and more omnipotent than he/she actually is in order to satisfy the need to be controlling; on the other side, the adult satisfies this need by positioning himself/herself in an intermediate area, which is an extension of play. The individual's past experiences

that determine his/her way of using this space, which is at the interplay between there being nothing but the individual and there being objects and phenomena outside omnipotent control.

According to Winnicott, creative playing and cultural experience that take place in the intermediate area can also be analyzed in a way similar to the play of children. The individual is in an unchallenged area where he/she can shape things under the effect of his/her past experiences. In the light of this information, it is possible to analyze the text as an intermediate area where the author positions himself/herself and performs "creative playing". "The History of a Family's Progress: From Birth to Death" chapter provides invaluable information for such an analysis because Gertrude Stein has already left the social and textual conventions behind and is now in a new area which opens new possibilities to her. Gertrude Stein's creative play which continues since the beginning of the work takes its extremest form in this final chapter since Stein forces the limits of language, the only tool that can limit her creative expression at this point. Her struggle for expressing existence within language gives the reader the chance how she defines herself as both an individual and an author in relation to language and existence. Stein's struggle is not only directed at the aim to go beyond the possibilities of language; Stein tries to draw attention to the growing awareness of existence in human beings. Although no one can grasp the exact nature of being, every one becomes conscious of the matter of life and death due to the continuity of existence between two certain points —birth and death. In other words, every individual is fated to confront being and nothingness at some point in the continuity called life.

The awareness of the temporal nature of human being's existence causes an inevitable existential anxiety. Although Gertrude Stein invites the reader to think about this matter, she does not elaborate on it. Rather, she directs her attention at family living —which is one of her major concerns throughout the work— and shows that it is possible to make the effects of the short existence of the individual on earth somehow longer. The continuity of one's family ensures the presence of the individual, even if he/she is dead, since there are still other

people who remember him/her. At this point, it is worth noting that Gertrude Stein does not use family living as a unit to explain or solve the individual's anxiety of existence; the most significant aspect of family living is that it goes on existing even if any member of family is dead —this fact leads one to think on the relatively longer life time of any family.

> Family living can go on existing. Very many are remembering this thing are remembering that family living can go on existing. Very many are quite certain that family living can go on existing. Very many are remembering that they are quite certain that family living can go on living. Any family living going on existing is going on and every one can come to be a dead one and there are then not any more living in that family living and that family is not then existing if there are not then any more having come to be living. (925)

The continuing existence of any family living forms the history of that family at the same time. The above quotation shows the reader how closely related Gertrude Stein considers the individual, family living, existence, and remembering; besides, this last paragraph reveals the novel's schema that the author follows since the beginning. Constructing the novel as a family saga, the author brings together the necessary elements to analyze human beings within the family setting. Through the depiction of the Herslands and the Dehnings, Stein invents a textual space for herself where she can analyze the individual both alone and in his/her relation with the family. While her analysis of the characters in their interactions with the others, family member or not, allows her to make a classification and definition based on types, the focus on the characters when they are not in contact with significant others around leads her to make deeper psychological analysis as in the case of David Hersland. As the author puts more emphasis on the individual rather than on his/her interaction with others, she finds herself in a new area where she feels the necessity of defining self in relation to the text. Stein's language becomes extremely repetitive in this area where she constantly draws attention to the limited possibility of expressing existence and selfhood in language. The fact that she does not make a decisive conclusion for this lengthy work is consistent with the problems presented in the text in that one can only make experiments on the possibilities of expressing existence in language since the exact nature of

being is unknown to the individual. Finally, Stein's use of present continuous throughout the last chapter is worth noting since such a use shows the reader that it is not possible to end either existential questioning or textual experimentation.

CONCLUSION

Gertrude Stein, whose works were more realistic in character in the early years of her career, defines herself as the literary genius of the twentieth century. She argues that being an author in a new era brings certain responsibilities and that the author must follow not only the contemporary quality of the work of art but the time sense of the new century as well. Based on this argument, Stein composes her writing in a way that will reflect the time sense of the twentieth century. The composition of her writing begins to be shaped after joins her brother, Leo Stein, in Paris where she meditates on her writing while running one of the most significant modernist salons in Europe. This meditation period, which is seen as her "silent period" by some, witnesses her development as an author. It is in this period that she leaves the social and literary conventions of the nineteenth century and begins to position herself as the author of the new century. Although her fight against the conventions brings the pain of alienation and solitude, Stein insists on the fact that she is a genius who represents the new century in literature. Bettina L. Knapp defines Stein's literary achievement as "incredible" and claims that "it was evident that [her incredible achievement] was deeply rooted in the literary soil of her time" (175). Gertrude Stein herself believes that she will be considered as less threatening and dislikable as a literary figure when her works become past. Contrary to her view, one of the prominent Stein critics, Richard Kostelanetz, argues that "even today most of her works are commonly misunderstood" (*The Yale Gertrude Stein* xiii) and adds that "the principal reason for such continued incomprehension is that her experiments in writing were conducted apart from the major developments in modern language" (xiii). Although both Stein's and Kostelanetz's assumptions are valid, the major point to be considered is that Stein's writing is a process of learning how to express self and temporality in language. To put it in another way, Stein tries to write the cosubstantiality of existence and temporality by forcing all the limits of her only medium for communication —language.

One of the most significant characteristics of the Steinian writing is that the author herself is no doubt the most important critic on her works. While she confronts each genre she uses and experiments on the the conventional textuality in her fiction, she tries to explain what such an intense experimentation process means in her nonfiction. She problematizes each genre and tries to determine her relation to that genre at the same time. Taken as a whole, it is possible to talk about Gertrude Stein as an author at two different levels: she is the writing subject and she is the critic that makes comments on the author and the text. Therefore, she is both the subject and the object of her writing, which makes many of her works autobiographical in character. This study deals with Stein's two autobiographies, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and *Everybody's Autobiography*, and her magnum opus *The Making of Americans,* in order to examine how she expresses selfhood and temporality in two different genres, namely the autobiography and the novel. Considered as a whole, Steinian writing can be defined as the verbalization of the author's memory and the construction/ deconstruction of selfhood and temportality so the problematics of Steinian writing should be evaluated within this framework. When examined from this perspective, the text can be seen as a realm for the construction/deconstruction/ reconstruction of self and writing where questioning the possibility of expressing existence in writing is inevitable.

In order to understand Stein's critical interest in her work, one should analyze what writing means to her. What attracts attention in Stein's writing career is that there is a long meditation period before her works become published. While her earlier works are realistic and based on descriptive psychology, her writing becomes increasingly experimental as she develops her views on language. In this period, she gets the everlasting feeling that comes from composing sentences which diagram themselves at the same time as well. Stein's views, which seem to depend upon that feeling, on language include a major point: the author not only examines language in theoretical terms but questions the relation of selfhood and temporality to language as well. From psychoanalytic point of view, this condition can be related to the author's object relations during

this period. Stein's writing is not taken seriously by her brother, Leo Stein, who is the most influential figure at that time and many people around her do not even know she is writing. Such a solitude causes an inevitable alienation although she spends significant amount of her time in a very popular salon, *Rue de Fleurus 27*. In these environmental conditions, Stein becomes a keen observer and tries to define her own self in relation to what she observes. At the beginning, Stein is interested in "bottom nature" in every person. However, this is an everlasting effort since "bottom nature" in one is continuously formed/reformed and since it has so many variations that it seems futile to try to cover them in one work. It is in this context that writing becomes a place where Stein constructs her sense of selfhood and her relation to the temporal dimension of existence. In this dissertation, the writer's major work *The Making of Americans* is analyzed in these terms. While the novel is a family saga at first glance, it is indeed Stein's examination of being in the present which is connected with both past and future. However, the story of two families, the Dehnings and the Herslands should not be neglected since it is through their stories that Stein tells about her family since their immigration to the United States, which forms the autobiographical nature of the novel.

In the early days of her career, Gertrude Stein is deeply interested in defining every type of person and revealing the similarities and differences among individuals, especially in *The Making of Americans*. Besides, she spends effort to describe people in present continuous, which results in the prolongation of the present in the novel. However, she sees that there are basic characteristics shared by every individual no matter how different he/she is as she develops her writing. Thus, she starts discussing sameness in difference, which underlies the constant use of repetition in the work. It is indeed these two tools, the prolongation of the present and repetition, which mark the author's rupture from conventional narrative patterns and shape the experimental nature of the novel. Among these two tools, repetition carries utmost importance. In her work *How Writing is Written*, Gertrude Stein clarifies the matter of repetition, which may seem to be a paradox to many readers:

> The question of repetition is very important. It is important because there is no such thing as repetition. Everybody tells every story in about the same way. You know perfectly well that when you and your roommates tell something, you are telling the same story in about the same way. But if you listen carefully, you will see that not all the story is the same. (158)

Stein's concluding remarks about repetition result from her method of observation and classification which she intensely uses early in her career. Every individual seems to repeat some version of being which differs slightly from others and very few of these individuals may show that they have "genuine existence". Then comes the question: What is genuine existence? Gertrude Stein assumes that the term refers to the existence of the individual who is aware of his/ her being-in-the world and of the finite nature of time. Such an awareness results in raising the question in regard to the meaning and expressibility of Being and time. It is indeed the search for the answer of this question that shapes Gertrude Stein's investigation into selfhood, writing, and the consciousness of existence and time.

The author's investigation is what makes her writing strategy a phenomenological inquiry into existence and temporality. In addition, the construction and deconstruction of selfhood as Gertrude Stein is drawn into the experimentation with language are examined within the framework of object relations theory in this dissertation. The author's analysis of the nature of beings, the Being, and the individual's relation to temporality can be investigated together with the formation of selfhood in Winnicottian terms. Especially in *The Making of Americans*, Stein tries to tell her family's life at a deeper level while telling about the Dehnings and the Herslands on the surface. This can only be achieved by the verbalization of memory which reveals the individual's relation to both his/her own self and other selves. When the autobiographical nature of the novel is considered, it will not be wrong to discuss the author's continuous use of present tense and forming the present's connection with both past and future as the basic elements of constructing and deconstructing selfhood in this context. Among these basic elements, obsessive use of present tense, which sometimes gives the

impression that there is a narrative amnesia in the text, is worth examining in terms of one's —especially author's— perception of selfhood and temporality. The original experience is immediately lost once it is expressed no matter how authentic it is since "the moment we are aware of 'being in the present', that present is already past" (Smith, Henry xvi-xvii). Therefore, it is impossible to catch present as it is. Despite being aware of this condition, Gertrude Stein does not refrain from using present tense in her major work, *The Making of Americans*. This results in a different dimension of the awareness of being in the world: the effort to catch present is indeed an effort to be the master of time, to preserve life and defy mortality. In this sense, the text can be read as a space where Gertrude Stein's own concerns in regard to the existence and temporality come into light besides being a phenomenological inquiry.

Another reason why *The Making of Americans* is placed into center of this dissertation is its developmental character or its "gradual making" in Stein's own words. The gradual making of the work witnesses the gradual formation of Stein's identity as an author as well. Depending on the simultaneous formation of the authorial identity and the text, the novel is accepted to provide a transitional space where the author both plays and experiments with language and constructs and deconstructs her sense of self. The definition of such a potential space and its analysis in terms of object relations theory makes it possible to investigate how Gertrude Stein becomes increasingly independent of the social and textual conventions and to trace the author's adventure of expressing existence in language. Since there is no formula to achieve what the author aims in her writing, she warns her readers that they should be patient during their reading process because the results of experimentation can be grasped in time. This lets her turn the text into the center of her experiments and investigations in language.

When the underlying psychoanalytic and existential reasons are ignored, Gertrude Stein's texts whixh are so full of experimentation are mere nonsense and the constant use of the present tense and repetition is part of a childish play. However, such a criticism has no sound bases. The literature of the turn of the

century when Stein starts writing is still dominated by the conventional norms of the nineteenth century. When the character of Steinian writing is considered, it is immediately grasped that these norms are not sufficient for Stein to fulfil her aim. Starting from this point, Stein tries to clarify what language and specifically literary forms mean and how she can use language as suitable to her own literary concerns. In the course of writing *The Making of Americans*, she realizes the question of expressibility. Her basic tools for writing provide the material for her work; however, it is impossible to use these tools without making too many repetitions. When her insistence on the use of the prolonged present is added, *The Making of Americans* becomes a space where Stein confronts language and selfhood as well as their relation to temporality. It is this confrontation that turns this major work into a transitional space for the author where she can experiment with expressing self and time.

It can well be argued that Gertrude Stein's autobiographies, *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* and *Everybody's Autobiography*, and her nonfiction are efforts to explain what she achieves in *The Making of Americans*. In this dissertation, both autobiographies are given place in order to examine the autobiographical nature of Stein's writing in general and to follow how Gertrude Stein, herself, perceives her writing process. In addition, these works help the reader understand how the author evaluates her past and present. Since one's perception of an everyday event changes as the moment passes, it becomes possible to follow the traces of Gertrude Stein's conception of her own life which is a significant issue in her nonfiction. Although these works challenge and problematize the conventions of autobiography, they can still be discussed in more traditional terms. What attracts attention in both texts is Stein's effort to present herself as a genius and to explain why she is writing in this way. Her expression that "writing belongs to her" arrives its full meaning at this point as Stein considers herself as omnipotent in writing, which is the main potential space for her, in Winnicottian terms.

In this study, how Gertrude Stein uses writing as a potential space and what her experimentation means in terms of her investigation into the nature of self and temporality are examined within psychoanalytic and existential terms. Attention is drawn to the continuous transformation of selfhood and the freeing nature of writing as a transitional space for Stein. The author keeps potential space as an area which does not threat her since it belongs to her, on the one hand, and also continuously deconstructs the space she constructed in order to create an area for further investigation, on the other. The important point to be considered here is that Stein's use of writing as a potential space is not an unconscious activity. Starting from *Three Lives*, which is her first published work, Stein follows a writing strategy based on cognition rather than inspiration. In all her works including her nonfiction, she focuses on herself sometimes directly and sometimes through characters which resemble to actual people in her life. Her increasing focus on language leads her to question the matter of expressibility, which forms the cognitive basis of her writing. Within this framework, this dissertation argues that the cognitive basis of Stein's writing is related to the construction and deconstruction of selfhood and temporality as well as language. Thus, the examination of the author's works from the perspective of object relations school provides valuable information about Stein's writing in general. In future studies, the data obtained in this dissertation can be discussed in terms of phenomenological psychoanalysis and further data can be obtained especially on the existential character of the author's works.

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