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**COLORFUL REVOLUTIONS IN SERBIA, GEORGIA
AND UKRAINE: A STATE-BASED APPROACH**

Caner TEKİN

Danışman
Doç Dr. Celal Nazım İREM

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Yemin Metni

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ABSTRACT

Master Thesis

Colorful Revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine:

A State-based Approach

Caner Tekin

Dokuz Eylul University

Institute of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

International Relations Program

This study seeks to explore the transition to democracy in post-communist countries, with specific reference to the so-called ‘color’ revolutions and societal transformations in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. By doing so, it scrutinizes the role of ruling elites and political institutions in respective transitions and social disorder, at the end of the process. Instead of a monist approach to external factors in the color revolutions, it undertakes the influence posed by dichotomic tension between the ‘demanding’ civil society and ‘resisting’ state/political elites.

Key Words: Democratization, Color Revolutions, State, Civil Society, Institutionalization.

ÖZET
Yüksek Lisans Tezi
Sırbistan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna’da Renkli Devrimler:
Devlet Merkezli bir Yaklaşım
Caner Tekin

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
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Bu çalışma komünizm sonrası ülkelerde demokrasiye geçiş sürecini Sırbistan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna’daki renkli devrimlere özel atıf yaparak incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Çalışma bu doğrultuda, münhasır geçiş dönemleri ve toplumsal düzensizliklerdeki yönetici elitlerin ve siyasi kurumların rollerini ele almaktadır. Renkli devrimler üzerindeki dışsal faktörleri gözetken tekil bir yaklaşım yerine, çalışma “talep eden” sivil toplum ile “direnc gösteren” yönetici elitler arasındaki iki yanlı gerginliğin geçiş süreçleri üzerindeki etkisini temel factor olarak öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratikleşme, Renkli Devrimler, Devlet, Sivil Toplum, Kurumsallaşma.

**COLORFUL REVOLUTIONS IN SERBIA, GEORGIA AND UKRAINE: A
STATE-BASED APPROACH**

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|------|--|
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| EU | European Union |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| NGO | Nongovernmental Organization |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| p. | Page Number |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| US | United States |

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INTRODUCTION

In 5th of October 2000, Slobodan Milosevic, the leader notorious with his war crimes and his dictatorship above the Serbian Community was overthrown. There was no armed resistance, but nonviolent revolutions in the streets and in front of the parliament. Three years later, on November 2003, Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze faced the same fate. Demonstrators entering the parliament and taking him out was grasping roses, this event became a myth and named the Rose Revolution of Georgia. Next year in November-December 2004, Ukrainian masses rebelled against the authority and finalized pro-Russian government. Because they were wearing orange, the movement was called Orange Revolution. Incidents of all breakdowns took place by civil hands, with nonviolent means as a response to so-called manipulated elections.

The international media just hailed those demonstrations and breakdowns in a belief that civil society would be spurred. When the comments of international public arena focused on civil society, they also pointed role of a transnational civil nongovernmental organizations. External support of those organizations was not only maintained in financial data, but also in revolutionary chain bringing Serbian, Georgian and Ukrainian activists together. The color revolutions were thus fixed to be memorized as the success of external drives. This, overemphasis on external factors in color movements is the point that this study challenges. It offers a hypothesis regarding the reality that these episodes are not “given”, instead these are “finalité” of a process within an ongoing economic and political transition, which had various controversies.

The survey on the literature, regarding of the study based mostly on conceptual history and assessing three cases in the established theoretical format drives the existing study to some intentions. At first, the study had been shaped as a response to some extent, much-debated on color revolutions as movements qua external factors. So called “The Soros Effect”, revolutions are assumed to take place via financial assistance of Open Society Institute, as well as several official

American civil society organizations such as USAID, National Endowment for Democracy or National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.¹ These organizations have become successful when they accelerated the revolutionary process and not only did they care of breakdown of authoritarian regimes, but they also supported construction of the new regime. George Soros in that manner financed the Rose Revolution, then agreed to fund the government officials for one year of aftermath and put Saakashvili on 1500\$ salary, to stabilize and refine governance from corruption.² In a phrase, it is not possible to deny the pivotal role of external factors concretized in NGO's, considering their part in mobilization of masses and reinforcing activists/opposition elites.

These views regarding the external influence on the ongoing revolutionary wave could be appropriate, however this does not prevailing the fact that they are grasping a monist approach. In this attitude, as if external factors were vital to emerge of the colored process, revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan would have been successful indeed. Nevertheless, taking Serbia apart, the country constructed in a "hopeful" phase qua its changing institutions and the transition secured by EU anchorship, other incidents are usually open to question in terms of fate of the revolutionary process and the future of the democracy. Thus, in the bushy path of transition through a democratic regime, external factors alone seem to be insufficient.

Second they are exiguous again in the explanation of why those revolutions broke up. For there had been a preminent, inner preparation phase which laid its roots in socioeconomic change inside society and state, a deeper outlook investigating any alternation and breaking points in different social strata before the onset of color revolutions is what this study's main aim. Accordingly, instead of a monist approach to external factors in color revolutions, the study undertakes the influence posed by transition on the dichotomic tension between the 'demanding'

¹ Ian Traynor, "US Campaign Behind the Turmoil in Kiev", *The Guardian*, 26.11.2004

² Thomas Goltz, *Georgia Diary: A Chronical of War and Political Chaos in the Post-Soviet Caucasus*, Armonk, New York, 2006, p.228

civil society and ‘resisting’ state/political elites. The transition is to that extent a process former Soviet or socialist countries faced throughout the world.

The process has two different liberalizations. One is economic liberalism in the direction to free market economy, which covers restructuring economy and total production. Meanwhile it has some side effects in the regulation process, rapid GDP growth or fluctuations in economic data indirectly influence masses in terms of unemployment, inflation and poverty. The other dimension of globalization is assumed to be in political liberalization leading a more democratic and transparent governance with the principle “rule of law” in whole administrative area, plus no restriction of individuals to engage democratic decision-making process. This is related with series of political institutionalization granting the society and state machine to the conditions of democracy, at the end of the transition process. The story below is by and large about the gap between two liberalizations and its reflections on controversies between civil society and ruling elites.

The first part deals with the circumstances of democracy, by giving specific reference to the study of Third Wave. The literati on the consolidation of liberal democracy generally base their arguments on some internal inputs, dynamics and forces. They mostly focus on the necessity of the consolidation under the influence of some elements. The formulas as abstractions of them such as civil society, income per capita or even religion were invented in order to theorize waving democracies, especially the third wave phenomenon. In the first part, it introduced some definitive approaches in identification of democracy, as well as theoretical contributions. Then compatibility of post-communist transitions with third wave democratic movement was undertaken.

The study gets an institutionalist approach to the definition of democracy, as well as in its research design. In the beginning, it thus utilizes some of works from scholars getting an institutional design to the meaning and conditions of democracy. Larry Diamond, Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Graeme Gill are some of them; ones covered the transition process as a consolidation through increasing institutional

capacity. Huntington was also one of them somehow; except his works on clash of civilizations and cultural-religious biases adopted before a democratic development he had made his output on political institutionalization as a set of suggestions to the emerging second wave democracies.

The study scrutinizes the differentiation between civil and political society, which are similar in essence but dissimilar in their functional width. Political society, wherein definitions of Hegel, Locke and Tocqueville were cited connotes to new level in a new epoch that civil society gains full capacity to participate the decision making process and politics in a larger meaning, via civic rights guaranteed. Because guaranteeing needs protection under institutions, say a specific amount of institutionalization over the state of political society, it covered a range of democratization theories within an institutional perspective. The first chapter thus illustrates such perspectives in the study of democratization.

Second part seeks to clearly introduce the incidents of color revolutions by historical background. Undertaking of those events had some communities inside: he most heading figures seemed to be political elites that make the transition as interplay between them, and nongovernmental organizations cited as western influence based on funding and recruitment of revolution activists. A third common characteristic posing to incidents seen in both cases called “stolen” elections as triggering factors was stressed. Though elections are nexuses between civil society and political elites, violating those elections means absence of such nexus.

Third part is mostly related with economic aspect of the transition process. Civil societies in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine faced harsh and challenging results of economic decline, in the level of giant poverty and unemployment incomparable with any Western country. It is mostly referred to the economic aspect of transition process that brought serious side effects to the society, as the economic structure was renewed, GDP was regulated and redistributed. It there sketched some numerical data about economic fluctuations, in order to show level of dissatisfaction in the masses. The study takes activities of NGOs as important signs of civil society, but

rather it tends to utilize mobilization capability of masses in its hypothesis. Apparently the level of unsatisfactory level on wealth as well as political disturbances, corruptions and instabilities effecting social life fed the mobilization capacity of civil society. Inspired from Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's approaches in their book called "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", it is thus claim of the study that due to the economic conditions or aftermath of the economic transition, masses within socioeconomic change turn to a stratum with mobilization capacity that demands socioeconomic-political change (qua institutions) from the ruling class.

If such is the case, did the ruling elites respond the masses by granting such changes? The last chapter draws upon this question by showing series of violations and manipulations of governments in the political system of three cases. It underlines the fact of the political institutionalizations to meet society's demands and adapting the needed transformation of political system within the transition process. It applies to Samuel Huntington earlier work, "Political Order in Changing Societies", citing the vitality of political institutionalization in third world states. In the latest phase before color revolutions too, sufficient level of institutions enabling the transparent governance and democratic decision making process are main requirements in view of the facts about evolving civil society, turning to be more "demanding" and more "political".

CHAPTER 1. DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Fareed Zakaria, in his famous article dealt with the increasing amount of liberally seemed authoritarian states, which has lacked constitutional liberalism and core human rights³. Albeit there is a tendency towards “democracy” says he, they are generally consisted of (if they are) free and fair elections. This leaves doubts on performance of developing states and thus raises a question that in what extent they owe democracy with liberal terms, with Zakaria’s term “constitutional liberalism”.

This question is current about the post-communist revolutions too. It is debatable whether the cases assumed to be “newly democratized countries” possessed democratic and survivable institutions. Additionally, some tend to see free and fair elections, minimalist conditions for democracy as sufficient at the preliminary stage of democratization in those countries⁴. Free and fair elections form an important institution but its sufficiency for a working democracy is under question. Called procedural minima, their presence contributes only a “Façade Democracy”.⁵ So, the chapter starts with the ambiguous definition of democracy and some of the debates on its requirements.

The literati on the consolidation of liberal democracy generally base their arguments on some internal inputs, dynamics and forces. They mostly focus on the necessity of the consolidation under the influence of those elements. The formulas as abstractions of them such as civil society, income per capita or even religion were invented in order to theorize waving democracies, especially the third wave phenomenon. Here, some definitive approaches to the definition of democracy, as

³ Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, *Foreign Affairs*, November 1997

⁴ Such optimistic comments about the relationship between democracy and electoral process are also given on the colored revolutions. For an instance, see Steven Woehrel, “CRS Report for Congress: Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and US Policy” April 1, 2005 p.10 available in <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32845.pdf>

⁵ Graeme Gill, *Democracy and Post-Communism*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003, p.4. He asserts Georgia and Ukraine as façade democracy with their procedural minima, and Serbia non-democracy with no proper operation in democratic institutions. *ibid*, p.180

well as theoretical contributions consist the first part. Then compatibility of post-communist transitions with third wave democratic movement is undertaken.

It is important to note that this theoretical part is an overview of a broader scholarship. The study has no intention to introduce whole theoretical approaches, but it aims to refer to major texts of the field, main concepts and a set of main theoretical contributions, especially ones making specific reference to the political institutionalization. It tries to undertake under key concepts below democratization is studied, such as economic society, civil society, and how the democratization theory deals with them. Between two concepts and in case they institutionally engaged to the politics, the study heeds the term political society and the legal background forged by political institutions. At first general information about third wave approach and its main tenets on democratization will be handled.

1.1 Three Waves of Democratizations

The consolidation of liberal democracies worldwide is not a new issue in the scholarship of democratization. Many one had dealt with it; one of them was Samuel Huntington, who named the notorious “third wave” incident. According to him, the three democratization movements impacted the world history⁶. One was the first gradual and “long“ way of democratization from 1828 to 1926, which was rooted by constitutional movements American and French revolution leaded. It was underlined with its steady development; but debates inside this wave also stressed some of the dissimilarities between evolution and revolution. British democratization was taken accordingly; a process based on social ground and formed its own conservatives, who were maintaining their gradualist views. French Revolution for a long time excluded from those tenets with its revolutionary and seemingly like “top to down” characteristic in its implementation.⁷ Respective characteristics in the making of French Revolution and its aftermath were pointed as a subject of criticism, by

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991, pp.13-26

⁷ Barrington Moore, *Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1993, pp.40-45

English scholars of the literature rising since 1688 Bloodless Revolution in UK.⁸ They took the steady, gradual and grassroots-level development of English canons and its peek in 1688 events as challenging to the French mentality of centrism. From Edmund Burke to Jeremy Bentham and John Mill those scholars stressed upon certain traditions that balanced ruler-citizen relationship under legal basis such as universal suffrage inherited to early American democratization approaches.⁹

The debate between ones that sided with British and French revolutions took a considerable part within that epoch. Reflecting the gradual characteristic of the first wave democratization, Edmund Burke was a leading critic on French Revolution by knocking ad hoc and top to down institutionalizations inside the movement. To exemplify, one of his criticism pointed that British conservatism expressed on the French Revolution that the Revolutionary Movement had cut off the gradual period of democratization in France. Burke had gotten such a gradualist idea of democratization. He was aware of the liberties inherited from step-by-step movements in the Britain, such as a process from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Rights.¹⁰ He underlines and praises the gradual aspect of British politics, indicating, “we have an inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties from long line ancestors”.¹¹ According to him; the French Revolution, although it had such advantages inherited from long, stable and fascinating past of the state, undermined those roots and renewed the sociopolitical ties as if civil society had never arisen.¹² Burke thus maintained his stance on gradually developing democratization in accordance to the general opinion in the European continent.

Citing European tradition, there was a consensus on western countries as flagmen of democratization. Those movements had a tradition derived from interplay

⁸ Anthony, S. Jarrells, *Britain's Bloodless Revolutions*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, pp.1-23

⁹ Adrian Oldfield, “Liberal Democratic Theory, Some Reflections on Its History and Its Present”, John Garrard, Vera Tolz and Ralph White (eds), *European Democratization since 1800*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000, St Martin's Press, New York, 2000, pp.9-11

¹⁰ Edmund Burke, *Reflections on The Revolution in France*, (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1978), p.119

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² *ibid.*, p.122

between parts of powers called ruler class, bourgeoisie and working class/peasants that Barrington Moore indicates first condition of democracy lays in a gradual development on a balance between those forces.¹³ This tendency apparently continued after the First World War but it was interrupted by rise of fascism with the fall of Weimar Germany.

After a counter movement in favor of authoritarianism intervened the period, second wave retook the political floor between 1943 and 1962, under the influence of victory of allies in the Second World War. The need of getting in the stage of Western Camp made the governments in urgency to “democratize” themselves, by rapidly implementing a series of institutionalizations in favor of elections, parliamentarism or multiparty system. This wave had grounding differences from the first in its foundation, that the relevant countries had been expected to change their institutions without a traditional background including a democratic culture, which was rooted in the first wave cases. The democratization process also fell upon a bipolar rivalry and in the end; a counter movement in the late 1950’s again interrupted it.

Again witnessing second authoritarian counter tendency, the third wave democratization reintroduced by the loosening and breakdown of the Socialist camp, have stood from 1975 to the present day. The loosening in the bipolar fragmentation and rise in the European influence were some of the reasons behind such a total move. In the light of Helsinki accords and Perestroika the movement had acceleration, but the main motive was thought to be weakening authoritarian regimes worldwide.¹⁴

¹³ Moore, *Dictatorship and Democracy...*, pp. 430-431

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, The Free Press, New York, Maxwell Macmillan, Toronto, 1992, pp.13-22, 39-40

Table 1.1: Waves of Democratization Throughout the History

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| First, long wave of democratization | 1828-1926 |
| First reverse wave | 1922-1942 |
| Second, short wave of democratization | 1943-1962 |
| Second reverse wave | 1958-1975 |
| Third wave of democratization | 1974-... |

Source: Huntington, *The Third Wave...*, p.16

Because this wave has been different from a gradual, constitutional evolution like as well as second one, its nature became debatable on its durability. There have been different facets inside the third wave, including post-communist transitions and European-Latin American liberations from dictatorships. As those showed different symptoms in essence, they followed dissimilar paths to the democratic ideal, such as simultaneously economic and democratic development with an external anchor like European Union; or much more differently, inter-elite conflicts in post communist transitions. It is thus claimed that by its nature, post communist democratizations have idiosyncrasies than the classical third wave examples. Color revolutions seem to be erupting in such circumstances among transition processes in economic and political meanings.

1.2 Theoretical Streams and Approaches to the Definition of Democracy

The global process of democratization and particularly the third way are differently evaluated by different stances. One of them, for instance is Graeme Gill's, which contain conceptualization of culture and economics-oriented groupings¹⁵. In his formulation, the cultural approach basically sees a relationship between the level of democracy and cultural values such as civic culture or Protestantism. This, which is best exemplified by Samuel Huntington, brought a set of bias on developing societies mostly from Middle East. The economic approach in contrast dwells upon relationship between democracy and economic development, mostly known with

¹⁵ Greame Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process*, St Martin's Press, New York, 2000, pp.2-8

Seymour Martin Lipset or Adam Przeworski. Finally the transition literature counts neither structural factors like economic ones or cultural values, but actor-based processes which lacks civil society in their explanatory tone.¹⁶

Generally such classifications come by comparing indicated ingredients of democratization; such as structural and actor-based ones.¹⁷ Accordingly the democratization literature was shaped by structuralist stance Seymour Martin Lipset opened. Structural outlook to democratization focused on socio-economic development signified by economic growth and income per capita as prerequisites of democracy. Falsifying validness of such a unilinear approach, scholars like Adam Przeworski, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter opened a new debate regarding democracy as an actor-related process. They demarcated that economic factors are not unique requirement or denominator of democracy¹⁸. However, they also became fragile to criticisms. As Larry Diamond states, elite-centered approaches of them specified in the work of O'Donnell and Schmitter seemed to be lacking those factors.¹⁹ The Third Wave democratization studies in 1990's, on the third class has generally stressed on both socioeconomic and actor-based requirements leading to a complete consolidation, just like civil control, welfare or rule of law.²⁰

By alluding outlook of the third wave study, the paper aims to associate substantial requirements of post-communist democratization like institutionalization, economic development and emerging political society. So it tends to dwell upon some of the characteristics of what Third Wave studies submit under evaluation of three streams of scholars, Samuel Huntington, Larry Diamond and Juan Linz &

¹⁶ *ibid*, p.7

¹⁷ Lisa Rakner, Alina Rocha Menocal and Verena Fritz, *Democratization's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned*, Overseas Development Institute (ODI Working Papers no. 1) London, 2007, pp.8-9

¹⁸ To begin with O'Donnell and Schmitter's words, welfare and socialist states have showed the inapplicability of the theory that democracy is rigidly dependent with the economic development. Rather, attainability and equal distribution of goods did not necessarily lead to the high amount of popular participations; high available goods of the market can provide also unequal distribution. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore Maryland, 1986, pp.12-13

¹⁹ Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World*, Times Books/Henry Holt & Company 2008, p.102

²⁰ *ibid*, p.9

Alfred Stepan. Accordingly they have various and respective approaches to the democratization. Some of differences lie in the definition of democracy, that like most of democratization studies, Huntington assumes the definition of democracy as something minimal, given and frozen. To exemplify, he sees “free, open and fair elections” as a common element in democracies, a somehow sufficient indicator.²¹ He is also notorious with his religion-based bias to the democratic values, as preconditions for democracy. Larry Diamond, another scholar on democratization studies has a try to strengthen definition of the democracy by applying Dahlian approach as well as his contribution. He completely sees democratic values something happened as a result of economic development, not religious changes. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan finally, deal with a more institutional framework for democratic consolidation. They stress on the civil society but more importantly they sketch its capability to become / remain a political society, to enunciate a democratic regime. To examine the democratic conditions in post-communist countries, a systematic outlook to some of those approaches opening a new path beyond political institutions between civil and political society may be auxiliary.

Role of institutions are also undertaken in definitive approaches. Since ancient times scholars give a try to define the term democracy. Among the various studies, those definitions had been evaluated whether they are minimalist or substantive.²² The need of minimalist, core assumptions is directly related with overcoming blurriness in different definitions and finding atomistic common points in a comparison between different regimes. In the terminology of political science, Joseph Schumpeter was one of the firsts, who dealt with the need of a procedural and working definition of democracy. According to him democracy had classical and modern meanings. To the classical side it connotes to that “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will”.²³

²¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave...*, p.9

²² Rakner, Rocha and Fritz, *Democratization's Third Wave...*, p.6

²³ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy*, London & New York: Rutledge, 1994, p.250

Referring to classical definition, therefore he pointed out the “common good” to tie citizens in an institutional framework, to create the common will. Thus he saw a direct relationship between democracy and economic development, as the will of the majority was provided by material utility.²⁴ However he was also aware of the common good might have differed among citizens; their meaning could be intentionally blurred. Thus, to stress on the struggle for leadership, institutional dimension to the definition is needed. So, he made his own approach to democracy by giving that “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.²⁵ This definition contains the role of institutions as well as political society that the political arena is seen as an intergroup struggle.

Another famous approach, which is assumed to be minimalist sketched procedures and norms of democracy, was Robert Dahls’s. Dahl made a try to modernize definition of the democracy. Accordingly, he adduced a completely working democracy is an imaginary ideal; only a lower level called poliarchy may be reached in pluralist regimes.²⁶ He put requirements of poliarchy in three groups of civilian rights such as formulating and signifying preferences and finally having principles determined in relationship with government.²⁷ General niches of those groups are:

1. Governmental decisions must be output of will of civil society, namely there must be not transcendental drives, but civilian control over political mechanism.
2. Elections must be fair and free. Zero tolerance must be given to violations and manipulations.
3. An adult franchise must be universal. Whole individuals in a defined age level signing adultery must be given the right to vote.

²⁴ *ibid*, pp.251-252

²⁵ *ibid*, p.269

²⁶ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971. p.2

²⁷ *ibid*, p.3

4. A general right of being candidate for public management. Individuals must be given not only capability of electing, but also the right to represent and govern the public.

5. A general freedom of expression must be given. This includes independence and immunity of individuals, interest groups and media etc...

6. Lack of monopolization in any way of reaching information. Mentioning independence of expression, any civil entity like media must also reach and update either public or governmental information as well as state archives.

7. A general right to found or participate civil society associations. Individuals to express their interests and demands must have the right to form an independent civil society organization maintained by civic rights such as freedom of expression.

Larry Diamond similarly gives his thick dimensions of democracy similar to Dahlian criteria such as universal adult suffrage or civilian control over institutions in order to see the basic conditions of democratic quality.²⁸ However, what Diamond disagree is these are insufficient to understand to what extent the democracy is consolidated. As he exemplifies, “free and fair elections” would not be enough for Iranian regime to be a democracy, as long as some upper religious institutions controlling the politics are not accountable to the people.²⁹ Therefore, considering minimalist views for definition of democracy, its conditions also become subject of inquiry. Hence a new scope, a deeper outlook for substantive approaches regarding characteristics and processes inside the political regime through a transition are born.

Substantive definitions are given to project the infrastructure, which is directly linked to the consolidation of democracy. For one of the most clear and explanatory instance of definition, Linz and Stepan handled what consolidated democracy is by a behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional.³⁰ A democratic regime is thought behaviorally, when there is no actor applying to the nondemocratic means such as violence to secede. Second, it is attitudinally understood by Linz and Stepan

²⁸ Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy...*, pp. 22-23

²⁹ *ibid.* p.22

³⁰ Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan *Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1996, p.7

as something when there is no or less (and isolated) anti-systemic faction, and the vast majority of population keeps their belief in democratic institutions. Finally, a constitutional approach defines a democratic regime with settlement of disputes by “rule of law”, relevant codes and institutions binding for both governmental and nongovernmental forces.

The advantage of those views like Linz and Stepan submitted is that consolidation brings routinization in political and psychological institutions.³¹ Second, in such an approach civil society is taken into account of democratization process.³² If so, deeper approaches to democratic consolidation seeking to clarify the survivability of democratic regimes consider institutionalizations and processes of political and economic developments for civil society leading to a democratic culture. Those approaches under cultural, economic and societal developments form roots of a broader stance to the substantial definition of democracy.

1.3 Cultural and Economic Factors of Democratization

In democratization literature, some inspirations and democratic values are linked with substantial definition of the democracy. This is taken in psychological attitudes of society including trust to democratic regime or political system or intolerance to illegal means, violations etc... Hence cultural preconditions are necessary requirements for democracy; their absence is also an issue of question. Various studies on democracy-culture relationship may be grouped in two fold: one looking for a nexus between democracy and local cultural tenets and the other which underestimates those factors or regards them as incompatible with consolidation of democracy.

At first, studies on culture deal with how the cultural tenets in democratizing countries may give a way to a democratic change. To concretize, in Islamic studies religious chronicles are not questioned but their interpretations, thus the role of

³¹ *ibid*, p.5

³² Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization...*, p. 238

foundations and brotherhoods are concerned in democratic consolidation.³³ Furthermore in the transition studies the focused point could be on economic underdevelopment as well as constructing democratic values. Accordingly, due to some traumatic events during the transition from Soviet Union to secessions of particular republics the state-based economic recovery gave minimum part to self-expression and similar liberties, which are essential for democratic values.³⁴ Expectations for the democratic consolidation in those parts are rather optimistic, however.

Second, those local tenets are assumed to predispose enclosures before a transition. Samuel Huntington's focus on democratic consolidation seemed to be much more culture-oriented and religiously biased. For, he exposes religion as a sign of ability to change; he gives examples from the converted Korean Protestant people and their democratic achievement within changing values.³⁵ Here, someone could opt that Huntington, who looked through a religious thus prejudged view was under the influence of his following work, the Clash of Civilizations.

However, Huntington's Third Wave seems to be much more universalist, comparing with his later approach called Clash of Civilizations. In his study on democratization he is much more positive, by declaring democratization is a set of some ingredients inevitable for humankind whereas in Clash of Civilizations he gives up such optimism and presupposes an incoming/ongoing conflict between cultures. By proclaiming an East-West conflict is inevitable, he also stresses on cultural differences among different cosmoes barricade before democracy. Comparing two studies, in Third Wave Democratization his factors are achievable whereas in Clash of Civilizations he saw those ones as reasons why countries with cultures different than West cannot consolidate democracy.³⁶

³³ Daniel E. Price, *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy and Human Rights: A Comparative Study*, Praeger, London, 1999, p.185

³⁴ Ronald Ingleheart, "East European Value Systems in Global Perspective", Hans Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka, *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, Routledge, New York and Oxon, 2006, Taylor and Francis eLibrary, 2006, pp.83-84

³⁵ *ibid.*, p.72

³⁶ Mark R. Thompson, *Democratic Revolutions in Asia and Europe*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004, pp.98-99. Democracy as a reachable ideal in "Third

Thus, “cultural effects” are not new in democratization literature; however their applicability is different that some stress on democratic values as a result of socioeconomic development³⁷ and some (like Huntington did) reflects on their prejudgments about cultural incapacibilities. The latter shows a quite cultural bias before democratic consolidation and the former centers economic development, giving room for the capacity to reach a bouquet of democratic values.

As stipulated, the economic factors have been within the criteria of the democratization literature. En passant, Samuel Huntington did not only stress on cultural factors, but he renewed relationship between economic development and democracy as a result of middle class-led boost, by referring to the structural thinkers.³⁸ The gradual theory implicates that economic development’s major contribution to democratization is a rising middle class, which in the end obtains a substantial share in the decision-making system via franchising, civil society activities or a direct political action. It’s important to quote from Seymour Martin Lipset’s famous work, which firstly related civil economic development in terms of income per capita and internal dynamics of democratization. He classifies them in titles called wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education.³⁹ By overemphasizing wealth and education, he concedes the influence of those factors in a gradual democratic development.

Various studies have showed the invalidness of that approach. Taking as instance, Przeworski and Limongi have proved that the important existence for a threshold of income per capita seems to be problematic that it enables authoritarian regimes to survive.⁴⁰ Anyway, the middle class effect also relates to the breakdown

Wave” is one of the differences from perspectives from his later work *Clash of Civilizations*. Accordingly, “Snowballing effect”, the term cited among elements in order to formulize the Third Wave democratization again is applicable in every country, as a contrary to cultural biases given in *Clash of Civilizations*. *ibid.*, p.100

³⁷ Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy...*, pp.98-102

³⁸ Huntington, *The Third Wave...*, p.59

³⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Doubleday, New York, 1960, p.48

⁴⁰ See Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development; Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World: 1950-1990*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000

of authoritarian regimes via their increasing ability in mobilization.⁴¹ On the other hand, Huntington also warns inverse effects of economic development as rapid growth, boost in GDP and unemployment as factors before instability and unhealthy regime change.⁴²

It seems Huntington gives special emphasis to role of the ruling elites in regime change and those stresses in his formula seemed to be far from a liberally seen democratization. He lacks the role of civil society, but agrees in elite-based movements in democratic consolidation.⁴³ To that extent, some works filled that gap and reformulated the role of civil society. Some of them, Linz-Stepan and Diamond stress on civil society, institutional effects upon them and legitimacy leading to a stable democratic consolidation. Their emphasis on the civil society as important but insufficient factor without a political identity is also related to the struggle of emerging civil society to become political one in third wave examples and colorful revolutions.

1.4 Sine Qua Non Condition for a Working Democracy: A Vivid Societal Life

One important example from Linz and Stepan, which constituted an institutional key to the democratization studies, evaluates conditions before a gradual democratization as five-fold ingredient: civil society, political society, rule of law and state apparatus.⁴⁴ What seem to be unique to them are the capability in between civil society and political society by regarding democratic values, mobilization capacity and also the institutional framework that the state forms. This is a relevant debate also in post communist democratizations, social transitions and the change the society faced. In further sections it will be argued that such a transition processes towards being a political society.

⁴¹ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization...*, pp.15-17

⁴² Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 69-71

⁴³ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization...*, pp. 124-125

⁴⁴ Linz & Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation...*, pp.3-15

Civil society by definition of Hegel is a general egoism in contrast state forms general altruism, by refining civilian preferences.⁴⁵ He marked out the civil society by three moments that involved individual satisfaction and needed mediation, second universal liberty such as property rights and implementation of guarantees of particular interests.⁴⁶ Linz and Stepan articulates it, civil society composed by individuals, organizations and interlinked movements that are autonomous from the state machinery,⁴⁷ Different from Hegelian view, it is a normative and omnipotent stratum therefore having capabilities to oppose and control the state actions.

Civil society has different foundations also in John Locke's stance. Locke believed that in order to save their civic rights and as a result of a bilateral agreement with state, men passed from human nature to the civil society.⁴⁸ Lockean views were differing in some stances like political characteristic of civil society, or genre of the social agreement. Hobbes, as an instance accented social agreement between state and people, ending the catastrophic era of human nature whereas Locke perceived it as handmade inside society, between people and people leading them to guarantee over civil and political rights.⁴⁹ Locke was also differing than Rousseau that he was regarding society not in the scope of common will but with an egalitarian view.⁵⁰ Second, he was dissimilar in assuming relationship between sovereign and the people as fundamental that created legitimacy of actors. Furthermore in terms of political feature of civil society Locke draws a different picture than his contemporary colleagues, somehow close to the modern view. To compare, his civil society was different than Hegel's; Locke emphasized political rights much more than him, who saw state as over the society. Lockean political society saw state instrumental to the society when Hegelian state was a provider above it.

⁴⁵ Georg Wilhelm Frederic Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 220-221

⁴⁶ *ibid*, p.226

⁴⁷ Linz & Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation...*, *ibid*, p. 7

⁴⁸ John Locke(author), Thomas Peardon (ed), *Second Treaties of Government*, Bobbs-Merrill Indianapolis 1960 pp.8-14

⁴⁹ For Locke- Hobbes comparison in modern security and government, see Tamar Meisels, "How Terrorism Upsets Liberty?" *Political Studies*, vol.53, 2005, pp.162-181

⁵⁰ Ian Shapiro, John Locke's Democratic Theory, *John Locke, Two Treaties of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration* Ian Shapiro (ed) Yale University Press, New Heaven and New York , 2003, pp.309-310

Seemingly the term civil society is open to change. It's meaning changed throughout the history and under those illuminating theoretical debates. It is again continuing through more liberalized tenets. Yet, however a consensus has existed on its material and economic infrastructure, based on property. Namely it is a phenomenon meaningful with economic freedom, as it concluded.

However the comments given above had been existed outside contemporary democratic regimes. The civil society is required to be rethought in a contemporary democratic context. Additionally its political meaning is to be denominated in order to mention a working civil society. Thus, some institutions to regulate the relationship between masses and the power in a democratic regime and to grant civil society to the political society are optive. If so, a political society opens institutional framework and legitimacy it offers to debate.

Having dealt with the contribution of the civil society to the transitionary process, it is needed to question whether a working civil society is sufficient. Hegel is known with applying civil society with economic practice, accordingly "civil society has gained a more complex economic definition, due at least in part to the progressive spread and maturation of capitalism".⁵¹ However the fact is that, although his approach assumes that the economic density is taking most part in genre of the civil society; it is not sufficient for the capacity for governance. The transition processes in post communist countries have a similar dilemma, having a working civil society in terms of economic activities but a relatively limited space for their political character. Consider cases wherein regime is strong and also civil society is participant in terms of economic instruments but does not reflect it or does not have any pressure to the decision making process. Examples from post-Soviet countries of Central Asia say that even though Kazakhstan (as an instance) has a high entrepreneurship in its economic sphere, manipulation and violation in the political system penetrates any civic endeavor to the power. In those conditions, there are

⁵¹ Michael Hardt, "The Withering of Civil Society", Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin John Heller (eds) *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998, p.24

debates about if the relationship between existence of a strong civil society and democracy is a dependency or not.⁵²

There happens reverse, when the nature of the authority responds to the demands from civil society. That is, the regime is to change like happened in Spain and Brazil, if the authoritarian part considers the calls from the agents of civil society, entrepreneurs or bourgeoisie.⁵³ By a generalization, it is concluded the business sector in authoritarian regimes favors a balanced and gradual transition rather than a shocking faint in state structure.⁵⁴ But the success of them depends in what extent they are able to transform to the political society, which is known by the regime as a legal actor.

Thus, and it seems a fully democratic regime mechanism maintaining role of the civil society in political arena is needed. Again turning to Linz and Stepan, the civil society cannot be thought without a complementary political rights making society transcend above state.⁵⁵ Thus political society is born, as a platform consisting legitimate rights and control over state-based institutions, military and civil bureaucracy. Hegel, by making a differentiation between civil society and political society points labor, which includes transformative social practices in production and education.⁵⁶ Political society according to him is the state itself and it has individuality, character and its own sovereignty.⁵⁷ He states that:

The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom. In this concrete freedom, personal individuality and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, have their complete development. In this concrete freedom, too, the rights of personal individuality receive adequate recognition. These interests and rights pass partly of their own

⁵² Laurence Whitehead, *Democratization: Theory and Experience*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp.78-79

⁵³ Fernando Cardoso, "Entrepreneurs and the Transitionary Process: The Brazilian Case", Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, The John Hopkins University Press, London, p. 151

⁵⁴ *ibid*, p. 152

⁵⁵ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation*, p.8

⁵⁶ Hardt, "The Withering of..." p.24-30

⁵⁷ George Wilhelm Frederic Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pp.194-198

accord into the interest of the universal. Partly, also, do the individuals recognize by their own knowledge and will the universal as their own substantive spirit, and work for it as their own end.⁵⁸

Hence, political society covers legal representation of the needs shaped in the civic community. In the body of state, it is much more discrete than the civil one. Additionally, Hegel's society seems to be communitarian, naturally born to be a community, ready to be shaped by the state mechanism. Whereas John Locke gets an individualistic view and claims the civil and political society are forged by individuals, quitting their human nature. In contrast to Hegel, he does not go to such a distinction between civil and political society (like community and state). He sees political and civil societies as complementary to each other, with the goods of economic and political rights:

Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.⁵⁹

Locke sees political society above the human nature, an integral level before legal governance. Differently than Hegel, he regards civil and political society complementary and indistinguishable strata. To that approach political society, as also Tocqueville utilized, refers to an extension from society, who occupied administrative cadres of the state machine, the judicial and legislative treatments and

⁵⁸ *ibid*, pp 198-199

⁵⁹ Locke, *Second Treatise..*, *ibid*, p.56

thus a different network they enabled. Civil society on contrast is assumed in economic sense, having potentials of creating an economic network.⁶⁰ He asserts that in the two different strata developments are unparallel but required in a steady level. Civil associations prepare the background for the development of political associations whereas political associations perform and maintain operation of a working civil society.⁶¹ Thus, the political society has the capacity for a legal political mechanism. Turning to the current debate, it has institutions and activities they enabled such as participating political organizations and competition without restrictions.

In order to guarantee societal rights and their implementation in civic-political arena also required existence of the rule of law, the third requirement that Linz and Stepan pose.⁶² Rule of law must be legitimate with the joint compliance by government and civil society. This includes not only society and visual offices of the state but whole bureaucracy. Thus, political system must provide democratic usage of bureaucratic apparatus as fourth requirement. The final condition Linz and Stepan draws is economic society, which is not consisted by unique instruments like considerable income per capita and economic growth but a sum of economic resources and activities assumed to be fair and reachable by whole citizens.⁶³ Finally, functionality of economic arena is dependent with regulations, Linz and Stepan thus composes their criteria completely hinged on political institutionalizations.

1.5 Legitimacy as a Nexus between the Civil-Political Society and the Regime

Diamond focuses on similar factors such as socioeconomic requirements and international institutions.⁶⁴ Again, what Diamond brings something different from Huntington are civil society oriented developments like political institutions, civil-

⁶⁰ Cheryl Welch, De Tocqueville, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 66-67

⁶¹ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, The Library of America*, New York, 2004, pp.604-610

⁶² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation*, *ibid*, p.10

⁶³ *Ibid*, p.11

⁶⁴ Larry Diamond, "Introduction: In Search of Consolidation", Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner Yun-Han Chu and Hung Mao Tien (eds) *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges (A Journal of Democracy Book)*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1997, pp. 35-36

military relations and capability of civil society.⁶⁵ Diamond's formulations of democratic consolidation specialize on civil society's role on controlling civil and military bureaucracy. Doing role of the civil society is a voluntarily business, so a consent factor there occurs to practice democracy: a common belief in democratic institutions and eagerness to fulfill their responsibilities⁶⁶. This in turn directly relates to the legitimacy of institutions, system and elected.⁶⁷ Thus the term legitimacy is defined with simplest terms as "right to govern", a privilege promoted by consent of people.⁶⁸

Legitimacy issue may yield either turnover or transformation of the elites.⁶⁹ To the extent that its presence means getting consent, in a legitimacy problem political elites in an authoritarian regime may try several tacks to regain it⁷⁰: At first, there could be a possibility for them to be silent to growing societal demands and willing to change the public opinion by conviction. Second, they may prioritize nationalist and flag-waver discourses to call people's common senses. That involves various examples that elites point an external threat and militarize the population. Iranian Islamic regimes similarly utilizes threat image of Israel and the US; or at past Greek colonels' regime did so by pointing Turkey. To finalize, elites are assumed to generally apply suppression and harsh polices over the people demanding change. On the other hand there are moments when they turn to be liberalizers in case they cannot have popular support and legitimacy for their actions.⁷¹ Namely, applying electoral legitimacy and specific freedoms, the "hard-liners" may become "soft-liners".⁷²

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp.29-31

⁶⁶ Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy*, pp.89-90

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.90

⁶⁸ Jean Marc Coicaud, *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.10-11

⁶⁹ It seems legitimacy in authoritarian regimes is a problem or a missing nexus stone between people and political elites. However there are two important situations affecting legitimacy level, accountability and economic development. Some socioeconomic circumstances and initiatives to restore legitimacy will be handled in further chapters.

⁷⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp.55-59

⁷¹ Ibid, p.57

⁷² Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy...*, ibid, p.102

If legitimacy is a problem, it's a regime problem. It causes not only authoritarian but also democratic breakdowns. So, absorption of institutions of the political system among the society is a necessity. Moreover, unless particular institutional behaviors like attitudes of military officers absorb the institutional legacy, the legitimacy problem continues.⁷³ Second, legitimacy is something related to borders, the fragmentation in the belief that the existing borders and state are not representing a particular section of the society, say minority than the system is no longer legitimate.⁷⁴ The tacks political leaders fallow in a democratic regime thus fallow that either elites may try to strengthen the executive branch with cooperation of regime-supporting parties and get over the deadlocks within the political system, or maybe more effectively expand the bases of the regime to a broader societal context via re-institutionalizations.⁷⁵

To that extent, constructing legitimacy is one important bridgehead of democratization. Diamond points four-fold scheme for a rising legitimacy, which cover historical legacy that the institutions and past regime elites had left, second current regime practices authoritarian or democratic, third party politics related to the institutionalization of political system and finally social structure completely dependent with society-based developments such as educative and economic transition fetching public trust or mistrust in the regime.⁷⁶ The historical legacy thus connotes to some “bad” or “good” actions from the former government (like restricting the freedom, causing the poverty by corruption or inverse, positive actions) and the image it left in the society, whereas current successive regime plays a drastic role in such an image construction. The political system is another stabilizing factor as long as it is democratic and finally, the social structure covers the image built by the implementations of governments in public and socioeconomic development including education and welfare, which create a vibrant society willing to participate in governance.

⁷³ Juan J. Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, John Hopkins University, Baltimore and London, 1978, p.45

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.46

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, pp.75-76

⁷⁶ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1999, pp.192-212

1.6 The Nature of the Transition in Third Wave

Thus and as stipulated, institutional and societal developments, which the nexus of legitimacy remains in between, grant a transition process towards democratization. It was given that the literature on the study of democratization acquires a structural approach and/or agent-based ones. The structural approaches prioritizing socioeconomic development and agent-based stance differ in their elite-centered views, according to Diamond.⁷⁷ However the scholars, who mostly study democratization in post-Cold war era we have so far seen are counting both economic practices and agent-level changes in civil society and political elites. Another contribution by Graeme Gill focuses on transitions and conceptualizes them with which actor was active in the process.

Gill groups third wave transitions in three branches.⁷⁸ With transition through transaction he identifies a process wherein elites and elite-led coalitions favoring civil society play outstanding roles, like Suarez-King compromise, which involved opposition to the political system. Transition with extrication refers to an essence that involves a rigid dichotomy between society and regime and vibrant and strong civil pressure for regime's withdrawal or negotiation seen in Bolivia, Uruguay and South Korea.⁷⁹ Finally transition through replacement means the horizontal change in the elite stratum that yields refreshment through a more open society like what a section of Portuguese military elites intervened and initiated the transition in favor of mediators and organizations of civil society.⁸⁰

The characterization of Gill gives us an elite-based approach it seems, and secondary but auxiliary role to the civil society. However, this does not mean that they are irrelevant to the process; on the contrary they are crucial in "structuring" the transition, making of democratic route and re-institutionalizing political system.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy...*, p.102 He elaborates by indicating O'Donnell and Schmitte's method of approach as an example of elite or agent-centered stance that is missing economical factors a multilevel view to the democratic transition is needed. *ibid*

⁷⁸ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization...*, pp.124-188

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 145- 160

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 160-186

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pp.124-127

If elites are main actors, then say, elite-based changes are counted in such studies. The structural approach often casts back elites' incentives in economic development, which is a drastic prerequisite before democratic evolution. Diamond similarly underlines that elites had outstanding role in third wave transitions wherein they boosted economic development towards a considerable wealth, which yielded urbanization and mobilization capacity of masses and free values society adopted.⁸² Nevertheless some political rights could also be given to alter societal complaints and rising social unrest. The question is why they, the political elites have such needs. When they face some difficulties in political and economic context, say when their legitimacy is endangered, various strategies they follow. Huntington, above summarized some of scenarios elites may follow as they encounter legitimation difficulties. Additionally, inter-elite divisions may also accelerate the change with differing organizational behaviors.

Additionally, an outstanding element when elites are assumed main actor, an external influence may drive the transformation.⁸³ That is, it may be referred in a regime where elites form unique competent they become more open to the international politics. This hinges on the individualized nature of the authoritarian regime that is open to influence by threats or opportunities. Let's say, disengagement amongst the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe of 1980's had taken place as a result of important changes such as dissolution of Soviet Union. Various studies had thus pointed external factors, which have so far competent in third wave regime changes and transition.⁸⁴

⁸² Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy...*, pp.95-102

⁸³ Ibid, p.125

⁸⁴ Huntington and Larry Diamond had employed the term external factors in accordance with consolidations, when those states became under great influence of the Western Camp which had finalized the Second World War as winner, an particularly the United States. The States with its structural funds and military assistances let the developing states to establish and maintain political institutions with those instruments. Finally the international organizations like OECD could improve those interstate ties. On the other hand, democratizations of second wave were so-called ones with their minimalized meanings. There the US did not need a well-established democracy that would endanger the political stability in the developing state in favor of communist movement. However as the European has begun to be a center of gravity and interested with its outer geopolitics, the third world democratization well benefited it. In this case, the EC and EU set funds and similar assistances, which required and thus made visible turns in those states through democratization.

Nonetheless, it is crucial to re-note for third wave the internal dynamics are going parallel with the external ones. Logically, it may be concluded that democracies mostly constructed on domestic civil initiative performing in civic and political arena are more likely to survive than one created by external challenges. Meanwhile, external factors are also outstanding sometimes that the regime needs to be overthrown with an outer touch. However and gradually, the external influence may need to be remaining in psychological basis, which is absorbed among civil society.⁸⁵ Thus, some agents like nongovernmental organizations may serve such means, establishing democratic norms diffused from outside. Some of the biggest success of those organizations happened in the post-2000 revolutions, which the study analyzes in the following chapters.

1.7 Nature of the Transition in the Communist World

Turning to the nature of transition, one may ask the resemblance between different cases in democratic path. That is, whether inter-elite struggle of those transitional movements is applicable to the ex-communist world is a different issue. As the communist world was apart from noncommunist one, the transition inside was dissimilar with its different socioeconomic context. Gill, debating that answer articulates several differences of communist transitions-breakdowns from the other third wave instances as follows:

1. It may be argued that the nature of the communist regimes differed from the Latin and Southern Europe with their level of control and suppression over the society. Even in their softening period of 1970's and 1980's the state machinery under communist party kept the strict control and gave no or relatively less space to civil society activities

2. The communist political economy as it was completely bounded with the state regulation was different from Latin America's state control that was relatively selective. The strict communist drive over economy kept no space for economic agents of civil society to grow. Only a limited state-led rapprochement (in Russia

⁸⁵ Whitehead, *Democratization...*, p. 77

called perestroika) gave a refreshing opportunity for first steps before individualism in economy and politics.

3. Also the communist economies based on heavy industry that post-revolutionary years the restructuring economical life meant de-industrialization whereas transitions in agricultural Latin American countries required re-industrialization to give a boost in economic development.

4. Due to the state-led socio-economic agenda, communist societies were less fragmented and differentiated in social structures comparing with Latin American example.

5. Another result of monism in communist social structure, civil society agents were so absent or much weak whereas in Latin America (Bolivia say) civil society could put a pressure on regime and opposition elites to compromise in favor of democracy. One reason behind the dissimilarity could be in the nature: genesis of the economic development and socioeconomic alternation in Latin America, as an essence for civil society were only intervened or interrupted sometimes, when authoritarian leaders have nothing concerned with capitalist circle. Communist movements in contrast totally cut and hindered the nature of the economy by playing with civic properties and in the end giving no room to the capital accumulation, touchstone of a vibrant civil society.

6. The revolution in communist countries meant the breakdown of the ex-regime, dependence with Soviet Union and also a necessity of state-building. These countries needed to construct their independent state while Latin Americans changed the regime, made the state formation continue.

7. Ethnic diversity was another characteristic differing former communist countries than Latin Americans. They needed to construct not only their own state but also their nation and national identities as they were suppressed by communist governments.

8. External factors seemed to be much more efficacious in post-communist transition than Latin America, where inner changes could drive the regime transformation.

9. Although civil society institutions were weak, masses played great roles in breakdown of communist regimes.

10. Different from Latin America, the transition in communist regimes meant also transformation in economy and a reformulation of the societal sphere signed by re-discovered national identities.

As it was vitally seen, transition genre in communist countries is substantially different than the other instances of the third wave democratization. Yet the socioeconomic genesis is quite different, situation between actors is also dissimilar. Before all else, civil society was far from being an actor, when intra-societal stratifications did not exist or were limited. Here Gill formulates leading actors in communist transition by distinguishing ruling class. He assumes the conflict took place between three actors, regime elites, opposition elites and the mass.⁸⁶ Accordingly, regime elites that Hungarian ruler class showed could drive the transition towards a democratic process on their own, whereas opposition elites like in Poland did take the floor. The way Gill calls third actor as “mass”, rather than civil society shows the monist nature of the social bases that were away from advanced civil society symptoms. Nevertheless mass pressure according to him did alter the regime by two ways: First one made elites go to negotiations seen in Czechoslovakia or German Democratic Republic. Second mass pressure was regarded in Soviet Russia; the mass run confrontation with the ruler class, which resulted suppression by military bureaucracy but also led an inter-elite split and coalition between society and opposition elite.⁸⁷

The three-fold power struggle that Gill had described in post communist transition had a totalitarian change but also some cleavages. First of all it was explicit that the revolutionary movement in post communist countries resulted in a holistic transition by all economic and political means.⁸⁸ Second and however, those changes in different fields did not start simultaneously. Post-communist transitions, which generally started in pro-communist times, had a different range that economic alternations followed many after political changes took place. So, it is suggested that

⁸⁶ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization...*, *ibid*, pp.210-234

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp.211-212

⁸⁸ Leszek Balcerowicz, *Post Communist Transition: Some Lessons*, The Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2002 pp.20-21

market-oriented changes are necessary for transitional countries, where economic institutions need to be in favor of fair redistribution.⁸⁹ The study deals with it in further chapters in the name of institutionalizations for political economy of certain countries.

Up to now, it's been seen general (and partial) theoretical outlooks given to cases about third wave democratizations. The approaches dealing with transition towards democracy are more or less but generally stressing on some agents such as elites or external factors and structural ingredients like income per capita. The economy-democracy relationship will again be overlooked in the next chapter. However, agents are relevant to the democratization process is keeping attentions on communist transition. Specifically elites and external factors seem to be extraordinarily important to the process. One aspect of this is that factor of the Cold War and its disappearance heavily influenced on ruling class' different actions as they encountered regime was in danger. Needless to say, more or less a societal touch became also crucial to fire the inter-elite split in those transitions.

This connotes to a triangular interaction during transition, say with Gill's words, regime elites, opposition elites and the mass. Even though, one may question the validity of those theorizations in post-communist transition. Especially in post-2000 period we have witnessed such movements: breakdown of regimes, construction of the latter and a transitional period containing whole actions. Those latter actions had been called colored revolutions. If so, what colored them and whether they are extension or rupture of the third way is what next part will consider.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.24

CHAPTER 2. THE VELVET REVOLUTIONS REVISITED

This chapter deals with how colored revolutions took place, with specific reference to incidents in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. It supposes some differences from the third wave democratizations seemed to exist, in international and domestic aspect of transitionary process. It finally gives some clues of an inference about idiosyncrasies of color movements in three countries, waiting to be examined in further chapters that those movements arose in a level of societal dissatisfaction and cleavage between society and state.

In post-2000 international arena, various civil movements have come to pass throughout the world. The most striking common point among those movements was leading civil protests against current regimes, resembling to the former variations against communist governments. They asked for a regime change and they succeeded. The international media just hailed those demonstrations and breakdowns in a belief that pure civil society would be spurred against authoritarian elites.⁹⁰

The Western part also stood near. The US leded the campaign including governmental and nongovernmental actors. When the comments of international public arena focused on civil society, they also pointed the role of a transnational civil nongovernmental organization, called Open Society Institute. Factually, there was more than one international actor: beside Open Society Institute; National Democratic Institute of the US Democrats, International Republican Institute of the Republicans and US State Department, which involved the process by funding Serbian opposition forces with 41 million and Ukrainian liberalizers with 14 million dollars.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Like it's written on Ukrainian revolution, "The orange revolution may not necessarily spread, but people will persist in their struggles against tyranny. And over time, some of them will prevail. Ukraine's victory over tyranny has been dramatic and inspiring. But the implications of that victory--throughout the region and the world--will be fully understood only in the years to come." Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution" *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2005

⁹¹ Ian Traynor, "US Campaign behind the Turmoil in Kiev"

What is also striking, external support of the US and Open Society Institute was not only visible in financial data, but also in revolutionary chain bringing Serbian, Georgian and Ukrainian movements together. Otpor, the youth civil society organization was founded in Serbia to lead a grassroots level mobilization via specific relationship with Open Society Institute. However the Otpor was successful not only promoting civil unrest and popular compromise in democratic demands; it also gave international assistance to its Georgian and Ukrainian derives: Kmara in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine founded with the same reason and external initiative was supported by Otpor; which trained their activists.⁹²

Hence colored revolutions show an exception amongst other instances of democratization. As it was interpreted in the first chapter, there've been several ways in which dissimilar stimuli in a transitional process shaped the process differently. If one for instance had highlighted elite-based movements in a regime, another stressed upon popular international movements under the concept of diffusion. Inspired from the domino theory, indicating countries successively falling in communist transitions, this is explained as domino or snowballing effect with spilling democracy throughout authoritarian regimes.⁹³ Demonstrations, in accordance with external or international alliances accordingly played a major part in breakdowns of authoritarian regimes. In Post-Soviet democratization countries, as they face such externally dependent protesting movements, fell in a same regional trend and international influence rather than totally domestic pressure.⁹⁴

Turning to the colored movements, they showed similar tendencies internationally supported. However there are also idiosyncrasies inside those countries of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. They had differences comparing with other snowballing transitions or internationally popularized movements of the third wave. Thought those processes took place in an outbreak like the third wave generally possessed, their international support was systematic and domestic agents were much

⁹² Mark R. Beissinger, "Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?", *Dissent*, Winter, 2006

⁹³ Huntington, *The Third Wave....*, pp.100-106

⁹⁴ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation....*, p.234

more powerful with internationally recognized relationships. The three countries had a preparation movement before the authoritarian regime was overthrown with relatively stronger opposition elites and their mass maintenance. Outbreaks occurred in a level of dissatisfaction and unrest in the society, against manipulated elections turning to local unrest and growing national uprising. The preparatory process in the political system is thus assumed to get from “easy democratizations”, which led substantive institutions of a working political system, so differently from classical third wave-oriented outbreak.⁹⁵

2.1 Serbian Bulldozer Revolution

The debut of Serbian transition goes back to 1980's, after Tito's death. Tito was born with both Croat and Serbian origins; he was coming from an anti-national socialist past and he was capable of features holding the Southern Slavic People. His death also opened new discussions about the future of the Yugoslavia, which was constructed on fragile balance.⁹⁶ In 1981 first reactions happened and Kosovar Albanians made a small youth riot to re-acquire their autonomy.

A second but giant actor in the process was Milosevic with his legacy, which came to presidency in 1989 with nationalist-chauvinist promises about Serbian society. His main claim was re-granting the lost privileges to Serbian community in the Yugoslavian decision making process and social life. Allied with the Yugoslavian army dominated by Serbians, he contradicted growing demands of autonomous regions.⁹⁷ To fulfill this, he changed the legal structure and especially 1990 constitution that he led in order to over-centralize Yugoslavia that was already receiving reactions and protests from the sub-administrations. Those attempts for amending the constitutions until 1992 and growing tension yielded to the civil war and dissolution of the Yugoslavia.

⁹⁵ Valerie J. Bunce, Sharon L. Volchik, “International Diffusion Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions”, *Communist and Postcommunist Studies*, vol.39, 2006, pp.284-286

⁹⁶ Leslie Bension, *Yugoslavia: a Concise History*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 132-155

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p.156 The same army would be one of state organizations cooperating to provide his arrest in 2000.

Nevertheless, Milosevic and the nationalist parties in power maintained their position in the government against the opposition in several elections, by manipulating the election system and suppressing the opposition elites.⁹⁸ Milosevic, his supporters in the parliament and Socialist Party of Serbia in the power kept manipulating the newly found multiparty system. By the time 1996-1997 local elections manipulated, first visual protests under the leadership of political alliance called Zajedno(together), rose inside Serbia against governmental dominance with political tricks. Zajedno had won three electoral districts accordingly and once the government refused this, the first riot against Milosevic government containing protests with thirty thousand students took place.⁹⁹ 11 Weeks after the demonstrations Milosevic finally had to accept the results meaning a local failure for him.¹⁰⁰ Plainly he was aware of a growing challenge, he sought to further his autocratic power to a most dominant and authoritarian position. He changed Serbian presidency by declaring himself as Yugoslavian president, endeavored to alter his rights unaccountable to the legislative process.¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, as rising tension between ethnic Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo turned to violence in 1996-1998 period, international community in the leadership of the United States directly accused Serbian authority with escalating the conflict and over-suppressing Albanians with ethnic cleansing. In 1999 NATO aircrafts bombarded the Serbian capital Belgrade, by giving a giant causality. This not only raised hatreds against Western Camp, also stressed resentment amongst the Serbian people about Milosevic government. Stipulated below, the bombardment had harsh impacts on the economy of Serbia, when it ruined the socioeconomic structure, the loss in GDP and relevant outlooks peaked in the conflict era.

⁹⁸ Gregory O. Hall, *The Politics of Autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic*, *East European Quarterly*, vol. 13.2, 1999 pp.241-243

⁹⁹ Vesta Nikolic Ristanovic, "Serbia between Civil War and Democracy", *Peace Review*, vol.10.2, 1998, p.249

¹⁰⁰ "Serbia's Milosevic to Recognize the Results of Elections in", *Wall Street Journal: Eastern Edition*, 02.05.1997, vol.229, issue 25

¹⁰¹ Alan J. Day, Roger East and Richard Thomas, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe*, Europa Publications: Taylor and Francis Group, 2002, p.361

In 2000, when Kostunica, leader of the 28-party oppositional coalition won the presidential elections (local and partially parliamentary elections were also held), the election council ruled to take the elections to the second electoral process, which met again country-wide demonstrations. On 5 October 2000, the protestors from all over Serbia that met in Belgrade besieged the parliament and captured Radio Television of Serbia. At last Milosevic was convinced to resign and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia is given to right to form the government when Kostunica also became president. The “Democratic Opposition” block committed themselves to the democratization and EU membership, as they went to change the political system of the country in order to harmonize them with the Union.

Serbian Bulldozer revolution was the first that involved a civil construction by internationally dependent NGO's, with governmental and nongovernmental funds. The whole non-violent process had controversies not only between ruling elites and society, but inside the state bureaucracy. Media was another opponent that was subjected by both revolutionary and pro-Milosevic forces. Georgia, having similar characteristics has been assumed to be continuity of such trendy wave declared.

2.2 Georgian Rose Revolution

Georgia faced a similar breakdown in 2003, in terms of inner and outer dynamics. Eduard Shevardnadze was ruling the country as a president since the fall of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 1995. The political conflict between two leaders had factually driven the civil war between 1991-1993, ending with economic collapse and hardened fragmentation of secessionist autonomies.¹⁰² Shevardnadze, who vanquished with military coup and Russian assistance captured the power and went to re-stabilize the political system as well as autonomous republics, which in turn led to ongoing conflicts with Abkhazia, South Osetia, Jevaheti and Adjara. The political fragmentation was thus intensified by territorial secessionism in Georgia.

¹⁰² Alexander Mikaberidze, *Historical Dictionaries of Europe: Historical Dictionary of Georgia*, No: 50 Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2007, p.49

Shevardnadze dealt with those issues as well as civil war with Gamsakhurdia qua Russian assistance, which also made Georgia a member of Commonwealth of Independent States, a pro-Russian organization gathering former Soviet members. On the contrary he also did seek to form a Western alliance by getting US aids and endeavors for NATO-EU memberships.¹⁰³ He tried to alter the fragmentation problem of Georgia by chasing a balance between two great powers, the US and Russia.

Although Shevardnadze had been elected twice, in presidential elections of 1995 and 2000 the second had many speculations and accusations on manipulations. His term opened a new expansion in economy: although rapid growth in GDP and privatizations looked like prosperous, wealth could not be locally distributed and inequalities plus rising unemployment augmented the social strata. His power was maintained by weak political authority only active in central districts. The growing tensions between autonomous regions and his political violations including manipulation of system led a growing unrest amongst masses.

Rustavi 2, an independent and opposition TV Channel was a leading factor in contradictory process. In 2001, after the government raided the channel over, in Tbilisi thousands actively protested Shevardnadze, who had had to surrender by dissolving the government. In 2002 parliamentary elections, when the ruling pro-Shevardnadzian party was declared to win majority, opposite factions arranged a series of demonstration in Tbilisi, again nearby parliament.¹⁰⁴ In return, Shevardnadze was convicted to resign and after renewed elections, after the renewed elections Michael Saakashvili was promoted as the new president of the Georgia.¹⁰⁵

Saakashvili's attempts in his term have been related to either reforming state structure or re-constructing nation.¹⁰⁶ To that extent his term staged various

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.50 Shevardnadze's endeavor to keep this alliance afloat resulted Georgian support to American war against terrorism, bilateral military cooperation, and direct support in NATO's Afghanistan intervention by opening its flight zone. Ibid, pp.50-51

¹⁰⁴ Natalia Antelava, "Georgia: Shevardnadze Fearless Before God?", *Transitions Online*, 11.17.2003

¹⁰⁵ "Saakashvili Sweeps Georgian Election", *Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press*, 02.04.2004

¹⁰⁶ Suleiman Dima, "Georgia's Saakashvili Shows a Strong Hand", *Transitions Online*, 02.09.2004

implementations to end the fragmentation problem. Changing the Georgian flag with Christian symbols, he dared to engage autonomous but de facto independent sub regions. Adjara, amongst them, which after an intense but nonviolent struggle surrendered to the Tbilisi government. However, his policies pursued in order to finalize the Rose Revolution were similar to Shevardnadze's or Putin's that with his power began he amended the constitution in favor of the presidency by reducing some rights of the parliament.¹⁰⁷

Georgian revolutionary movement was similar to the Serbian one in some reasons. First, again the unrest began as a reaction to manipulated election results. Second, Georgian popular mobilization was accelerated by a youth organization called Kmara, similar to Serbian OTPOR.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, in the aftermath of the revolution elitist and particularist propagandas from Saakashvili drove Georgian masses as well as Kostunica's. Saakashvili sought to find legitimacy amongst the masses with calling their nationalist senses. Kostunica, leader of the opposition block in Serbia had also applied to national values of the people, brusquely objected to Kosovar independence and surrender of Milosevic to the international court in Hague.¹⁰⁹

There were, nevertheless some differences in between. First of all, Georgian sociopolitical aspect, although similar in economical terms, was much more different in ethnic fragmentation. When the revolution broke out, Saakashvili had to deal with several autonomous regions wherein a considerable minority was opposing a turnover. Serbia, in contrast was far more unified country, with firm central sovereignty, even in the existence of Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina. Second,

¹⁰⁷ Nicklaus Laverty, The Problem of Lasting Change: Civil Society and the Colorful Revolutions in Ukraine, *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.16.2 Spring 2008, pp.152-153

¹⁰⁸ Suleiman Dima, "Georgia, Shevardnadze Facing Milosevic's Fate?", *Transitions Online*, 11.24.2003

¹⁰⁹ See Janine Natalya Clark, "Vojislav Kostunica, Some Reflections on His Time as Serbian President", *Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans*, vol.10.1, 2008. As an addition to Kostunica's nationalist character, patriotic public opinion in Serbia led politicians to instrumentally use such a wave. Milosevic had also utilized the enemy myth by calling nationalist senses and gained credit against the opposition. Veljko Vujacic, "Nationalist Mobilization and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View", *Theory and Society*, vol.25.6, 1996, pp.785-786. Bojan Tadosijevic, "The Structure of Political Attitudes in Hungary and Serbia", *East European Politics and Societies*, vol.22.4, 2008, pp. 896-897

although there were similarities in the way societies mobilized, Serbian government possessed media control much more than Georgian. As the Serbian opposition had less opportunity to use fixed media agents such as TV or radio channels they could benefit internet-based broadcasts.¹¹⁰ In this case Georgian opposition forces looked like more advantageous that they had even a media channel called Rustavi 2. Even though there were differences in the level, the role of media, as stipulated has been drastic in two (also with Ukrainian case) civil uprisings.

2.3 Orange Revolution in Ukraine

Ukraine's Orange Revolution was a similar event, which took civil resistances with nonviolent actions including various protests against Ukrainian former regime and the former president Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma was the president since 1994 elections, with Leonid Kravchuk, the "founder" of Independent Ukraine was defeated. That was beginning of his 10-year power in Ukraine.

Ukraine had been constructed upon its Soviet institutional inheritance for its pro-Soviet constitution was in effect with amendments until 1996 and Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament continued until 1994, as consisted of deputies elected in Soviet era.¹¹¹ The parliament was so fragmented to form a government or make legislations; Kuchma made it ratify a new constitution based on increased power in execution, specifically for presidency. The new constitution was thus interpreted as an impact to constitutional democracy, as the president got many rights above the legal codes to ignore them.¹¹² Although he had given election promises of 1998 elections that the presidency would be further strengthened; he sought to increase his rights with a series of constitutional amendments that face strong reaction and opposition from the parliament.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Andreas Bosina; Georg Gössweiner "Dossier Civil Society: The Revolution will be Televised", *deScripto*, no.2, 2006

¹¹¹ Poul D'Anieri, *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design*, M. E. Sharpe, New York, 2007, p.75

¹¹² Ibid, p.85

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 88

Tension between parliament and Kuchma grew from his willing to maintain his power by implementing illegal actions and finally serious event of kidnap and murder of the journalist Gongadze (The presidency was accused with it called “Kuchmagate”). The opposition faction formed by Victor Yushenko, leader of Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko leading Tymoshenko Bloc and the party in the power under Yanukhovich sided their camps with a rigid polarization in 2002. Yanukhovich, whose Party of Regions had gained majority in 2002 elections, was put as a candidate of 2004 presidential elections by Kuchma, who decided not to go on due to public discontent. The orange revolution took place in that presidential election of 2004.

After the 2004 elections, the election committee announced that Yanukhovich had majority with 49 percent, while Yushenko was behind with % 46 of the votes. Hundreds of thousands of orange-clad people protesting the results and accusing the government with manipulation began demonstrations with Yushenko’s call. As the protests reached Kyiv, the parliament took a decision to declare the elections were invalid. Renewed elections made Yushenko president with % 51 of the votes and carried Tymoshenko to the power. The country entering a new era adopted new policies such as changing regime to presidency (in 2006) and defining foreign agenda in accordance to NATO and EU membership intentions. The revolutionary movement was thus seen as a milestone before Ukrainian structural democratization.¹¹⁴

The aftermath of the revolution has not been going so satisfactory. Yushenko, leader of the Orange revolution was blamed to have some inconsistencies by ignoring public opinion. He took Tymoshenko government from power just months after the revolution, instead it gave credits to anti-revolutionist Yanukhovich faction by signing a memorandum about violations in the 2004 election and thus did let him to grow electoral-parliamentary support of his Party of

¹¹⁴ Taras Kuzio, “Yushenko Victory to Speed up Ukraine’s Democratization and Europeanization”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol.1.149, 16.12. 2004

Regions.¹¹⁵ Finally energy disputes with Russia impacted Yushenko's success and credibility of Orange Revolution at all.

The politics in Ukraine since 1991 have seemed to be a struggle between executive and legislative branches. Although it was one of the extreme examples in post-Soviet countries in which the government gave least respect and life space for opposition parties in its foundation years, its institutionalization after 1998 brought a legal atmosphere for political participation as well as political fragmentation.¹¹⁶ The later institutionalizations gave a way to political fractions via "introduction of proposal representations which legitimized place of political parties in elections".¹¹⁷

Thus the issue turned from a monist execution-opposition dilemma to the high intensity of fragmentation. Accordingly, the political diversity is fed also by some other factors. As Kuzio puts, the main attribute of Ukraine mostly posing problems before a consensus is diversity, lack of cultural and religious unity.¹¹⁸ Those cleavages are not new but output of historical events such as division of Ukraine between Russian and Austrian Empires in 19th century. Kuzio thus heeds regionalism as an inherent question that averts public opinion in a broader context.¹¹⁹ The Eastern parts of Ukraine are mostly consists of industrialized areas where labor force is common. Inhabitants in those areas are assumed to feel dependent to Russia, as they dominantly speak Russian. These parts generally support pro-Russian parties such as Yanukhovic's Party of Regions.¹²⁰ The West in contrast belongs to agricultural and rural areas where contribution to the GDP and income per capita are relatively low. People living there are assumed to demand political changes in favor of regional development; they stress upon Ukrainian language substantive from Russian. Despite the fact that such generalizations may not be fully applicable the

¹¹⁵ Taras Kuzio, Orange Revolution at the Crossroads, *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.14.4, Fall 2006, pp.478-479

¹¹⁶ Andrey A. Meleshevic, *Party Systems in Post Soviet Countries: A Comparative Study of Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia and Ukraine*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp.206-207

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 208

¹¹⁸ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 2000, pp.18-19

¹¹⁹ For an ethno-lingualistic distribution of regions in Ukraine, see Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Routledge, London, 1998, pp.72-99

¹²⁰ Gwendolyn Sasse, "Ukraine at the Brink of a Break-up?" *The Guardian*, 30.11.2004

level of regionalization and seem to be “given”, when it turns to political polarization that could be a serious question waiting for negotiation.

The fragmentation in Ukraine has several implications. First, and as stipulated there is a dichotomy between Western and Eastern, or Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russophile segments. Second the cultural difference was fed by a set of economic inequality: the Western regions are notorious with industrially backwarded rural agricultural areas whereas the Eastern ones are known with over-industrialization. Thus the culturally fragmented structures again became politically contradict in the issue of overcoming dependence with Russia and total representation of Ukrainian language.¹²¹

Ukrainian Orange revolution had similar characteristics with Georgian and Serbian examples in terms of research mobilization of civil society movements. Both processes fed from youth organizations Otpor in Serbia, Kmara in Georgia and finally Pora in Ukraine, which had similar tactics and were all internationally funded.¹²² After long-dureé of the authoritarian leader, with the help of NGO’s and opposition elites the regimes were overthrown. Those countries have further similarities about their fragmented political structure, mostly in Ukraine and Georgia. Regionalism factor hence occupies in political arena as another dimension of negotiation and conflict: with exceptions of Serbian political spectrum generally agreed to roll on unifying nationalist tone, Georgian political conflict lasts in centralism-decentralism/secession and Ukrainian debate is still on Western-Eastern dichotomy.

What is also evident in those events, they are not sudden episodes but outputs of gradual developments. The tension growing against ruler’s attitudes was quite explicit due to the fact that governments largely lost credits. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine the governments were fixed with failure economically and politically. Slobodan Milosevic, a defeated commander in various wars including Bosnia and

¹²¹ Paul D’Anieri, “Ethnic Tensions and State Strategies: Understanding the Survival of the Ukrainian State”, *Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol.23.1, 2007, pp.14-26

¹²² Nicklaus Laverty, *The Problem of...*, *ibid*, pp.157-158

Kosovo could not prevent secession of former Yugoslavian countries and by economic embargo and crisis he wasted credibility even among nationalists. Shevardnadze had similar disappointments by his ineffectiveness in Adjara, Abkhazian and Osetian conflicts with the central government. Second, violations, abuses and visual connections with the criminal cases (especially in ministries of internal affairs) became an evident factor.¹²³ To that extent, Milosevic, who was the founder of Serbian Paramilitary Organization, was found guilty of authorizing assassination of Ivan Stambolic, former president of Republic of Serbia.¹²⁴ Khucma, former leader of the Ukraine was also showed as authorizer of kidnapping Gongadze in his speech recorded, which was evident of the crisis Kuchmagate.

Comparing with former revolutionary movements grouped under Third Wave, those instances refer to different characteristics. Some studies approach it as a new, fourth wave with substantial features.¹²⁵ En passant, the color movements had a set of idiosyncrasies such that increasing role of external actors concretized in intergovernmental policies and role of International Nongovernmental Organizations, role of political elites, “stolen” elections, and media.

2.4 The Three Cases Compared: Role of the NGO’s and External Actors

It is needed to consider the role of international actors in the process that they had concrete influences within direct state-led (mostly American) aids or intangible stimuli by NGOs with international and national interactions. The American campaign led a set of governmental and nongovernmental actors such as Open Society Institute; National Democratic Institute of the US Democrats, International Republican Institute of the Republicans and US State Department. Those actors

¹²³ Taras Kuzio, “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave”, *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.16, 2008, p.99

¹²⁴ “Court Finds Milosevic Behind Rival’s Murder”, *New York Times*, 12.03.2006

¹²⁵ See Taras Kuzio, “Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave of Democracy” Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš (eds), *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe*, German Marshall Fund and Erste Foundation, Bratislava, 2007, pp.217-234.

created an incentive in the process by funding Serbian opposition forces with 41 million dollars and Ukrainian liberalizers with 14 million dollars.¹²⁶

The international nongovernmental connection with civil society became a drastic catalyzer in Color Revolutions. In those movements youth organizations led the masses. In Serbia OTPOR, Georgia Kmara and Ukraine Pora had drastic roles in social mobilization. They forged a nexus point between international and domestic sphere. Comparing three examples, Serbian case seemed to be the country having fewer connections with the outer space, due to authoritarian government of Milosevic.¹²⁷ Just the same, Serbian Otpor not only joint research mobilization of Serbian society through the revolution, it also trained Kmara and Pora, youth organizations of Georgia and Ukraine.

Youth organizations, initially OTPOR had taken directions from famous works of Gene Sharp on nonviolent movements.¹²⁸ They had an indirect relationship, which in turn strictly defines their strategy. Accordingly, one of Sharp's friends, Robert Helvey, a retired colonel gave instructions in Budapest, to the activists of OTPOR and introduced his directions cited in two important books, "The Politics of Nonviolent Action" and "From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation".¹²⁹ According to the United States Institute for Peace, the anathema of directions was consisted of:

Tactics for recruiting support from a wide spectrum of Serbian citizens, including winning support from within the ranks of the government itself; the psychological effect of fear, and methods and techniques for

¹²⁶ Ian Traynor, "US Campaign behind the Turmoil in Kiev"

¹²⁷ Menno Fenger, "The Diffusion of Elections: Comparing Recent Regime Turnovers in the Five Post-Communist Countries", *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.15, 2007, p. 11

¹²⁸ Mark R. Thompson, *Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe*, Routledge, New York, 2004, p.7

¹²⁹ United States Institute for Peace, "Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia," August 6, 2001, Available in www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr72.html (16.03 2009). Accordingly, 198 methods of nonviolent action include a broad-ranged tactics such as economic and political defiance, boycott and disobediences in social arenas where state and society have a common contact point. Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorships to Democracy, A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2003, pp.69-76

overcoming it; psychological methods designed to improve public opinion of Otpor and its objectives; crisis management and the importance of leadership in moments of crisis; and how to avoid unnecessary risk that could jeopardize the movement or, worse, the lives of its activists.¹³⁰

Otpor getting accuracy of the nonviolent movement became interlinked with various international funding organizations. They became hinged in terms of training and formed a network in various variations of countries.¹³¹ In Georgia, “Kmara” had a similar function. Founded by student groups in 2003 in order to react to government’s suppressive attempts against Rustavi 2 Channel, they were aided by some of civil society organizations including Liberty Institute or Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association.¹³² In Ukraine finally, contribution of OTPOR, Serbian activists to the contradictory process became top with even a quassi-competition with the Georgian Kmara group.¹³³ Meanwhile the Ukrainian government that was aware of the potential of revolutionary tendencies performed a wide-ranged suppression to Pora, the Ukrainian youth opposition group.¹³⁴

In most of those examples, the US had played a crucial role with its governmental and nongovernmental organizations. As cited before, Open Society Institute; National Democratic Institute of the US Democrats, International Republican Institute of the Republicans and US State Department somehow involved the process by funding Serbian opposition forces with 41 million dollars and Ukrainian liberalizers with 14 million dollars.¹³⁵

¹³⁰ United States Institute for Peace, “Whiter the Bulldozer...”

¹³¹ Ian Traynor, “Young Democracy Guerillas Join Forces: From Belgrade to Baku, Activists Gather to Swap Notes on How to Topple Dictators”, *The Guardian*, 06.06.2005

¹³² United States Institute for Peace, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution, A Participants Perspective”, July 2006, available in <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr167.pdf> (16.03.2009)

¹³³ Vesna Peric Zimonjic, “After Georgia, a New Target for Serbia’s Student Activists”, *Independent*, 02.11.2004

¹³⁴ Taras Kuzio, “Ukrainian Leaders Crack down on Youth Groups Ahaed of Election”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol.1.104, 20.11.2004

¹³⁵ Ian Traynor, “US Campaign behind the Turmoil in Kiev”

Russia was another actor in international context of the revolutions. Especially in Ukrainian elections, Russia and specifically the Former President Vladimir Putin had sided with pro-Russian government of Yanukhovich and expressed his opinions in the public media.¹³⁶ In the aftermath of the revolution and failure of pro-Russians, Kremlin's activities in damage of new regime did not cease, in two energy crises of 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off Ukrainian gas and rationalized this with Ukrainian governments in damage of the Russian interests. Russian government not only in energy but also in whole of available economic instruments vetoed Ukrainian activities in terms of cooperation.¹³⁷

2.5 Role of the Elites in Three Color Revolutions

Because there were a considerable amount of norms, principles and limited freedom for political opposition (as long as they are out of political threats) anti revolutionary central governments in colorful processes were much more different what we saw in Third Wave. Taras Kuzio names such regimes competitive-authoritarian, stressing their difference in the existence of a working political system.¹³⁸

If a political system exists, then it is easy to predict a deliberative structure alternates. However, Gene Sharp, the theorizer of nonviolent actions in color revolutions indicates that dictatorships are reluctant to negotiate; if they do they are already ready to manipulate such dialogues.¹³⁹ Thus, it is his suggestion that masses are to obtain a perpetual objection against the dictator, by refraining themselves from a surrender till they get rid of the rulers. Additionally it is again needed to consider that those regimes are semi-dictatorial in theory, and they need to make their power dependent with society, getting legitimacy via a less or more working political system.

¹³⁶ Igor Torbakov, "Kremlin Recognizes Yanukhovich as Ukraine's New President", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol.1.133, 22.11.2004

¹³⁷ Vladimir Socor, "Ukrainian Steel Exports Face Hurdles on the Russian Market", *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, vol.2.16, 23.01.2005

¹³⁸ Kuzio, "Democratic Breakthroughs...", p.99

¹³⁹ Sharp, *From Dictatorships...*, pp.9-13

Due to such attribution, regime change became nonviolent. Because complainants had a chance to express their opinions via elections or other less effective instruments they had no need to apply to illegal means, say. This takes the issue as if competitive-authoritarian governments manipulate those elections in order to secure themselves on power. Then elections become “stolen”, which raise tension among society and become a common point of color revolutions.

This process includes also a third part, calling to Graeme Gill’s scheme, the opposing elites.¹⁴⁰ In a nutshell, they have a two-fold function to either indirectly mediate between society and state elites or directly challenge to the rulers by using public unrest in their rhetoric. Taking the transition process of post communist countries towards democratization as interplay between political elites, in three cases revolutions happened in such a power struggle. In Serbia as stipulated, Kostunica, the leader of the 28-party alliance, in Georgia Michael Saakashvili, founder of the United National Movement and Nino Burjinadze, leader of the Burjinadze-Democrats and in Ukraine Victor Yushchenko, leader of the Nasha Ukraina and Yulia Timoshenko, leading Timoshenko Bloc allied against the authoritarian governments in the elections and aftermath. For they are political elites, they had had supreme status in the power before, that for instance Saakashvili was the minister of justice from Shevardnadze’s Union Citizens of Georgia, and Yushchenko was nominated by Kuchma from his presidency in the Central Bank. It seems to be ironic that those revolution leaders were once upon a time working with whom they opposed, Saakashvili and Kuchma.

2.6 Elections as Trigger Mechanism

Elections in a nutshell symbolize a crossing between civil masses, political powers and elites referring to reform, change in policy etc. In Third Wave examples authoritarian governments did not generally let elections or at least damaged their principles of being free and fair. Because authoritarian or totalitarian regimes did not involve wide-range elections; this became what differed third wave cases from color

¹⁴⁰ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization*, pp.210-234

revolutions. As they had a functioning political system and comparing with authoritarian regimes a relative supremacy of rule of law they had, revolutionary movements did brake out to appeal a manipulated, that is to say, stolen elections.

It is again needed to consider the semi-authoritarian profile of pre-revolutional governments in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, which had permitted a reasonable amount of political opposition. The problem was not their existence, but their potential to be power. Therefore rulers generally had a need of tricks by manipulating elections, misreporting their results, changing sum of votes etc.

Reactions to stolen elections as seen in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine had increased the potential for social mobilizations leading wide range protests and demonstrations in various cities as well as capitals, in front of parliament specifically. Some implications stolen elections give are counted:¹⁴¹ At first, their moral leaders (such as Kostunica in Serbia) may benefit them, against falsifying rulers. Second, as they accelerate angers to be expressed in practice, the suppressed masses may begin to action. Third and more concretely it serves fragmented oppositions to unify against such corruptions. In three countries, as dissimilar from classical third wave movements, elections thus played an important “triggering” role.

2.7 Media: An Agent of Facilitation

Sharp has pointed some communicative techniques for nonviolently engaging the power such as, “communications with a wider audience, slogans, caricatures, and symbols, Banners, posters, and displayed communications, leaflets, pamphlets, and books, newspapers and journals, records, radio, and television, skywriting and earthwriting”.¹⁴² Since he mentioned most of the strategies related to media, the public broadcasting has become one of the crucial elements in color revolutions. As an instance, to overthrow the Milosevic regime, American government went to

¹⁴¹ Kuzio, “Democratic Breakthroughs...”, pp. 87-89

¹⁴² Sharp, *From Dictatorships...*, p.69

increase the funding five times (2 million dollars) which was provided to media channels and trade unions in Serbia, towards the bulldozer revolution.¹⁴³

As TV channels and radio stations are immediate in terms of propaganda, not only revisionist sides but also regime rulers tend to possess such tools. Radio Television of Serbia was thus a Serbian instance in spread of pro-governmental news and comments. As he replaced editors of “critical” magazine Politika in 1987 and controlled Borba in 1994, Milosevic acquired crucial media channels in case they were making propaganda of him and the Socialist Party of Serbia.¹⁴⁴ Maybe the biggest supporter of Milosevic was his wife in media affairs too. His Wife Mirjana Markovic held a pro-governmental public media organ called Radio Television of Yugoslavia and she was a columnist in a newspaper (Duga) claiming for government’s ideology.¹⁴⁵ Ironically those channels became triggers of former regime also: the opposition forces in October 5 Bulldozer Revolution took control of Radio Television of Serbia, by knowing the supreme role of media in Serbian mobilization.¹⁴⁶ Considering the lack of international monitorship before and during Serbian elections, media illegally played into hands of either Milosevic government or the opposition forces.

Georgian and Ukrainian examples of media seem to be much more independent and likely to be constructed on a free and legal basis, albeit they still have some defects.¹⁴⁷ In Georgia, the press freedom was relatively in its highest ranking comparing with other instances; as assumed, Rustavi 2 Channel in Georgia played an outstanding role in Rose revolution.¹⁴⁸ By the additional help of civil society organizations including Kmara, Rustavi Channell kept its independence and became an active partner in revolutionary process.¹⁴⁹ The channel had closer ties

¹⁴³ Steven Erlanger, “US to Increase Funds for Anti-Milosevic Media and Unions”, *The New York Times*, 13.02.1997

¹⁴⁴ Gregory O. Hall, “The Politics of Autocracy...”, p.244

¹⁴⁵ Justin Brown, “Milosevic’s Troubles at Home”, *Christian Science Monitor*, vol.90, issue.235, 10.29.1998

¹⁴⁶ Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radovanovic, *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York-Hampshire, 2003, pp.145-150

¹⁴⁷ Taras Kuzio, “Democratic Breakthroughs...”, p.108

¹⁴⁸ Menno Fenger, “The Diffusion of Elections...”, p.14

¹⁴⁹ United States Institute for Peace, “Georgia’s Rose...”

with several NGO's and civil society activists. The Liberty Institute, a famous active Georgian civil society organization had been established within Rustavi 2 Channel and its squad, which were funded by American organizations like USAID and Eurasia Foundation.¹⁵⁰

Rustavi 2 had relatively appropriate conditions till Shevardnadze regime lost credit and he went to suppress the opposition and finally busted the channel. In 2001, those suppressions peaked with a series of harsh coercion and hidden murders, which reacted by demonstrations in Tbilisi. In transparency international, an anticorruption watchdog it is indicated that:

...The current political crisis began when the Security Ministry police tried to raid the private TV station Rustavi-2 on 31 October, allegedly in an attempt to uncover tax evasion. Over the past year, the media has accused high-ranking politicians of involvement in kidnapping, murder and drug-dealing, and the whole nation was shocked at the murder in July this year of Georgi Sanaia, a journalist at Rustavi-2. After the raid of the TV station last week, journalists were joined on the streets of Tbilisi by thousands of members of the public in protest marches...¹⁵¹

Ukrainian former regime had similar authoritarian attitudes against the independent media. The Ukrainian tax system was so available and likely to accuse a media incumbent with fiscal violations and arrest him without going to court.¹⁵² By instrumentalizing this, the government tried to manipulate the media. Beginning by Khucma's victory in 1999 presidential elections, it was also assumed with his control over the media.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ David Anable, "The Role of Georgia's Media and Western Aid in the Rose Revolution", *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol.11.3, 2006, pp.14-15

¹⁵¹ Protests Highlight an Urgent need for Government in Georgia, Transparency International, available in

http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2001/2001_11_12_georgia (15.05.2009)

¹⁵² Paul D'Anieri, *Understanding Ukrainian...*, p. 195

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 8

Kuchma was also accused by directly executing some journalists: the murder of Gongadze in 2000 was claimed to be authorized by Leonid Kuchma and Kuchmagate crisis met a nation-wide protests. Heorhiy Gongadze was operating his independent *Ukrainska Pravda* with critical essays-news to the Kuchma government before his kidnapping and murder.¹⁵⁴ Suspecting that the US was chasing to perform a “Kashtan Revolution” in Ukraine bringing Youschenko to power, the Kuchma regime had already took some sorts of prevention against civil society agents.¹⁵⁵ It was sending warnings as well as suggestions on news making. To concretize, the guideline dictated by government about how to make and publish news had been sent to media organs (called “temnyky” in public); as written in *Ukrainska Pravda*.¹⁵⁶ However Kuchma-led engagements were also having reactions from the independent media. Protests and resistances in Ukrainian media to such restrictions just started in the aftermath of those restrictions concretized by Gongadze’s murder in Kuchmagate crisis, and continued till the Orange Revolution.¹⁵⁷ Within the Revolution, during they captured the power in 2004 reformists had promised an independent media. However and especially locally the media restrictions are claimed to go on that in 2006 alone, 200 Russian journalists were killed.¹⁵⁸

2.8 Some Lessons Drawn from the Color Incidents

Those common elements seen in Serbian, Georgian and Ukrainian revolutionary movements seemed far from a break-up of communist transitions, between authoritarian state and suppressed civil society. A dual approach underlining ruling and opposition elites may be insufficient that the factor of a working civil society is needed. The quest is how come the term civil society in those transitional movements gave a way to political society. The next chapter dwells upon this issue, the compatibility of civil society in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine with political society.

¹⁵⁴ Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion”, Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (eds) *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2006, p.105

¹⁵⁵ Taras Kuzio, “NGOs and Civil Society Under Attack in Ukraine”, *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, vol.1.18, 26.05.2004

¹⁵⁶ Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian...”, p.106

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.106

¹⁵⁸ Lawrence A. Uzell, “The Reality of Ukraine’s Revolution”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 21.08.2007

Thus those movements occurred as a result of a confrontation between ruling authorities, popular and opposition elites and finally a substantive, assumingly consolidated civil society, existed in a legal political spectrum. In different natures of political system, role of elections in the process evolved in those circumstances triggered the contradiction. When the level of complaining was in a considerable level, reactions to stolen elections became crucial.¹⁵⁹

Some outlooks regarding changes in state and societal level shows the steady-look like increase or decreases in civil society and state capacity. What is related, the cleavage between societal expectations and state capacity seemed to be in its highest rank before color revolutions. It is thus argued that color revolutions, beside their respective characteristics such as external influences, are social movements as reactions to mismanagement or ill-treatment from authoritarian governments.

Table 2.1: State and Societal Capacity in Three Countries before Revolutions Inside

| | Serbia | Georgia | Ukraine |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---|---|
| Regime Type | Authoritarian | Moderately Democratic | Democratic |
| Trade Openness | Low | Low | Above Average |
| Corruption | Very High | Very High | High |
| NGO Sector | Improvement with revolutions | Rather Healthy Civil Society but worsening since 2000 | Improving since 2001 slightly below average in 2003 |

Source: Partly taken from Menno Fenger, "The Diffusion of Elections: Comparing Recent Regime Turnovers in the Five Post-Communist Countries", *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.15, 2007, pp.18-19

Evaluations given above indicate that Serbian regime had an authoritarian regime type comparing with other ones. In Serbia, trade openness is extremely low due to sanctions blocking integration with international economy. Georgia, because of its instable political history with secessionist sub-divisions was again away from

¹⁵⁹ Mark R. Thompson, "Democratic Revolutions...", pp.86-88

trade-based beneficiaries. Although Ukraine had a relatively democratic political system and by and large an integrated economy, it had a high level of corruption just with the others. In Serbia, the EU membership perspectives, improving political spectrum and its international reaction favored civil society and NGOs. Georgia, which had a prosperous economic growth in 1990's, reflected it to its societal existence, but the post-2000 fluctuating agenda looked like impacted the current aspect.

The study in general heeds the fact that democratization in those countries is an uneasy path by its nature. Those triggering stolen elections and wide-ranged demonstrations through a totally revolutionary process had symbolized a milestone before a democratic change. However and as interpreted; democracy needs time, everyday practice and legal framework by political institutionalization. Additionally the transitional process bears another evolution of civil society, towards a more mobilizing and participant in the political system, say political society. In a nutshell, it is not certain to say that those revolutions have represented a democratic change. Rather, and as stipulated they had a great success in overcoming the cleavage between state and society, the first stage before democratic consolidation.¹⁶⁰ In which extent there had been a cleavage so, how come those different factions evolved, departed and finally defied each other are new questionnaires of this study.

To that extent, remembering the correlation the inverse proportion between rapid economic development with socioeconomic crisis and weak state capacity to fill the gap looks like one of explanatory reasons before the onset of the defiance. Leon Aron had assumed Russian "Demokratizatsiya" with such an approach, cleavage and growing defiance for authority, between incapable state and newly mobilizing society as a consequence of economic transition.¹⁶¹ Applying that approach and dwelling upon explicit characteristics evolved in state and societal

¹⁶⁰ Viktor Stepanenko, "How Ukrainians View Their Orange Revolution: Public Opinion and National Peculiarities of Citizenry Political Activities", *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.13.1, 2005, pp.614-615

¹⁶¹ See Leon Aron, "Ideas of Revolutions and Revolutionary Ideas" Irina Starodubrovskaya and Vladimir Mau (eds), *Velikie Revolutsii ot Kromvelya do Putin* [Great Revolutions from Cromwell to Putin], Vagrius, Moscow, 2004

level will be next discussions. In the next chapter in which extent the civil society in those countries could apply to become political societies will be seen.

One point is that a democratization theory hinged on civil society has to be kept in a broader and deeper outlook to the mass level. Civil society to that extent is a multidimensional term, which is not to be induced directly to the NGO activities. Rather, considering the role of NGOs in those countries are under strong external influence and this is a drastic factor for networking capacity, the study tends to evaluate civil society with its mobilization capability. Those mass movements in color revolutions had based on a great amount of mass-demonstrations as well as other kinds of nonviolent actions. Nevertheless it is also known that mobilization capacity does not generate democratic values quickly, without institutional ties assessing different classes in the society. This is related to the political society and in the absence of interclass ties including legal networks; masses remain dependent with top to down directions of elites. In a nutshell, the democratization process in those countries is jammed as an elite interplay.

The next section thus tries to give a motive to how the socioeconomic and political process evolved to the level of mobilization in those countries. By socioeconomic process, the crisis of transition economies is tabled via some data gathered by World Bank or related institutions. It is argued that while transition process has been going on in economic meaning, political transformation remained silent, slow and resisting.

CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC TRANSITION, POVERTY AND SOCIAL UNREST IN COLOR MOVEMENTS: BIRTH OF A “DEMANDING” SOCIETY?

The Color Revolutions took place upon a societal unrest. The civil society in those movements relied on a set of complaints including bad governance, violating political system and economic problems. Accordingly, transition in the related countries refers to two interlinked levels of change in economic and political strata. This chapter dwells upon the economic factor of complaining the ill-treating transition. To the economic extent, post-communist countries, especially former Soviet members had similar crises related to economic shrinkage and poverty.

The economic transition had left some important responsibilities for newly born Former Soviet governments. They had been separated from the Soviet Command Economy, which based on regional one-type productions; those countries (with their new names, members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)) had to construct their own economy on their own resources and productions.¹⁶² This brought incredible economic shrinkages that are not prior to Georgia and Ukraine, but to all former Soviet Countries.

¹⁶² Michael Dunford, “Different Development, Institutions, Modes of Regulation and Comparative Transition to Capitalism: Russia, Commonwealth of Independent States and the Former German Democratic Republic”, in John Pickles & Adrian Smith (eds), *Theorizing Transition: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformations*, Routledge, London, New York, 1998, Taylor & Francis Elibrary, 2005, pp. 84-93

Table 3.1: Changes in GDP Growth of CIS Countries

| | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2001: |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Armenia | 14 | -8 | -12 | -42 | -9 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 10 | 8 | 74 |
| Azerbaijan | -4 | -12 | -1 | -23 | -23 | -23 | -20 | -12 | 16 | 10 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 62 |
| Belarus | -8 | -3 | -1 | -10 | -8 | -13 | -10 | 3 | 11 | 8 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 91 |
| Georgia | -5 | -12 | -21 | -45 | -25 | -11 | 2 | 11 | 11 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 37 |
| Kazakhstan | 0 | 0 | -13 | -3 | -9 | -13 | -8 | 1 | 2 | -2 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 8 | 84 |
| Kyrgyz Rep | 8 | 3 | -5 | -19 | -16 | -20 | -5 | 7 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 71 |
| Moldova | 9 | -2 | -18 | -29 | -1 | -31 | -1 | -8 | 1 | -7 | -4 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 37 |
| Russia | 0 | -4 | -5 | -15 | -9 | -13 | -4 | -4 | 1 | -5 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 64 |
| Tajikistan | -3 | -2 | -7 | -29 | -11 | -19 | -13 | -4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 56 |
| Turkmen. | -7 | 2 | -5 | -5 | -10 | -17 | -7 | -7 | -11 | 5 | 16 | 18 | 12 | 14 | 96 |
| Ukraine | 4 | -3 | -12 | -14 | -14 | -23 | -12 | -10 | -3 | -2 | 0 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 46 |
| Uzbekistan | 4 | 2 | -1 | -11 | -2 | -4 | -1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 105 |
| CEE & Baltics | 1 | -7 | -10 | -2 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 113 |

Source: Gur Ofer & Richard Pompfret (eds) *The Economic Prospects of CIS: Sources of Long Term Growth*, Edward Edgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2004, p.12

Accordingly the economic shrinkage of post Soviet transition impacted whole CIS economies especially in the first half of 1990's. The years 1993 and 1994 are the dates having density of such impact that all countries had their greatest economic losses. Taking the total change in the phase, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine became the first three countries in the ranking of deepest economic loss. Inside such an outcome, Ukrainian and Georgian society had drastic dwindling in their wealth: Ukrainian income per capita fell from 5995\$ in 1990's dollars to 2528\$ in 1998; whereas in the same period Georgia's reduced from 7569 \$ to 2737\$.¹⁶³ Those countries were wealthiest in the Soviet Union but the transition ruined their economy as well as social life inside. Considering the Serbian economic underdevelopment, which was dealt above those three countries the study handle are visible in facing dark side of development in economic means.

¹⁶³ Ofer & Pompfret (eds) *The Economic Prospects...* op. cit. , p.13

What about political side? The study claims the economic transition in Post-Communist countries was not accompanied by a political change. Rather, it was witnessed that the elder rulers from communist era (nomenclature) continued to govern the society by vertical ties, giving least capacity to masses to engage the political system. This section deals with the civil society in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, by claiming that their economic transition ported serious changes and harsh poverty results, which in turn made people, complain about the system and increase their mobilization capacity. At first, some approaches to economic development – democracy relationship will be seen. Considering the theory of social capital, it underlines the fact that societies in also Color Revolutions demand some changes to secure their “future” in terms of economic and political safety. They rely on institutionalization hence, to guarantee the system changed in their favor.

3.1 Classical Approaches to Economic Development

Seymour Martin Lipset is known as a scholar proving the dependency between economic development and democracy. He abstracted some important very criteria applicable to countries worldwide in order to compare their compatibility with democracy. These, average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization and the level of education are much more higher in “democratic regimes” among others.¹⁶⁴ Methodologically he counted in wealth factor, the income per capita and its social backgrounds such as telephone or newspaper per capita. He observed the level of energy-consumption and employment in the agriculture and industrial sectors to measure countries’ compatibility with industrialization, the so-called criterion before democratization. He took the degrees of literacy in education level and number of dwellings in towns and cities in urbanization level.

By giving special reference to wealth and education, what he underlined is those factors are rather interlinked.¹⁶⁵ Level of industrialization, income per capita, urbanization and education and their influences to a democratic consolidation are collective. This also doesn’t mean that ones lacking some of them may not reach a

¹⁶⁴ Martin Lipset, *Political Man...*, pp.50-57

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p.58

democratic regime; but as to him, level of education and income per capita prevail in such process. Nevertheless, his approach seems to be reflecting a gradual process, when economic development unilinearly contributes and finally grants a full range of notional and institutional democracy.¹⁶⁶

This approach has been criticized by obtaining several shortcomings. The assumption of unilinear and steady development is ahistoric and abstracted from the practice. Let's say, it is an output of observing first wave democratizations that generally began in 18th century. In chapter one, this is also called a structuralist manner heeding structure above other ingredients of democratization. To falsify this, Przeworski and his colleagues showed some inconsistencies that in a considerable level of wealth some countries were becoming a fully or partly nondemocratic regime. Agent-based approaches claiming that economic development was not only prerequisite for democracy suggested elite-based movements as superiors in such processes.

Accordingly, the lack of tight relationship between democracy and (economic) development, they draw upon.¹⁶⁷ Considering wealth, income per capita is not a unique denominator that wealthy regimes may initiate a sense of political participation but the fact is that wealthy dictatorships may also employ some sort of "welfare policy" in order to justify their representation. Cases in economic development do not fall in a similar domain. Saudi Arabia, having around 15000 \$ of income per capita, does not have a democratic system whereas South Korea, possessing a similar performance (around 18 000\$) does owe a working democratic system.

If wealth is not a completely reliable denominator, that doesn't mean economic development is needless for poor countries, or ones having relatively less

¹⁶⁶ In the evolutionary theory scholars such as Tonnies, Durkheim or Comte also shared social change is directional and with the background of economic development it plans on human and societal progress at the end of a no revolutionary but a gradual phase. Alvin Y. So, *Social Change and Development*, Sage Pub., New York, 1990, p. 19

¹⁶⁷ Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006 p.178

income per capita. Again, it is agreed in specific and substantive contribution of economic development to the democracy.¹⁶⁸ Rather it is applicable to claim that the economic benefits rather serve to a transitory process, by calling forth a set of conditions including social change in “civic” practices such as greater participation in the political system.

How economic factors overwhelm the civil society in a transitory process varies. Still, it is assumed to have a gradual influence over the change from the civil society to the political society. In a try to give a sequential context, economic development refers to:

1. A set of changes in democratic values of citizenry including alternation in tolerance, moderation, rationality and respect to rule of law.
2. It simply brings high levels of income and provides economic security of masses letting them act rationally in political system.
3. It eventually enables a network between socioeconomic classes so that they agree to come to cooperate.
4. Also considerable increase in income per capita closes up wealth of different classes, which contributes to the social cooperation.
5. Increase in income per capita lets workers economic security and refrains them from falling to anti-democratic means.
6. Increased wealth alters how obtaining “the power” is perceived, by reducing inequalities and the potential of government to act as a social force apart and contradictory to other social forces such as leading elites in civil society. When private economic sources and occupations they created are profitable and wealthy, acquiring the governmental power becomes less important, and less violent.
7. It brings a revolution in socioeconomic structures that authoritarian powers cannot resist by overemphasizing rise of the middle class.
8. In a prospered society, civil society organizations seeking not profits but social ideals are more willingly effective in directing political or social agenda.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ *ibid*, pp. 136-137

¹⁶⁹ Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization...*, pp. 3-4

As economic effects over society are countless, what is again needed to stress is they are complementary in each other and point a gradual transition. In the study of socioeconomic transition, some argued that what is needed to focus is not so much related to visible outputs such as GDP or wealth it created, but a social network the economic actors constituted by “playing in the field”. “Social capital” called, a term introduced by Robert Putnam serves to this point. Regarding the fact that visible indicators are not so much sufficiently valid to explain socioeconomic change in developing countries, those approaches look at the development as a mode of transition, which also serves to democratic or so-called “civic” values.

3.2 Transitory Nature of Socioeconomic Development

Transition, by its genre connotes to two different but interlinked meanings.¹⁷⁰ One is that, transition means an economic transformation to working, affective and functional market economy. Second, it is a transition in the political system, evolving to pluralist democracy. It is crucial to stress both sides of the ongoing transitory process, their complex relationship and inseparability.

The comments given may come up with the idea that the transitory process is gradual. Nevertheless this doesn't connote to that there becomes no breaking point in social strata in a socioeconomic alternation. An inverse claim would be some like classical modernists argue. The transitory rhetoric dealt with the issue between “gradualism” and “big bang” approaches; gradual development accordingly leads to a totalitarian understanding of economic progress, which step by step yields a democratic change in the society, whereas the latter refers to a quick and urgent change in the economic means like rapid economic growth and considerable outputs it grants.¹⁷¹ It is known that supremacy of the gradualist approach lies in its healthy development, which involves a planned socioeconomic development and gradual democratic changes in the political system like franchise. However these examples

¹⁷⁰ Josef M. Van Brabant, *The Political Economy of Transition: Coming to Grips with History and Methodology*, Rutledge, London and New York, 1998, Francis & Taylor Elibrary 2002, p.2

¹⁷¹ Andrew Richards, “Economic Challenges for New Democracies”, in Jorge I. Domínguez & Anthony Jones (eds), *The Construction of Democracy: Lessons from Democracy & Research*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007, pp.52-54

were so rare at the end of 20th century and transitory of that epoch process could not meet such conditions.

In a socioeconomic development of newly emerged countries from command economy there are several obstacles such as economic conditions, societal demands and cost of transition.¹⁷² At first, the economic circumstances such as state-controlled economic means and low income per capita really harden any possibility of democratic appearance. According to Przeworski and Limongi, the wealth range below the level of 6055 dollars is unlikely to meet the criteria of democracy's survival.¹⁷³ Second, there are some popular demands in those transitory processes, about inequalities or enrichment, much more transcendental to some needs related to democracy. Finally those economies in a transition process require an expense; the cost of reforms generally creates large amount of unemployment and low income per capita.

Consequently the economic development in transition processes of those countries is a turbulent process that its progress may make up different levels of social unrest. What this study argues rather, there, in capitalizing countries a transformative process occurs, by having economic development seemingly gradual but factually fluctuating. As the (semi) democratic phase and political system are introduced to society and economic transition from central economy to an open market economy runs, different side effects such as social unrests occur.

By all means, economic development is a process felt in different strata. By stressing communication, economic activities create inter-group, inter-class and inter-stratum relations, which in turn cause social networks of civil society.¹⁷⁴ In its essence, economic mobility calls forth vertical and horizontal ties between different strata, enabling a complete change in sociopolitical aspect.

¹⁷² Richards, "Economic Challenges.." op. cit., pp.48-51

¹⁷³ Ibid, p.46

¹⁷⁴ Robert Putnam (ed), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004 p.6-7

Institutions play significant role here. That is, in an efficiently working economy resources must be liberally accessible and economic activities must be maintained under specific rules in order to increase interaction between societal networks what Putnam underlined in his social capital. The interaction is believed to lead the volatility and mobilization of individuals among different networks, which in turn brings government-society interaction under passage from vertical ties to horizontal ones. Putnam, additionally admits the role of institutions coordinating environ available for social interactive and participant civil society.¹⁷⁵ There is a strong relationship between society and institutions that highly effective, strong and accountable institutions provide healthy conditions for development of social capital. However, the reverse claim is also valid: if the institutionalization is under the effective level, if social and political institutions are weak, then the evolution of civil society may be harassed by several negative effects of social capital. This generally occurred in Post Communist countries, which faced in their transitory process a serious challenge of corruption, organized crime and mafia.¹⁷⁶ According to the study, color revolutions also had such handicaps, by lacking an effective institutional framework for civil and political society, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Such approaches point the background of the economic development, differently from structural approaches that focus mostly on some indicators, such as GDP or income per capita. Instead, they prioritize the turbulent process of transition, wherein civil society agents do rise. Because they look at institutions due to their permanently endurance, they heed transition which had alterations on those political institutions.¹⁷⁷ In consequence, it is believed that democratizations exist thanks to potential of civil society forces, which grow from transitory developments.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's stance seems to be compatible in this regard. By bringing a new perspective, the will of citizens is underlined, not only in

¹⁷⁵ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, West Sussex, 1993, p.176

¹⁷⁶ Nicholas Hayoz and Victor Sergeev, "Social Networks in Russian Politics", Gabriel Badescu and Eric M. Uslaner (eds), *Social Capital and Transition to Democracy*, Routledge, London and New York, 2003, Francis Taylor Elibrary, 2004, pp. 47-48

¹⁷⁷ Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p.24

democratic regimes where they freely express themselves but also in non-democratic ones that society had a potential.¹⁷⁸ To that extent, societies have potential, an unnamed, de facto power in non-democracies. They have a minimal satisfaction in terms of economy (or politics somehow) but because they want to guarantee their satisfaction in the future, they demand changes in political institutions.¹⁷⁹ Such a contradiction (between de jure power-holder elites and de facto power-holder society) carries the regime towards a democratized one, or say, to a clashing point where a new regime is formed.

Turning to the cases of color revolutions, a similar approach regarding the transitory and tutelary dimensions of regimes are needed. On one hand, there is an economic change in socioeconomic view of the civil society; on the other hand the state is expected to sacrifice some of its incumbency. Suffering from the economic transition, people unsatisfied with authoritarian political elites demand a set of changes related to reconstruction of the regime by giving control to the civil society, with granting it to political society. Looking at uniquely those indicators of GDP or income per capita, as stipulated may not explain such a transition in the society, but it gives an idea about to which extent post-communist countries face socioeconomic changes, and how upset the masses are.

Post-communist democratizations may lack or narrowly meet those characteristics like a sufficient level of income per capita: Slovakia for instance, being a wealthy member of Former Yugoslavia and by assistances of the EU membership showed an important performance in economic development in terms of income per capita, which countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States have not possessed. Ukraine, Georgia and a European instance Serbia have different levels of economic development concretized in income per capita. They have different levels of industrialization, sufficiently high but different levels of literacy and different level of urbanization.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 24-25

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, pp.25-26

What is also outstandingly important, the rapid development, or fluctuations in GDP had various effects over the society. Especially countries of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) have been facing such social problems resulted by large amount of changes in GDP and its aftermath affects called income per capita and unemployment.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, lower levels of wealth and high levels of unemployment led a set of social outbursts, unrests and discontent due to dissatisfaction with the authoritarian government. Supposing with Acemoglu and Robinson's stance, society conducts the transition, by demanding a series of changes related to economic crises and underdevelopment. Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine had serious economic crisis specified in unstable changes in the wealth, due to restructuring economy. The unstable economy forms only one but a drastic dimension of social eruptions.


“Civicness” of any society is absolutely immeasurable that some indicators give only a limited, sometimes deflecting perspective. Here the study deals transition of the political economy in those related countries. It counts drastic and dramatic changes in economic growth and some aftermaths in poverty and unemployment ranks. By doing so, it offers an inference that “crisis of the economic transition” brings dissatisfaction among the society and demands for change, even in countries of authoritarian governments, similar to the materialist approach that Acemoglu-Robinson had.

3.3 Serbia

In 1990's Serbia faced a decline in its economic performance due to isolation from the international community and external economic sanctions to the authoritarian Milosevic government. Accordingly the gross domestic product of Serbia remained in a dwindling size until 2000, when the Milosevic regime was overthrown. In 2000, indicators started to change: international recognition leading commercial freedom and a considerable impact over the GDP rates was granted. If the pre-crisis period of Yugoslavia is taken into account with a 100 percent of GDP, the changes in the aftermath of political crisis are seen as:

¹⁸⁰ van Brabant, *The Political Economy*, pp.461-464


Chart 3.1 GDP Change in Serbia



Source: Marat Terterov (ed), *Doing Business with Serbia*, GMB Publishing, London, 2006, p.6

The table showed the dissolution in the economic growth of Serbia taken in 1990 as 100. The percentages in post 1990 period connote to a rigid decline in terms of economic performances. Accordingly the war economy and international sanctions deteriorated the situation. This boosted high amounts of unemployment and poverty. In post 2000 reconstruction period however, as international sanctions were over Serbia met an onset in counterbalancing GDP levels. Such a waving also reflected to the income per capita of the society.

Chart 3.2: Changes in Income Per Capita of Serbian Society




Source: Marat Terterov (ed), *Doing Business with Serbia... idem*

From a general view, Milosevic era has ever impacted Serbian economy the most seriously. Political incidents were previously leading such an outcome. During

the years of Yugoslavian civil war, the inflation rate increased in 1993 from 9 % to 16.5x10¹² per cent with an absolutely mind-boggling bounce.¹⁸¹ Yugoslavian crisis years are followed by new ones and international sanctions continued to damage the national economy. In 1999 NATO bombardment over Belgrade held against conflicts in Kosovo. In the aftermath, the economic loss of the Serbia was about 29.6 billion dollars as those raised a general discontent against Milosevic.¹⁸²

As stipulated before, Milosevic government had manipulated and violated the elections of 1997 and 2000, giving no chance to political opposition, which based its critical rhetoric on economic crises and isolation from the international economy. The society seemed to be incapable of intervening government's agenda about political economy.

Chart 3.3: Unemployment in Serbia and Montenegro



Source: Ondrej Jasco, Milos Jevtic, Ivan Stefanovic, "Employment Dynamics and Competitiveness of Enterprises in Serbia", Paper Presented to *International Scientific Days 2006: Competitiveness in the EU- Challenge for the V4 Countries*, 2006, p.849 available in http://www.fem.uniag.sk/mvd2006/zbornik/sekcia4/s4_jasko_ondrej_163.pdf (08.04.2009)

According to the charts the structural relationship between GDP changes and unemployment rates looks like clear. Due to economic sanctions and wartime losses Serbian economy was in a huge shrinkage until 2001, the date international pressure

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p.7

¹⁸² Ibid

was removed. Comparing with the economic development levels of chart 3.3; unemployment rate was in a steady rise until 2003, and it was huge because of not only GDP decline, but also rapid GDP growth and fluctuations. Again, rapid changes in income per capita had a potential of fuelling social discontent.

3.4 Georgia

Georgia, since its independence had several problems in improving its economy. First, as any former Soviet country it had to construct its own economy and produce its own GDP. This made an expectation about shrinkage in the economic volume in 1990's. Second and foremost, Georgia suffered from lack of central authority and political instability raised by local and political fragmentation.¹⁸³ Accordingly, conflicts between Tbilisi government and local autonomous regions under civil war impacted economic stability and sustainable economic growth.

Due to stand by agreements signed with IMF, there was a considerable increase in Economic outputs in 1996 and 1997. However when crisis in Asia and Russia deeply affected Georgian economy and fluctuations in the GDP restarted. In 1998, a worsening economic situation was being regarded: unemployment rate in cities was about to be 29 percent¹⁸⁴ and urban poverty was 56 percent (ones having incomes below a defined subsistence minimum) as a result of rapid but unstable economic growth and global economic crisis.¹⁸⁵ Until Rose Revolution, poverty was one of main complaints in public.

However, the unsteady development also went on after the Rose Revolution. Accordingly, although Saakashvili government was assumed successful in performing economic reforms,¹⁸⁶ ongoing instability inside country, civil war and

¹⁸³ Alan J. Day, Roger East and Richard Thomas, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe*, Taylor and Francis Elibrary, 2005, p.227


¹⁸⁴ United Nations Development Project, "National Human Development Report Georgia", 1998, p. 129 available in, http://undp.org.ge/new/files/24_134_912825_georgia_1998_en.pdf (08.04.2009)

¹⁸⁵ United Nations Development Project, "National Human...", *ibid*, p. 113

¹⁸⁶ For those reforms, see World Bank, "Doing Business: Georgia is the Year's Top Reformer", available in <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/GEORGIAEXTN/0,,contntMDK:21042336~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:301746,00.html> (08.04.2009)


Russian intervention disabled the economic growth. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 45 percent of the population is suffering from extreme poverty.¹⁸⁷ As charts of GDP and average wealth statistics indicated, the post-revolutionary Georgian society keeps being starving and unable to meet basic material needs.

Chart 3.4: Annual GDP Change in Georgia (%)



Source: International Monetary Fund, available in, [http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=85&pr.y=14&sy=1994&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=915&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPRPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=\(08.04.2009\)](http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=85&pr.y=14&sy=1994&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=915&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPRPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=(08.04.2009))

Chart 3.5: Income Per Capita in Georgia



Source: International Monetary Fund, available in, <http://imf.org...> (08.04.2009)


The hampered economy had deep impacts on income per capita in Georgian households. During the years of economic reconstruction, the average wealth decreased to 1380 dollars in 1995.

¹⁸⁷ International Fund for Agricultural Development, “Rural Poverty in Georgia”, available in <http://operations.ifad.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/georgia> (08.04.2009)

3.5 Ukraine

“Ukraine has one of the worst economic records of all transition countries”.¹⁸⁸ Ukraine, as a peasant society that was urged by the Soviet Union to be industrialized, had many economic traumas especially in western parts, which were ignored and forsaken in the second term of Joseph Stalin.¹⁸⁹ Ukrainian society faced serious problems in 1990’s, due to shrinkage in the economy. Consequently, the reconstruction years of economy from communist to the market economy had impacted the economic growth in all sectors, especially in industrial means.¹⁹⁰

Chart 3.6 Annual GDP Change and Real GDP in Ukraine



Source: World Bank, Ukraine Country Profile, available in <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/UKRAINEEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20631767~menuPK:328541~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:328533,00.html> (09.04.2009)

The chart shows the incredible shrinkage in the Ukrainian economy until 2000. Some of reasons as counted were aftermaths of restructuring economy and


¹⁸⁸ Hans Van Zon, *The Political Economy of the Independent Ukraine*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000, p.2

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p.11

¹⁹⁰ Marat Terterov (ed) *Doing Business with Ukraine*, GMB Publishing, London, 2005, p.97 Over-industrialization was one of main problems in Ukraine, which was basely dependent with military sector. Re-industrializing economic sectors thus became important matter and cost unemployment and restructuring costs. Gur Ofer & Richard Pompfret (eds) *The Economic Prospects...*, pp.82-83

1997-1998 Asian economic crises. In Soviet functional economic model of industrialization, Ukraine was producing only 5 per cent of its own GDP (in 1990), but with independence it was about to produce all of its economic growth and it had to reconstruct its economy.¹⁹¹ Such a reborn incidentally influenced wealth of the society.

Chart 3.7: Income Per Capita in Ukraine



Source: GLOBALIS, Ukraine: GDP Per Capita, available in http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?country=UA&indicatorid=19 (10.04.2009)

Accordingly there was a huge loss in wealth of Ukrainian society in 1990's. In 1990, two years before Ukrainian independence, the income per capita was around 6.900 dollars and in following years of nonalignment it had a harsh reduction. Consequently, problems of rapid liberalization, legal obstacles and governmental violations on one hand and growing inequality inside society, hyperinflation on the other, made people suffering from extreme poverty.¹⁹²

The regional development inequality is another issue. Accordingly, most of the eastern regions developed more than the west, that is to say, eastern sphere is much more advanced in terms of industrialization. In terms of wealth, there is a huge cleavage between east and west; the eastern cities labor prices are much more than

¹⁹¹ Hans Van Zon, *The Political...*, p.18

¹⁹² Hans Van Zon, *The Political...*, ibid, pp.72-73 The hyperinflation in Ukraine included more than 100 per cent in 1995, comparing with the indicators of 1990. In 1995 the inflation rate was 128 per cent whereas in 2000 this raised to 700 per cent. See "Globalis", available in http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?Country=UA&IndicatorID=152#row (10.04.2009)

that in western parts.¹⁹³ The eastern cities known as more industrialized and economically advanced than the west; eastern regions support a Russia-based alignment while western cities were maintaining West-oriented and anti-Russian views. The Orange Revolution consequently had begun in western cities, including capital Kyiv and Lviv.¹⁹⁴

Additionally, the reluctance of Ukrainian political elites to perform economic reforms led them to benefit Russian economic assistances generally consisting energy-led cooperation. This made Ukrainian political economy much more dependent with Russia than other examples as the political elites became open to indirect control or pressure of Russian authorities.¹⁹⁵ The dependency was a clashing point between different political parties supporting or opposing Russia-based alignment. The political fragmentation in geographical districts thus became economically based: the industrially dominant eastern regions kept maintaining dependency to the Russia symbolized with Party of Regions of Yanukovich, whereas the agricultural western cities saw the alignment the main problem before democracy and redistribution of resources represented with Our Ukraine or Tymoshenko Bloc.

3.6 Mentality of Transition: Towards a “Demanding” Society

As stipulated, the transitory process led a development but also several crises and some breaking points in economic stratum. Those countries, with their independence had to product their own GDP and maintain their own services to the society by re-constructing their economic structure, from command economy to the free market economy. In 1990’s, the negative side of the transition showed itself in shrinking economic growth in all cases. All countries suffered economic downturn and big scale of unemployment International problems such as economic sanctions to Serbia or Asian crisis had also played great roles in such reconstructions.

¹⁹³ See Держкомстат України (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine) “Середня заробітна плата за регіонами за місяць у 2008 році”, (Average Salary by Region by Month in 2008) available in http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2008/gdn/reg_zp_m/reg_zpm08_u.htm (10.04.2009)

¹⁹⁴ Kamil Tchorek, “Protest Grows in Western City”, *The Times*, 26.11.2004

¹⁹⁵ Ofer & Pomfret (eds) *The Economic Prospects...*, pp.85-86

Yet the term transition referred two understandings, in the post soviet transition the political structure was somehow static than the economic agenda. This is because, the economic transition was little followed by political change, due to resisting authorities. In the light of the fact that transformation towards a market economy leads sociopolitical changes given by the data above it is thus visible that social capital in those countries is in a considerable level, even though it is not meeting the same level of democratization.¹⁹⁶ This is assumed to be as a result of authoritarian post-communist governments resisting demands of the civil society, which had sociopolitical transitions.

In those transitions, the dependency between political elites and society is again low. Such dependency consisted of sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions between society and state and among society is weak in Post Soviet, velvet revolutions. However, due to mobility in the Post Communist societies some informal ties in intra-societal level performed “niche networks”.¹⁹⁷ Those networks, according to that study could be either banal meetings in everyday life between members of society, or some civil society organizations following either mediation between different state and society or a preparation phase before a non-violent revolution.

The social network has seemingly grown in objection to the authoritarian governments in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Facing extreme poverty and various economic shocks augmented such unrest. The democratic values additionally are assumed to be in increase and spread through the transition process. Utilizing New Democracies Barometer and World Values Survey, Haerpfer showed the changes in public opinion of Post Soviet countries (including Ukraine and Georgia) that a huge majority increased from 1992 to 2002 shared the belief for democracy.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Kathleen M. Dowley and Brian D. Silver, “Social Capital, Ethnicity and Support for Democracy in the Post Communist States” , Gabriel Badescu and Eric M. Uslaner (eds), *Social Capital...*, p.117

¹⁹⁷ Henk Flap and Beate Volker, “Communist Societies, Velvet Revolutions and Weak Ties”, Gabriel Badescu and Eric M. Uslaner(eds), *Social Capital...*, p.29

¹⁹⁸ Christian Haerpfer, “Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1992, 2002” *International Political Science Review*, vol.29, 2008, p 423-424

Hence, and by all means we see an increasing commitment to some market-oriented values such as respect for property rights or rule of law in transition process. It is thus arguable that civil society in those countries is on progress, by obtaining considerable circumstances. What the study sketches here, the ongoing crisis and structural problems in the transitory economy they possess, (such as overindustrialization in Ukraine and extreme unemployment in Serbia) they became aware of the need to democratically intervene the decision making process. When the authoritarian government violates the elections several times we saw in Serbian example, as the societal will was not reflected to the government, then a nonviolent action by civil forces happened. Thus and so far, the society showed its “civilness”.

However, this uniquely doesn't mean that civil society is promoting to a political society. Civil society in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine is referred in terms of some characteristics based on economic changes. Yet or till the color revolutions, practices in those countries lack some legal conditions for political society. Therefore, by utilizing Acemoglu and Robinson's rhetoric, the society needed to guarantee its economic and political safety in the future, by demanding some institutionalizations from the government. When it is neglected, contradictions rose in a level of conflict, or color movements.

To bridge with the previous chapter, the stolen elections played important part in the social outbreak of transition process. Because elections belong to a political system, which is lacked by communist phase and prior to the newly emerging institutionalization in the transition process (going towards democracy, say) changing societies had a say via those public engagements. When they were “stolen” in Post-Communist examples, society engages illegally or abnormally above the procedure, by showing civil protests till the government was overthrown. Thus, the society in its evolution in the transition process finally found its opportunity to guarantee its future political and economic safety by altering the authoritarian government to a more “democratic” one.

It is again visible that the lack of effective governance in its ill treatment had a reaction from society. It brings the question of legitimacy: as generally a legitimate regime is hinged on an adequate level of accountability that the regime has, it is not so hard to claim that these countries lacking such a capability lost their legitimacy in public. Say then, the transition requires some political alternations related to democratic and effective governance, opening channels between state and society. Thus the next section deals with the political aspect of the transition, the needed institutionalizations previously, as well as modified state tradition with liberal terms.

CHAPTER 4. CHANGING ROLES OF THE STATE IN COLOR TRANSITIONS: STATE-BUILDING REVISITED

So far, after a theoretical prologue and some history prior to color revolutions, transformations in “demanding” societies were handled. Here a final contribution, a missing niche for the argument hypothesizing the crisis of transition, a legal, legitimate and effective state based on fundamental political institutionalizations is offered. At first, it gives an outlook to the concepts of state and sovereignty and their survey throughout the history. Second, regarding the contemporary (but not final) phase of those concepts, the situation in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine is seen. Regime and state machine in those countries have been performing a huge deficit in democracy and rule of law by being notorious with corruptions and violations in political system. Day by day they were questioned and the final level of such inquiry reached the level, called lack of the legitimacy, as masses made public demonstrations and overthrown the semi authoritarian regime. Thus, a legal framework based on rule of law, a series of related political institutionalizations will be suggested.

By weak state, it is referred to an aspect that people in grassroots level suppose that there is no clearly and legally working state machinery above the current authoritarian regime. Thus, the level of political institutionalization, rule of law and accountability from the government are considered to be relevant. This section defines that supremacy of those three elements, which forged trajectories of a democracy, were somehow disobeyed by the ruler class in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The next part as a complementary and concluding side dwells upon the need of the third feature, political institutionalization in those transition countries.

Those countries had by and large a state machine, a government and a ruling political-legal system. However the background of the appearance was quite different. In the sixth year of passage to “democracy”, the CIS countries according to a different case study, had not much progressed in developing rule of law, separation of powers and civil society; adding that the unique responsible for this outcome was

the rulers. Attitudes of political elites after years, in the onset of color revolutions have not been so much different.¹⁹⁹

4.1 State, Sovereignty and their Changing Meanings

The state machine throughout the history has been assumed omnipotent from its subjects by the legal authority it enabled. Max Weber, best known with his theorization of the state gave similar, but more instrumental characteristics of which, today is still valid. Weber had five criteria for statehood that are assumed to be permanent to the modern state formation. These are:

1. Monopoly control of means and violence that only state is fully competent in utilizing disciplinary methods including violence.

2. Territoriality that a state is hinged on a specific territorial field.

3. Sovereignty that the state has full sovereignty over that field. Here as the sovereignty is not clearly defined, further approaches question it and nexus points with the state.

4. Constitutionality that the state had such omnipotence due to rights, which a working and respective constitution gives. This is related to rule of law, set of codes above the autonomy of any branch or power.

5. Impersonal Power is that state is consisted of bureaucratic organizations, not centered on one's hand. Accordingly an absolute monarchy is not compatible with modern state, whose system is based on separation of powers.

6. The public bureaucracy is that the state is consisted of a mass bureaucracy, to properly implement public affairs. The famous gift that the industrialization-modernization gives to the state, mass bureaucracy plays important part in governance or administration.

7. Legitimacy is that authority of an existent political body circumstantially described as an omnipotent organization is legitimized among the society thanks to its legality and rule of law.

¹⁹⁹ Gale Strokes, "Is Eastern Europe "Normal" Yet?", Peter Rutland (ed), Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: 1997: The Challenge of Integration , EastWest Institute, New York, 1998, pp.15-17

8. Citizenship is a set of privileges and status given by state, to its subjects, which in turn poses a part of its legitimacy.²⁰⁰

Additionally Pierson accretes one more criterion called taxation, one that authority's rights to collect taxes from its subjects to fully assume it a modern state.²⁰¹ These are state-led privileges over the society and represent certain sovereignty. However in the extent of time, the state-sovereignty relationship has been about to change while the meaning-function of those concepts altered. Scholars tracked those changes by also putting forward their own projections on the conditionality of state.

In Hobbesian rhetoric the sovereignty has two-fold meaning, either in a type that based on blood or family ties, or a voluntarily surrender in return of security.²⁰² In contrast to his idea that sovereignty is unrepresentable, Jean Jack Rousseau takes that sovereignty is the result of a societal will, an output derived from social contract. Accordingly their opposite views on sovereignty form two edges of the intellectual debate.²⁰³ Similarly Hegel tends to give a spiritual character to the state with sovereignty, while on the contrary John Locke again regards it a turnover of some rights to the state, as a result of social contract signed among society.²⁰⁴ However in the Westphalian system, the state became likely to be seen as a body apart, loaded with sovereignty.

An important leading example, who influenced by Hobbes, Carl Schmitt in 20th century re-formulated the idea of state on the scope of security, by inferring the human nature that human seeks safety.²⁰⁵ Defining sovereignty a total exception and state as the unique sovereign, in his reflection state and sovereignty had maybe the

²⁰⁰ Christopher Person, *The Modern State*, Rutledge, New York, 2004, pp.6-23

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp.23-26

²⁰² Thommas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp.114-115

²⁰³ Faruk Yalvaç, "Devlet", Alitta Eralp (ed), *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, pp.20-21

²⁰⁴ In the theoretical discussion on contractivist nature of state (chapter one) debates over Hegelian-Lockean views were undertaken.

²⁰⁵ George Schwab, "Introduction", in Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: For Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, Cambridge and London, 1985, pp. xxiii-xxiv

closest distance.²⁰⁶ In his early work *Die Diktatur*, he evaluated the constitutional responsibilities of state as a supra existence upon society, a politically responsible entity against external threats, assumed “other”.²⁰⁷ Schmitt assumed the state as a political character and competent of keeping the society militarized and inseparable against the enemy. “Distinguishing friend and enemy” is duty of the decision makers in the essence of law according to him.

Meanwhile through the 20th century, the criteria in favor of state domination became a subject to challenge. At first, state as a myth that was born with the Treaty of Westphalia is open to change qua new political pluralization in the 20th and 21st century, by offering organizational differences inside state machine and adding new responsibilities to the sovereign.²⁰⁸ Accordingly with a Kantian stance, state is responsible of not only security of citizens but also performing conditions for their preliminary rights. In the body of republic, those natural privileges of citizens such as human rights are assured and the state is accountable to the international society for such implementations.²⁰⁹ It is to provide wellbeing of individuals not only in domestic but also external realm. Hence; the state, though it has moral responsibilities, is regarded as an instrumental body, capable of guaranteeing rights of citizens.²¹⁰

To that extent, some adopting cosmopolitan view like Kant did, interrogate responsibilities of state to achieve conditions for individual representation, liberty and even emancipation. Beitz argues that there is a need to distinguish two approaches, one is that state gets its legitimacy from its performance in providing citizens’ freedom of association, whereas the second gives a traditional view that states have self autonomy and immunity from intervention regardless its policy to its

²⁰⁶ Schmitt, *Political Theology...*, pp.5-15

²⁰⁷ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp.19-79 Also see Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, vol: 19.4

²⁰⁸ Marcel Wissenburgh, *Political Pluralism and the State: Beyond Sovereignty*, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, Taylor & Francis eLibrary, 2008, pp.132-145

²⁰⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Casimo Classics, New York, 2005, pp.9-12

²¹⁰ Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Theory of the State”, in Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2006, p.188

subjects.²¹¹ The state with its meaning modified to the cosmopolitan understanding of world politics that Beitz formulated in the first approach, has its legitimacy as long as it assures individual freedom. John Rawls also regards the main principle for the states in the world system to assure justice is providing liberty and equality of individuals.²¹² Thus a new just war theory raised from such a cosmopolitan approach indicates that the legitimate reason for an international intervention could be misdoings of a state over its subjects such as violating human rights.²¹³ Namely, the modern just war theory inclines that civilian support for an external intervention is (but not sufficiently) essential for a legitimized war between the authoritarian state and international powers.²¹⁴ Thus and especially through the end of Cold War, state-sovereignty relationship became dissimilar from it seemed before as undistinguishable. Factually; the point was that the state had been assumed a supplier of safety for the society; just so the concept of security altered towards more individual-oriented, unconventional cases such as health security or structural peace based on provision of basic human rights. At the moment it is not wrong to add that the current international environ tends to see states as suppliers of those circumstantial kinds of security.²¹⁵ It means, in the last quarter of 20th century, legitimacy of state is envisaged as long-lasting as the state performs such civil rights of its subjects.

To the fairway of globalization thus it is given a new definition to the state assumed in transformation. Michael Mann, to that extent offers a new conceptual identity to the state seemingly more available to the conditions within globalization, especially by removing the monopoly of violence-usage, a Weberian criterion.²¹⁶ He asserts new criteria for statehood that it is a group of personnel specialized in division of labor, a mechanism making the political system rallied within the center

²¹¹ Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1999, pp.77-78

²¹² John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, The Belknap Press of University of Harvard Press, 1971 Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1971, pp.60-65

²¹³ See Beitz, *Political Theory...*, pp.80-82, State autonomy is thus interlinked with domestic justice, equality and liberty state provides to citizens. *ibid*, pp.121-123

²¹⁴ Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2004, pp.9-10

²¹⁵ Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, Routledge, New York and Oxon, 2008, pp.6-19

²¹⁶ Martin Shaw, *The State Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Globalization*, Review of the International Political Economy, vol.4.3, 1997, p.505

and in a consistency of centrality, by implementing overbidding rules and norms with relatively supremacy of political force in a specific territory that mechanism operates in.²¹⁷ The commonality of the definition with classical sovereignty approaches looks like the immunity of the norm-adoption of the state machinery in a specific territory. But such immunity is not strong as in the previous one that the monopoly of state to use violence is removed. Nevertheless the state seems to be more institutional and instrumental than classical state understanding, according to the envisage.

To sum up, the changing international conditions, codifications on human rights led a new phase wherein states' sovereignty is restricted with civilian responsibilities; say human security, preservation of individual representation and an ongoing economic prosperity by civilian hands in a market economy.²¹⁸ The most important motives before this change, the alternation of the state from the absolute sovereign to an instrumental sovereign were mostly counted in international context. Success of western powers and dissolution of Axis, then Soviet unions led to disengagement in bandwagoning countries resulting in second and third wave democratizations as well as renewing perceptions on state with a western meaning. Nevertheless, state autonomy is defined in its dependency with societal factors.²¹⁹ Accordingly, giving the international pressure essential but secondary importance, societal factors including social mobilizations and resistance to the state capacity played the main role inside. According to Joel Migdal, state's capacity to implement its policies regulatory in society as well as its autonomy vis a vis masses and finally its changing meaning in terms of political institutionalization all derive from

²¹⁷ Martin Shaw, *The State Globalization...*, ibid

²¹⁸ Sorensen argues that the changing aspect is one institutionalization of state sovereignty, of which is inferred to three distinct but interlinked characteristics called constitutive rules of sovereignty directly related to state's status in the international arena, substantial and empirical statehood which opts state machine as inevitable in international relations and finally regulative rules of sovereignty setting constraints on states in IR play, namely rules of the game; membership, alliance, war and peace. Georg Sorensen, "Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution", Robert Jackson (ed), *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, Blackwell Publishing, Massachusetts, 1999. He thinks constitutive rules of state sovereignty are permanent whereas regulatory rules are prone to change in the altering international context. Ibid, pp. 173-174 Thus, his methodology, instead giving a room to the steady deviation of sovereignty from the state, dwells upon the changeability in one aspect of sovereignty, the regulatory rules in international relations such that state sovereignty inside is immune from any intervention still, however some exceptions in international conditions (like legitimate use of force) restricts it and state autonomy inside.

²¹⁹ Keren Barkey and Sunita Parikh, *Comparative Perspectives on State*, Annual Review of Sociology, vol.17, 1991, pp.547-546

development inside the civil society and its conflicting/confronting nature.²²⁰ This is what this study inducts in previous and this chapter that the evolution takes place in a process of contradiction between “demanding societies” and “weak states”. Using such a dichotomy, in relation to demands and actions of strengthening society, capacities of authoritarian but weakening states become resistance to change. Turning to the cases, post-communist transitions sketched a series of struggle between ruling elites and society concretized in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine as a dichotomy between weak state and strengthening civil society. Civil society in color revolutions is thus assumed vibrant with special reference to the third section of the study. And finally it’s this chapter’s argument that when the state resists giving in, demanding society in turn favors fruition of regime change by the hands of opposition elites.

4.2 State, Elites and Political Transition in Post Communist Countries

It was underlined before, that the transition in post communist countries had two fold meaning in political and economic spectrum. Also it was added that the economic transition has not been simultaneously accompanied by the political transition, due to authoritarian governments resisting any change. That is, when the economic transition covered liberalization of the market and privatization of resources, the political transition was consisted by only limited and so-called expansions towards parliamentary democracy, such as multiparty system and franchise. As the political transition was a phase militated by interplay between political elites in those countries, it is argued that the semi-authoritarian regimes kept their power via legal or illegal constellations with those elites. Even the collapse of these regimes took place by a color movement led by some of opposition elites.

The term Nomenklatura and its connoted units, omnipotent former bureaucrats had been performing one of important figures in the post-communist political system. Those elites in Soviet era had been responsible of administrating the Communist Party and consequently the state machine. Once Soviet rule has ended,

²²⁰ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988, pp.33-34

these important key persons did not withdraw from political arena, inversely they remained in crucial points of the governance by transforming themselves to ones adopting the transition and gaining economic benefits. Usually due to mass privatization of state-owned economic resources, the post-communist elites possessed those economic instruments (nomenklatura privatization) and maintained their economic-political position by creating a network, which spanned being supported by political-economic allies (clients) or directly supporting the power.²²¹

Generally utilized with the word “patronage”, those elites consolidated their power and status by benefiting their networks. The relationship between patron and the client is mostly seen in party cadres, or in unofficial meetings. Both instances are so familiar with communist and post-communist cases with diversifying instruments when market-liberalism enters the transition process. The clients or ones having interest in relation to the status-holder are called oligarchs in Russia and former Soviet countries, who were entrepreneurs mostly from nomenklatura stratum, attended the business in the mass privatization process of state-owned economies. Like Russian oligarchs like Khodorkovsky or Berezovsky, they had benefited Yeltsin government by politically and economically supporting him.²²²

There were four overlapping reference points where oligarchs appeared:²²³ The supreme nomenklatura had a chance to profit advantage of their position in the former Communist Party. Lower cadres in nomenklatura however gained important ties in 1980's refreshment in liberalizing economy. Third, first entrepreneurs in dissolving Soviet countries made first ties with nomenklatura that will be in their favor for further privatizations. Finally the mafia and notables in unofficial network of Soviet economy stood their position in new market economy of former Soviet countries. Also in Ukraine and Serbia, important figures of nomenklatura, in upper

²²¹ Day, East & Thomas, *A Political and Economic...*, p.406

²²² In Russia, when the government changed to Putin's, the re-nationalization of economic resources led to a contradiction between power and those oligarchs. In the end of that struggle, Khodorkovsky went to jail whereas Berezovsky fled to the UK and new authoritarian government in Russia kept the control with its respective oligarchs. Marchall I. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, pp.99-120

²²³ Oleh Havrylyshyn, *Divergent Paths in Post-Communist Transition*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p.187

communist party cadres kept their power and captured head of the governance like Kuchma and Shevardnadze. Kuchma was former administrative of Communist Party of Ukraine and in the end of the struggle for presidency, had beaten Kravchuk whereas Shevardnadze was former Foreign Minister in the Soviet Union and captured power from Gamsakhurdia by a military coup in Georgia.

The birth of new political elites in the transitory phase and disappearance of nomenklatura is not a sudden event but a process. However as long as there is no clear-cut dichotomy between former elites of Communist Party, rising elites in new regime and oligarchs, the ongoing agenda in political transition seems to be not a contradiction but interplay in political arena. In Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia accordingly the political elites showed the interplay based on patronage relationships in political constellations. The opposition elites then appeared against the ruling elites to acquire the power with the rhetoric especially comprised rejection of corruption and bad governance.

A specific outlook to the power politics in those countries gives a key to understand the interplay between political elites, wherein the balance is changed as one side seeks to illegally guarantee its powers and relevantly loose support from civil society and notables or oligarchs. In Serbia, the political agenda was shaped by conflict and interaction between Socialist Party of Serbia, leading the government of Milosevic and Serbian Radical Party allied with SPS on one hand, major opposition parties called Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia on the other. Later on, after losing in parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1997, those fractionalized opposition parties rallied under Democratic Opposition of Serbia in 2000, by showing Vojislav Kostunica, leader and the founder of the Democratic Party of Serbia as a candidate against Milosevic for presidential elections.

Milosevic kept his presidency with various tricks towards stolen elections. In 1992, when Serbian Prime Minister Panic had challenged him, he managed to survive by bringing 230 thousand Serbians from outside Serbian territory for additional votes, though this could not prevent Panic from getting 34 percent of total

votes.²²⁴ According to 1990 constitution, which was seen one of the last triggers of dissolution of Yugoslavia, Milosevic had to remain president in two terms. He overcame this by changing his position from President of Serbia to the President of Federal Yugoslavia and opening new terms in presidency omnipotent from legislation.²²⁵ In 1997 new presidential elections was also held for Serbia, where Milosevic did not enter due to his new Yugoslavian presidency and above the new elected Serbian president Milutinovic (from Milosevic-led Socialist Party of Serbia) he continued to govern the country till 2000, with autocracy.

It is also needed to stress on that the autocracy even in Milosevic's Serbia was semi-authoritarian, dependent with the legislative support of nationalist parties such as Serbian Socialist Party or Serbian Radical Party. However he was intolerant to any different view out of his control, he had ousted anyone even from his political factions. Serbian Prime Minister Panic and President of Yugoslavia Dobrica Cosic had been dismissed with similar reasons.²²⁶ To the opposition, he was absolutely reluctant to give a room in the decision-making system. One the most striking event of Milosevic's violations in political system took place in 1996-1997 local elections; when in some cities victory of Zajedno, the coalitionary opposition was cancelled. As mentioned before, the countrywide protests resulted with his withdrawal from such a claim and declared limited opposition victory in some cities.

Obtained control of armed forces and police organization, Milosevic was also sovereign in social life of Serbia. However he continued to look forward to find ways in order to strengthen his position and amended the constitution in 2000 and declared for the elections. In constitutional amendments there were important changes in favor of presidential branch, first was that not parliament but the people would elect the president. Second, two-third of the members of the parliament would be able to relieve president's duty rather than half of the amount.²²⁷ As a matter of fact,

²²⁴ Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, Routledge, London, 2003, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, p.166

²²⁵ Ibid, p.177

²²⁶ Hall, "The Politics of Autocracy..." , pp.242-243

²²⁷ Dragan Bužosevic & Ivan Radovanovic, *The Fall of Milosevic: October 5 Revolution*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York and Hampshire, 2003, pp.1-2

Milosevic was trying to guarantee and reinforce his power, in order to overcome any possibility of defeat similar to 1996-1997 local elections.

Finally patronage in Milosevic's Serbia was in an extreme level either in legislation or in judicial branch. He had been choosing notables close to him, from cadres of Socialist Party of Serbia or Serbian Radical Party. His wife Mirjana Markovic had owned a party called Party of Yugoslav Left, which represented pan-Serbian and greater Yugoslavian tenets. The Party had collaborated with Milosevic several times, like forming a coalition government in Milosevic's second term.²²⁸

Serbia was considered with having a strong state tradition; however without a working principle of rule of law, the validity of regime became questioned. Thus, the Serbian political system based on lack of accountability in the presidential level, ad hoc decisions above the legislation, individualism that Milosevic had and non-operating separation of power those as a result of those characteristics connotes to the idea that Serbian state was a weak state, whose regime was questioned by masses.

For Georgia, the situation of governance was similar. High level of corruption and patronage relationships were dominating the political system and weak state structure. Ruling the country as the president since 1995, Shevardnadze and his party Union of Citizens did possess a fragile public support. Presidential elections of 1995 and 2000 that opened his previous terms was already claimed to have election tricks. The political arena before the Rose Revolution had consisted the struggle in such frangibility, between Shevardnadze and Union of Citizens as a ruling faction, Saakashvili leader and founder of the United National Movement and Burjinadze, leader and founder of the Burjinadze-Democrats as opposition parties. Those opposition elites was not new to the political arena unlike their fresh parties, Saakashvili was minister of Justice in Shevardnadze government Burjinadze was minister and chair in the Committee of Constitutional and Foreign Policy. Later on by reacting to the ill-treatment among governmental affairs, they had resigned and founded their own parties in 2001 (Saakashvili) and 2002 (Burjinadze). They were

²²⁸ Justin Brown, "Milosevic's Troubles at Home"

opposing Shevardnadze's corruptions and so-called actions of gathering his family or his neighborhood to the ownership and administration of important economic resources. It was claimed that especially his family was controlling most of the economy with corruptive actions, according to New President Saakashvili.²²⁹ His inner circle was dominant in business sector: His son Guram Akhvlediani was Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and he was leading Akhvlediani Group, holding the Port Poti and famous with its share in raw materials sector, whereas his son in law Gia Joghtaberidze was driving communication sector and finally his nephew Nugzar Shevardnadze with her clan were important figures in retail trade.²³⁰

Georgia under Shevardnadze was also notorious with instances of corruption and violations. To exemplify, according to Peter Shaw, who lived in Georgia between 1996 and 2002 and worked for the European Commission had several incidents including kidnapping. He states the visible illegalities in underdeveloped conditions in Georgia as:

There was no real infrastructure in Georgia, at least not as we know it in the west. During the winter, schools closed because there was no heating. There was no heating because there was no consistent electricity or gas supply, and even if there were, the radiators within the schools may well have been removed and sold as scrap metal. Officially, Georgia's biggest export was and is scrap-metal. Salaries to teachers, police, judges, and Government Ministers were paid, at best, sporadically. The police existed by taking money from drivers who paid up rather than risk being thrown in jail. Judges thrived by taking bribes – the highest bidder won the court case. Government Ministers existed by stealing money from International Donor Organisations. Teachers had no chance and depended upon family

²²⁹ Jim Heintz, "Georgian President Elect Targets Shevardnadze in Anti-Corruption Drive", *Independent*, 07.01.2004

²³⁰ Zurab Chiaberashvili and Gigi Tevzadze "Power Elites in Georgia: Old and New", Philip H. Fluri, Eden Cole(eds), *From Revolution to Reform: Georgia's Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform*, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence, Vienna, pp.191-192

support, and direct international aid, as did surgeons, doctors and nurses. University degrees and driving tests were easily purchased.²³¹

Not only bureaucracy but also President Shevardnadze was being accused. He was claimed to construct its patronage relationships in cabinet and economy sector. Economic development was blocked by self-interests of oligarchs and Shevardnadze's family, who owned important resources.²³² In one side there was a dependency with external power Russia, not only by intergovernmental means, but by second track relationships in business sector. Russian oligarchs controlled the energy sector in Georgia, by cooperating with local politicians in trade corruption.²³³ On the other side Georgian ruling class was accused with benefiting such relationships.

Georgian bureaucracy was inherited from former Soviet regime, as Shevardnadze was also a former nomenklaturian, it is possible to say there was much more focus of an alliance between Shevardnadze and his party Union of citizens and finally nomenklatura, the bureaucracy dominant in politics.²³⁴ The political agenda was determined by consensus of those factions. Additionally and above the parliament Shevardnadze was much more powerful than the president was capable of rights including approving or dismissing the cabinet and dismissing autonomous governments.

According to Kuzio, counter elites from former Communist Party cadres posed a direct opposition in Caucasus countries whereas Ukrainian elites, whose 40 percent came from nomenklatura, did not show such a rigid distinction in its early years.²³⁵ Later in Ukraine, especially in the second term of Kuchma with 1999 a division came into effect between political elites. Parliamentary fragmentation abided on the dichotomy between pro-Kuchma centrists, which favor pro-Russian policies and mostly supported by eastern and southern provinces and national

²³¹ Peter Shaw, *Hole: Kidnapped in Georgia*, Accent Press, Reading, 2006, Foreword, p.1

²³² Ibid, p.16

²³³ Ibid, pp.18-19

²³⁴ Chiaberashvili and Tevzadze "Power Elites in Georgia...", p.189

²³⁵ Kuzio, Ukraine: *State and Nation Building*, pp.28-29

democrats, which found their majority in Western and Central Ukraine.²³⁶ In this effect, opposing political elites in national democrats led by Timoshenko Bloc of Julia Timoshenko and Our Ukraine party of Victor Yushchenko gained a considerable support from most of oligarchs specifically after Kuchmagate crisis. On the other side, Yanukhovich and his Party of Regions had a complete support from Russia, with whom the previous Yanukhovich government before the revolution had made an energy agreement and secured Russian interests.²³⁷ In the onset of Orange Revolution, three leading political factions had thus taken their standings.

Ukrainian politics has been similarly led by interplay between political elites having great interests in economic and political life. In 1990's political sides were defined under the influence of former nomenklatura, oligarchs and Russia as an external actor with internal ties. Julia Timoshenko, one of them, who had been a deputy prime minister in Yushchenko government in 2000-2001, was imprisoned due to accusations about her involvement in energy sector. Factually she was operating United Energy Systems, which sold Russian gas with lower prices that Russia was discontent with. As mentioned, Russia, Russophile oligarchs and political elites cooperating had been driving the Ukrainian politics before the Orange Revolution. There were closer ties between centrists and Oligarchs seen in the politics especially with 1998 parliamentary elections.²³⁸ Hence in the end of 1990's Timoshenko was one of few oligarchs in opposition. After her imprisonment she founded her block and stood her opposite position.²³⁹

Finally before the revolution began, oligarchs were also dispersed through the political sections. While notables who had business done in Eastern regions and dependent with Russia maintained their support to Party of Regions, some oligarchs (in pre-Yushchenko areas like Donbass) and some exiled Russian oligarchs such as

²³⁶ Kuzio, "Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges...", pp.53-54

²³⁷ Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Politics, Energy and Corruption Under Kuchma and Yushchenko", Harvard University, 7 March 2008, available in http://www.taraskuzio.net/conferences2_files/Ukrainian_Politics_Energy.pdf

²³⁸ Sarah Whitmore, *State Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990-2003*, Routledge-Curzon, London and New York, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, pp.95-96

²³⁹ Kuzio "How the Gas Issue..."

Berezovsky sided with national democrats.²⁴⁰ For the centrists and their backing oligarchs, Yanukhovic, successor of President Leonid Kuchma was symbolizing their ongoing interests with Russia.

What about the presidential side? At first, Ukrainian state after communism was consolidated as a “neo-patrimonial one”, which had inherited bureaucracy dependent with their interests, autonomies and direct official or unofficial ties to the president.²⁴¹ Actually Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, despite of his increasing powers, had been a target of criticisms about his corruptions and his indifference to abuse and finally his intentions to strengthen the presidency status against legislation. He had unforgivable instances of corruption and violations especially in Kuchmagate crisis. Kuchma was chasing to increase his powers and guarantee his position; but suspecting with a US-led Revolution it dared to control civil society agents and media.²⁴² The murder of Gongadze in 2000 was thus claimed to be with the authorization by Leonid Kuchma. Called Kuchmagate crisis, he was showed as authorizer of kidnapping and murder of opposition journalist Gongadze. This was an event preparing a countrywide atmosphere against him. As he had gained the right of running for the third time presidency, the Ukrainian society had already condemned that decision. According to Razumkov public poll, 81.6 per cent of Ukrainian public were against Kuchma’s third term as president.²⁴³

Therefore, origin of the debate was twofold in Ukrainian political arena, in parliamentary level between pro-Kuchma followers (centrists) and reformists and in a wider spectrum between presidential and legislative branch. For the first time reformists gained majority in the parliament (Rada), the president sought to balance and regain the position. Kuchma had thus tried twice, to strengthen its powers in 1999-2000 and 2003-2004 constitutional amendments.²⁴⁴ As the first were removed

²⁴⁰ Kuzio, “How the Gas Issue...”

²⁴¹ Hans Von Zon, , “Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.52.5, 2005, p. 15

²⁴² Taras Kuzio, “NGOs and Civil Society Under Attack in Ukraine”, *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, vol.1.18, 26.05.2004

²⁴³ Kuzio, “Oligarchs, Tapes and...”, p.50

²⁴⁴ Oleh Protsyk, “Constitutional Politics and Presidential Power in Kuchma’s Ukraine”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.52.5, 2005, pp.25-26

from agenda by meeting harsh reactions, the second in 2004 was approved by the parliament, which gave the president wider rights like dismissing the cabinet and sub governments and finally increase the term of presidency from four to five years.²⁴⁵ Kuchma also chased other illegal ways. To weaken the opposition, he did lead oligarchs to tempt reformist deputies in Yushchenko - Timoshenko camp by bribing.²⁴⁶ To that extent, oligarchs from central and southern regions enhanced their powers by profiting their entrance-intervention in politics thanks to Kuchma's patronage politics.²⁴⁷ That is to say, there had been a specific relationship with Kuchma and centrist oligarchs in Ukraine, which was in damage of reformists.

Going back to the energy fold of that alliance, as Timoshenko was imprisoned; Yuschenko was also ousted from the cabinet in 2001, when he threatened oligarchs' interests by promising a more "transparent" energy trade.²⁴⁸ Accordingly, Medvedchuk, a member of the Parliament and a Kyivian oligarch having special relationship with Kuchma, made leadership in order to form the majority to dismiss Yuschenko. In the end and due to efforts of oligarchs, Medvedchuk became new prime minister, by ousting Yuschenko from the cabinet. The event was the milestone taking Yuschenko to the leadership of opposition.

4.3 Suggestions for Transition Countries: Political Institutionalization and State Building Revisited

The progress in political transition in post communist countries in an uneasy path refers to several inferences. At first, the political outcome in those countries has been a result of interplay between elites, which had been mostly inherited from former nomenklatura and deeply affected by oligarchs. Former leaders in all cases are from bureaucratic cadres of former regime; Milosevic from League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Eduard Shevardnadze from Soviet supreme bureaucracy (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Leonid Kuchma from Communist Party of Ukraine. These

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 26

²⁴⁶ Sarah Whitemore, *State Building...*, ibid, pp.108-110

²⁴⁷ Hans Von Zon, "Political Culture..." , p.14

²⁴⁸ Ibid

figures had important benefits in patronage relationships, placing their inner circle to key positions in economic and political instruments. Second, despite the fact that there was a constitutional framework behind the political system, the principle rule of law was sometimes violated within the political cadres especially in public elections. Furthermore ruling political elites did seek to manipulate the auxiliary organs for a working political system, such as media. Media organs were subjected into a series of suppressions from the government, in both countries.

Elections in a democratic regime symbolize government's accountability to the public. In a working democracy the cabinet is accountable to legislation and judiciary branch with parliament's strengthened instruments like vote of no confidence or ratification for budget approval, or direct applicability of civil jurisdiction on the government. For the point for interdependency between parliament and public is the tool of elections, this mechanism is the first step before governmental accountability. Nevertheless, if elections are overshadowed by several frauds and violations, or elections are "stolen", the legitimacy that the government has is quite questioned. Consequently the problem of legitimacy, which is seen in the first part of the study, as a nexus between civil-political society and the regime occurs by raising the question of regimes' and sometimes states' legality. Governments at the cost of losing legitimacy in public dare to de facto remove their accountability.

Consequently; individualism, corruption and patronage on one hand, governments' reluctance to transparently open their actions to public opinion and keep their accountability qua a working rule of law principle are common problems in Post-Communist countries. This is linked to the level of democratization that governments' transition processes scappily absorb democratic values such as allegiance to rights and responsibilities derived from the constitution. They selectively and instrumentally adopt those values by manipulating such rights in timing. According to O'Dwyer, one of the reasons before such frauds and individualism in governments is directly related to the state building:

If democratization occurs in the context of an unconsolidated state, it creates strong pressures for patronage politics and a predisposition for

runaway state-building. Because democratic leaders have extraordinary license for reform and because the state is associated with the old regime, it is very tempting for governing parties to use state resources for party-building in what often are difficult conditions for popular mobilization.²⁴⁹

Thus and as stipulated, it is needed to stress institutionalization for transition countries where the old regime inherits some of its institutions to successor or where new regime notables individually benefit deadlocks and holes in the political system. Improving level of the political institutionalization which refers to consolidation of the effective state machinery based on rule of law valid and binding in its bureaucracy and whole administrative cadres contribute to removal of corruption, extreme and anti-systemic patronage relationship and violations in the political system. Before going far for state-building, the study benefits some of the indicators the World Bank sketched for transition countries, in specific reference to Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine in order to firmly establish the argument in those countries, where level of governance is below average of Western instances.

The data under governance indicators of the World Bank, some of characteristics related to government performances in democratization of three countries are given below. Accordingly, governmental attributes under voice and accountability, political stability, governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption were measured in a range between -2.5 and +2.5, in which lower levels meant lower performances. In the scheme of categorization of World Bank, UK and Germany as example of “good” governance showed performances falling to the rank no less than 1.50. The data given to point for Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine thus reserves improving but insufficient performances. In general, the numbers give an opinion about there are important changes in the level of governance before and after color revolutions.

²⁴⁹ Conor O’Dwyer, *Runaway State Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, p.193

Table 4.1: Voice and Accountability

| | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serbia | -1.38 | -1.14 | -0.72 | -0.12 | -0.03 | -0.10 | -0.19 | -0.13 |
| Georgia | -0.39 | -0.41 | -0.26 | -0.50 | -0.45 | -0.19 | -0.16 | -0.15 |
| Ukraine | -0.30 | -0.32 | -0.57 | -0.58 | -0.67 | -0.58 | -0.37 | -0.17 |

Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, Policy Research Working Paper 4654, "Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007", available in <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148386> (18.05.2009)

Level of voice and accountability presents the idea that in which extent citizens in that country are capable of participating decision making process as well as government's responsibility of accounting to the legislation and judiciary branch. Independent media, freedom of expression and association are also counted in. Considering Serbian performance, the levels were in a low ranges improving. With 2000 Bulldozer Revolution, a positive change is seen in civil voice and governmental accountability. In Georgia and Ukraine, accountability and civil society levels were much better in 1990's, except some negative changes in 2000's, before Rose and Orange revolutions.

Table 4.2: Political Stability & Absence of Violence

| | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serbia | -1.11 | -1.96 | -1.70 | -0.76 | -0.83 | -0.86 | -0.87 | -0.68 |
| Georgia | -0.93 | -1.59 | -1.46 | -1.47 | -1.61 | -1.03 | -0.69 | -0.90 |
| Ukraine | -0.23 | -0.22 | -0.37 | -0.20 | -0.31 | -0.39 | -0.37 | -0.06 |

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters VII..."

Political stability ranges are directly related to whether any domestic or international disturbance, unrest or conflict happened. Georgia, to that extent suffers from ongoing civil war between central government and autonomous regions. Serbia

had several and dissimilar clashes not domestically but from international environment; the Kosovo crisis had fed such outcome in 1998-1999. Ukraine had relatively stable agenda despite of its fragmented political structure. It is however needed to consider, political stability & absence of violence level is indifferent to legal challenges to political power. Ukraine had serious instabilities after Orange Revolution in 2004, however these were linked with governmental constellations and coalitionary debates, not violent conflicts like others had.

Table 4.3: Government Effectiveness

| | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serbia | -0.45 | -1.18 | -0.85 | -0.61 | -0.53 | -0.24 | -0.37 | -0.27 |
| Georgia | -0.34 | -0.64 | -0.62 | -0.77 | -0.65 | -0.40 | -0.39 | -0.23 |
| Ukraine | -0.75 | -0.74 | -0.65 | -0.71 | -0.53 | -0.68 | -0.40 | -0.50 |

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters VII..."

Government effectiveness according to the research connotes to an effective bureaucracy independent from governmental pressure. In Serbia, in 1998-1999 period the bureaucratic independence was very low as it was open to direct intervention of Milosevic government. In Ukraine Kuchma regime may be claimed to have similar engagement before Orange Revolution. In both cases former nomenklatura, inherited characteristics from Soviet bureaucracy and patronage relationships impacted the bureaucratization.

Table 4.4: Regulatory Quality

| | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serbia | -1.38 | -0.53 | -0.48 | -0.63 | -0.61 | -0.70 | -0.82 | -0.28 |
| Georgia | -1.23 | -0.77 | -0.51 | -0.83 | -0.75 | -0.52 | -0.56 | -0.26 |
| Ukraine | -0.48 | -0.30 | -0.46 | -0.66 | -0.65 | -0.62 | -0.82 | -0.50 |

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters VII..."

Regulatory quality refers to government’s ability and willingness to positively arrange steady institutions of a free and working market system. In Serbia and Georgia the mid 1990’s point some backwardness according to data; whereas although post revolutionary environment was assumed to have some improvements related to market reforms, it was in a fluctuating aspect.

Table 4.5: Rule of Law

| | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serbia | -0.98 | -1.30 | -1.20 | -0.91 | -0.97 | -0.70 | -0.86 | -0.59 |
| Georgia | -0.84 | -1.18 | -1.08 | -1.24 | -1.20 | -0.77 | -0.75 | -0.56 |
| Ukraine | -0.54 | -0.96 | -0.97 | -0.84 | -0.85 | -0.71 | -0.57 | -0.77 |

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VII...”

Rule of law is relevant with power of over-binding legal codes and government’s credibility to adhere. In pre-2000 era of Serbia violations that Milosevic government made lowered the ranking. Accordingly, all the levels before revolutionary dates seem to be higher than next ones. This is explicable that Bulldozer, Rose and Orange revolutions came into effect as a reaction to “stolen elections”, violated legal codes about elections and manipulation of political system, which lacked any sort of accountable governance.

Table 4.6: Control of Corruption

| | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serbia | -0.99 | -1.08 | -1.11 | -0.75 | -0.52 | -0.47 | -0.44 | -0.32 |
| Georgia | -1.12 | -0.84 | -0.90 | -1.07 | -0.93 | -0.63 | -0.43 | -0.26 |
| Ukraine | -0.82 | -1.16 | -1.01 | -0.97 | -0.90 | -0.90 | -0.59 | -0.65 |

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VII...”

Control of corruption is a characteristic including governmental will above private interests and any possibility in elite-based control of state. It is thus related to

behaviors of private elites, which is generally called “oligarchs”, penetrating the state affairs and driving in their benefits. They mostly gained their assets in state-led privatizations of economic resources. Also stipulated in the data, the governments before color revolutions had lowered performances as some of them enjoyed such a relationship with oligarchs. It is known that the period between 1998-2004 in Ukraine symbolized a strict dependency between president Leonid Kuchma and economic cartels in that sense, which started with 1998 parliamentary elections.²⁵⁰ In 1998 elections, some pro-presidential parties representing oligarchs’ interests gained an important majority, like Party of Regions, which was leading power till the revolution comes. Similarly the level of control on corruption in Ukraine is its lowest size in 1998. Serbia and Ukraine had semblances to that extent, having overlapping interests between state and private elites in 1990’s.²⁵¹

The data above was given to concretize the argument that an effective state tradition is in those countries’ transition processes in a limited level, it looks like in progress though. It is the study’s argument therefore, that the political transition could not keep in step with socioeconomic transition by leaving a need of political institutionalizations to meet the gap in between. It is thus useful according to the study, to refer Samuel Huntington’s early work called “Political Order in Changing Societies” to stress the political institutionalization matters. Huntington in his book had called into a paradigm that an efficient level of state-building with political institutionalizations regulating the socioeconomic life was absolutely needed in transition countries, even before other prerequisites for democracy.²⁵² “Political Gap” he states, in developing countries between socioeconomic development and instability-unrest and on the other side the limited governance was to be filled with building the “order”. With his own words, he underlined giant differences between developed and developing states in terms of political order as:

²⁵⁰ Taras Kuzio, “Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: “Kuchmagate” to the Orange Revolution” *Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol.23.1, 2007, pp.30-31

²⁵¹ Chris Groner, “The Post-Communist Media, Comparative Oligarchization and After”, *Slovo*, vol.18.1, 2006, p.6

²⁵² Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1968, pp.1-8

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between dictatorship and democracy are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective, rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the governments governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based. All three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of political participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict....²⁵³

Huntington specified the need of state-building not only for preventing anarchy, but for accompanying a socioeconomic change with some key characteristics of political institutions. These are, however required not for encompassing state supremacy, but to consolidate rights and responsibilities of state and civil society and the rule of law it is hinged on. For overcoming either social unrest derived from crises of economic development or “crises of modernism“, such as corruption and patronage, hence political institutionalization is the main focus in his work.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ *ibid*, p.3

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp.33-72

Nonetheless, state-building must be analyzed not in terms of broadening autonomy of the state. Again to say, political institutions are to be forged for firming role and capability of civil society. Maybe using the term “habitus” could be impressive to call into a legal environ for individuals; entwined by institutions, norms and their legitimized traditions, which grant “political society”, what the study refers in the theoretical stance. By the habitus here an inherited word from Roman lifestyle, connoting “life space” is meant.²⁵⁵ Throughout the history, legal habitus of civil and political society is permitted by different approaches. Two of them, specifying patterns of the statehood in relation to the civil society could be useful: An instrumental formation precedently gives the society maximum participation as the institutions act only what wrights in the codes.²⁵⁶ The right of political fulfillment is given to the society. It regards state machine something that is to fulfill what is written in the legal framework, constitution or relevant codes. Bureaucracy carries out tasks given to them, in rigid allegiance to the laws. This system sees itself as a tool before the political system, respecting the government from a democratic competition. Hans Kelsen, being an instance of maintaining an instrumentalist approach, bases his argumentation on the scope of a normative, but “purified law“ from any political initiative.²⁵⁷

Against that western-oriented tradition, transcendentalism assumes a different framework. In such state, the society has general interests and ethics above the individuals and the institutions represents them. A minimum political participation is given to society. The transcendental state shows a supra-tradition in favor of institutions as the instrument state grants the participant civil society. Basically, a state has a spirit in transcendental formations. One of its leading followers Carl Schmitt argues, the state as a supra existence upon society, has some constitutional responsibilities, a politically responsible entity against external threats, say enemy.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ The other, by its specific usage is owed by Pierre Bourdieu to cite some cores inside human mind, epistemologically reflecting itself to the ethno-cultural and circumstantial reactions. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Language & Symbolic Power*, Edited by John B. Thompson, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991

²⁵⁶ Metin Heper, *Türkiye 'de Devlet Geleneği*, (Ankara: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 2006) p. 28-29

²⁵⁷ Martin Loughlin, *The Idea of Public Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.88-93

²⁵⁸ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp.19-79 Also see Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, vol: 19.4

According to him, state is a political character and competent of keeping the society inseparable by detaching friend and enemy.

Consequently, those different state formations influenced responsibilities, rights and habitus of state apparatus and civil-political society. Inferring the difference in between, instrumental state formation looks like giving more room for breath of civil society, its capability to express itself and participate the decision-making system. The understanding of transcendental state is by contrast hinged on an idea that state prevails civil society. One may ask the crucial question that what formulation fits to a sort of a post-communist state. What is known, the state machine in such cases was inherited from ex-communist antecedent, which based its formation on transcendental Communist Party and the nomenklatura within. According to Dryzek and Holmes, the fate of post-communist political system seems to bear potentials of statism. They additionally stress the need of a democratic constitution and separation of powers before a healthy statist system.²⁵⁹ This again does opt political institutionalization, to develop an efficient (and democratic) state, which accompanies the “demanding” society within the transition process.

In the adjacent of Cold War sufficient prerequisites for creating strong states were counted differently: the state needed to act in accordance to a dominant wave, tendency in the international public, a military threat coincidentally or instrumentally benefited by the authorities to drive the society, conditions for an independent bureaucracy and facultative leadership in governance.²⁶⁰ Those elements are seemingly unable to compete with post-Cold War conditions. New phase underlines requirements for an effective institutionalization with reference to changing conditions of the transition countries. Accordingly, the idea on the priority that the state has for a democratic consolidation reflects development in several potentials in political and administrative system, the crucial in a working, efficient and transparent party system.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ John S. Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, *Post Communist Democratization, Political Discourses Across Thirteen Countries*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.272

²⁶⁰ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988, pp.271-277

²⁶¹ Larry Diamond, “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation”, pp.XXI-XXVIII

Hence, whether it has transcendental or instrumental symptoms, post-communist countries exact some levels of state-building, with a series of political institutionalizations in order to meet the demanding society. It is a need in the transition process, wherein state and society keeps their transformation in different densities. Previous chapters showed the crisis of rapid development or fluctuating growth in those countries just like its aftermath covers unemployment and poverty. Like Huntington asserted, state is a requirement for internal order in chaotic transition years and what could be added is that people having a sense that “there is a legal authority” are likely to be compatible with engaging the political system legally. They, passing through complications of transition may participate the decision making process with democratic means, if there is legal, legitimized, effective state machinery, regulating political system justifiably and equitably.

CONCLUSION

Yet there are so few academic works in the literature that analyze color movements, the aim of this study was to bring a new and deeper approach to the related field, claiming that those had been actions in grassroots-level as a reaction to ruler stratum. In a nutshell, transition process brought two means of change, the transformation of the society and the state: the fact is in those respective cases while socioeconomic alternations in phase of constructing open market economy reflected several points of social unrest, political elites remained silent and resisted to put forward a proper and liberal political transition and political institutions in favor of masses. The point is that instead of a monist “external factors approach” to the field, such dichotomy between state and society played a large role.

The study in the beginning evaluated the circumstances of democracy, by giving specific reference to the study of Third Wave. The literati on the consolidation of liberal democracy generally base their arguments on some internal inputs, dynamics and forces. They mostly focus on the necessity of the consolidation under the influence of some elements. The formulas as abstractions of them such as civil society, income per capita or even religion were invented in order to theorize waving democracies, especially the third wave phenomenon. In the first part, it introduced some definitive approaches in identification of democracy, as well as theoretical contributions. Then compatibility of post-communist transitions with third wave democratic movement was undertaken.

By doing so, the study had underlined in some niches necessary for a democratic consolidation. These were political society having full capability to express themselves in political arena, the institutional framework securing those rights and rule of law to be obeyed and a final legitimacy of the regime gains. Political society, wherein definitions of Hegel, Locke and Tocqueville were cited connotes to new level in a new epoch that civil society gains full capacity to participate the decision making process and politics in a larger meaning, via civic rights guaranteed. Because guaranteeing needs protection under institutions, say a

specific amount of institutionalization over the state of political society, it covered a range of democratization theories within an institutional perspective. Hence it had a glance over works of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Larry Diamond, Samuel P. Huntington and Greame Gill, who are known with their focuses on institutions as sine qua non preconditions for democratic consolidation. These views aimed a satisfactory level of institutionalization that guarantees modern conditions of civil life and political participation of civil society to the policy making of the political center. According to Larry Diamond, a set of institutionalization in such framework assures legitimacy of the system amongst the society. This is the point for the study also, which in turn claims that absence of a subsequent level of institutionalization for existence of political society is likely to be followed by a legitimacy problem too. Therefore it enacts the current status of political institutions and rule of law in countries before color revolutions, and the systemic legitimacy the society gave.

After such theoretical entry to the study, color revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine were introduced with two quests “what was going on?” and “how?”. There inside, the most heading figures seemed to be political elites that make the transition as interplay between them, and nongovernmental organizations cited as western influence based on funding and recruitment of revolution activists. A third common characteristic, which ported incidents seen in both cases called “stolen” elections as triggering factors was stressed. Though elections are nexuses between civil society and political elites, violating those elections means absence of such dependencies. This makes a sense of legitimacy problem, just like civil society in the three cases felt.

Ill-treatment in the governance could have been tolerable when a wealthy state apparatus guaranteed the welfare of citizens. It is known that in some of rich countries having been governed by dictatorships welfare politics have eased the legitimacy problem. States hence do not saddle society some of responsibilities crucial and in turn do not demand any competence in policymaking. So far post-socialist societies have not possessed such attributes of wealth that when different

sakes drove masses, problematic operation for rule of law (concretized in stolen elections) augmented their unsatisfactory level.

What is obvious is that civil societies in three cases (as well as other CIS countries) faced harsh and challenging results of economic decline, in the level of giant poverty and unemployment incomparable with any Western country. It is mostly referred to the economic aspect of transition process that brought serious side effects to the society with the economic structure renewed, GDP regulated and redistributed. The study there sketched some data about economic fluctuations, in order to show unsatisfactory level in the masses. Taking Acemoglu and Robinson's approach to the regime change from their work called "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", the study underlines that the civil societies in three countries express their demands for economic and political amendments via institutionalizations from ruling elites. When the most fundamental and crucial instrument for their legal engagement to the government, countrywide elections were violated, the question of legitimacy peaked and insurrection began. Thus stolen elections became triggers of the civil unrest and demonstrations.

One point is that a democratization theory hinged on civil society has to be kept in a broader and deeper outlook to the mass level. Civil society to that extent is a multidimensional term, which is not to be induced directly to the NGO activities. Frankly considering the role of NGOs in those countries under strong external influence as drastic factors for networking capacity, the study rather tends to evaluate civil society with its mobilization capability. Those mass movements in color revolutions had based on a great amount of mass-demonstrations as well as other kinds of nonviolent actions. Nevertheless it is also known that without a set of institutional ties that assess and associate different classes in the society, mobilization capacity does not generate democratic values quickly. This is related to an appropriate level of the political society that in the absence of interclass ties including legal networks; masses remain dependent with top to down directions of elites. In a nutshell, the democratization processes in those countries are jammed as an elite interplay.

Simply put, endeavors the civil society fallowed were all for institutionalizations promoting them to the level of political society. Therefore it seems right to emphasize the need for political institutionalizations in countries of velvet movements. State structure, legal framework and implementations in transition countries are open to change, not only in economic term, but also within second mean of the transition, the political. What Samuel Huntington claimed indeed, “political order is needed for changing societies” that some level of political institutionalizations to settle rule of law and legitimacy of regime over masses are primordial in a democratic consolidation. Turning back to a post-communist transition case, an effective, democratic and transparent regime formation is to accompany the ongoing socio-economic transition of masses. In other words, economic geneses of the new-born civil society need to be granted to much more institutionalized conditions for political society.

Nevertheless, it was given above that ruler elites were reluctant to alter a system they benefit to a more democratic and transparent one with respect to rule of law. Various examples showed that in all three cases, before the onset of revolution regime leaders were in an individualist position while they sought to generalize their support via mutual agreements with key political and economic notables. Patron-client relationship it is called, Milosevic, Shevardnadze and Kuchma had benefited such vertical ties in their inner circle, by distributing economic goods (by and large) and getting credits and support. They manipulated the political system by amending it for safety of their power and did not hesitate to violate it generally in elections when their position was endangered.

Because transition to democracy was interplay between elites, existences of opposition elites that Gill stressed were also outstanding in mobilization of masses and driving them to the revolutionary phase. Furthermore, opposition elites were also active and leading parts in colorful movements too. What is striking (and touching somehow) is that opposition elites in Georgia and Ukraine were recruited from cadres of the former regime, while it performed as constitutive power of political

system. In any case, they became voice of the masses in colorful revolutions, by denoting their expectations in a rhetoric based on criticism of violation, absence of rule of law and unfair distribution of income. They involved in their speech act, fundamental institutionalizations that the civil society needed.

In a nutshell, it seems the conclusion draws upon a chronic dichotomy between demanding civil society and resisting regime, specifically ruler elites. It is the study's argument that the political transition could not keep in step with socioeconomic transition by leaving the need of political institutionalizations to meet the gap in between. As long as there was no working institution that performed a perfect rule of law principle, prevented corruption and manipulative acts of elites and provided conditions for political participation of civil-political society, the grassroots-level unrest became more likely to break out.

The stolen elections played important part here, in the social outbreak. Because elections belong to a political system lacked by communist phase, prior to the newly emerging institutionalization in the transition process (going towards democracy, say) changing societies had a say via those public engagements. When they were "stolen" in Post-Communist examples, society engaged illegally or abnormally above the procedure, by showing civil protests till the government was overthrown. Thus, the society in its evolution in the transition process finally found its opportunity to guarantee its future political and economic safety by altering the authoritarian government to a more "democratic" one.

The process reflects further connotations. Opting the fact that settled democracy is not really possible with a unique external touch and what relevantly much more matters in the process is the required political institutionalizations filling the gap between economic and political aspects of transitions, between demanding society and ruling elites. Second, the finalité politique within re-consolidation in the subsequent phase may not be independent from the systemic legitimacy the society gives and it depends on democratic governance based on rule of law, which is politically institutionalized.

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