

**DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM  
MASTER'S THESIS**

**THE IMPACT OF DEPENDENCY ON TURKISH  
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST  
THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**




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## **ABSTRACT**

**Master's Thesis**

**The Impact of Dependency on Turkish Foreign Policy**

**Towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s**

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**Graduate School of Social Sciences**

**Department of International Relations**

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Throughout the 1950s, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East as can be observed from the case studies of Turkey's prominent role in the Bagdad Pact starting in 1955 on, its support in the American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan in 1958, its negative attitude towards the Algerian War of Independence by the end of 1950s and the formation the Peripheral Pact between Israel and Turkey in 1958 have been quite antagonistic and in line with its pro-USA foreign policies. Although Turkey has been following a pro-Western and pro-USA foreign policies through its history, there has not been any other period that Turkish governments followed such anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies. Turkish foreign policies towards the Middle East in general have been moderate. Starting from 1980s on and particularly today these relations have been very close. This thesis is trying to find an answer to the question of why Turkish governments of the 1950s followed such hostile foreign policies towards the Middle East.

In an attempt to find an answer to this question, the thesis will refer to two prominent theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis: Realism and Liberalism. Through realism Turkey's anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies will be analyzed by concentrating on its survival strategies particularly against

**Communism and Soviet Union in the new bipolar world of the Cold War Era. Through liberalism Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will be analyzed in the context of dependent foreign policy by focusing on Turkey's alignment of its foreign policies with the United States as a result of its political (security) and economic dependency on the United States.**

**Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Middle East, dependency, realism, liberalism, USA, Soviet Union, Bagdad Pact, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria and Israel.**

## ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

1950'lerde Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'ya Yönelik

Dış Politikasında Bağımlılığın Etkisi

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Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'ya yönelik dış politikaları 1955'ten itibaren Bağdat Paketi'ndeki güçlü rolü, 1958'de Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Lübnan'a ve İngiltere'nin Ürdün'e olan müdahalelerini destekleyen politikaları, 1950'lerin sonunda Cezayir'in bağımsızlık mücadelesindeki olumsuz tavrı ve 1958'de İsrail ile Çevresel Paketi'ni imzalaması göz önüne alındığında bir nevi düşmanca olmuştur. Aynı zamanda bu politikalar Batı yanlısı veya diğer bir deyişle Amerikan yanlısı dış politiklardır. Türkiye aslında kuruluşundan itibaren tarihinde çoğunlukla batı yanlısı dış politikalar izlemiştir. Ancak buna rağmen Ortadoğu'ya yönelik politikalarının bu kadar muhalif olduğu başka bir dönem görülmemiştir. Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'ya yönelik dış politikaları genelde ılımlıdır. Özellikle 1980'lerde itibaren olan dönemde ve günümüzde daha yakın hale gelmiştir. Bu tez 1950'lerde Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'ya yönelik politikalarının neden bu kadar olumsuz olduğu sorusuna cevap bulmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bu soruya cevap bulabilmek amacıyla tez uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinden ve dış politika analizi yaklaşımlarından Realizm ve Liberalizm teorilerinden yararlanacaktır. Realizm Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu karşıtı dış politikalarını yeni kurulmuş çift kutuplu Soğuk Savaş düzeninde Komünizm ve Sovyetler Birliğine

**karşı mücadelesi ile analiz edecektir. Liberalizm ise Türkiye'nin bu dış politikasını bağımlı dış politika analizi çerçevesinde inceleyecektir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye'nin ABD'ye ekonomik ve siyasi (güvenlik) bağımlılıklarının dış politikaya etkisi üzerinde duracaktır.**

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, Ortadoğu, bağımlılık, realizm, liberalizm, ABD, Sovyetler Birliği, Bagdat Paktı, Lübnan, Ürdün, Cezayir ve İsrail.**

**THE IMPACT OF DEPENDENCY ON FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS  
MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	vi
CONTENTS	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	xi
INTRODUCTION	1

**CHAPTER 1**

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE REALIST AND LIBERALIST  
EXPLANATIONS TO TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE  
MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**

I. INTERNAL FACTORS	7
A. Public Opinion, Identity and Values: A Constructivist Approach	8
B. Governmental Systems and Bureaucratic Politics	11
C. Leadership Styles and Psychology of the Leaders	12
II. EXTERNAL ACTORS	13
A. Marxism	13
B. Realism	15
C. Liberalism	20
1. Dependency Theory and Types of Dependent Foreign Policies	24
a. Independence	25



b. Anti-Core Foreign Policies	26
(1) Counter-dependence	26
(2) Compensation	26
c. Pro-Core Foreign Policies	27
(1) Compliance	27
(2) Consensus	28

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITH AN EMPHASIS ON DEPENDENCY**

I. EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD	32
II. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR	34
III. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE POST SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD AND THE BEGINNING OF COLD WAR ERA	37

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**

I. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE DEMOCRAT PARTY GOVERNMENT (1950-1960)	42
A. Economic Ties between Turkey and the United States during the DP Government	44
II. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s	49
III. CASE STUDIES	51
A. Turkey's Active Role in the Baghdad Pact	51
B. Turkey's Support to Americans in Their Intervention in Lebanon	56
C. British Intervention in Jordan	61

D. Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards the Independence of Algeria	64
Formation of the Peripheral Pact between Turkey and Israel (1958)	66

#### **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s FROM REALIST AND LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES**

I. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT	71
II. REALIST PERSPECTIVE	72
III. LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE	75
IV. DEPENDENCY THEORY – CONSENSUS	77
CONCLUSION	81
REFERENCES	84

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AKP</b>	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
<b>CHP</b>	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
<b>DP</b>	Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>WWI</b>	First World War

## INTRODUCTION

Turkey, under the rule of Democrat Party, with its pro-western foreign policy followed an anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy throughout the 1950s which witnessed the power struggle between two super powers; the United States (US) and the Soviet Union. In the chaotic atmosphere of the Cold War, Turkey felt the need to ally itself with one of the superpowers, and the Soviets' desire to control the Straits and aims of invading Kars and Ardahan, Turkish policy makers decided to ally with the United States starting from the last months of the Second World War. When the Democrat Party came to power in 1950, the government continued to follow the traditional pro-western foreign policy of Turkey. However, the pro-western foreign policy of Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*—DP) government showed somewhat more antagonistic tendencies to the Middle Eastern countries. These hostile-looking foreign policies can mainly be observed in Turkey's prominent role in the Bagdad Pact starting in the mid-1950s, its support to the American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan in 1958, its negative attitude towards the Algerian War of Independence by the end of 1950s and the formation the Peripheral Pact between Israel and Turkey in 1958. These foreign policies caused negative reactions against Turkey in the Middle East.

Although the Turkish governments in general followed a pro-west, in other words, pro-US foreign policies throughout the history of Republican Turkey, their policies towards the Middle East have not been negative. Turkish governments in general followed moderate foreign policies towards the Middle East. Starting from the 1980s, these policies became even more moderate and close and particularly during the rule of the current government of Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP), they have become very friendly. Consequently, the foreign policies followed by the Democrat Party towards the Middle East differed from the other governments that ruled Turkey throughout the history of Turkish Republic.

This thesis aims at finding an answer to the question of why the Turkish governments in the 1950s followed a hostile foreign policies towards the Middle East by referring to the realist and liberal international relations theories. Through realism

Turkey's anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies will be analyzed by concentrating on its survival strategies particularly against Communism and the Soviet Union in the new bipolar world of the Cold War Era. Through liberalism Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will be analyzed in the context of dependent foreign policy by focusing on Turkey's alignment of its foreign policies with the United States as a result of its political (security) and economic dependency on the United States.

During the Cold War years, the Soviet Union and the US were in a power struggle against each other, especially in the Middle East due to the rich energy sources of the region. This bipolar world system also forced Turkey to choose its side and develop policies accordingly. So, Turkey followed a security-based foreign policy in its region due to the fear of Soviet expansion, and aligned its foreign policy with the rival of Soviet Union, namely the liberal superpower, the United States. In this context, the security-based foreign policy decisions, and the balance of power strategy of the Menderes government can be explained within the realist theory. During the 1950s, in order to secure its position against the expansionist policies of Soviet Union, Turkey as a liberal state made an alliance with the United States. Therefore, Turkey started to get military and economic aid from the United States, which increased the dependence of Turkey on US. The increase of dependence also resulted in the alignment of Turkish foreign policy with the US. Consequently, Turkey started to follow a pro-western foreign policy especially in the Middle East.

The liberal theory that concentrates on interdependence is also used to analyze Turkey's dependency on the US and as a result the alignment of its foreign policies with the US. Moreover, considering the article of Jeanne A. K. Hey; "Foreign Policy Options under Dependence: A Theoretical Evaluation with Evidence from Ecuador", the thesis examines the dependence of Turkey on US in respect to its foreign policy type. Jeanne A. K. Hey, in her article designs five different types of dependent foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 1950s can be analyzed through one of these foreign policy types which is called 'consensus'. In consensus, state or bureaucratic elites of the core and periphery discuss their state's foreign policy and the state elite of the periphery aligns its foreign policy with the core's due to the high-

volume of economic and military relations between the core and the periphery. In Turkish case, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the bureaucrats around him were the most influential figures in the design of the foreign policy, since the public opinion and opposition had no voice at all in terms of foreign policy. So, the thesis analyzes the 1950s foreign policy decisions in Turkey, based on realist, liberal and dependency theories which are thought to explain the period thoroughly.

The first chapter of the thesis concentrates on the theoretical framework. Two main factors internal and external will be examined in the chapter. Under internal factors, 'constructivist' approach will be examined. Internal factors are classified as Public Opinion, Identity and Culture (constructivism), societal groups, government organizations and leaders. External factors will be analyzed under Marxism, realism and liberalism (dependency under liberalism). The chapter explains why the case study under examination was analyzed with the help of realism and liberalism.

The second chapter examines the historical background of Turkish foreign policy until the 1950s. The historical background chapter examines these periods under three titles: Early years of the Republican period namely Turkey under the rule of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey during the Second World War, the post-war period and beginning of Cold War. By doing so, different approaches to foreign policy prior to the 1950s will be analyzed.

The third chapter in an attempt to analyze the Turkey's hostile-looking foreign policy towards the Middle East examines the specific foreign policies in depth. This includes Turkey's active role in the Bagdad Pact starting in the mid-1950s, its support in the American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan in 1958, its negative attitude towards the Algerian War of Independence by the end of 1950s and the establishment of the Peripheral Pact between Israel and Turkey in 1958. These cases are selected for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s, since each of them reflects the anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies of Turkey very well.

The fourth chapter concentrates on the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1950s from realist and liberal approaches. In this chapter, the period under examination is analyzed through the international relations theories of realism,

liberalism, and as a sub-theory of liberalism dependency theory. It is aimed to explain the foreign policies of Democrat Party government regarding the case studies with the help of those theories.

The conclusion will also include the theoretical analysis of the case studies. Consequently, the pro-western foreign policy of Democrat Party government is analyzed in terms of realist and liberal theories and it is aimed to find an answer to the question of why the Democrat Party government followed an anti-Middle Eastern and pro-west foreign policies throughout the 1950s.

**CHAPTER 1**  
**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:**  
**REALIST AND LIBERALIST EXPLANATIONS TO**  
**TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST**  
**THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**

Foreign policy analysis examines the factors that shape foreign policies of the countries. In this analysis it looks at the approaches that best explains the factors that shape the behaviors of the states. The factors that shape foreign policies of the states can be classified as external and internal factors.<sup>1</sup> Kaarbo et. al. consider anarchy and power in the international system that is analyzed by the Realist theory of international relations and interdependence in the international system that is analyzed by Liberalist theory of international relations as external factors. As internal factors the same scholars consider public opinion, identity and culture that are analyzed by the constructivist approach, societal groups that include links and opposition, government organizations that examine democracies and bureaucracies, leaders by concentrating on both their leadership styles and psychology.<sup>2</sup>

Christopher Farrands classifies foreign policy analysis in four categories. Under domestic factors he examines governmental systems such as open and close and bureaucratic systems. Under international factors Farrands focuses on the alliances and blocs that the countries belong. Under this classification he also looks at dependencies. In other words, how dependency of a periphery country to the core shapes its foreign policy. As the third category he concentrates on the psychological factors that shape the leadership style of leaders who are in charge of foreign policy. His fourth category under

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<sup>1</sup> Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Ryan K. Beasley “The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective”, **Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior**, 2nd Edition, (Eds. Ryan K. Beasley et. al.) CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2012, pp. 1-2

<sup>2</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 1-2.



societal or operational factors includes variety of factors such as the impact of religion and identity on foreign policy behavior.<sup>3</sup>

This study will analyze the anti-Middle Eastern or anti-Arab foreign policies followed by Turkish governments throughout the 1950s. In an attempt to analyze why Turkish governments of the time acted the way they did and aligned their foreign policies with the Western bloc and particularly with the United States will refer to the external factors that are classified both by Kaarbo et.al. and Farrand. In an attempt to analyze Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern states, this study will mainly refer to realism and liberalism and particularly dependency under the framework designed by Jeanne Hey.<sup>4</sup>

Realist perspective, on the one hand, examines the Cold War period from a security-based angle, and it analyzes the power relations between the states whose aim is maximizing their interests. In this respect, realist theory will guide us in understanding the chaotic atmosphere of the Cold War period which sets the stage for the Democrat Party government in Turkey. It will also help us to understand the security concerns of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' government.

Liberal theory, on the other hand, based on the natural rights of human such as; right to private property, or freedom of individual, emphasizes peace among liberal states. In this respect, it claims that a war is not likely to occur among liberal states, since there is always an ongoing economic activity between liberal states. So, they would not want to harm their economic ties with a possibility of war. Liberal theorists also put forward that those economic ties affect the foreign policy decisions of states. They claim that with increase in trade and economic activity between the states, they became more and more interdependent in time. Therefore, political and/or economic dependence of a periphery state to a core state may force the periphery state to align its foreign policies with the core. Since liberalism emphasizes the importance of economic

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<sup>3</sup> Christopher Farrands, "The Context of Foreign Policy Systems Approach", **Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach**, (Eds. Michael Clarke and Brian White) Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1989, pp. 84-108.

<sup>4</sup> Jeanne Hey, "Foreign Policy Options under Dependence: A Theoretical Evolution with Evidence from Ecuador", **Journal of Latin American Studies**, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1993, pp. 543-544.

wealth, it is argued that states prefer to cooperate with each other rather than struggling with others. The cooperation in the international arena is beneficial for the interests of every state.<sup>5</sup>

This chapter –in an attempt to analyze the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s –following a brief analysis of both internal factors and external factors that shape the foreign policies of the states will mainly concentrate on “realism” and “liberalism”. Under liberalism it will mainly focus on interdependence and “dependent foreign policy” behaviors that were designed by Jeanne A. K. Hey.

## **I. INTERNAL FACTORS**

This classification examines internal factors such as the great diversity of political systems, culture, and leaders as the factors that point states in different directions, even though they face the same external forces. Domestically oriented explanations, in contrast to internationally oriented explanations, argue that states sometimes make decisions that do not necessarily benefit them in international politics. These theories explain such “deviations from rationality” by pointing to the need of leaders to satisfy both domestic political goals and foreign policy interests or by examining the imperfect nature of decision-making process that are related to values and identity.<sup>6</sup> Under this classification Kaarbo et al. focuses on issues such as public opinion, identity and culture and societal groups that can be analyzed under the constructivist approach. Moreover, as part of internal factors the scholars also examine the governmental systems such as democracy versus authoritarianism (open and closed systems) and bureaucratic politics. Another issue related to internal factors is the leadership style or psychology of leaders that have been considered as a significant factor in the foreign policy making.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Kaarbo et. al, p. 10

<sup>6</sup> Kaarbo et. al, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 16-19.

## A. Public Opinion, Identity and Values: A Constructivist Approach

Constructivism which has been popular in international relations and foreign policy analysis since 1990s understands the world as being “socially-constructed”. Social constructivists argue that rather than the material feature of world politics, the socially-constructed meaning is more important. For them, socially-constructed meaning occurs in time with an interaction between agents such as states, individuals, and non-governmental organizations. Constructivists, therefore, prefer to examine the process of construction of interactions between the actors, rather than the power struggle or different interests of those actors.<sup>8</sup>

Constructivists emphasize the importance of actors in world politics as well as the process of interaction between them. In this respect, they share the belief of liberals that there are also actors other than states, such as non-governmental organizations, multi-national corporations, or different social groups. In constructivist view, the role of those actors is not stable; their structure and interests can change over time. They explain that situation as; the interests and the identity of actors are not something naturally given but the actors learn to act differently due to the interaction between them through historical context. Therefore, their interests and identity can change over time with the change of interaction between them. If a state acts with its security concerns today, it can change its attitude after ten years due to its change of interests or identity.<sup>9</sup>

Aside from the common views of constructivists, they are, actually, divided into two groups as North American and European. North American constructivists, who are mainly the scholars of United States, explore social norms and sometimes the meaning of identity. They try to build a causal relationship between actors, norms, interests and identities. North American constructivists are also referred as positivists, since they study international relations with the observable facts in a causal relationship. European

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<sup>8</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivism and foreign policy”, **Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Cases**, (Eds. Steve Smith et al.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 72.

<sup>9</sup> Alice Ba and Matthew J. Hoffman, “Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes”, **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol. 4, No.1, 2003, p. 20.

constructivists, on the other hand, are referred as post-positivists. They examine the role of language in constructing the interactions between the actors. However, the search for the role of language for European constructivists is not explanatory, it is interpretative. They do not look for the reasons behind the change in interests or the identity of the actors, but they look for the background conditions and the role of language in those changes. European constructivists use a bottom-up technique to reconstruct the reality, while North American constructivists use the bottom-down technique to find the reasons behind the change in interests or the identity of the actors.<sup>10</sup>

According to constructivist approach, actors develop their social context by the help of constructed interaction and action between themselves. Constructivists believe that the course of interaction and action between the actors cannot stay the same throughout the history. Because, they think that the actors are dynamic and the change of interests and identity is possible in international relations. The change of interests and attitude is believed to occur with the circulation of ideas and the interaction between the actors.<sup>11</sup> Constructivist theory brought a new perspective to international relations. Before the emergence of constructivist approach, the other mainstream theories such as realism or liberalism were emphasizing the importance of actors and their interests in world politics. But, constructivism stressed the importance of the interaction between the actors instead of actors themselves. They also brought the concepts like social norms, linguistic context, and discourses to the agenda, all of which actually shape the relations between the actors.<sup>12</sup>

Consequently, constructivism looks at socially constructed values and rather than seeking how the world is; they focus on what we make of it. Therefore, constructivism examines public opinion which is consisted of beliefs which is shaped by values that would include nationalism or religion. As defined by Kaarbo et al., public opinion is “the attitudes citizens have about particular foreign policy issues”.<sup>13</sup> Public opinion may or may not shape foreign policy. Majority of the time, the public cares more about

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<sup>10</sup> Checkel, pp. 72-73.

<sup>11</sup> Ba and Hoffmann, pp. 21-29.

<sup>12</sup> Checkel, p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 13-14.

domestic politics rather than foreign policy issues. However, there are times when the public would care about the foreign policy issues and would have an impact on foreign policy too. This can easily be observed in Turkish politics during the 1970s when the anti-American sentiment of the public could easily shape Turkish foreign policy. However, during the period under examination in this thesis and particularly concerning Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s, public opinion did not play much role.

Actually a country's identity, in other words, how it sees itself in relations to others or its conception of the world can also have an impact on foreign policy decisions. As a result of these powerful ideas that are shared by the members of the public, the leaders may set boundaries to their foreign policy decisions. Moreover, the identity and role that are usually constructed by the elites may support certain foreign policy positions.<sup>14</sup> Kemalist ideology which includes westernism and modernism that was constructed by the elite for a long time (and even partially including the current period) has been shaping the foreign policy of the Turkish governments. Along the same line the Sevres Syndrome which was defined as the syndrome originated from the Sevres Treaty signed by the Ottoman Empire that aimed at dividing Anatolia among the western powers, Russians and Armenians has been shaping Turkish foreign policy for a long time. The current foreign policies followed by the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* –AKP) vis-à-vis Syria can be analyzed under this framework. Currently, particularly the religion, Islam plays a significant role in the foreign policy of the AKP especially under the foreign ministry of Ahmet Davutoğlu.

However, identity or public opinion or as an approach constructivism, does not bring a strong explanation for the foreign policy followed by the Menderes governments towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s. Although it is possible to approach these anti-Middle Eastern or anti-Arab foreign policies from a historical background such as the hatred towards Arabs or “stabbing at the back syndrome” which refers to the alliance of the Arabs with the British against the Ottoman Empire, such an explanation does not offer a strong analysis.

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<sup>14</sup> Kaarbo et. al, p. 14.

## **B. Governmental Systems and Bureaucratic Politics**

Governmental systems such as open versus closed systems or democratic versus authoritarian systems are significant factors that have an impact on foreign policy-making. While foreign policy making is a complicated issue under democratic governments where there are many actors involved in decision-making, in authoritarian regimes, it is usually much easier where an authoritarian leader and the council under his rule make the last decision. Bureaucratic politics also play a significant role in foreign policy making.<sup>15</sup> As one of the best works on this issue Graham Allison's book on Cuban Missile Crisis in the United States during John F. Kennedy's Administration analyze in depth the bureaucratic politics as an important concept in foreign policy decision-making.<sup>16</sup> In this case study a variety of actors including the military, FBI, CIA, Secretary of State and Defense Representative in the UN, the President and his advisors all attempted to play crucial roles in the final decision-making. Although the American President reached the final decision, all these groups and departments bargained with each other and fought for the priority of their ideas.

In Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s, although there was a government that came to power democratically as a result of free and fair elections, the final decision mainly belonged to the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and eventually to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu.

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<sup>15</sup> Farrands, 84-90; For more details see Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, (Eds. C.F. Herman, C.W. Kegley, and J. N. Rosenau, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1987, pp. 339-365.

<sup>16</sup> Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, **The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis** 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed, Little Brown, Boston, 1999.

### C. Leadership Styles and Psychology of the Leaders

Leadership styles and perception of the leaders are particularly more important in foreign policy analysis of the authoritarian systems. Since the leader is the only decision-maker in these systems, the upbringing and psychology of the leader might have a crucial impact on foreign policy decision-making. As can be observed in Jerold Post's article on Saddam Hussein, his upbringing throughout his childhood played a significant role in his perceptions and foreign policy making once he became the ruler.<sup>17</sup> However, psychology or the leadership style should not only be limited to the authoritarian regimes. Even in the democratic regimes, who leads the country does matter. It made a big difference in the foreign policies followed by the United States when Bill Clinton ruled the country and when George W. Bush did. Similarly there was a dramatic difference between the foreign policies of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair in the United Kingdom.<sup>18</sup>

During the period under examination throughout the 1950s, it is not that relevant to analyze the anti-Middle Eastern policies of the Turkish governments since there was not one leader who made the decision. During this period while Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was dominant on foreign policy decision in the first four years toward the end of 1950s Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu took over this task since Menderes was mainly busy with the troublesome domestic politics.

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<sup>17</sup> Jerrold Post, "Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile", [http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/saddam\\_hussein\\_political\\_psychology\\_profile.pdf](http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/saddam_hussein_political_psychology_profile.pdf) (12.11. 2012)

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed analysis of leadership styles see Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Bahgat Korany and Timothy M. Shaw, "Who Leads Matters: The Effect of Powerful Individuals", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, pp. 83-131.

## II. EXTERNAL FACTORS

This classification argues that since all states reside in an international system and argues that the foreign policies of a state could be the product of an international system. Under external factors while Kaarbo et.al. include Realism and Liberalism, Steve Smith et.al. include Marxism. This section will start with a brief examination of Marxism and continue with an in depth analysis of Realism and Liberalism and particularly dependency under liberalism which are referred in this study as two approaches that bring an explanation to the analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s.

### A. Marxism

Marxism emerged as a critical theory against the expansion of capitalism in the mid 1840s. Karl Heinrich Marx as a philosopher interpreted the expansion of capitalism as the reason behind the disappearance of international state-system and the emergence of world capitalist society. According to Marx, in capitalist world system there was a conflict between the classes of bourgeoisie and international proletariat. Marx also believed that a socialist revolution would overthrow the capitalist system and bring about an equal and just socialist world system.<sup>19</sup>

Although there are various definitions and interpretations of Marxist theory, the criticism of capitalist system is the focus point in every definition or interpretation. In Marx's interpretation, capitalism was exploitative. The working class was to sell their workforce to the owners' class to be able to gain their living. The product, namely capital, was created by the working class, but the control of capital was in the hands of private owners. Because, the workers had to work in order to gain only enough to meet their basic needs, and let the capitalist system control their workplaces. So, the process of production was undemocratic, unequal, and exploitative according to Marx.

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<sup>19</sup> Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", **Theories of International Relations**, (Eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater et. al), St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p.119.



Therefore, for him, capitalism was in such a degree that human labor was sold and bought on the market. He believed that despite the productive structure of capitalism, its methods were unequal and exploitative.<sup>20</sup>

In the undemocratic and unequal capitalist system, the class conflict also plays a prominent role. Majority of people, in Marxist perspective, have always worked for the enrichment of a small group of people, which is found exploitative. Working class produced capital, but it also produced itself as a product by selling its labour. Marx thought that with the process of such kind of a production, the isolation of society was destroyed and it led to a worldwide capitalist system.<sup>21</sup>

In capitalist societies, the main conflict has always been between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In fact, Marx believed that the society is already inclined to class conflict. Marxist theory states that the capitalist system helps the rich continue to prosper by abusing the poor working class. Marx explains that situation as saying: “Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality at the opposite pole.”<sup>22</sup>

Although, Marxist theory seems to be dealing with domestic issues rather than inter-state relations, capitalism for Marx was not just a domestic issue. The process of production in capitalism was seen highly global by Marx. The fact that capitalist system is expansionist explains the swift spread of that production process worldwide. Despite the expansionist component of capitalism, Marx did not essentially relate it with colonialism or imperialism. That approach was developed in early 20<sup>th</sup> century by Marxist writers like Vladimir Lenin. They thought that the capitalist enrichment of capitalist states would lead them to colonial expansion.<sup>23</sup>

Despite its deficiencies in foreign policy analysis, it would be unfair to say Marxism just deals with domestic issues or economy policies. Marxist theory aims to

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<sup>20</sup> Mark Rupert, “Marxism and Critical Theory”, **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 150-154.

<sup>21</sup> Linklater, p. 122.

<sup>22</sup> Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, “Marxist theories of International Relations”, **The Globalization of World Politics**, (Eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 202-204.

<sup>23</sup> Rupert, p. 155.

understand the capitalist system through its historical process of development. The capitalist system in Marxist theory encompasses not just the economic relations, but it also encompasses political and cultural issues that would affect global relations.<sup>24</sup> So, in terms of foreign policy, Marxism analyzes the international relations within the global capitalist structures. Therefore, for Marxists, in order to understand the world politics it is crucial to examine the global capitalism in every sense.<sup>25</sup>

In terms of Turkish foreign policy, Marxism is irrelevant to our analysis of 1950s foreign policy towards the Middle East. Since Marxists emphasize the importance of global capitalism in understanding the world politics, it is not an appropriate approach for the case study under examination. In this case study throughout the 1950s Turkey followed a pro-western foreign policy towards the Middle East, not because of the structures of global capitalism but because of its security concerns and its military and economic dependence on the United States. Moreover, the preferences and the decisions of state elites were also distinctive in Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s. So, the global capitalism and its structures are not the main dynamics that bring an explanation to our case study.

## **B. Realism**

Realist theory which has many definitions and interpretations is one of the most influential theories in international relations. Despite its being known as a political approach before the Second World War, the realist theory became known as a school of thought in international relations after the war. Great losses of the war discredited the prevailing theory of idealism, and realist theory emerged as a popular theory in international relations.

Realist theory has basically three assumptions about the working process of the world. The first one is ‘groupism’ in which human beings see each other as members of a group. Accordingly, in every group people need a common value that can keep them

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<sup>24</sup> Rupert, p. 163.

<sup>25</sup> Hobden and Jones, p. 202.

together. Realism points out the nation-states as the most important groups and nationalism as their common value. The second assumption is 'egoism' which is claimed to be rooted in human nature. They interpret egoism as related to self-interest which is thought to be the driving force of politics. The third and the last assumption of realism is 'power centrism' which puts the concept of power at the heart of the theory.<sup>26</sup>

The three core elements of realism can be identified as 'statism', 'survival', and 'self-help'. Statism, first of all, refers to the state which is legally representing the will of its people. The state can use its authority inside the boundaries of itself, but outside of the country there is 'anarchy'. The anarchy in realist theory means the lack of authority in international arena. Therefore, they claim that the basic structure of international system is "anarchy," in which every state is sovereign and none of those states affiliate an authority other than itself. Under such kind of an anarchic system, the survival of the state depends on its ability to defend itself. In this respect, the element of self-help is utmost important in realist theory since the national interests are a must for the survival of the state.<sup>27</sup>

The main assumptions and the important elements of classical realism are all based on the fact that classical realists developed the theory benefiting from the analysis of 'human nature'. According to the classical realists, human nature had a huge potential to be innately evil and self-centered. As a classical realist Reinhold Niebuhr states that; "man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind; but he pretends not to be limited...All of his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of pride."<sup>28</sup> Once, George F. Kennan who was also one of the classical realists, stated that; "Man is still an animal, whose physical nature depends on combat; and whether he can ever find self-expression and peace in these gleaming well-ordered stables, where the discipline of good social behavior is demanded of him as in no other

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<sup>26</sup> William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and foreign policy", **Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Cases**, (Eds. Steve Smith et.al.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 32-33

<sup>27</sup> Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism", **The Globalization of World Politics**, (Eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 143-144.

<sup>28</sup> Keith L. Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism", **Review of Politics**, Vol. 54, No. 2, 1992, p. 288.

place, seems doubtful.”<sup>29</sup> The author of ‘Politics among Nations,’ Hans Morgenthau also claimed that it is a futile effort to understand the dynamics of international relations without analyzing the human nature.<sup>30</sup>

Realist theory assumes that the evil and self-centered feature of human nature leads to an anarchic environment with full of conflicts in international politics. Therefore, it is inevitable to have distrust, competition and power struggle among states. So, the main motivation of their foreign policy decisions becomes the need to obtain the required power to eliminate the other states. The aim of every state, in realist theory, is to survive and maintain their territorial integrity.<sup>31</sup> Security is the main concern of states which try to survive in an anarchic environment. In fact, survival is the first step of their foreign policy agenda. The other goals which may include the hegemonic expansion of a state or just the development of defensive systems come after the survival of a state.<sup>32</sup>

The realist theorists are divided into two groups in terms of the foreign policy decisions of states, as ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realists. Offensive realists claim that the desire for obtaining power is endless for states, and the real aim behind their power-seeking nature is reaching a hegemonic position in international arena. But, the defensive realists claim that maintaining the security is the most important aim of a state, so they do not prefer to obtain more power.<sup>33</sup> Defensive realists also tried to explain that even in an anarchic environment, it is possible for states to keep peace without threatening their rival states and maintain their security. Conversely, offensive realists interpret the anarchic nature of international system as an atmosphere of uncertainty due to the lack of authority. In this respect, they claim that states usually feel themselves insecure, so they can be suspicious about the other states’ maximization of power which can lead to an expansion of a state.<sup>34</sup>

Either defensive or offensive, both groups emphasize the concept of “power” in international system. Since the power can either guarantee a state’s security or enable a

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<sup>29</sup> Shimko, p. 290.

<sup>30</sup> Shimko, p. 290.

<sup>31</sup> Kaarbo et. al, p .8.

<sup>32</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, pp. 151-152.

<sup>33</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, p. 152.

<sup>34</sup> Wohlforth, p. 35.

state's territorial expansion. However, according to the realist theory, if a state does not have the adequate power, it is possible for the weaker state to make an alliance with a powerful one. But, for the militarily powerful states the main concern is to keep their power as it is and balance against other powerful states. The states with less power, namely the middle powers, are usually compelled to make alliances with one of the global powers in order to maintain their security. However, that situation also affects the foreign policy decisions of those middle powers and they start to arrange their foreign policies under the influence of major powers. For the least powerful states, it is even more difficult to follow an independent foreign policy. So, they are forced to serve for the interests of their allies or protectors. As a result, according to the realist theory, every state whether it is a major, middle power or a weak state, they all have to be cautious about the potential threat in an anarchic system.<sup>35</sup>

The search for power and security is the main goal of states according to the realist theory. Given the fact that international system is anarchic, the use of violence is possible and sometimes inevitable. Nevertheless, according to some realists, balance of power can minimize the possibility of the use of violence in international relations, and it can create a reasonable balance among the global powers.<sup>36</sup> If one state becomes extremely powerful, and poses a threat for the other states with its attitude and geographical situation, balance of power policies are likely to play a prominent role in world politics. We can see an example of that situation after the Second World War, when the United States started balancing against the Soviet Union which is even a militarily inferior power. In terms of the balance of power theory, Soviet Union's geographical situation which lies at the heart of Europe and its aggressive foreign policy led to the balancing policies of the United States, as a result the period ended with the superiority of United States against Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup>

In realist theory, individuals, groups or states are compelled to protect themselves from external or internal threats. In the anarchic international system,

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<sup>35</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 8-9.

<sup>36</sup> Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", **Theories of International Relations**, (Eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater et. al), St.Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 81.

<sup>37</sup> Wohlforth, p. 36.

balance of power and military power are two important elements that can protect states from external threats. However, balance of power is also seen as a contradictory element in realist theory. It might protect a state from being occupied and it might also reduce the possibility of a war. But, balance of power might also increase the level of tension in international relations and provoke the rival states, so it can lead to a war. Realists argue that for some states and leaders which were under the obligation of a common culture or convention, balance of power can restrain their inclination to war. But, in the event of a lack of common culture or a convention, the balance of power could not work, and those states or leaders become prone to warlike situations.<sup>38</sup>

Realists argue that sovereign states which seek power and try to maximize their interests are the main actors in the anarchical international system. They also argue that it is inevitable for states to use violence in order to maximize their interests. Because the international system in realist approaches, is based on the self-help mechanism. In conclusion, realists claim that the conflict and competition among states will always prevail in international relations due to the lack of security and authority in the international system which is defined as anarchic.<sup>39</sup>

In terms of foreign policy, states feel the need to maintain their security by strengthening their military power, as the international system is anarchic which leads to distrust and conflict between the actors. However, the gain of power, namely the increase in military power of a state threatens and agitates its neighbor, so the neighbor starts to maximize its own interests and takes measures to maintain its own security. Therefore, the pursuit of power in international relations becomes an obligation for states in order to compete with their rivals. In realist perspective, while the powerful states can maximize their interests without the help of other actors and maintain their security, the less powerful states have to make alliances with the more powerful states in order to eliminate their rivals. Nevertheless, both military and economic alliances between the powerful and less powerful states usually result in the dependence of the

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<sup>38</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, "Classical Realism", **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 57-58.

<sup>39</sup> Burchill, pp. 80-90.

less powerful state on the other, leading to the parallel foreign policies. Due to its dependence on the powerful state, the less powerful one usually feel the need to align its foreign policy with the powerful state.<sup>40</sup> The fact that realists emphasize the importance of security in international relations, the states as the actors of anarchical international system constantly seek to strengthen their military abilities, which is the main point of the criticisms against realism.

Realism brings a satisfactory explanation to the period and the case study under examination. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey had no choice but to ally with the Western Bloc. Once the Soviet leader threatened Turkey with establishing dominance in the Straits and invading Kars and Ardahan, the two provinces in the north-eastern part of Turkey, the Turkish government under the leadership of İsmet İnönü decided to ally with the Western bloc. In an attempt to do so first the transition to multi-party system was accomplished. Eventually, by becoming a member of NATO in 1952 under the leadership of Adnan Menderes and his Democrat Party (*Demokrat Party* — DP), Turkey committed itself to Western Alliance. As a result of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Turkey became dependent on the US economically and politically (mainly for security reasons). As defined by Realism international politics is anarchical, and therefore in this anarchic atmosphere of the post Second World War period, Turkish leadership's only purpose was to survive in this newly established bipolar world. Therefore, as part of this survival, Turkish governments of the time, particularly, DP governments aligned their Middle Eastern foreign policies with the US. Moreover, DP governments were afraid that the newly established Arab neighbors surrounding it would all turn into Communist states under the orbit of the Soviet Union.

### **C. Liberalism**

The starting point of the liberal theory is its emphasis on the importance of human freedom. The emphasis on that concept creates rights and institutions in liberal theory. The rights which are utmost important for the liberal theory are; freedom of

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<sup>40</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 8-9.

conscience, right to private property, freedom of thought and speech, equality of opportunity in education and health care. According to the liberal theory, in order to guarantee all those rights, maintenance of democratic representation is also necessary.<sup>41</sup>

As to the institutions that shaped the liberal theory; first one is the legal equality of citizens, such as the freedom of conscience or religion. Second one is the representative legislatures which obtain their authority from the free will of citizens. Third, the recognition of the right to private property is crucial for a state's economy. Private property is seen in liberalism as an effective element in economy and as a protector against the state monopoly. Fourth and last institution; economic decisions in a state are made by the forces of supply and demand, without the interference of domestic or international bureaucracies.<sup>42</sup>

Liberal theory, actually, started to become popular toward the end of Cold War. The rise of liberal approach came with the detente period of 1970s in which European community emerged as a multi-national power in the international system. Following that, scholars started to examine the role of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions in world politics. With the emergence of such organizations, economic interdependence and international cooperation came to the agenda of international relations.<sup>43</sup>

With the rise of liberalism in world politics towards the end of Cold War, the democratization of states also accelerated. The right of representation of citizens through the elections supported the democratization process. In terms of international relations, liberal theory put forward that democratic states keep the peace among each other, and they are not war-prone due to their democratic nature. In fact, the idea of a peace among democratic states belongs to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant who lived between the years of 1724 and 1804. In 1795, he argued that for the rational citizens welfare is very important and they usually avoid from risks and unnecessary costs. So, they would

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<sup>41</sup> Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and Foreign Policy", **Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Cases**, (Eds. Steve Smith et. al.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 50.

<sup>42</sup> Doyle, pp. 50-51.

<sup>43</sup> Diana Panke, and Thomas Risse, "Liberalism", **International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity**, (Eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 91.



not want to carry the burden of a war. Moreover, if they are dissatisfied with the government, they could show their dissatisfaction in elections. Therefore, the governments of democratic states would not risk their position and they would try to please their citizens.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, democratic states endeavored to keep the peace at least among each other.

Peace among democratic states is not a rule of liberal theory, but it is an idea that suggests democratic states would not go to war against each other under normal conditions. Liberal theorists claim that if democratic states are compelled to go to a world war, most probably all of the democratic states gather on one side. Based on their assumptions, liberal theorists argue that democratic and liberal states managed to establish peace among themselves. Although, most of the democratic states are in Europe or North America, the number of democratic states worldwide is increasing day by day. So, that situation creates a hope among liberal theorists that the peace zone will expand in time and finally the possibility of a global peace will increase.<sup>45</sup>

While peace among democratic states is highly probable for liberal theorists, there is also a concept called ‘aggression against non-liberal states’. Liberal theorists claim that peace is only possible among liberal states, but liberal states have gone to war against non-liberal states many times. Furthermore, they claim that most of those wars were defensive. According to the liberal theory, authoritarian regimes which are usually power-seeking, and war-prone, creates conflict and strikes fear in the international system. However, throughout the history, liberal states have also showed ‘imprudent aggression’ or reckless enmity against the weak non-liberal states. For the powerful non-liberal states liberal states have always approached them with suspicion and showed their distrust in their foreign policies. While blaming the authoritarian regimes for war-proneness, liberal states also initiated many wars.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the numerous wars that was started either by liberal or non-liberal states in the international system, liberal theorists still count on cooperation, international trade and financial relationships which made the world more interdependent. According to the

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<sup>44</sup> Panke and Risse, pp. 90-96.

<sup>45</sup> Doyle, pp. 52-54.

<sup>46</sup> Doyle, p. 54.

liberal theory, states prefer to cooperate with each other rather than struggle with each other in a chaotic environment. Through cooperation, states can reach the goal of economic wealth. It is even claimed in economic liberalism that if states can just produce what they are good at producing, the economy of all states would be better off through cooperation. In terms of foreign policy, interdependence is regarded as a prominent element of liberalism. Because, in an interdependent world if one state threatens another, it means that it might lose one of its potential trade partners and as a result, that situation might harm its own economy.<sup>47</sup>

Dependency levels of states vary in respect to their financial or military power. Wealthier states are also affected by the foreign policy actions of other states, but thanks to their financial or military power, they are not dependent on others substantially. They can find some other trading partners in order to improve their economy. But, for the poorer states, foreign policy decisions are dependent on their trade partners or allies. In fact, the future of their economy is dependent on the course of their relations with other states and some international organizations. Since that their economic and military capabilities are limited, they usually have to follow the foreign policy of their trade partners or allies.<sup>48</sup>

Interdependence in the international system also increased the importance of international organizations such as United Nations, International Monetary Fund, or World Trade Organization. Those organizations work as a coordinator between the states while the cooperation takes place. The lack of authority to guarantee the cooperation between states made them comply with the rules of international organizations. The existence of international organizations, and multi-national corporations also helped the globalization process of the world.<sup>49</sup> However, states cannot benefit from that process at the same level. While the richer states improve their economies with various trade partners, poorer states are compelled to comply with the decisions of their trade partners or allies resulting in dependent foreign and economy policies.

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<sup>47</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 10-11.

<sup>48</sup> Kaarbo et. al, pp. 10-11.

<sup>49</sup> Kaarbo et. al, p. 11.

To conclude, due to the emphasis on the rights of individual, private property, or representation, liberalism is regarded as more of a domestic theory rather than an international one. But, in terms of international system, liberal theorists also have some ideas and claims. The most prominent contribution of liberalism to international relations is the theory of ‘democratic peace’ which claims that democratic states would not go to war against each other, but they can go to war against the non-liberal states. Liberal theorists acknowledge that liberal states cooperate in trade with each other, in which they all can benefit from.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, liberal theorists emphasize the necessity of international organizations which regulate international trade, cooperation between liberal states, and the benefits of interdependence. Moreover, they concentrate on the dependence of periphery states on core states in the cases of economy and security. This dependency most of the time forces the periphery or the dependent state to align its foreign policies with the core state. However, from time to time periphery states do not follow the same foreign policies the core state wants them to do. In such cases there is a high chance that these dependent states will be punished for this foreign policy by either through a reduction of financial aid they were receiving from the core or a sanction that will applied to the dependent by the core. Jeanne Hey in the next section examines different types of pro-core and anti-core foreign policies.

### **1. Dependency Theory and Types of Dependent Foreign Policies**

Having seen the concept of ‘interdependence’ in liberalism, this section will analyze the ‘dependency theory’ and its five different types of foreign policies with regards to the article of Jeanne A. K. Hey; “Foreign Policy Options under Dependence: A Theoretical Evaluation with Evidence from Ecuador”. Dependency approach has a strong explanatory power through which the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s can be analyzed.

As the concept of interdependence puts forward, there is a relation between economic dependence and foreign policy. The term of dependent foreign policy is used

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<sup>50</sup> Kaarbo et. al, p. 59.

for the states which are usually economically dependent on financially or militarily powerful states. Jeanne Hey categorizes the dependent foreign policies into three categories. In the first category called independence, the foreign policy behavior of the periphery country has nothing to do with its dependence to any core country. In the second category, Hey concentrates on anti-core foreign policies in which despite its dependency to the core economically and politically, the periphery does not align its foreign policies with the core. She classifies that group as counter-dependence and compensation. In the third category, she focuses on pro-core foreign policies in which as a result of their dependency to the core economically and politically, the periphery countries align their foreign policies with the core. She calls those foreign policy behaviors as compliance and consensus.<sup>51</sup>

#### **a. Independence**

The foreign policy of a dependent state does not have to be designed in respect to its relations with the core. The independent foreign policy can emerge autonomously without the interference of the core. Consequently, the foreign policy of the periphery may or may not align with the foreign policy of the core. Leader's political style, pressure from local interest groups, or the traditional context of the foreign policy can be effective on the independent foreign policy of a dependent state. The independent foreign policy events can be the cooperation agreements between friendly states, diplomatic visits of neighboring states, or the policies of universal issues such as basic human rights or global environmental issues.<sup>52</sup> So, it is also possible for a periphery state to follow an independent foreign policy even if a state is dependent on another state economically.

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<sup>51</sup> Hey, pp. 543-544.

<sup>52</sup> Hey, p. 551.

## **b. Anti-Core Foreign Policies**

### **(1) Counter-dependence**

Counter-dependence is a type of dependent foreign policy that does not comply with the foreign policy decisions of the core. Although the periphery state is dependent on the core state economically and politically, it does not align its foreign policies with the core. Leaders in periphery states follow a foreign policy which does not serve for the interests of the core due to the harmful results of a dependent relationship for the periphery. The dependent relation between the periphery and the core may economically give damage to the periphery or this relation may politically demean the periphery. In spite of the consequences they may face the leaders of the periphery may diverge their foreign policies with the core. So, the main actor in counter-dependence is the leader or the leaders of the periphery.<sup>53</sup>

### **(2) Compensation**

An anti-core foreign policy is implemented in compensation as well. But, as different from counter-dependence, the leaders of the periphery may not want to damage their relations with the core, but they have to follow an anti-core foreign policy due to the popular unrest in the country. In this case, anti-core foreign policy is just used to appease the people who are irritated by the dependent relationship and its economic results.<sup>54</sup> Otherwise, the disturbance of people would risk the positions of leaders in the periphery. The important point in compensation is; the leaders of periphery put aside their desires regarding the foreign policy for a while in order to satisfy the needs of their people who are disturbed by the dependent situation of the country.

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<sup>53</sup> Hey, pp. 549-550.

<sup>54</sup> Hey, pp. 549-550.

### **c. Pro-Core Foreign Policies**

#### **(1) Compliance**

Compliance has its roots in realist theory. This approach assumes that weak states that are dependent on a core state both politically and economically will align its foreign policies with the powerful state. In other words, the foreign policy of the periphery is assumed to be parallel with the core's due to its dependency in economy or security. The process of compliance is described as periphery's arrangement of its foreign policy in respect to the wishes of the core. To do otherwise would be a risk for periphery as it may encounter with political or economic sanctions. In foreign policy, the periphery quits its interests and preferences for the sake of economic needs and national security.<sup>55</sup>

The main point of compliance as a dependent foreign policy is, the leaders of the periphery decide to follow a dependent foreign policy by themselves under overt or covert pressure that comes from the core. Because, the leaders think that not complying with the foreign policy of the core would harm their country both politically and economically. Otherwise, under normal conditions this would not have been the foreign policy they would follow. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s cannot be examined under compliance. During this period there is a high chance that even if Turkey was not an ally of the US and was not forced by the US to follow anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies, it could still follow such hostile foreign policies as a result of its bitter experience with the Arabs during the First World War.

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<sup>55</sup> Hey, pp. 545-546.

## (2) Consensus

Consensus is derived from the dependency theory. Dependency theory assumes that cooperation between the elites of the core and periphery creates an economic system which works for the benefit of the core, and that cooperation creates a consensual relationship between core and periphery. Such kind of a relationship between core and periphery results in a foreign policy alignment. The consensual relationship is created by both sides over time, and it is beneficial for the elites of both sides.<sup>56</sup> However, periphery has to give up its own foreign policy interests and follow the foreign policy of the core. In consensus, rather than the society it is the elites who support the idea of aligning its foreign policies with the core in order to reach their economic benefits (which may as well include some security benefits) Consensus explains the anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies of Turkish governments quite well since it was the political elite that was consisted of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the prominent members of DP as well as the state elite such as the military that supported such an alliance with the United States and agreed to align its Middle Eastern foreign policies with the US.

Turkey followed an anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy during the 1950s as a result of its struggle in the new bipolar world system. As it will be examined in the historical background chapter, following the Second World War as a result of the Soviet threats (territorial claims to Kars and Ardahan and privileges in the Straits) Turkey had no choice but to ally with the Western bloc, thus follow a pro-western foreign policy. The young Republic of Turkey had no intention to live under the domination of the Soviet Union which could have included it in its group of orbit states. Consequently, Turkey fearing from the expansionist policies of Soviet Union was against any intention of the Soviets to control the newly established Middle Eastern states. Inclusion of the neighboring Middle Eastern states into the Soviet domain would endanger the security of Turkey. From a realist perspective in an attempt to maintain its security and survive

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<sup>56</sup> Hey, pp. 547-548.

in this new atmosphere of Cold War period Turkey followed a pro-west foreign towards the Middle East. Moreover, from liberal perspective and interdependence under this perspective, Turkey by receiving economic and military aid from the West, and particularly the US, aligned its Middle Eastern foreign policies with the West.



**CHAPTER 2**  
**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY**  
**WITH AN EMPHASIS ON DEPENDENCY**

Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, Turkish governments followed various foreign policies in accordance with the change of time, international dynamics, interests, and leaders. While some of the governments followed pro-west foreign policies in respect to the interests of the state, some of them implemented anti-west policies from time to time. In this chapter, the historical background of Turkish foreign policy will be explained.

After the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish foreign policy was designed to be neutral and cautious. The leader of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's motto "Peace at home, peace in the world" explains the period very clearly. Due to the westernization process which took place in every aspect of the state and social system during the early years of the republic, there was no place for an active foreign policy in Atatürk's Turkey. However, when the Second World War started after the death of Atatürk in 1938, the neutral Turkish foreign policy was to be challenged due to the upcoming threat of war. İsmet İnönü who succeeded Atatürk as the President of Republic, during the war, tried to follow a neutral and cautious foreign policy as long as he could. However, towards the end of war, he had to join the anti-German camp, namely the Allies. By joining the Allies of the Second World War in the last couple of months towards the end of the war, Turkey fortunately did not have to fight in the war.

Towards the end of Second World War, the traditional enemy of Ottoman Empire Russia –after the communist revolution of 1917 as Soviet Union— re-emerged as a threat for Turkey with its territorial claims and demands of some privileges at Straits. Meanwhile, after the Second World War, Soviet Union and United States emerged as the two superpowers of the world, which started the Cold War era between the communist Soviet Union and capitalist United States. Therefore, following World War II, Turkey changed its foreign policy and started to follow a pro-west and pro-US foreign policy due its security concerns and economic needs. In 1950s, during the

government of Democrat Party, the pro-west attitude of Turkey became clearer, especially in the policies it followed towards the Middle East. However, after the coup of 1960, Turkish foreign policy changed again, and it became multi-dimensional. With the new constitution of 1961, the public gained the right to have a voice in foreign policy decisions of the country. The reason behind the change of Turkish foreign policy was mainly the result of ongoing problems with United States such as in the case of Jupiter vs. Cuban Missile Crisis and Cyprus Issue which caused an anti-US attitude in the public opinion. The governments that came to power following the 1960 coup realized that a pro-US foreign policy was not in accordance with the interests of Turkey anymore. In terms of Middle East, due to the pro-west policies of the Menderes government in the region during the 1950s, Turkey could not get the support of Arab states in the case of Cyprus.

Throughout the 1970s Turkish foreign policy continued to be multi-dimensional due to the ongoing petroleum crisis worldwide, the atmosphere of détente between two superpowers, Soviet Union and United States, and also the Cyprus problem. Especially Cyprus problem played a prominent role in Turkish foreign policy starting from 1960s to the end of 1970s. For that reason, Turkey tried to strengthen its relations with the Middle East during that period. 1980s and 1990s also witnessed the multi-dimensional foreign policy of Turkey in regards to its interests. The collapse of Soviet Union at the end of 1980s also helped Turkey to seek for its own interests in the region, as the threat of Soviet Union was eliminated.

When the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey started to develop warm relations with the Middle Eastern countries. But, that move of AKP did not mean that Turkey had broken its ties with the West, the good relations with the United States and the European Union continued. The emphasis on the relations with the Middle East increased the trade between Turkey and Arab states, and indicated the region as the most important region in terms of international politics for the AKP government.

In this chapter, the examination of the foreign policies of the early years of the Republic of Turkey, World War II and post-World War II and the beginning of the Cold

War era will be given in order to compare the Democrat Party period with the previous periods of Turkish Republic in terms of their foreign policy approaches.

## **I. EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD**

The Lausanne Treaty, which was signed on 24 July 1923 after the First World War between Turkey and the Entente Powers, marked the birth of a new state. Three months after the conclusion of the treaty, Mustafa Kemal and his friends announced the regime of the new state as republic. Mustafa Kemal in an attempt to establish a modern, westernized and civilized secular state planned to initiate drastic reforms. In order to accomplish his ideal, he planned to keep good relations with the states that he fought against in the war of independence. By taking lessons from the Ottoman period he planned not to establish a young state surrounded with hostile neighbors. Therefore, he followed the principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world” in his foreign policy decisions. He wanted to establish a neutral country that was not dependent on any other powers. A new foreign policy perspective was needed for the young republic, not because the war was over and the Ottoman Empire was collapsed, but because Turkey was established as a nation state from the ashes of a multi-national and multi-religious empire. With the guidance of ‘National Pact’, which was formed at Erzurum and Sivas congresses, Atatürk and his fellow friends decided to preserve the current borders and territorial integrity of the country rather than claiming any rights on the territories of neighbouring states.<sup>57</sup> There were two main reasons behind that decision; first of all Turks were tired of fighting at wars for many years, and also Turkish Republic would not afford going to another war for more territory. Second of all, as mentioned before, Atatürk had to focus on implementing reforms inside the country and since the international environment had changed after the WWI, the young republic had to keep up with the new period and keep the peaceful relations in the international arena. So, in

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<sup>57</sup> Mustafa Aydın, “Determinations of Turkish foreign policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs”, **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 35, no. 4, p. 156.

order to realize all the reforms, Atatürk tried to keep the country away from any international conflict.

In the first few years of the republic, Atatürk concentrated on transforming the country into a civilized and a modern state. The reforms such as secularization of the administration, adoption of Latin alphabet, western calendar, on judiciary helped the country to move closer to the European state system. Aligning with his reforms to westernize the country, Atatürk's foreign policy was also western-oriented. Atatürk's main goal was to make Turkey a respected member in the European community. He had no intention to take the revenge of the past or to take country into any adventurous struggle. As a result, he managed to keep good relations with the previous enemies of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>58</sup>

His foreign policy mainly concentrated on keeping good relations with the European countries. Keeping good relations with Europe naturally kept him away from establishing good relations with the Middle Eastern countries since the majority of them were under the mandate of British and French between the two world wars. There was a break with the Arab world as a result of the bad memories of the First World War when the Arabs allied with the British against the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, as a secular and nation state, did not have much in common with the Middle East. New reforms of Atatürk slowly but surely started to transform the Turkish society towards a more western culture. Arabs did not approve the changes in the Turkish state system and culture. They saw the situation as the abandonment of Islam in Turkey. These developments led to a mutual alienation between the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey.<sup>59</sup> However, the rupture in the relations with the Middle East did not mean a hostile attitude of Turks against Arabs. On the contrary, Turkey had to follow a peaceful foreign policy in order to strengthen the reforms inside the country. Atatürk followed a

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<sup>58</sup> Leonard A. Stone, "Turkish foreign policy: Four Pillars of Tradition", **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol. 5, No. 2, June-July 2001, pp. 14-16.

<sup>59</sup> Yücel Bozdağhoğlu, "Modernization and the Construction of Turkey's Official Identity", **Turkish foreign policy and Turkish Identity: a Constructivist Approach**, Taylor and Francis Books, New York, 2003, p. 58.

neutral and peaceful foreign policy towards both to the west and east in order to promote his reforms in his country.<sup>60</sup>

Turkey, as a newly established state in such a strategic geography, tried hard to serve for the international peace and security. Atatürk's cautious and realist foreign policy was different from the adventurous foreign policies of the states which were newly established as well. That kind of cautious foreign policy was also the result of Turkey's unique geographical position at that time. After the WWI, Turkey's neighbors became the biggest powers of Europe with the changing borders. Northern border was surrounded by the Soviet Union, in the south there was Iraq and Cyprus, but they were under the rule of Britain, and there was the mandatory regime of France in Syria, twelve islands, on the other side, belonged to Italy. Therefore, Turkey had to follow a very careful foreign policy in terms of its neighbors.<sup>61</sup>

Atatürk's foreign policy was designed not to deal with the international problems of the post-war, but to give a breathing space for Turkey to absorb the reforms and develop a civilized state system. The success of that foreign policy stemmed from Atatürk's knowledge of country's own limits and potentials. By obeying the rules of the international environment, he followed a rational and realist foreign policy. Such a foreign policy helped Turkey to be a respected member of civilized western community. Furthermore, during the period until the Second World War Turkey could follow a very successful neutral foreign policy.<sup>62</sup>

## **II. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

The 1929 world economic crisis which resulted in a decrease in world trade and an increase in unemployment rate created serious problems in every European state. Germany, Italy, England and France were all suffering from the economic crisis.

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<sup>60</sup> Mehmet Gönübol and Cem Sar, "Lozan'dan Sonra Türk Dış Politikası", **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)**, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, pp. 59-60.

<sup>61</sup> Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994**, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2004, p. 93.

<sup>62</sup> Baskın Oran, "Görelî Özerklik I 1923-1939", **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980**, (Ed. Baskın Oran), İletişim Yayınları İstanbul, 2006, pp. 256-257.

Moreover, the rise of the Communist Revolution showed itself as a serious threat to the capitalist western world. In their point of view, compared to Hitler's Nazism in Germany, Communism in the Soviet Union was much more dangerous for the other European countries. Consequently, they turned a blind eye to Hitler's actions which eventually started the Second World War in Europe.<sup>63</sup>

Following Atatürk's death, under the leadership of İsmet İnönü Turkey attempted to continue its neutral foreign policy, which was quite difficult under the threat of a world war. However, with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Germany and the annexation of Albania by Italy, İnönü started to seek security alliances especially against Italy since Benito Mussolini had militarized the twelve islands (Dodecanese). The expansion of Italy in Europe was seen as a bigger threat for Turkey compared to Germany. So, İnönü signed the Tripartite Agreement which forced Turkey to establish a security alliance, at first with England, then with France in 1939. An important supplementary protocol was also signed. The protocol stated that the alliance among France, England and Turkey should not lead Turkey to involve in strife against Soviet Union in any case. Therefore, İnönü managed to guarantee the security of Turkey against a possible invasion of Axis powers. İnönü followed a very careful foreign policy by avoiding any clash with the either side until the invasion of Paris by Hitler's Germany in 1940. In accordance with the declarations signed between England, France and Turkey, Turkey was supposed to help its allies. However, İnönü refraining from entering a war started to make use of the Soviet Union threat to Turkey as an excuse.<sup>64</sup> According to the Turkish thesis, if Turkey entered the war, the Soviet Union would feel itself insecure and attack Turkey. So, İnönü did not want to agitate the Soviet Union by entering the war.

Throughout the war, Turkish foreign policy was designed to balance its relations with the belligerent states and to keep the country out of the war. The bad memories of the First World War were still very fresh in minds of Turkish people, besides Turkish

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<sup>63</sup> Sander, pp. 113-115.

<sup>64</sup> Günay Göksu Özdoğan, "II.Dünya Savaşı Yıllarındaki Türk-Alman İlişkilerinde İç ve Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Pan-Türkizm", **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, (Ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu), Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, pp. 133-134.

Republic would not afford another world war in such a short period and with such a weak army. Britain and France helped Turkey with a special agreement to strengthen Turkish military in case of any situation that would drag Turkey into war. As a requirement of that agreement, Turkey received 25.000.000 pounds for war materials, 16.000.000 pounds as a gold loan and a 3, 5 million pounds for the transfer of Turkish credits. Therefore, İnönü managed to receive the economic aid to strengthen its military. Thus, he promised to Allies that Turkey would preserve its benevolent neutrality in case of any attack either to France or England.<sup>65</sup>

As a result of İnönü's cautious foreign policy Turkey managed to stay out of the war in the first half of the Second World War. However, the pressure on Turkey was growing day by day especially after the German defeat in Stalingrad in 1942. Turkey was hoping to keep good relations both with Soviet Union and Germany. In Turkish point of view, Germany was the state which could balance the power of Soviet Union in Europe. Turkey would not trust Soviet Union's future plans especially after the victory of Stalingrad. The allies of Turkey, on the other hand, wanted Germany to be stuck in Europe. So, they needed the other allies to pass through Turkey to Europe, but Turkey's refusal to enter the war was hindering their plans. For that reason, especially Winston Churchill as the prime minister of United Kingdom and Franklin D. Roosevelt as the president of the US strived hard to convince İnönü to enter the war.<sup>66</sup>

İnönü was determined not to enter the war and stay neutral until the end of the war. He was using the deficiency of military material as the major excuse for not entering the war. Although Turkey received military aid from British and Americans, this was not sufficient for it to enter the war. However, allies started to pressure Turkey more and more so Turkey agreed to cut its diplomatic relations with Germany in 1944. But, even that move did not satisfy Soviet Union, and Stalin kept expressing their demands on the Turkish straits to Churchill who did not support Turkish policies at all.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Selim Deringil, "Turkey at the outbreak of war", **Turkish foreign policy During the Second World War**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 88-89.

<sup>66</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye 1939-1945", **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980**, pp. 450-451.

<sup>67</sup> Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası", **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)**, pp. 178-185.

Turkey succeeded in staying out of the war with İnönü's meticulous and realist foreign policy. By using the traditional tactic of playing the European powers against each other and balancing its relations with them, Turkish foreign policy survived another dangerous and painful period of world politics. However, towards the end of the war, Turkey had no choice but to enter the war on the Allies' side once it started to receive the Soviet threats.

### **III. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE POST SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD AND BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR ERA**

The real victors of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union; one being capitalist and the other as communist, those two countries emerged as the two superpowers of the world at the end of war. Naturally, the other countries were divided into two groups around either Soviet Union, or the United States. Therefore, the "Bipolar World System" emerged in international arena.<sup>68</sup> The Cold War period started in 1947 and condensed throughout the 1950s and finally ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.

The US officials, fearing from the communist Soviet expansion in Europe after the war, designed a plan which was called 'Truman Doctrine'. The doctrine that was suggested by the US president Harry S. Truman in 1947 comprised economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece. According to the US officials, Turkey and Greece were the two countries which were under the direct threat of communism. So, Truman aid was given as 300 million dollars to Greece, and 100 million dollars to Turkey in total. Truman Doctrine marked the beginning of Cold War and it became the symbol of the division of the world into two blocks as western and eastern. The doctrine also brought the 'Containment Policy' which was defined as surrounding the Soviet Union

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<sup>68</sup> Oran, "Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye I 1945-1960", **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980**, pp. 480-481.



with the pro-US states.<sup>69</sup> Turkey became one of those pro-US states with the beginning of Cold War, since it felt itself threatened by its traditional enemy Soviet Union.

A few months after the approval of Truman Doctrine in the senate, the US decided to help the other European countries which were economically suffered after the war. So, they introduced the ‘Marshall Plan’ to the Europe in order to strengthen the fragile economies of the continent. In fact, that was another method of preventing the Soviet expansion in the region. The plan was named after Secretary of State George Marshall and it began to operate in April 1948.<sup>70</sup> Turkey which was originally excluded from the program was eventually included and a small amount of aid was proposed to Turkey since the country was not damaged physically from the Second World War. Finally, the US was persuaded to extend Turkey 10 million dollars in credit as an initial aid. The 60% of the aid was to be used in agriculture sector in Turkey which would lead to a dramatic production increase in the following years.<sup>71</sup>

During the post-war period a new Europe was being designed by the US with the help of the aid programs and security organizations such as Council of Europe. Turkey, desiring to be a part of western European defense system, was disappointed for not being invited to the council for its first meeting. After the Second World War, the main concern of the Turkish foreign policy was the Soviet threat. According to the Turkish officials, if the US did not include Turkey in its security organizations, the aid coming from the US would decrease and Turkey would be the next step of Soviet expansion in Europe. However, the Turkish concerns were futile, because Turkey was invited to the council after a short period of time. Seeing such alliance enterprises in Europe, Turkey comprehended that the US had a vital role in the region, and from that time onwards Turkey’s foreign policy was aligned with the Western world, and particularly the US.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Sander, pp. 257-259.

<sup>70</sup> Çağrı Erhan, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980**, p. 538.

<sup>71</sup> George S. Harris, **Troubled Alliance Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971**, Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1973, pp. 31-34.

<sup>72</sup> İlder Turan and Dilek Barlas, “Batı İttifakına Üye Olmanın Türk Dış Politikası Üzerindeki Etkileri”, **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, pp. 154-155.

As stated by İnönü: “Turkey, from its isolation in 1945, had risen to the rank of a respected member of the civilized world.”<sup>73</sup>

Soviet Union’s expansion in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War increased the security concerns of the Western Europe. The administrators of ‘Cominform’<sup>74</sup> were explicitly stating that their primary aim was to destroy the western regimes. The security concerns of Western Europe forced them to make alliances among themselves in order to eliminate the threat of Soviet Union. So, on 17 March 1948, England, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg signed the “Brussels Treaty” to unite their military power against any attack that would come from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even those five countries’ military power would not compete with Soviet Union’s, so they needed the US to join that treaty. Therefore, on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Pact was signed among those five countries and the US.

The alliance among the western countries against the Soviet expansion was also a very important development for Turkey which felt the same threat from the Soviet Union. Turkish policy makers were in favor of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as soon as possible, because they did not want to see Turkey as an isolated member of western bloc after adjusting the Turkish foreign policy in accordance with the West and the US. However, Turkey was not invited to the organization in the first place, since its location was found more secure compared to the other European countries which were defined as under the direct threat of Soviet Union. Turkish public opinion was disappointed by that decision. Moreover, with the inclusion of Italy and the north of Algeria to the treaty, the reactions grew bigger in the Turkish society and media.<sup>75</sup> In spite of all these efforts and complaints, Turkey had to wait for three more years to join the NATO officially in 1952.

In Turkey until the period of Democrat Party government, the traditional pro-west foreign policy was also prevalent during the early years of republic, the Second

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<sup>73</sup> Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “1949: Ankara’s Frustration Grows”, **Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952 The First Enlargement of NATO**, Frank Class Publishers, London, 1999, p. 130.

<sup>74</sup> Cominform(Communist Information Bureau): Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties. It was founded after the WWII and it took the place of dissolved Comintern.(Oran, p.500)

<sup>75</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol and A. Haluk Ülman, “Genel Durum”, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)**, pp. 223-225.

World War, the post-war and the beginning of Cold War. Since Turkish Republic was established as a modern, secular and western state, Turkish policy makers preferred to follow pro-west foreign policies throughout the history of Turkish Republic. However, the pro-west foreign policy did not mean an active and one-sided foreign policy for Turkey for long years until the last period of Second World War. Atatürk had designed the Turkish foreign policy as neutral, cautious and realist, and İnönü followed the foreign policy that was designed by Atatürk even during the Second World War in order not to be dragged into the war. The neutral and cautious foreign policy of Turkey was extremely beneficial for the country in the early years of the republic, because the state elite could manage to concentrate on the reforms that shaped the society and westernized the state. However, towards the end of the Second World War, İnönü had to abandon the neutral and cautious foreign policy, and made alliances with the western powers in order to eliminate the Soviet threat. Then, at the end of the Second World War, with the emergence of the bipolar world system, Turkey started to get military and economic aid from the west, particularly the US to maintain its security which led to the alignment of Turkish foreign policy with the US. The pro-west foreign policy of Turkey continued during the early years of the Cold War in which Democrat Party ruled the country. However, the attitude of the Democrat Party government was different than the previous governments especially towards the Middle East, which will be analyzed in the following chapter.

**CHAPTER 3**  
**TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST**  
**THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**

Since its establishment in 1923 young Republic of Turkey did not establish close relations with the newly establishing Middle Eastern countries. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, between the two world wars majority of these countries were ruled under the British and French mandate. In the aftermath of the Second World War, once these countries (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt) gained their independence from the British and French rule, they started establishing their states under the authoritarian rulers with the exception of Lebanon. As a loyal ally of the Western bloc, Turkish foreign policy makers preferred to keep their distance from these countries since several of them were inclined to socialism and were establishing close relations with the Soviet Union. After suffering under the unjust British and French mandate between the two world wars, majority of the Middle Eastern and North African countries started following anti-Western foreign policies. Although they did not have much political experience with the US during that period, they still considered the USA as an ally of the Western or European countries which they hated. Therefore, during the 1950s while the Middle Eastern countries followed pro-Soviet foreign policies, Turkey followed a pro-western, pro-American foreign policy.

This chapter as a continuation of the preceding chapter on historical background will start with a brief analysis of Democrat Party's general pro-western foreign policies mainly by concentrating on the economic ties between Turkey and the US. It will continue with an in depth analysis of the case studies of Turkey's prominent role in the Bagdad Pact starting in 1955 on, its support in the American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan in 1958, its negative attitude towards the Algerian War of Independence by the end of 1950s and the formation the Peripheral Pact between Israel and Turkey in 1958, which all show Turkey's pro-western foreign policies towards the Middle East during the 1950s.

## **I. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE DEMOCRAT PARTY GOVERNMENT (1950-1960)**

Transition to multi-party system in Turkey had actually taken place with the May 1950 general elections in which the Democrat Party was elected. The Republican People's Party became the opposition party for the first time in its history after almost thirty years of ruling the country. The prime minister of the new government Adnan Menderes who had been in politics for twenty years was an ambitious leader. As soon as he came to power, he found himself in a very busy foreign policy agenda.

The first serious foreign policy decision he had to make was to take Turkey to the Korean War. Korea which was a colony of Japan during the Second World War was divided into two at the end of the war. While the northern part of the country was handed to Soviets, the southern part of the country was under the American control. In the north a communist state was established, in the south, naturally, a capitalist state emerged. However, those two opposite ideologies could not stay on the same island peacefully, and there began a clash between south and north on June 25, 1950. Upon the demand of the US, the United Nations congregated and decided to send some troops to stop the North Korean forces. Menderes government actually, by seeing the situation as an opportunity to prove its loyalty to the western world and especially to its new ally the US, responded to the call of UN and sent a troop of 4500 soldiers to Korea. Despite the negative reactions of the opposition, Menderes was determined to use this opportunity to make Turkey a NATO member. However, Turkey's 1950 application was declined by the NATO members.<sup>76</sup>

Menderes government was working hard to find a way to guarantee Turkey's security under the NATO umbrella. Although Turkey was invited to take part in NATO military planning for the Mediterranean region, Menderes government was only seeking for full-membership. Impressed by Turkey's ambitious efforts and its heroic fight in Korea, the US also suggested membership of both Turkey and Greece to NATO to the members of the organization. The US was afraid that Turkey's isolation from NATO

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<sup>76</sup> Erhan, pp. 545-547.

would lead the country to follow a neutral policy in the region. Actually, there was a disagreement between Britain and the US on Greek and Turkish membership. Britain was in favor of establishing a Middle East defense system which would include Turkey and Greece as well, but their forces would report to the British. However, Turkish side wanted its forces to report to US and be a member of NATO army. As a result of its tremendous efforts Turkey finally managed to become an official member of NATO on February 18, 1952.<sup>77</sup>

Turkish membership of NATO was considered as a victory of the Menderes government by the public opinion. From that time onwards, the security of Turkey got under the responsibility of NATO, as it was stated in the motto of “common defense”. The most controversial article of the NATO agreement was put in process after Turkey’s entry into the organization. According to the agreement, member states would keep their military personnel and their military base in one another’s territories, and moreover, they would implement their own laws on another country’s territory. In fact, Turkey was one of the countries in NATO that opened its soil to the American forces after its entry to NATO.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, the Turkish military was being equipped by the American aid and the Turkish troops were put under the command of NATO. That situation was also leading to NATO’s and Americans’ control over the decision-making process of Turkish foreign policy. If NATO or the US did not approve any of foreign policy decisions of Turkey, they would have the right to prevent the use of Turks’ own military facilities. So, the dependence of Turkish foreign policy on American power started to increase as a parallel to its military’s dependence on American aid.<sup>79</sup>

According to Menderes government, the Soviet threat was the main problem in Turkish foreign policy thus it had no choice as ‘neutrality’. Particularly in such a strategic geography, Turkey had to ally with one of the great powers and form its foreign policy accordingly. That is exactly what Turkey did and allied with the US and followed pro-US foreign policies towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s.

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<sup>77</sup> Harris, pp. 40-44.

<sup>78</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, p. 235.

<sup>79</sup> Turan and Barlas, p.159.

## **A. Economic Ties between Turkey and the United States during DP Governments**

After the Second World War, a bipolar world system emerged with the rivalry of two superpowers. The US and Soviet Union started to send military and economical aid to their allies in order to strengthen their political power. The economists and social scientists in the US had pointed out that the income gap between the rich and poor societies of the world kept on widening and such gap would work in favor of the Soviet Union. In their point of view, poverty would lead to a Marxist revolution all around the world, for that reason some precautions had to be taken by the US government to prevent a communist takeover. So, the US decided to send military and economical aid to some countries in order to prevent the Soviet expansion.<sup>80</sup>

The first attempt of US in this context was to announce the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to help Greece and Turkey in their military and economical problems. In the doctrine of President Truman, it was planned to allocate a \$400 million economical aid in total to Greece and Turkey. Moreover, military and civil advisors were to be sent to those countries. For Turkey, the doctrine would provide a foreign capital which was necessary for the development of the country and it would eliminate the threat of Soviet Union. Turkey also needed that military aid, as the Allies saw the reality during the Second World War that Turkey was not ready for a modern war with its outdated military equipment. Consequently, the Truman Doctrine greatly pleased the Turkish officials.<sup>81</sup>

While Turkey kept on receiving military and economical aid from the US through the Truman Doctrine, another plan called the “Marshall Plan” was designed to strengthen the western European economies. The purpose of Marshall Plan was to provide economical aid for the weak economies of Europe. However, Turkey was not included in the plan, as it got its share through the Truman Doctrine. Nonetheless, Turkey insisted on being a part of the plan and succeeded in incorporating itself in the

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<sup>80</sup> Erhan, pp. 550-551.

<sup>81</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, “Türkiye’nin Batı İttifakına Girişi”, **Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar**, Odtü Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2007, pp. 6-8.

aid plan. Meanwhile, the change of government in Turkey and replacement of Peoples Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* –CHP) with Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* –DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes in 1950 brought the idea of free enterprise as an important step for economic growth. In fact, the economic interests were the most significant issue on the agenda of the DP elites.<sup>82</sup>

The amount of American aid between 1949 and 1953 was \$225.100.000 in total, and the amount of military aid was \$305.700.000. During the period of 1954-1962, the economic aid was raised to \$867.500.000 and the military aid to \$1.550.000.000. Until 1952, the aid coming from the US was taken as a debt by the Turkish governments, but when the economic situation had started to deteriorate, the US decided to send the aid as a grant. The grants were given to be invested in the areas which Americans suggested to do so. However, after 1954, the grants were given for the finance of imported goods. Subsequently, the US also started to send its redundant agricultural products to Turkey as a grant.<sup>83</sup>

Under Menderes government agricultural sector was seen as the most important sector for economic growth. Consequently, the American credits were used to buy machinery for the development of agriculture in Turkey. The import of tractors increased as well; between the years of 1948 and 1952, the number of tractors grew from 1750 to over 30.000. That situation also led to an expansion in cultivated lands; in 1956 the largeness of cultivated lands grew to the number of 22, 5 million hectares. The development in agriculture also stimulated the Turkish economy as a whole, and it grew at a rate of 11 and 13 per cent during the Democrat Party government.<sup>84</sup> However, the spare parts of the machinery were also bought from the US; with such a method the US was retrieving the aid which was given to Turkey.<sup>85</sup>

For the Menderes government, American aid was the only solution for Turkey to eliminate its economic problems. However, that aid was not sufficient to stabilize the

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<sup>82</sup> Harris, p. 71.

<sup>83</sup> Erhan, p. 553.

<sup>84</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, **Turkey, A Modern History**, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. Publishers. New York, 1998, pp. 234-235.

<sup>85</sup> Erhan, pp. 553-554.



Turkish economy, since the external debt was deepening rapidly. So, the government made another effort to save the Turkish economy and decided to encourage the foreign private investment. In fact, İnönü government earlier had also removed some of the restrictions on the transfer of foreign capital to Turkey. Menderes continued that process by extending the area of foreign investments in 1951 by an amending law. However, that amended law did not provide the expected increase in foreign investments in the country. So, upon the advice of American industrialist Clarence Randall, Menderes passed another law in 1954. With that new law, all the restrictions on foreign private investment were removed. Furthermore the foreign investors started to enjoy the same rules that were applied to the local investors. Menderes government also made a change in the petroleum law in order to remove the state monopoly on the underground resources of the country, which was an effort to attract the investment of foreign companies. However, the opposition CHP interpreted this policy as the newly established capitulations.<sup>86</sup>

The law amendments to stabilize the Turkish economy was made to attract the keen investors from all around the world, but mostly the Americans benefited from the change as the closest ally of Turkey during the 1950s. The 30, 5 per cent of the capital that came to Turkey between the years of 1954 and 1965 was American origin.<sup>87</sup> During the toughest years of Turkish economy, the American aid was doubled compared to the prior years and it grew to the number of \$96 million annually between 1953 and 1959.<sup>88</sup> The financial and technical assistance of the US to Turkey included the construction of new roads and highways as well. While the length of hard-surfaced roads was 1600 km in 1950, with the American aid, the 5400 km of two-lane highways were built in the upcoming years. The new roads were built to serve for the increased number of imported cars and trucks which were increased from 53.000 to 137.000. However, despite the excessive amount of American aid, Turkey could not solve its economic problems. Menderes was against economic planning; since he associated the planning with the statism, which he hated. So, the government never planned the investment. For that

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<sup>86</sup> Harris, pp. 72-73.

<sup>87</sup> Erhan, p. 554.

<sup>88</sup> Harris, p. 73.

reason, they could not predict the results of their investments properly which caused problem to Turkish economy.<sup>89</sup>

Turkey had felt the Soviet threat more during the Middle East crises toward the end of 1950s, and that situation caused Turkey's need for the military and economical aid of the US. With an economic development, Turkey would resist the threat of Soviet Union in the region. However, that threat led to Turkey's dependence on foreign aid for its economical development. The dependence on American aid also affected Turkish foreign policy. Menderes government started to follow a strict pro-US foreign policy in the region, although the Arab world blamed Menderes as being the spokesperson of western imperialism. In 1957, the deputy Foreign Minister Etem Menderes who had seen the relations with the west as the only expedience for economical development in Turkey, said in one of his speeches that Turkish people was thankful to the aid that came from the US in order to share the burden of Turkey in such an insecure and dangerous environment. He continued his speech by stating that the demands for the increase of the aid had resulted from the desire of government to serve for the issue of common security in the region and the desire for reaching a certain level of economic development. In fact, the deteriorating economy and the need to strengthen its military power especially towards the end of 1950s forced Turkey to demand more economical aid from the US.<sup>90</sup>

Menderes government was using the Cold War conditions as an excuse to demand more aid from the US. In addition, DP government also borrowed from the international markets which led to a \$1, 5 billion external debts in 1960. The inflation rate had also gone up from 3 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1958. Starting from 1954, the international monetary organization IMF began warning Turkey about its deteriorating economy. Finally, in 1958 the government agreed to apply the prescription of IMF in Turkish economy.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, Menderes government had to submit Turkish economy to an international organization despite a certain amount of development in some areas of economy, as in agriculture.

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<sup>89</sup> Zürcher, pp. 235-236.

<sup>90</sup> Gönübol and Ülman, pp. 319-320.

<sup>91</sup> Zürcher, pp. 239-240.

In the chaotic atmosphere of the Cold War, Menderes government had allied itself with the western bloc against the Soviet threat. However, the growing expenses of Turkey's military and economic security forced Turkey to depend on the American aid which led to a dependence on its foreign policy initiatives as well.

Since being established as a civilized, modern, and secular republic, Turkish policy makers tried not to be involved in the chaotic and problematic politics of the Middle East until the beginning of the Cold War. Both Atatürk and İnönü, preferred Turkey to follow the route of the Western civilizations. They actually identified modernization parallel with westernization. Consequently, while not being hostile, they did not try to develop any particular relations with the Middle East. Following the death of Atatürk, İnönü continued with the traditional neutral foreign policy due to the threat of Second World War. He followed a very cautious foreign policy during the war. However, the re-emergence of Soviet threat on the northern border of the country changed the course of Turkish foreign policy. So, in the 1950s, following the Second World War, Turkey started to follow a pro-west and pro-US foreign policy in order to maintain its security. The pro-western attitude of the Menderes government affected mostly the relations with the Middle East. Turkey's relations with Middle East had never been perfect before the Menderes government, but with the policies of Menderes government, the perception of Turks in the Middle East worsened, and the relations were deteriorated in a degree that as they have never been before. Arabs blamed Turkey as being the spokesperson of imperialist west in the region.

The security concerns and the economic weakness of Turkey led to an alliance with the US. Starting from the Second World War on, Turkey started to see itself as in a vulnerable situation due to its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and tried to maintain its security by joining the Western Bloc and by making military and economic agreements with the US. However, those agreements increased the dependence of Turkey on US, which resulted in aligning Turkish foreign policy with Americans'.

## **II. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s**

In order to analyze Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East throughout the 1950s, it is necessary to examine the international context of the period. The end of Second World War marked the beginning of a new world system in terms of politics. The Nazi Germany was defeated by mainly the American and Soviet powers. European states were weary of the long war years and they were also weak both economically and militarily. Victorious Soviet Union striving to take advantage of the weak situation of Europe, attempted to spread its Communist regime to the Eastern European countries which were geographically close, and then gathered all of them under its rule. Fearing from the expansion of Soviet Union in Europe, the United States planned to provide a series of economic and military aid to Western Europe. The US achieved its containment policy which aimed at helping the countries under Soviet threat by applying the Truman Doctrine (March-1947) and implementing the Marshall Plan (July-1947).

The end of the Second World War had clearly divided the world into two blocks, as Western and Eastern blocks. The Middle Eastern region gained more significance in the eyes of both the Soviet and American policy makers. Rich oil reserves of the region were the main reason of the rivalry between those two superpowers. Although the Soviet Union, having sufficient reserves, was not desperately in need of Middle Eastern oil, it did not want to permit the US to prevail the whole region. On the US side, the story was pretty much the same, but the need for oil in Western block also stimulated the competition.<sup>92</sup> After the Second World War, most of the Middle Eastern states that had gained their independence were trying to get out of their colonial past. The interference of the two super powers made the state formation process in the Middle East more complicated.

Turkey, due to its distinct geographical position, was in the heart of the power struggle between the two blocks. During the Second World War, Turkey under the leadership of President İnönü tried to stay neutral as long as it could. However, towards

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<sup>92</sup> Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994**, pp. 295-296.

the end of the war, once the dynamics of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union changed, it was forced to choose its side by joining the US-Soviet led forces. At the end of the war, Soviets showed their real aim on Turkey by claiming to have rights over the territories of Kars and Ardahan and showing their aim to control the strategic Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. In this context, Turkey had no choice but to ally with the Western Block and particularly with the US. In other words, Turkish foreign policy's inclination towards the West, after the Second World War, stemmed from its fear of Soviet threats.<sup>93</sup> In spite of the detente in relations after the death of Stalin in 1953, Turkish policy makers always felt the need to be cautious regarding Turkish-Soviet relations. In the light of this data, regarding the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US in Middle East, it can be said that Turkey followed a pro-west (pro-US) foreign policy, particularly during the 1950s.

Following the end of Second World War and beginning of Cold War Turkish-American relations got closer and closer. Although Turkey and the Soviet Union established warm relations in the early years of the Republic, in general starting from the days of the Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union had always been a trouble neighbor for Turkey. Particularly, at the end of the Second World War, Soviets' territorial claims deteriorated the Turkish-Russian relations. However, with the US, the course of relations was totally different. Although US was one of the members of the Western powers, Turkey never saw US as a traditional enemy since there was not much Ottoman - American relations. It was not in the list of one of the Western powers that worked for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For that reason, they could cooperate in the Middle East harmoniously, especially during the period of Menderes government. After Turkey's entry into NATO in February 1952, military aspect of the relations gained importance as well. However, for the Middle East region, military defense systems would not be enough without Turkey's significant role according to the US officials.

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<sup>93</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations", **Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974**, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1975, pp. 80-81.

Turkey was also a model for the other Middle Eastern countries; as its being a secular state with the western norms such as liberal economy and democracy.<sup>94</sup>

The founder of Turkish Republic, Atatürk's principles were not against any of the European norms or system as well; in fact, the arrangements during the establishment period were made in order to liberate and take out the country from its old Asian and Arabic state system. After the independence, the ideas of nationalism and secularism gained importance in Turkish society, whereas during the independence period of the Middle Eastern states, the idea of religion was important. The difference between two experiences of independence in the region, made Turkey's foreign policy understanding more clear. Turkey turned its face towards the west, since the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923.

### **III. CASE STUDIES**

While analyzing the Turkish Foreign Policy throughout the 1950s, this thesis will analyze the anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies followed by the Menderes governments. These anti-Middle Eastern foreign policies include: Turkey's active role in the Bagdad Pact, its support in the American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan, its negative attitude towards the Algerian War of Independence and the formation the Peripheral Pact between Israel and Turkey.

#### **A. Turkey's Active Role in the Bagdad Pact**

The Bagdad Pact was a mutual security and defense agreement that was adopted in 1955 by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as the United Kingdom. The Pact, which can be interpreted as a positive step in the American-Turkish relations, emerged with the need of a defense alliance in the Near East against the Soviet Union. John Foster Dulles, as the US Secretary of State, wanted to establish an alliance among the

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<sup>94</sup> George S. Harris, "Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine", **Turkish-American Relations Past, Present, Future**, (Eds., Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan), Routledge, New York, 2004, pp. 67-68.

Middle Eastern states to prevent the ideological expansion of the Soviet Union. For that reason, he traveled all over the Middle East in May 1953 and made some negotiations with the presidents or ministers of those countries. However, due to the ongoing tension between Israel and the Arab states, he could not accomplish his project and therefore, had to postpone the idea of establishing an alliance to a more proper period. Turkey, having a more positive attitude than the Arab states, did not let that idea fade away and eventually Prime Minister Adnan Menderes started to work on that issue and made a series of visits to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in 1955 to convince the leaders of these states for the need of establishing a defense alliance in the Middle East.<sup>95</sup>

His first visit was to Iraq where he was welcomed with a great interest by the British appointed Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri al-Said. As a supporter of a continued and extensive British role in Iraq, Said was in favor of a western-dominated military alliance in the Middle East. Menderes, who left Iraq optimistic, was not welcomed the same way in Syria. Menderes' visit was met with protests on the streets of Damascus, while he was holding his meeting with President Faris el-Khoury. Due to those harsh criticisms, Menderes had to leave Syria earlier than he planned. His next stop was Lebanon. Nonetheless, it turned out that Lebanon would not join the pact unless it gets the permission of the Arab League.<sup>96</sup> Despite the ineffective initiatives of Prime Minister Menderes in Syria and Lebanon, he could at least convince Iraq to sit at the table of negotiations. As a result, on 24 February 1955, 'The Mutual Cooperation Agreement' was signed between Turkey and Iraq.

After signing of the agreement between Iraq and Turkey, England, who was eager to have a voice in the Middle East, joined the pact on 4 April 1955. Menderes was very pleased with the decision of England and he commented on that as this occasion would serve for the peace of the region. Although establishing the pact emerged as the idea of the US Foreign Minister John Foster Dulles, the Bagdad Pact also served the aim of England in the region. England did not want to lose its power in the Middle East, as it needed the oil for its economic development. England still dreamt about being

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<sup>95</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, **20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi**, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2004, p. 525.

<sup>96</sup> Bağcı, "Demokrat Parti'nin Ortadoğu Politikası", **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, pp. 179-180.

influential in its former colonies and mandates. Although the participation of England in the pact made Menderes optimistic about the pact, the Soviet Union felt the need to declare its worries by condemning the military pact.<sup>97</sup>

In fact, the Soviet Union was not the only country to feel insecure and isolated due to the pact. Abdel Nasser's Egypt was also against the formation of such an alliance. Nasser, as the Prime Minister of Egypt, did not believe that such a pact would provide a benefit for the region. As one of the leaders of the Egypt's independence movement against the British, Nasser did not trust a military pact with Britain and knew that British were still after neo-colonization. Furthermore, Nasser was against Turkey's desire to play a significant role in the future of the Middle East, since Egypt itself wanted to be the leader of the Arab world. Nasser saw Menderes as a rival to himself and furthermore did not want to compete for the leadership with another leader.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, Turkey was following a moderate foreign policy towards the newly established Israel which was rejected by the rest of the Middle Eastern countries.

In spite of the protests of Nasser, the Bagdad Pact continued to proceed. Upon the invitation from Iraq and Turkey, Pakistan under British influence decided to join the pact on September 23, 1955. Then, on November 3, 1955, Iran under the rule of Shah Reza Pehlevi who was well-known with his pro-British and American foreign policies joined the pact officially. The Shah of Iran owed his position to British and Americans. He was forced to leave the country as a result of the election of Mohammad Mossadegh as the Prime Minister who nationalized the Iranian oil. However, both British and Americans who were upset about this nationalization orchestrated a coup and took Mossadegh from power and brought the Shah back to the country. Therefore, for the shah to become a member of a pro-western (pro-British and pro-US) military pact was significant. In addition, the Soviet threat to Iranian territories was another significant motivation behind Shah's membership to the alliance. Shah was also hopeful about the economical aid that would come from the West.<sup>99</sup> To some extent, Menderes government was pleased with the expansion of the Bagdad Pact. However, at the same

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<sup>97</sup> Gönübol and Ülman, pp. 263-264.

<sup>98</sup> Bağcı, **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, pp. 181-182.

<sup>99</sup> Esmer and Sander, p. 265.



time, the protests from Syria-Egypt side were getting to be more and more serious. So, Turkey actually did not manage to unite all of the Middle Eastern states against the Soviet Union.

Despite the tremendous amount of effort Turkey spent, the Bagdad Pact could not make the effect that was planned. There were some reasons for the failure of the pact. First of all, Syria and Egypt took part in several campaigns against the pact. In those campaigns, they tried to impose the idea on the other Middle Eastern states that the Bagdad Pact was a tool, which was created by the western imperialism, to serve for the interests of Israel and western block including Britain and the US. In order to strengthen those campaigns firstly Egypt and Syria, then Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed other military pacts in October 1955. The other reason of the failure was that Iran and Pakistan were not considered as the Middle Eastern Arab states. Therefore, the pact did not seem to protect the interests of the Arab states in the region. So it was not completely supported by the Arab states. Another important reason for the ineffectiveness of the pact was the lack of US attendance. Despite the hopes of Menderes for the involvement of US in the pact, US did not choose to join due to the opposite ideas in the region.<sup>100</sup> In other words, US did not want to risk its position in the region which was divided into three blocks; as the pro-west, anti-west and neutrals. Because the main reason to form such a pact was to unite all the Middle Eastern states against the threat of Soviet Union, but with the existence of opposite ideas in the region, US would not get the support it needed.

The Bagdad Pact obviously could not reach its goal in the region and failed. But the turning point for the future of the pact was the crises both in Lebanon and Iraq in 1958. Those events also affected the future of Menderes government and led to various criticisms against their foreign policy understanding in the Turkish public opinion. In Iraq, the pro-British regime was overthrown in a coup d'état on 14 July 1958. These events clearly raised fears in Menderes government, since its similar pro-west foreign policy had started to get criticisms from both the opposition party and the public. The ruling DP members also thought that revolution in Iraq was either carried out with the

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<sup>100</sup> Armaoğlu, pp. 527-528.

help of the Soviet Union or at least with the communist motives. Actually, the very first reaction of the Prime Minister Menderes, following the revolution, was to send Turkish troops to Iraq to help his ally, the incumbent pro-British Iraqi government. The opposition in Turkey, CHP criticized Menderes' policy for taking Turkey into a dangerous adventure. Following the Iraqi coup, another crisis broke out in Lebanon which also affected Menderes government as badly as the Iraqi crisis. The pro-western leaders of the Middle East were frightened from the possibility that the revolution in Iraq would be contagious and would spread to their own countries. So, the Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, fearing from the possibility of a revolution in his own country, invited American troops to Lebanon, in order to protect his regime.<sup>101</sup>

Emergence of those crises changed the direction of the Bagdad Pact dramatically. After the coup in Iraq, the military started to control the state. Turkey had to recognize the military government on 31 July 1958. This also caused a change in Iraqi foreign policy. Iraq withdrew from the Bagdad Pact on March 24, 1959. Following the withdrawal of Iraq, the pact was renamed and turned into more of a cultural and economic alliance rather than a military one. Therefore, it did not really serve the purpose of its establishment. The new name of the pact became Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Ankara became the new headquarter of CENTO. The organization with its new name continued to make suggestions to the US to be a full member of it, but US officials did not change their minds and rejected the suggestions. However, the US president Dwight David Eisenhower and vice president Richard Nixon promised all the CENTO members of American support.<sup>102</sup> In this respect, the US, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran signed dual treaties in Ankara on March 5, 1959. The content of treaties was almost the same with the Bagdad Pact. With that treaty US promised a military aid to all those three countries in the case of an intervention. Actually, that treaty did not mean anything for Turkey, since Turkey had been a NATO member for seven years by 1959. NATO agreement was also promising the same military aid in case

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<sup>101</sup> George S. Harris, "Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971, pp. 62-66.

<sup>102</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, pp. 204-205.

of an intervention in Turkey. Therefore, in the eyes of public opinion, the dual treaty did not serve for the security needs of Turkey at all.<sup>103</sup>

CENTO, after the withdrawal of Iraq, continued to work as a regional organization. Shah of Iran feared from a coup, wanted to strengthen the role of CENTO in the region in order to protect himself. However, during the same period a coup had taken place in Turkey and replaced the DP government with a military rule for a short time. Fortunately enough, National Unity Committee of the military administration stated their loyalty to the organizations such as NATO and CENTO as soon as they came to power. Therefore, Shah of Iran was relieved after seeing the positive attitude of National Unity Committee. Nevertheless, in 1979, 19 years after the coup in Turkey, Islamic Revolution took place in Iran and CENTO lost its meaning.<sup>104</sup>

Turkey's active role in the Bagdad Pact was seen as an anti-Arab foreign policy by the majority of the Arab world. Turkey was seen as a traitor and an instrument in the hands of the Western powers. Majority of the Arab countries believed that this pact served for the imperialist ambitions of the Western world, particularly the Great Britain and the United States. However, for Turkey this pact was part of its survival strategy in the face of Soviet danger. Turkey struggled hard to keep its Middle Eastern and Arab neighbors not to get into Soviet orbit in order to protect its own security.

### **B. Turkey's Support to Americans in Their Intervention in Lebanon**

Lebanon located at the crossroads of the Mediterranean and Arabian hinterland has always been rich in the diversity of cultural, religious and ethnic identities such as Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shii Muslims, Druzes, Greek and Armenian Orthodox groups. After living under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, with the collapse of the Empire between the two world wars, the five provinces that constitute the modern Lebanon were put under the French mandate. Once it gained its independence in 1943, the political inclinations of different ethnic groups became more important. The

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<sup>103</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, pp. 307-309.

<sup>104</sup> Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "İran'la İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980**, pp. 651-652.

Maronites were usually pro-European, Muslims preferred Arabism over pro-west policies. Therefore, in order to eliminate the tension between those two major religious groups, National Pact was proposed by the first president of Republic of Lebanon Bechara El Khoury who was in office from 1943 to 1952. As a result, Lebanon established a consociational democracy which consisted of a power-sharing mechanism in which president would be elected from a Maronite Christian, speaker of the Parliament from a Shiite Muslim and prime minister from a Sunni Muslim and the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and the Deputy Prime Minister from a Greek Orthodox.<sup>105</sup>

During the 1950s, when the nationalist president of Egypt Gamel Abdel Nasser became popular among pan-Arabists, the Muslims of Lebanon took him as an idol as well. During that period, the Christian President of Lebanon Camille Chamoun was accused by Muslims and some Christians for treating them different from Maronites. In other words, they accused the president of being biased in his governance and discriminating Muslims and Christians (who are not Maronites). Muslims, who were dissatisfied with the rule of President Chamoun, organized some demonstrations on the streets of Lebanon which caused clashes between the government forces and the opposition. The government accused Syria of supplying military equipment for the opposition and they took the case at first to the Arab League, then to the United Nations Security Council. However, neither of the organizations could resolve the conflict.<sup>106</sup>

During the 1957 summer elections, the Christian President of Republic Camille Chamoun ensured the victory of a parliament which could help him to extend his tenure. In fact, his tenure was about to end in September 1958 and it was not possible to extend it to four more years by law. The opponents of President Chamoun were kept out of the Lebanon Parliament. Moreover, the president through fraud tried to be re-elected. These behaviors led to the growth of discontent in the country. The killing of an opponent journalist on 8 July 1958 fired the crisis and the opponent groups including the Muslim pro-Nasser demonstrators went on to strike in Beirut and Tripoli. They claimed that the

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<sup>105</sup> Yahya Armajani, **Middle East Past and Present**, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1970, pp. 306-308 and 395.

<sup>106</sup> Armajani, pp. 395-396.

government was behind the murder of the journalist. The riot was against the US and the rest of the Western powers. As a result the American News Center in Beirut was burned down by the insurgents.<sup>107</sup>

The riots that took place in the summer of 1958 in Lebanon expanded fast and turned into a civil strife. In that case, besides the complaints of some Christians and Muslims about the governance of Chamoun, the Maronites also started opposing the President fearing that the President Chamoun could endanger their existence in the Arab world by following wrong policies.<sup>108</sup> The Muslim support for the anti-western Nasser administration, the newly established Syria-Egypt Union, and Syria's backing of the Muslims in Lebanon caused more demonstrations. In this chaotic atmosphere, in order to stay in power Christian President asked for the help of the United States.<sup>109</sup> At the beginning, the US hesitated to send help to the president and blamed Syria for organizing the riots. The United Nations sent some observers to Lebanon, in order to examine the situation. In that examination, they could not find any proof of Syria's intervention in the riots. As a result, the US that did not want to take initiative at the beginning decided to intervene in Lebanon. The US was afraid that anti-western coup that had taken place in Iraq could have taken place in Lebanon too.<sup>110</sup>

Consequently, on July 15, 1958, in an attempt to preserve its interests in the Middle East, the US government sent its sixth fleet to Lebanon. Its main purpose was to stop the overthrowing of a pro-American President from power. The US was also afraid that such a chaotic anti-western atmosphere under the influence of Egyptian President Nasser would bring a pro-Soviet government into power and did not want the Soviets to take Lebanon under their influence. Therefore, for the first time the US government decided to implement the "Eisenhower Doctrine"<sup>111</sup> by sending troops to Lebanon.

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<sup>107</sup> Armaoğlu, pp. 510-511.

<sup>108</sup> Armajani, p. 396.

<sup>109</sup> Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994**, pp. 309-310.

<sup>110</sup> Armaoğlu, p. 511.

<sup>111</sup> Eisenhower Doctrine: Named after the US president Dwight David Eisenhower, the doctrine was giving right to the other countries which were under a military threat, to demand aid from the US. The military threat was often referred to the Soviet threat.

When the US asked for Turkey's help in the Lebanon crisis, Turkey gave the permission to the US military the use of İncirlik Base in Adana. Consequently, 5000 American soldiers were sent to İncirlik by the US in case of an emergency. In fact, it was not the only offer of Turkey to the US officials during the Lebanon crisis. Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu notified the American Ambassador in Ankara that Turkey would prepare its air forces to support the American intervention. However, the US turned down that offer stating that the intervention was not a NATO operation. Moreover, as a NATO member Turkey was not supposed to join the Americans in that intervention.<sup>112</sup> Actually, since that was not a NATO operation but an American operation, Turkey did not have to open the İncirlik base to the USA. This was a decision made by the Menderes government.

The day when 5000 American soldiers had disembarked the Lebanon soil, Turkey also expressed its support for the American intervention. Then, on July 16, 1958, another American troop of 11.000 soldiers came to İncirlik air base from Europe. Irritated by the news, Syria declared mobilization of its soldiers and closed the border between Turkey and itself. Soviet Union was also disturbed by the situation, so it started to mobilize its military on the Turkish border. In the atmosphere of Cold War, such moves were not surprising at all for Turkey. As a result, Menderes sent a message to the Premier of Soviet Union Nikita Krushchev stating that every precaution that Turkey would take in such kind of a situation, would be only for defense reasons. It had no intention to attack the Soviet Union. The Turkish troops, on the Iraqi, Syrian and Russian borders were alarmed. As the final phase of the intervention, on July 19, 1958, the American planes which were carrying nuclear weapons, took their positions on İncirlik Base.<sup>113</sup>

As a result of the intervention, Lebanon President Chamoun was relieved by the help of the US. He eventually abandoned the idea of extending his tenure. So, Lebanon went for new elections and the conflict was solved by the end of July 1958.<sup>114</sup> On July

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<sup>112</sup> Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980**, pp. 633-634.

<sup>113</sup> "1958", **Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1941-1960 Cilt 2**, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 335.

<sup>114</sup> Armaoğlu, p. 511.

31, 1958 General Fuad Shehab was elected by the parliament as the new President of Lebanon. General Shehab selected Rashid Karami who was the Muslim leader of opposition as the new Prime Minister. The Cabinet was also arranged equally in respect to the different religious groups. Therefore, Lebanese became content with the outcome of the civil war.<sup>115</sup>

The crisis was resolved in Lebanon. However, for Menderes government, it did not wither away for a long time due to the criticisms of the opposition party and the public opinion. The use of İncirlik base by the American forces was the last straw for the opposition party, CHP. During the reign of Democrat Party government, CHP had supported most of its foreign policy decisions, but, especially when the Middle East crises broke out, CHP withdrew its support from the government. They criticized the government for serving the interests of just the US, not Turkey. Concerning the use of İncirlik base, the opposition party CHP leader, former President İsmet İnönü and his associates interpreted the incident as the exploitation of Turkish soil by the US. Since, it was stated by US officials that intervention in Lebanon was not a NATO operation, Turkey was not supposed to open the İncirlik base for the US military. That also raised the question of the limits of NATO. In other words, CHP was questioning if the NATO was dealing just with the fight against communism, namely the Soviet Union or not. The other issue, which was confusing for the opposition, was again about the use of İncirlik base. Giving permission to American press to enter the İncirlik base and not permitting the Turkish press into base also created disappointment among the public.<sup>116</sup> The other issue that created disappointment was the lack of information regarding the intervention in Lebanon in public opinion. In one of his articles in *Ulus*, Bülent Ecevit was blaming the Menderes government for not obtaining the approval of even the parliament while welcoming the intervention of US in Lebanon. Ecevit, in his article, stated that “there might be some benefits and necessities in declaring the contentment of the government regarding the intervention; however these benefits and necessities were not explained to

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<sup>115</sup> Armajani, p. 398.

<sup>116</sup> Harris, **Troubled Alliance**, pp. 66-67.

Turkish public and the parliament.”<sup>117</sup> In the same article Ecevit also criticized the deployment of American soldiers at the İncirlik base without any communiqué for the parliament or public opinion. So, he claimed that the responsibility of Turkish foreign policy just belonged to the Menderes government and it could not be regarded as a national policy.<sup>118</sup>

The struggle to get the attention of US for Turkey continued with the help of other signatory states of Bagdad Pact. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey declared their support for the US intervention in Lebanon at a joint meeting. In fact, those three allies saw the crisis as an opportunity to convince the US to be a full member of the pact. The respond of the US did not change; they refused the offer. However, in order to compensate their negative respond, the US officials offered signing bilateral agreements with the members of Bagdad Pact. So, Turkey signed an agreement called “Cooperation” with the US on 5 March 1959.<sup>119</sup>

### **C. British Intervention in Jordan**

Following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Jordan was ruled under the British mandate. As part of “divide and rule” policy of the Great Britain the area of Transjordan was handed to Hashemite Kingdom under the leadership of King Abdullah. Following the incorporation of the parts of Palestine into Jordan in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the majority of the population of Jordan was consisted of Palestinians. Palestinians were not happy to be ruled by the newly established Kingdom of Jordan because of the moderate policies King followed towards Israel. Following the assassination of King Abdullah by a Palestinian, his mentally-ill son Talal was in power for a short time. Talal’s 18 year old son Hussein who ruled the country until 1999 became the king in 1953. Jordan followed pro-British and pro-American foreign policies during the Cold War and was criticized by Egypt and Syria for those policies.

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<sup>117</sup> Bülent Ecevit, “D.P. iktidarının O.Doğu siyaseti”, **Ulus**, 18.07.1958, p. 3.

<sup>118</sup> Ecevit, p. 3.

<sup>119</sup> Harris, **Troubled Alliance**, pp. 68.



As a country which was mainly consisted of desert, Jordan's economy was very poor. There was no way the country could survive without the economic aid it was receiving from the Western powers. Moreover, Egypt, Syria and Palestinian Arabs warned Jordan for the dangers of allying with Britain, America, Turkey and Iraq. Palestinian Arabs were uncomfortable with Jordan's alliance with the West because they believed that the West would not permit the destruction of Israel.<sup>120</sup>

There was a growing opposition towards King Hussein's pro-western rule in the country. These groups were supporting pan-Arabism and were in favor of socialist and pan-Arabist Egyptian leader Nasser. New Jordanian Chief of Staff and Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar viewed himself as the Nasser of Egypt. Head of National Socialists under Suleiman Nabulsi wanted the king to terminate its treaty with British and ask for arms and aid from Soviets. He won 11 seats in the 40 member chamber. In 1957 to save his throne King Hussein dismissed socialist Nabulsi and Nuwar. Syrians reacted against that policy followed by the King and moved its troops to south to occupy northern Jordan. However, King Hussein showed a real courage and rallied his troops and reestablished authority in the north.<sup>121</sup>

As a reaction to the establishment of socialist United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Iraq established their pro-western Arab Federation in 1958. However, the union ended when King Faisal II, prime minister and the members of the new federation revolution in Iraq was murdered in a coup in July 1958 under the command of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qassim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif. As soon as he came to power, Qassim supported Arab nationalism. He also established friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

The impact of Arab nationalism in Iraq showed its effects in Jordan. King Hussein who was known with his pro-British foreign policy felt the same fear of losing its throne and a possible coup that could overthrow him, so he demanded help from England and the US. The king called England and the US for help on July 16, 1958. At the Cabinet meeting of 17 July, in England, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan stated that

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<sup>120</sup> Harris, **Turkish American Relations Past, Present, Future**, pp. 311-312; William Ochsenwald and Sydney Nettleton Fisher, **The Middle East, A History**, McGraw Hill, Boston, 2010, pp. 550-551.

<sup>121</sup> Ochsenwald and Fisher, pp. 550-551.

an intervention in Jordan was compulsory for England, since there were British interests in the region, and a western-oriented administration was necessary in order to protect those interests.<sup>122</sup> England responded the call and sent its troops on July 17-18 that were deployed in Cyprus at that time. British paratroopers were flown in from Cyprus to help King Hussein to protect his power. Jordan blamed the United Arab Republic for the unrest in its territories and filed complaint to the UN and eventually cut all of its diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic in July 1958.<sup>123</sup>

The reaction of Menderes government to the disembarkation of English soldiers in Jordan was the same as the reaction to the US intervention in Lebanon. Regarding the issue of Jordan, Foreign Minister Zorlu stated that if the Soviet Union was to send a group of 'volunteers' to Middle East in order to observe the situation, Turkey would also send troops to Jordan, and he also stated that he welcomed the British intervention in Jordan with satisfaction.<sup>124</sup> He also said that the members of Bagdad Pact were supporting Jordan in every sense.<sup>125</sup> Then, he defined the leaders of Iraqi coup as the political bandits and suggested that the intervention that was applied by the Western powers to Jordan should also been done to Iraq. The speeches of Foreign Minister Zorlu were not welcomed by the Soviets and led them to mobilize their troops by their Turkish borders. Turkey, as a response, mobilized the Turkish military and informed the Iranian government under Shah Regime to get ready for a possible clash with the Soviet Union.<sup>126</sup>

The Menderes government's response to the crises in the Middle East in the second half of 1950s was making alliances with the western powers by following a pro-western foreign policy. During the Menderes government, the neutral and inactive foreign policy approach of Atatürk towards the Middle East was abandoned, and an anti-

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<sup>122</sup> Cihat Göktepe, "The 'Forgotten Alliance'? Anglo-Turkish Relations and CENTO 1959-1965", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 35, No. 4, October 1999, pp.104-105.

<sup>123</sup> Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, p. 634.

<sup>124</sup> Bağcı, **Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar**, p. 100.

<sup>125</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, p. 304.

<sup>126</sup> Mustafa Albayrak, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası", **Türk Tarihinde Adnan Menderes Cilt 2**, (Eds. Dilşen İnce Erdoğan, Talip Kabadayı, Hüseyin Üreten, and Gülay Gündeay), Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Yayını, Aydın, 2012, p. 606.

Middle Eastern and active foreign policy was implemented leading to the hostile relations with the Arab neighbors of Turkey and the isolation of Turkey in the region.<sup>127</sup>

#### **D. Turkey's Foreign Policy towards the Independence of Algeria**

The pro-western foreign policy Turkey followed towards the crises in the Middle Eastern countries continued with its foreign policy towards another Muslim country of North Africa, Algeria. In Algeria's struggle for independence movement from France, Menderes government supported the French in the United Nations (UN) meetings.

Turkey, which had got accustomed to evaluate the incidents in Middle East from the perspective of NATO and the West, approached the wave of independence in the region with suspicion. During the 1950s, for Turkey, every idea that included nationalism and independence was the result of Soviet influence in the region.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, these ideas had to be eliminated before they spread all over the Middle East.

Algeria was one of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa which was struggling hard to gain its independence from France during the 1950s. French had ruled the country for 132 years until Algeria gained its independence in 1962. After the long years of French rule, Algeria had started a challenging independence struggle. In 1954, a guerilla movement called National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*) started the War of Independence. The internationalization of the Algerian problem was also as important as the independence for the National Liberation Front. National Liberation Front received help from the Soviet Union. The war lasted for eight years with so many casualties on both sides. Eventually Algerians gained their independence in 1962.<sup>129</sup>

Interestingly enough, the young Republic of Turkey which has gone through the same experience and fought against the Western powers for its independence only three

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<sup>127</sup> Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities", **Mediterranean Politics**, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, p. 9.

<sup>128</sup> Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, p. 634.

<sup>129</sup> Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 33, No. 2, May 2001, pp. 222-239.

to four decades ago, did not stand by Algeria during the United Nations meetings. In 1955, at the General Assembly of United Nations, the Asian and Arab states demanded the issue of Algeria to be brought to the agenda. However, Turkey voted against the demand of those countries, while Greece as a member of NATO and Balkan Pact, sided with Arab and Asian states. In 1957 and 1958, Turkey, this time refrained from a vote against the “self determination” offer for Algeria which was suggested by the same Asian and Arab countries in United Nations.<sup>130</sup>

That kind of attitude against Algeria in the UN resulted in Turkey’s isolation in the region. Starting with the Bagdad Pact and ending with the negative votes for Algeria, Turkish foreign policy in Middle East created discontent and suspicion towards the real aim of Turkey in the region. As a result, Turkey could not get the support it needed from the Arab states, regarding the Cyprus issue in 1960s. In fact, Greece which had voted on the side of Algeria at United Nations, gained the support of the Arab states during the negotiations about Cyprus. Turkey was to realize its mistake in the following years when the Cyprus issue emerged as an important problem in its foreign policy.<sup>131</sup>

The obvious pro-western attitude of Menderes government about the Algeria issue led to many reactions again both inside and outside the country. Even the DP members in the parliament criticized their own government’s foreign policy. For example, the DP member of the parliament from Antalya, Burhanettin Onat who was known with his pro-Islamic ideas, criticized the government and said that at least the government could be neutral and avoid voting against Algeria and in favor of France at the UN meeting. Thus, the pro-western vote of DP in the UN received all kinds of criticism from all walks of life.<sup>132</sup>

Against all those criticisms from inside or outside the country, the government kept defending themselves by explaining the motives of their attitude. Foreign Minister Zorlu said in one of his speeches in 1959: “We hope that the issue will be resolved among the Algerians through the negotiations.”<sup>133</sup> This sentence was interpreted as the

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<sup>130</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, p. 314.

<sup>131</sup> Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, p. 635.

<sup>132</sup> Albayrak, p. 605.

<sup>133</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, p. 314.

reluctance of Turkey for bringing the issue to the agenda at the UN meeting.<sup>134</sup> Turkey which inspired many independent movements in the Middle East with the success of its War of Independence against the Western powers disappointed the Middle Eastern world with the negative foreign policy it followed against Algerian independence movement.

### **E. Formation of the Peripheral Pact between Turkey and Israel (1958)**

Turkish-Israeli relations started in good terms since Turkey was the first Muslim country that officially recognized Israel as a state in 1949. In January 1950, Turkey established diplomatic relations with Israel by sending Charge D'affaires Seyfullah Esin to Tel Aviv. As a response, Israel also established an Israeli legation in Ankara that included one of the four Israeli military attaches<sup>135</sup> (the other three being accredited to London, Paris and Washington).<sup>136</sup> In March 1950, the Turkish Government informed Israel that it had decided to raise its recognition from de facto to de jure, retroactive to the start of diplomatic relations. Although the rest of the Muslim world in the Middle East was hostile to the establishment of Israel, Turkey followed a moderate policy towards this development. Particularly, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war when almost every single Arab country in the region including Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestinians started a war against Israel as a reaction to its proclamation of State of Israel in 1948, Turkey remained neutral. Interestingly enough this was the same land which the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II refused to give to the Jews in 1901 when it was requested by Theodore Herzl, first president of World Zionist Organization. Although Herzl offered to pay down a substantial portion of the Ottoman debt in exchange for the permission of the Jews to settle in Palestine, Abdülhamid rejected the offer. However, forty years later, Turkish governments did not have a problem with the

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<sup>134</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, p. 314.

<sup>135</sup> Eliyahu Sasson, the head of the Israeli legation in Turkey was removed from his post as chief negotiator with King Abdullah of Jordan to undertake the task.

<sup>136</sup> Amikam Nachmani, **Israel, Turkey and Greece, Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean**, Frank & Co.Ltd, London, 1987, p. 5.

establishment of Israel on the land of the Palestinians as long as Jews did not establish a Communist state. The young Republic of Turkey was not that much interested in the formation of the new Arab states as long as they were not Communists.

Consequently, in the first years of the Democratic Party's rule, the Turkish-Israeli relations continued to advance as commercial ties developed, regular air and sea links established as well as a variety of sports and cultural events. However, in the 1956 Suez Crisis when Israelis, British and French attacked Egypt for nationalizing the Suez Canal, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes severed his policy toward Israel.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless, the relations between the two countries improved again in 1958 when Israel and Turkey entered an alliance in the summer of 1958, with an agreement for cooperation in diplomatic, military and intelligence spheres, as well as in commerce and scientific exchanges. The pact was signed at a time when the Arab boycott on Israel was at its peak and pan-Arab tendencies were strong. Israel signed the pact with the encouragement of the United States which saw it as an anti-Soviet initiative. This agreement which was known as “peripheral pact” actually embraced Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Israel, and certain Christian parts of Sudan.<sup>138</sup> The Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion had a secret meeting in August 1958 in Ankara to discuss Israeli assistance to Turkey in industrialization, joint scientific research, and the extension of trade between two countries.<sup>139</sup>

During the 1950s, Turkish foreign policy was still shaped with the anger of the “stabbing at the back syndrome” when the Arabs allied with the British that fight for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Moreover, in the late 1940s and early 1950s Turkey in an attempt to survive from Soviet threat was struggling hard to impress the Western world and particularly the US to become a member of NATO. Along this line, Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 and its establishment of a

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<sup>137</sup> George Gruen, “Turkey's Relations with Israel,” *Turkey's Relations with Israel and Its Arab Neighbours: The Impact of Basic Interests and Changing Circumstances*, **Middle East Review**, Vol. 17, No. 3, Spring 1985, p. 36.

<sup>138</sup> Nachmani, 74.

<sup>139</sup> See, Michael Bar-Zohar, **Ben-Gurion: A Biography**. Delacorte Press, New York, 1978, pp. 264, 265: Deniz Tansi, “Turkish Israeli Relations: The Points of a Triangle”, **Reflections Turkey**, <http://www.reflectionsturkey.com/?p=806> (28.11.2012)

peripheral pact can be analyzed through Turkey's struggle to become a member of the Western security alliance and to protect itself from Communism.

In sum, the period of crises in the Middle East that has taken place towards the end of the 1950s, while directing Turkey's way towards west, exposed some important results for the future of Soviet Union and US rivalry. The crises such as Iraqi coup, and Lebanon and Jordan interventions accelerated the Cold War which had started to lose its affectivity before the crises. The Middle East provided the two superpowers an area to test the limits of their political and military powers. When the US had challenged the Soviet Union in the region with its economic and military power, the Soviet Union realized that it could not involve in any adventurous enterprises in the region. As a result, that realization deterred both of the states from starting a new world war. Arab states of the region counted on the Soviet Union when the crises broke out. The Soviet Union tried to support the Middle Eastern countries as much as it can within the limit of its capacities. So, the Arab states realized that they have to count on their own power in terms of politics, economy and military.<sup>140</sup>

With Turkey's pro-US attitude during the Middle East crises, the relations between the prominent Arab states of the region and Turkey became more intense. Syria and Egypt started to see Turkish Prime Minister as a political figure that serves for the interests of the west and desires in order to become the leader of the entire Middle East. For Menderes, prevention of the expansion of Soviet Union in the region was crucial, thus the US was the only country that could do that. Therefore, Menderes used the "balance of power" policy which was also used by the Ottoman Empire for years against the Soviet Union. When the Cold War had shifted its way towards the Middle East, Menderes started to act with the US to prevent Soviet Union from spreading its ideology and system in the region. Starting from 1955, Menderes started to blame the Soviet Union due to the crises in the region, and he, even claimed that the Soviet Union was trying to capture the whole region.<sup>141</sup> Consequently, it was not surprising to see

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<sup>140</sup> Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994**, pp. 310-311.

<sup>141</sup> Bağcı, **Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi**, pp. 200-202.

Menderes developing a pro-US foreign policy in the region both to solve the economical problems of the country and to eliminate the Soviet threat.



**CHAPTER 4**  
**THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE**  
**MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE 1950s FROM REALIST AND LIBERAL**  
**PERSPECTIVES**

As already analyzed in depth in the third chapter, throughout the 1950s during the rule of Democrat Party under the leadership of Adnan Menderes concerning its foreign policies towards the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey followed a pro-western in other words, pro-US foreign policy. In the era of pan-Arabism these foreign policies were somewhat anti-Arab and anti-Middle Eastern. They seem to be against the establishment of new independent Arab countries. These policies as can be observed in the American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan in 1958 were pro-Lebanese and pro-Jordanian leadership, in other words pro-system. However, since both countries were ruled by pro-western leaders, these leaders did not reflect the will of the people. Moreover, by promoting the establishment of the Bagdad Pact, Turkey in a way volunteered to protect the interests of the western powers in the Middle East. By allying with Israel and signing the peripheral pact, Turkey actually allied with the greatest enemy of the Arab world. By not supporting the Algerian War of Independence, Turkey actually aligned its foreign policy with the west. Although in general Turkish foreign policy almost in every period has been pro-western, it has never been so antagonistic to the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, this thesis aims at trying to find an answer to this question; ‘why was Turkish foreign policy so hostile towards the Middle East during the 1950s?’

This question will be analyzed through the liberal and realist theories as well as the dependent foreign policy approach. The chapter will first start with an analysis of the international and domestic environment of the period under examination, and then it will continue examining the case studies, in other words Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East through realist and liberal theories that also includes the dependent foreign policy approach.

## **I. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT**

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the young Republic of Turkey tried to follow a neutral foreign policy. After the bitter alliances the Ottoman Empire had experienced, Turkey's main purpose was to keep good relations with both the west and the east. However, even under this neutral look with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's modernization plans which were identified under the same category as westernization, there were still the signs of the pro-west foreign policy. Turkey in some ways was not anti-systemic, which in other words was not trying to change the new system that was established by the West. Although with the War of Independence it was against the new territorial plans established by the west, once Republic of Turkey was established, it had no intention to expand its land with the dreams of re-establishing the Ottoman Empire.

During the Second World War, concerning its foreign policy Turkey had gone through some tough times. President İsmet İnönü tried almost every single trick and diplomacy not to get the country involved into the war. He tried to keep the country in good terms with both warring parties. Eventually, towards the end of the War, he had no choice but to join the war on the side of the Allies. At the end of the War, he was again forced to choose sides in this new bipolar world. Allying with the Soviet Union meant getting under the orbit of the Soviet communist system, giving the control of the Straits to the Russians and perhaps giving some provinces in the eastern part of the country to the strong northern neighbour. Therefore, in this new bipolar system and the beginning of the Cold War environment, Turkey allied with the West.

Since the Ottoman Empire period, Russia had been one of the strongest enemies of the Turks. One of the many reasons for the collapse the Ottoman Empire was the wars between Turks and Russians. Russian dream of reaching the warm waters by controlling the Straits never faded away. One of the biggest fears of Turks was losing the Straits to Russians. Actually for Turks losing the Straits to Soviet Union meant giving the country to the Russians. Another fear Turks suffered from was the transformation of Turkey into a Communist country under the Russian orbit. This was such a strong fear

that Turkey did not even want its neighbours to transform into Communist countries. It was already surrounded by the Soviet Union in the north and northeast and Bulgaria in the northwest. Greece was the only other country in the western bloc. Turkey did not want the newly established Arab neighbours to fall under the orbit of Communism. That would make Turkey feel quite insecure in the region.

This alliance as already analyzed in the historical background chapter, led Turkey to receive political and economic aid from the United States which in a short time turned into an economic dependence. Moreover, in its attempt to become a member of the democratic western world, Turkey was supposed to make radical changes in its single party system. Transition to multi-party system finally was realized in 1950 where there were fair and free elections that brought Democrat Party into power. Following the 27 year-rule of Atatürk's Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP), for the first time a new political party was in power. This new political party under the leadership of wealthy landlord Adnan Menderes was supposed to prove itself to the Turkish society in a period when the country was going through a serious economic crisis that was inherited from the Second World War. In such an environment, the US aids come to the help of the Democrat Party. With the help of the US, during the first years of DP, the economy of the country boomed. However, as already analyzed this growth in economy did not lead to development in the same sector. Therefore, towards the last four years of DP rule, the country found itself in dire straits to receive more and more aid from the US and from the international financial organizations such as the IMF. Therefore, in such an atmosphere, being economically and politically dependent on the United States and afraid of its Arab neighbours to fall under the orbit of Soviet Communism, Turkey followed such foreign policies in the Middle East.

## **II. REALIST PERSPECTIVE**

The foreign policies Turkish governments followed in the Middle East in 1950s can be analyzed through realism. Democrat Party government ruled Turkey during the Cold War period, in which the world was divided into two blocs ideologically, as

communist and capitalist-liberal. The western hemisphere of the world was mainly under the dominance of United States, and the eastern hemisphere was under the dominance of Soviet Union. Middle East was the region in which the two superpowers were competing in order to dominate. Turkey, as being neighbors both with the Middle Eastern countries and the Soviet Union, was situated in a very strategic location.

As already analyzed in the chapter of theoretical framework, realist theory has basically three assumptions about the working process of the world. The first one is 'groupism' in which human beings see each other as members of a group. Accordingly, in every group people need a common value that can keep them together. In terms of international relations, states are the members of the groups and the common ideology or the aims keep them together. Similarly, in the period under examination, Turkey saw itself as the member of the Western bloc due to the Soviet threat and shared same values such as liberal economy, democratic and secular state system with the other members of the Western block. The second assumption is 'egoism' which is claimed to be rooted in human nature. Realists interpret egoism as related to self-interest which is thought to be the driving force of politics. Along the same line, Turkey's egoism was a result of its fear to be invaded or in other words, to lose its territorial integrity. Turkey was so much afraid of being dominated or invaded by the Soviet Union that the country was ready to align its foreign policies with the Western bloc in order to maintain its security. The third and the last assumption of realism is 'power centrism' which puts the concept of power at the heart of the theory. Again during this period Turkey's fear of Soviet Union led it try to take the power into its own hands by establishing pacts such as Bagdad Pact and Periphery Pact. Through those pacts, Turkey aimed to both protect its territorial integrity from the Soviet Union and gain the power to be an active political figure in the region.

The theoretical framework chapter also identified the core elements of realism as 'statism', 'survival', and 'self-help'. Statism, first of all, refers to the state which is legally representing the will of its people. While the state can use its authority inside its territories, there is anarchy outside of the country. Under such kind of an anarchic system, the survival of the state depends on its ability to defend itself. In this respect,

Turkey's main goal during this period was to defend itself against Communism. Therefore, the element of self-help is utmost important in realist theory since the national interests are a must for the survival of the state. Along the same line Turkey for its own survival did everything it could do. At the end of the Second World War, Turkey started to get military and economic aid from mainly US in order to strengthen itself against the Soviet threat, because it was a must for Turkey to maintain its own security.

Turkey by becoming a member of NATO and the western bloc also tried to guarantee its security. This was the only way it could survive the Soviet threat. Turkey did not only want to keep the Soviet threat away from its own country but also from the newly established Middle Eastern countries. Turkey did not want to be surrounded by a group of newly established Communist (or Socialist) countries. Such a containment policy would risk Turkey's territorial integrity and Turkey would also be fallen under the dominance of Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey had to do whatever it could to prevent these Middle Eastern countries from joining the Soviet Camp. Bagdad Pact was the first attempt for that. It was established as a regional security organization to prevent Communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. In order to prevent its neighbors to turn into Communist states, Turkey worked hard for the establishment of the Pact. However, the pact was seen as the continuation of the American and British imperialist ambitions in the region. Arab countries saw Turkey as an instrument being used in the hands of the Great Powers. Therefore, Turkey could not get the support it needed from the Arab states regarding the Bagdad Pact. Along the same line Turkey's support for both American intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan in 1958 was the result of its fears that both countries with the strong ideas of pan-Arabism and nationalism under the leadership of charismatic Egyptian leader Nasser would get into the Soviet orbit.<sup>142</sup> Menderes government had thought that the takeover of the existing governments in Lebanon and Jordan would lead to a Soviet dominance in the region, therefore supported the western interventions. Similarly, the Independence War of Algeria was considered as a socialist movement in Turkey. Menderes government

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<sup>142</sup> Although Nasser was a socialist and received military aid from the Soviet Union and followed pro-Soviet foreign policies. Egypt was not a country that could exactly be called as Soviet orbit state.

was afraid that once Algeria gained its independence, it would be ruled by a communist government, thus voted against Algeria's independence at the UN. The reason for Turkey to sign the Peripheral Pact with Israel was the result of Turkey's fear from pan-Arabism which would develop in parallel with Communism in Middle East. Therefore, in an attempt to prevent the expansion of pan-Arabism and Communism in the region, the Turkish government wanted to establish an alliance with Israel.

Facing with the harsh conditions of Cold War, Turkey tried hard to become a member of Western bloc. The territorial claim of Soviet Union on the northern part of Turkey and the demand of some privileges at the Straits forced Turkey to seek alliances in order to balance the power of Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey made alliances with west and the US starting from the end of Second World War. In this respect, Turkey's need to balance its power with its northern neighbour Soviet Union with the help of another superpower can be analyzed through realism. Since the concept of 'balance of power' is utmost important in realist theory, the period under examination can be analyzed with the help of realism. Turkey's efforts to prevent the Soviet domination in Middle East can also be analyzed through realism as the survival of Turkey depended on the survivals of the Middle Eastern states. If the Middle Eastern states were to fall under the dominance of Soviet Union, it was more likely for Turkey to be an orbit state of Soviet Union as well. Therefore, realist theory is beneficiary for understanding the foreign policy of Menderes government in 1950s during the Cold War.

### **III. LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE**

As stated before, throughout the 1950s, Democrat party governments followed pro-western and pro-US foreign policy towards the Middle East, since there was a Soviet threat which made Turkey to establish alliances with the Western bloc during the Cold War. The US was the most important ally of Turkey during that period, because it was the liberal superpower which stood against the communist Soviet Union. Therefore, the relations between Turkey and US started to develop in terms of military, trade, and economy. As the cooperation between Turkey and US increased, the dependence of

Turkey on US increased as well. The degree of dependence of Turkey on US and its effects on Turkish foreign policy can be analyzed through the liberal theory.

As already stated Turkey's western alliance and pro-western foreign policies also helped the country economically. Democrat Party that came to power in 1950 under the leadership of Adnan Menderes made use of the American aid and benefitted from those credits to buy imported machinery. During the period of 1948 and 1964, US delivered Turkey \$ 2,271 million and \$ 328 million in deliveries of surplus equipment. Western economic aid to Turkey during the 1950-1962 periods totaled to \$ 1,380 million, of which the vast majority came from the US.<sup>143</sup>

As a result, total number of tractors increased and expanded the area being cultivated. Moreover, combined with excellent weather, there was a tremendous increase in the agricultural product. The expansion in the agricultural sector led to the economic growth. So, the DP was massively supported by the peasants. During the first half of 1950s, the industrial base of the country grew and new road network was opened. However, this was the result of economic growth due to the American aid. There was not much economic development. In a short time, rapid import-substitution based industrialization led to inflation. Modernization of agriculture pursued through external borrowing also increased the external debt. In addition, importing huge quantities of materials and machinery caused trade deficit. Printing more money worsened the economy. Therefore, the last period of 1950s, during which the DP governments followed hostile-looking foreign policies towards the Middle Eastern countries, was the period Turkey needed more economic aid than ever. Following the 1954 elections Menderes visited US asking for financial aid and received \$ 30 million rather than \$ 300 million. Moreover, in 1958, the DP government agreed to the demands of IMF to devaluate, to end the artificial prices, subsidies and import and export restrictions.<sup>144</sup>

Therefore, as analyzed in the last two paragraphs, Turkey was both economically and politically (security) dependent on the US. The dependency is examined under the framework of liberalism. Liberal theory argues that cooperation between the states

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<sup>143</sup> William Hale, **Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000**, Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 123.

<sup>144</sup> Zürcher, pp. 224-230

reduces the risk of conflict and war in the international system, while providing benefits to all of the states that cooperate with each other. Due to the increased volume of trade between the states, none of the states would prefer to give harm to the interests by creating a conflict in the international system. Involving in a conflict may harm the international trade as the liberal theorists put forward. However, the emphasis on cooperation and international trade usually lead to the interdependence in liberal theory.

The financial aid Turkey received during the 1950s led to the dependence of Turkey on US regarding its security and economic needs. According to the liberal theory, dependence of the periphery on the core usually results in the alignment of the foreign policy of the periphery with the foreign policy of the core. So, the Menderes government aligned its foreign policy with the Americans' due to its dependence on the US in terms of military and economic needs. The support of Turkey in the interventions of Lebanon and Jordan by the US and Britain can be explained through the dependence of Turkey on the US. While receiving tremendous amount of military and economic aid from the US, it would have been difficult for the DP government not to support the American foreign policy in Middle East. Similarly, the formation of the Bagdad Pact and the Periphery Pact can be analyzed in terms of Turkey's dependence on the US, since the cooperation had resulted in the alignment of Turkish foreign policy with the American foreign policy. Therefore, in terms of dependency, the liberal theory explains the pro-western and anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy of the Menderes government against the Arab world and the Middle East.

#### **IV. DEPENDENCY THEORY - CONSENSUS**

As part of the liberal theory, by taking the dependent foreign behaviour into consideration, Jeanne A. K. Hey defines five different dependent foreign policy types; as pro-core foreign policies compliance and consensus, and as anti-core foreign policies counter-dependence and compliance and independence. Among the pro-core foreign policies while the compliance cannot bring a full explanation to the case studies under examination, consensus does. In compliance, the periphery country aligns its foreign



policies with the core in order to avoid an economic reward and economic punishment. However, under normal conditions this is not the foreign policy the periphery would follow. In Turkey's foreign policies towards the Middle Eastern countries there is a high chance that under normal conditions Turkey would still follow similar policies since Turkish foreign policy was shaped with the memory of Arabs' betrayal to the Ottoman Empire. Even in the early years of the Republic, Turkey was not that close to the Arab world. However, consensus -which argues that consensus among elites in the periphery and core leads to foreign policy alignment- brings a strong explanation into the case studies under examination. In consensus, the ongoing economic relationship between the elites of core and periphery creates an economic system which is usually beneficial for the core, and that relationship between the elites results in the foreign policy alignment of periphery with the core. This study argues that the pro-western foreign policy of Menderes government in the Middle East also stemmed from the consensus between the state elites of Turkey and the US. Because, during the 1950s, the only decision makers on foreign policy were the Prime Minister Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and some bureaucrats around them, as the public and the opposition knew very little about the foreign policy decisions of the government. Since the public opinion gained importance after the declaration of 1961 constitution, before then, only Menderes and his fellow bureaucrats were responsible from the foreign policy decisions. So, the pro-west foreign policy towards the Middle East was the decision of the state elite.

A close analysis of the case studies show us that each foreign policy decision was made by the elites of the DP since majority of these decisions received criticism from the opposition and sometimes even from the members of the governing DP who were not included in the decision-making. In the case of Bagdad Pact, it was the Prime Minister Menderes himself who travelled in the Arab countries; Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. While he could not succeed including Syria and Lebanon into the pact, he managed to convince Iraq to be a member of the pact. During the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958, it was again the elites of the DP government who decided to open the İncirlik Air base to American troops. Foreign Minister Zorlu even offered the Americans to send the Turkish air force in order to help their intervention. The offer was

rejected on the ground that it was not a NATO operation, but an American operation. Interestingly enough DP elites wished to involve Turkish military into a non-NATO operation for the sake of ingratiating itself to Americans. DP elites received tremendous amount of criticism from the opposition for putting Turkey in such a difficult position in which both Syrians and Russians mobilized their troops on Turkish borders.

Similarly, the intervention of the British in Jordan in July 1958 was supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu. Through briefings he stated that the members of Bagdad Pact were supporting Jordan in every sense. Moreover, he also stated that if the Soviet Union continued to send its volunteers to the region, Turkey would send its troops to Jordan in order to help the British in the intervention. Again such a speech caused the mobilization of Soviet troops on the Turkish border. As a reaction DP government also mobilized the Turkish troops on the Russian border.<sup>145</sup> In the case of Turkey's negative policies towards Algerian independence; it was also the result of the decisions of DP's elites. It was obvious that all of the members of DP and none of the members of the opposition CHP were included in this decision since the Menderes and his close associates received criticism both from CHP and even from its own members of DP. Similarly, concerning the Peripheral Pact signed with Israel in 1958, it was the Prime Minister Menderes who signed it in a secret meeting held with the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion in Turkey.

In sum, Turkey would follow pro-western foreign policy if it was not for the Menderes government during that period. However, it is clear that Turkey would not follow such an anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy if it was not for the Prime Minister Menderes and his bureaucrats close to him. The negative reactions of the opposition and even the other DP members regarding Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s explain us that there was a consensus between the state elites of Turkey and the US. Therefore, all of the anti-Middle Eastern and at the same time pro-western foreign policies during the 1950s were decided and implemented by the elites of the DP, mainly the Prime Minister Menderes and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu.

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<sup>145</sup> Gönlübol and Ülman, p. 304; Albayrak, p. 606.

To conclude, through the analysis of realist, liberal theories and dependency theory as a sub-theory of liberalism, this study claims that in 1950s when the Democrat Party government ruled the country, Turkey followed an anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy. As a result of the Soviet threat the maintenance of security, the dependence of Turkey on US both economically and militarily, and the consensus between the state elites of Turkey and US was effective on the foreign policy decisions of Democrat Party government throughout the 1950s.

## CONCLUSION

Turkey had no choice but to follow a pro-west foreign policy during the 1950s under the rule of Democrat Party government. The main fear of Turkey during the Second World War was the invasion of the Straits by the Soviet Union, and once the war was over, the Soviet threat was still there. Stalin's ambitious wishes to dominate the Straits and occupy provinces in the north-eastern part of Turkey left the country with one option: To become a member of the Western bloc. Although Turkey managed to follow a neutral foreign policy (with still a pro-western tendency) during the early years of the Republic, this was not possible any more. Domestic constraints also forced the country enter into an alliance. Even though the country had not exactly entered the war (except the last couple of months), its economy was in shambles. It was not possible for Turkey to go through an economic growth while the rest of the world was fighting around its borders. Mobilizing one million soldiers on the western borders of the country had weakened Turkey's already weak economy. Therefore, the country was in dire need for an economic assistance. Allying with the West was not only going to help Turkey with its security but also with its economy.

The transition to multi-party system in Turkey takes place during this period. The main reason for the transition was first to make the economically suffering population happy with other choices and to prove the democratization efforts of the country to the West so it could be included in the Western bloc easily. Turkey's first attempt was to become a member of the NATO. It was not easy for Turkey to convince the NATO members regarding the membership, since Turkey was seen as part of the Middle East not Europe. Rather than NATO, British were trying to convince Turkey to join a British led Middle Eastern Defense System. However, the global situation radically changed by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and then the threat of Communism was everywhere. Turkey as a clear sign of its commitment to Western alliance, with the hope that it would be admitted to NATO, sent a dispatch of a Turkish brigade of 4,500 men to join the UN forces. As a result of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower's impact on the American President Truman, at the meeting of NATO

Council of Ministers held in Ottawa in 1951, Turkey's membership was accepted. Its extension of the alliance was officially approved at a meeting of NATO in Lisbon in February 1952. Consequently, Turkey officially became a member of the Western bloc.<sup>146</sup>

Turkey's fervent efforts to become a member of the Western bloc can be analyzed through the realist theory. Realism points out the maintenance of the security for an actor in an anarchical international system. In this context, Turkey, during the Cold War, maintained its security by making an alliance with the rival of Soviet Union, United States and balanced the power of Soviet Union, which is also argued by the realist theory.

When Turkey made an alliance with the US during the Cold War period in order to eliminate the Soviet threat, it started to get military and economic aid from the US through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid. However, the increased amount of American aid led to the dependence of Turkey on US regarding its security and economic needs. In liberal theory, dependence of the periphery on core state usually results in the alignment of the foreign policy of the periphery with the core's. Therefore, the Menderes government aligned its foreign policy with the Americans'. In this thesis, the liberal theory explains the pro-west and anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy of the Menderes government against the Arab world and the Middle East in terms of dependency.

As to the dependency theory itself as a sub-theory of liberalism based on the article of Jeanne A. K. Hey; it is argued in this thesis that the foreign policy of the Menderes government during the 1950s towards the Middle East, can be explained through consensus which is one of the pro-core dependent foreign policies that Jeanne Hey defined in her article. In consensus, due to the ongoing economic relations between the state elites of core and periphery, an economic system occurs which works for the benefit of the core and results in parallel foreign policies. So, since Prime Minister Menderes and the bureaucrats close to him were the only decision makers in the 1950s, considering the high volume of economic and military aid that came from the US, the

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<sup>146</sup> Hale, pp. 117-118.

responsibility of directing the Turkish foreign policy belonged to the Menderes government. Moreover, the fact that Menderes government received large number of criticisms both from CHP and the other DP members was the result of decision making process of the Menderes government. Therefore, the pro-west foreign policy towards the Middle East was the decision of the state elite in Turkey in 1950s.

To conclude, the thesis is aimed to emphasize the anti-Middle Eastern foreign policy approach of the Menderes government, and the reasons behind that decision. Although, the pro-west foreign policy is the traditional foreign policy approach of Turkey since the establishment of Turkish Republic, Menderes government as different from the other governments that ruled Turkey throughout the history of Turkish Republic, not only followed a pro-west foreign policy but also followed an anti-Middle Eastern and somehow hostile foreign policy towards the Middle East. Far from being inactive or neutral, Prime Minister Menderes preferred to involve in the conflicts of the region with its pro-west foreign policy which irritated most of the Arab states. In this respect, Menderes government differentiated from the other governments that ruled Turkey. In order to analyze the motivations behind the pro-west foreign policy of the Menderes government, realism, liberalism, and as a sub-theory of liberalism dependency theory are explained in the thesis in regards to their relations with foreign policy. Therefore, it is argued that, from a realist perspective; the security issue and balance of power explains the policies of Menderes government in Middle East. From a liberal perspective, the cooperation between Turkey and US becomes more of an issue, and the military and economic aid that come from US creates dependence, resulting in the foreign policy alignment of Turkey with the US. Lastly, the dependency theory contributes the role of realism and liberalism in the pro-west foreign policy of Menderes government towards Middle East, as putting forward that the economic relations between the state elites of Turkey and US creates a consensus leading to the alignment of Turkish foreign policy with the US.

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