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TEACHING SPEECH ACT THEORY AND ITS REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY OF THE THEATRE OF ABSURD IN ELT CLASSES

Ümit SANER

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Tez Danışmanı

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YEMİN METNİ

Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak sunduğum "Teaching Speech Act Theory and Its Reflections on The Study of The Theatre of Absurd in ELT Classes" adlı çalışmanın, tarafımdan, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve bunu onurumla doğrularım.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis has focused on the teaching of **Speech Act Theory**, which is so essential in communication and the acquisition of language. This theory is taught in ELT programmes of the universities but it is forgotten afterwards unless it is practised. As the language is the primary means of communication, the importance of the speech and acts is obvious. Teaching Speech Act Theory through literature, and its being applied to literary works, especially the works of drama, is thought to be helpful in foreign language teaching. For this purpose, *The Zoo Story* and *Waiting for Godot*, which can represent the **Theatre of Absurd,** which is a genre that reflects the fact that communication is based on acts rather than sentences and breakdowns in communication are observed in the situations where these acts are not sensed and the monotony of life that prevents people from realizing the reality, are chosen. The background of Speech Act Theory is given via its basic terms and two plays are analysed through the theory. In addition, the speech acts are studied on the extracts from these plays. This study shows the possibility of using Theatre of Absurd as works of literature in the teaching of Speech Act Theory and the applicability of the theory to the analysis of literary works.

Key Words: 1) Speech Act Theory **2)** Theatre of Absurd **3)** Absurd Theatre

TEACHING SPEECH ACT THEORY AND ITS REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY OF THE THEATRE OF ABSURD IN ELT CLASSES

Ümit SANER

ÖZET

Bu araştırma, iletişim ve dolayısıyla dil ediniminde çok önemli olan **Söz Edim Kuramı**'nın öğretimi üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Teori olarak İngilizce öğretmenlerinin eğitiminde öğretilen bu kuram, uygulamaya dökülmediği sürece kısa bir zaman sonra unutulabilmektedir. Dilin insanlar arasındaki iletişim aracı olduğu düşünüldüğünde konuşmanın ve edimlerin önemi açıkça ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Söz Edim Kuramı'nın edebi eserler aracılığıyla öğretimi ve edebi eserler üzerinde kuramın incelenmesi amacıyla tiyatro eserlerinin araştırmada yararlı olacağı ve bu şekilde daha kalıcı bir dil eğitimi sağlanacağı düşüncesi ön plana çıkarılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, bireyler arası iletişimin sözlerden çok edimlerden oluştuğunu, edimlerin algılanmadığı durumlarda iletişim sorunları yaşandığını ve hayatın sıradanlığının kişilerin gerçekleri görmesini engellediğini topluma yansıtan bir akım olan **Absürd Tiyatro**'nun (**Uyumsuz Tiyatro**) temel eserlerinden olan *Hayvanat Bahçesi* ve *Godot'yu Beklerken* seçilmiştir. Söz Edim Kuramının tarihi ve temel kavramları anlatılmış, iki eser Söz Edim Kuramı kullanılarak yorumlanmış ve son olarak 10 örnek soru ile eserlerden alınan diyaloglar üzerinde söz edimleri incelenmiştir. Bu araştırma Absürd Tiyatronun dolayısıyla da edebiyatın Söz Edim Kuramı'nın öğretiminde kullanılabileceğini ve aynı zamanda edebi eserlerin incelenmesinde ve yorumlanmasında teorinin kullanılabilirliğini göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: 1) Söz Edim Kuramı **2)** Absürd Tiyatro **3)** Uyumsuz Tiyatro

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Since the improvement of the education programs is so essential in the foreign language teaching, researches and theories are supposed to be built. But unfortunately, there is no one single method or technique appliable to all areas to be the best for the development of learner abilities in a foreign language.

Learners of a language have to acquire all four skills (listening, reading, speaking, writing) to be able to use the given language as well as a native speaker. As the language is a means for communication, the use of it must help its users to communicate their ideas and grasp the meanings that are uttered for them to be transferred. Learners of a foreign language can know the grammar well but may have problems in speaking and listening since the structure and meaning of the expressions are vital in communication as well as the speaker's intention and the hearer's recognition of this intention.

Language learners tend to have difficulty understanding the intended meaning communicated by a speech act, or producing a speech act using appropriate language and manner in the language being learned. As this is the case, classroom instruction on speech acts can help learners to improve their performance of speech acts and thus their interactions with native speakers. Although used in some classrooms, the materials used are limited to the intuition of some textbook writers. The belief is that we acquire these acts intuitively in our native language without any need to be informed of the techniques. But in a second or especially in a foreign language the social use of the language becomes unknown to the learners of that language. In fact, even a native speaker's intuition is sometimes unreliable. For example, a textbook writer might have a teenager greeting his friend at the airport with, "Hello, Harvey. How was the flight? I see you got a new bag," when he might actually say something like, "Hey, man — what's happening? I like your bag. It's awesome!"

The speakers of a language may explain what one should say in such and such conditions but they may not use it. The real interaction among people in everyday conversation may not be reflected adequately in coursebooks.

For example, in EFL textbooks, speakers typically accept a compliment modestly and with grace:

A: What a beautiful dress!

B: Thank you. I'm glad you like it.

However, in real life, when someone compliments us, we may reply:

A: That's a cute dress you're wearing.

B: Really? This old rag? I got it at the Salvation Army for $2.00!

or

B: You're the third person today who's complimented me on it. I must have done something right!

The important thing here is the teaching of pragmatics which includes the appropriate use of language in conducting speech acts such as apologizing, requesting, complimenting, refusing and thanking. Understanding the intended meaning communicated by a speech act and producing a speech act using appropriate language and manner in the language being learned are vital to be able to communicate in that language. So, classroom instruction on speech acts can help learners to improve their skills in interactions with native speakers.

When reading a book, or watching a film or simply communicating with others the ignorance of the speech acts leads to misunderstandings and the learner, who has not yet got the ways to discover what is inferred, may stand hopeless or may miss the focal point and the real message lying beneath the utterance. To be able to teach a language

properly and therefore to improve ELT students' acquisition of language, pragmatics should be taught. The theorotical knowledge may not be useful enough for ELT students, for that reason, practice may be needed as well.

The Purpose of the Study

The pragmatics, although much analyzed and applied, is unknown to most of the teachers of English. As the importance is not conceived by many teachers, they may forget the pragmatic issues once they are on the scene. Being actors / actresses in the classroom instead of the stage, teachers need to know how to speak and how to use examples of utterances as they represent the most available source of information for the learners.

Speech Act Theory, having the basic principles in pragmatics, is applied to many areas from Information Technologies to Computer Mediated Programs in education, in economics, in discussion forums etc. and the applicability of the theory makes it more valuable and necessary to be learned.

The lack of communication among people is increasing with the prevailing improvement of technology. Beginning with the television and then cell phones with SMS (Short Message Service) and via internet people become passiver in the use of language around themselves. The search for direct utterances makes communication impossible through indirect expressions. This case is reflected in the works of drama which is called **Theatre of Absurd.**

In this paper, this lack of communication will be analysed using speech act theory to derive meanings of utterances. The collected parts will be used as examples for study for a better understanding of the dialogues even in such a condition where communication hardly occurs.

In the first chapter, the background of **Speech Act Theory** has been aimed to be stated through Austin, the father of Speech Act Theory, and Searle, the one who established a theoretical base for the theory, and Derrida and Bach, the ones who made comments on the theory.

In the second chapter **Theatre of Absurd** and why it is chosen for the study of speech acts are explained. The features of this genre and meaning relations from the extracts in the light of the theory are given. The famous absurdist plays *The Zoo Story* and *Waiting for Godot* are chosen as examples to study the theory. The importance of language and its misuse are the subjects both Speech Act Theory and the absurd theatre focus on. The lack of communication and the reasons for the problems in conversation are tried to be explained.

In the third chapter the theory is tried to be applied through ten questions. The main purpose of this study is to show the applicability of Speech Act Theory in real life situations through the works of drama.

The Statement of the Problem

How can passages taken from **Theatre of Absurd** be used as a means to raise students' awareness of **Speech Act Theory** and therefore the use of pragmatics to acquire and use the language properly?

The Significance of the Study

As stated before, the question of how to improve EFL (English as foreign Language) students' use of speech acts properly is still unanswered. To be aware of the functions and intentions beyond uttterances: whether it is direct or indirect, whether the miscommunication stems from the ignorance of the intended meanings or context; the students of ELT should acknowledge the act theory.

The speech mentioned in the theory should not be taken only as the spoken discourse; but also the written discourse. In writing or in a play there are also acts. The playwright has an intention to write that play, and there is an audience to perceive the acts sometimes independent of the intentions of the playwright.

As literature is a vital source in ELT classes, reading the given critics and memorizing the terms and a few examples are not enough for a better usage of language. The important issue is the fact that one really begins to use a foreign language when he/she thinks in the terms of that language critically and applies his/her theorotical knowledge to real communication situations such as reading or watching a play.

This analysis will try to draw a broader view of **Speech Act Theory** with its applications to different areas and try to give basic examples for the application of this theory to reading and evaluating **Theatre of Absurd.** Thus, showing a better way of understanding drama and the theory and the relationship between literature and philosophy of language has been seeked and the results have been tried to be reflected.

ABBREVIATIONS

Act: Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind

Aux: Auxiliary

CALD: Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary

FTAs: Face Threatening Acts

HDTW : How to Do Things with Words

Int: Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man

(MET): Metaphor

NP: Noun Phrase

(PAR): Paraphrase

PC: Performative-Constative

PP : Philosophical Papers

SA : Speech Act

SCR: Searlean Constitutive Rules

S: Sentence

VP: Verb Phrase

Works: The Works of Thomas Reid

WG: Waiting for Godot

WCR: Williamson's Constitutive Rules

ZS: Zoo Story

CHAPTER I

SPEECH ACT THEORY

1.1. The Initial Steps of the Theory

Ever since J.L. Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* (1962) the term **Speech Acts** has been an important issue in the field of philosophy of language. J.L. Austin developed the foundation of the current theory of speech acts. In his essay *Performative Utterances* (1961), Austin explores the nature of performative utterances.

In his lectures Austin mentions that people cannot describe sentences only in a truthfulness scale. He asserts that there are sentences which we cannot say either true or false. Wittgenstein also thinks of language not as a system of representation but as a vehicle for all sorts of social activity. *Don't ask for the meaning* he admonishes *ask for the use* (Bach, 1998: 2). These have been the silent footsteps of a great theory of today but in fact the theory goes earlier in history.

1.1.1. From Aristotle to Reinach

Aristotle has already noted that there are uses of language, for example prayers which are not of the statement-making sort. Aristotle and the logicians have analyzed one species – to wit, the *proposition*. Unfortunately he confines *the study of such uses of language to the peripheral realms of rhetoric and poetry.* Thus, only Reid and Reinach *can be credited with having made early efforts to advance a theory of the needed sort* (Smith, 2003).

Thomas Reid recognizes that the principles of the art of language are to be found in an analysis of the various species of sentences. Though Reid agrees with Aristotle in the thought that *man is by his nature a social animal* (1969:55), he states that *language is an instrument of thought, as well as of the communication of our thought* (1969: 705). In the chapter "On The Structure of Speech" in his *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic* (1774) Reid remarks of Aristotle that he

> observes justly that besides that kind of speech called a *proposition* which is either true or false, there are other kinds which are neither true nor false, such as a prayer or a wish; to which we may add, a question, a command, a promise, a contract, and many others (Works, 692 cited in Schuhmann & Smith, 1990: 57).

For Reid, the main purpose of language is communication. His philosophy lacks detailed analysis of examples and a unified approach, but he is aware of the fact that there are problems in communication which **Speech Act Theory** has evolved and tried to find a solution for. Both Reid and Austin try to solve the certain philosophical problems caused by improper use of language thus their studies support each other in essence. According to Reid (1789) *the expression of a question, of a command, or of a promise, is as capable of being analyzed as a proposition is; but we do not find that this has been attempted* (Schuhmann & Smith, 1990: 47).

Reid's discussion about social acts constitutes the approach which has been renewed since Austin. For him the main purpose of language is communication. He is a dualist, although not as rigid as Descartes, conceiving two concepts such as mind and body, social acts and solitary acts as two independent systems. There are two acts according to him; solitary and social. Solitary acts include apprehending, seeing, hearing, understanding, reasoning, thinking and also acts like willing intending, desiring etc. They are characterised as being not essential to be expressed. They happen in our minds. Therefore the performance of these acts does not presuppose intercourse with any

intelligent being in the universe in addition to the person who performs the acts (Int 71: act 437 cited in Schuhmann & Smith, 1990: 59).

On the other hand, social acts are communicative and directedness to people other than the speaker is necessary. Both the addresser and the addressee must be conscious of what is being said. These acts are performed at the moment they are uttered by the speaker and understood by the addressee. Lying for example is possible only with two participants in the act. One cannot lie to himself/herself. The act of lying is social not solitary. Reid proves that as he says *a false testimony is a lie but a wrong judgment is not a lie* (Int 533 cited in Schuhmann & Smith, 1990: 62).

Prior to Austin (1911-1960) and his followers, Adolf Reinach (1884-1917) developed a full-fledged theory of the given sort. In his *The A priori Foundations of The Civil Law* which was published in 1913, long before Austin and Searle, he developed a theory of *social acts* which is an equivalent to the later speech acts. His work did not have much influence, most probably, due to his death at 33. Barry Smith comments on Reinach saying that:

> His work comprehends many of the elements we find in the writings of Austin and Searle, and even incorporates additional perspectives deriving from Reinach's background as a student of law. Unfortunately, however, Reinach's theory of social acts was doomed, like Reid's theory of social operations before it, to remain almost entirely without influence (2003: 7).

1.2. Austin's Speech Acts

Austin's theory of speech acts stems from *his consideration, and rejection, of a distinction which he sees as central to philosophy of language up to his own work.* Instead of the traditional constative/nonsense distinction, Austin postulates two distinctions: *constative/performative* and *meaningful-utterance/meaningless-utterance* (Halion, 1989).

The Oxford Philosopher J.L. Austin's work is in many respects a reaction to the traditional and influential attitudes to language. These attitudes have the assumptions that

a. the basic sentence type in language is declarative (i. e. a statement or an assertion);
b. the principal use of language is to decribe states of affairs (by using statements);
c. the meaning of utterances can be described in terms of their truth or falsity.

These assumptions are associated with the group of philosophers known as logical positivists, a term which is originally applied to the mathematicians and philosophers of the Vienna Circle. For these philosophers, *how far the meaning of a sentence is reducible to its verifiability* is an important matter (Saeed, 2003: 223).

Austin's opposition to these views is the "common sense" one that language is used for far more than making statements and that for the most part utterances cannot be said to be either true or false. He makes two important observations. The first is that not all sentences are statements and that much of conversation is made up of questions, exclamations, commands and expression of wishes like the examples below:

a.   Excuse me!
b.   Are you serving?
c.   Hello.
d.   How much? Are you serious?
e.   Two kilos of potatoes and half a kilo of onions, please!
f.   You are under arrest!
g.   (Boss) Your services are no longer required.

These sentences are not descriptions so cannot be put on the truthfulness scale.

Austin's second observation was that even in sentences with the grammatical form of declaratives, not all are used to make statements. Austin identified a subset of declaratives such as;

a.   I promise to take a taxi home.
b.   I bet you five pounds that that horse wins the race.
c.   I declare this meeting open.
d.   I warn you that legal action will ensue.
e.   I name this ship the Flying Dutchman.
f.   I charge you with treason.
g.   I invite you to come and visit me sometime (Adopted from Saeed, 2003: 223).

Here all the sentences perform the same speech act. But there are sentences in which it is not as easy as it is here to tell them as performative uses of language. In such a case we have the mood, auxiliary verbs, intonation, etc.

In *How To Do Things With Words*, the posthumously published lectures of J. L. Austin, the view that language is only a means to assert propositions about the world was attacked. The acclaimed work of J. L. Austin led philosophers to pay more attention to the way in which language is used in everyday activities. Austin recognized that truth conditional semantics was troublesome for certain kinds of utterances that are not descriptive, but rather constitute actions. The saying of certain words changes the world, rather than merely describing it. The failure of traditional semantic theories to deal with this problem he called the descriptive fallacy. *It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely*. Austin called these special kinds of utterances performatives (e.g. baptising, marrying) (Austin, 1962 cited in Ljungberg & Holm,1996: 29-51). In these expressions, the action that the sentence describes (nominating, sentencing, promising) is performed by the sentence itself.

So again we turn to the question that is "what is a speech act and how can it improve the understanding of language in its philosophy?"

The speech act is a concept in linguistics and the philosophy of language. It is a theory that asserts the claim *in saying something, we do something*. It is an action that is

performed by means of language. In other words, actions that are carried through language are called speech acts (Adopted from http://www.azlifa.com/blog/dpspeech-acts.html).

The most common example is performative act of a minister during a wedding ceremony when s/he says *I now pronounce you husband and wife*. When this sentence is uttered it changes the social situations of the bride and the bridegroom from being single to becoming married with all its requirements accepted. This utterance cannot be falsified or verified. It does not describe a situation or thought, on the contrary it creates the situation when it is uttered. So it is not a report or assertion, it is the action.

One can perform an action by means of language, such as describing something (*It is raining.*), asking a question (*Is it raining?*), making a request or giving an order (*Can you pass the sugar?*, *Drop your guns or I'll have to shoot you!*), or making a promise (*I promise I'll bring it to you.*). Other common examples of speech acts include greeting, apologizing, insulting or challenging as in the sentence *Can you race to that tree?* (Adopted from http://www.answers.com/topic/speech-act).

In a **Speech Act Theory** the effect of an utterance is analyzed in relation to the speaker and listener's behaviour. So the theory can help to analyze utterances from the perspective of their function rather than form.

1.2.1. Constative or Performative

The sentences which can be true or false are *constatives*.

Eg. I gave you ten dollars..

He killed his wife.

Water boils at 100 C.

These sentences can be either true or false depending on the relations between the world they describe and the real world they match. They can be justified or falsified.

But most of our sentences are in the realm of performatives. We do not only state the facts. However, as he developed his analysis, Austin collapsed distinction and viewed the making of statements as just another type of speech act, which he called simply stating. He argued that there is no sound way to distinguish between performatives and constatives. For example, the felicity conditions can also be applied to statements: statements which are odd because of presuppositon failure as in the sentence *The king of France is bald* are infelicitous because the speaker violated the conventions for referring to individuals. Therefore, there is no need for the judgement of the truth or falsity of the sentence. This sentence is different from the sentence *The president of France is a woman* (Saeed, 2003: 226).

There is an asymmetry between constatives and performatives which Austin expresses by talking about their different directions of fit (Halion, 1989). To state something is to fit words to world. The statement will be true if it fits to world and false otherwise. To utter a performative is different as it is uttered to fit the world to (one's) words. In performatives language is used to bring about a new state of affairs in the world.

Performatives are speech acts of a special kind where the utterance of the right words by the right person in the right situation effectively is (or accomplishes) the social act. The moment they are uttered they are performed. Performatives perform some action whereas constatives merely report on states of affairs. For instance, if one says *I promise…*, then, without any further action, s/he has promised.

In some cases, the speech must be accompanied by a ceremonial or ritual action. Uttering the necessary words is not enough for the act to be performed successfully. Whether the speaker in fact has the social or legal standing to accomplish the act depends on some things beyond the mere speaking of the words.

A difference between the performance of a promise and, for example, a baptism is that in the former case but not in the latter uttering certain words is sufficient to perform the act. Simply saying 'I promise...' counts as promising whereas simply saying 'I baptise you...' does not count as baptizing without further ado. In order to baptise one must ordinarily (i.e. not in emergency cases) be some kind of religious cleric, e.g. a priest. Also, one must perform certain actions such as pouring water on the baby's brow or immersing it. Without these concomitant actions the utterance in question would not effect the child's baptism. Similarly, without the words there would be no baptism (Halion, 1989).

The situations necessitating a legal or social condition depends on the sentence itself. Here are some examples:

1. I promise to take a taxi home.
2. I invite you to come and visit me sometime.
3. I warn you that legal action will ensue.
4. I bet you five pounds that that horse wins the race.
5. I declare this meeting open.
6. I charge you with treason.
7. I dub thee Sir Walter.
8. I name this ship the Flying Dutchman.

In the first three examples, uttering is enough for the act to be performed. In the fourth one, having that amount of money is necessary but again social condition is not necessary for the act to be happy. In the fifth one, the chairman or the director has the power to act this performative out successfully. And in the last three sentences performative acts depend on the social status of the utterer as naming a ship or charging are not acts to be performed by every single person randomly. This proves the fact that the utterances and the performatives can be uttered in certain conditions depending on their functions.

Here are some conditions where performatives are found at work:

The church: baptizing, marrying, funerals, exorcism and excommunication.

Governance and civic life: crowning of monarchs, dubbing, dissolution of Parliament, legislating, awarding honours and ennobling.

The law: enforcing of various judgements, giving sentence and swearing oaths (at the court).

The armed services: giving an order to attack, retreat, open or stop fire.

Universities and schools: conferring of degrees, excluding students and approving dissertations.

Business: hiring and firing, resigning, selling, naming a ship.

Sport: cautioning or sending off players, starting and ending the game.

Gaming: placing a bet, doubling in blackjack.

Performatives that are uttered in appropriate contexts are said to be *happy* (or *felicitous*) as opposed to *unhappy* (or *infelicitous*). For example, in the case of a baptism, the child must not be known to have been baptized already or in the case of naming a ship, the ship must not have been named beforehand.

Performatives can be explicit or implicit. In the sentence *Stand up!* there is an order and therefore, it is a performative. But we do not use a performative verb here. The act of ordering is implied so it is implicit. There are of course criteria to decide whether a performative is explicit or implicit. The features of explicit performatives makes them easier to understand. First of all, we have the hereby test. In explicit performatives we see the adverb 'hereby' or the insertion of this adverb does not seem odd. This word makes sure that the act is performed by saying that sentence. Leech gives us the criteria:

i. The subject is in the first person. (I or we).
ii. The verb is in the simple present tense. (state, ask, pardon, etc.)
iii. The indirect object, if one is present, is *you.*
iv. It is possible to insert the adverb *hereby*.
v. The sentence is not negative (Leech, 1981: 322).

In addition to these criteria, we can state that the verbs used in explicit performatives belong to a special class describing verbal activities such as promise, warn, sentence, name, bet, pronounce, apologize, thank, threaten, order, request etc. All these features can be seen in the sentence *I hereby sentence you to 20 years.*

It is also possible to express a non-explicit (implicit) performative with an explicit performative verb as in the examples given below.

a. Shut the door!
b. I order you to shut the door!

a. I will call her.
b. I promise to call her.

Word order, stress, intonation also make one sentence performative (*You're going! You're going? Are you going?*). An implicit performative can be made an explicit performative in multiple ways as the sentence *I will be there.* may be a prediction, a promise or a warning for the addressee (Prasad, 2005).

According to Austin:

> …a performative is judged as to whether it brings about the state of affairs it purports to. One judges a person's statement about a certain state of affairs by asking whether what he said was a true account of it. One judges a person's performative utterance purporting to bring about a certain state of affairs by judging whether it conventionally succeeded or whether it was sincere (Halion, 1989).

It is certain that there is a gradient between performatives that are highly institutionalized, or even ceremonial, requiring sophisticated and very overt support, like the example of a judge pronouncing sentence, through to less formal acts like warning, thanking, etc. To decribe the roles of the conditions for institutionalized performatives Austin writes that:

> 1.   There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances…
> 2.   the particular persons and circumstances must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked…
> 3.   the procedure must be executed by all the participants correctly…
> 4.   …and completely… (1975: 25-38 cited in Saeed, 2003: 224-225).

Infelicity is a matter of how performative utterances operate in a given context. And for the happiness of the acts, both internal (intentional) and external (worldly) circumstances should be at work. For the utterance to be felicitious, the utterer must not be drunk, coerced, at the point of a gun or insane (Miller, 2001: 31).

> Where a performative is unhappy (infelicitious) due to external circumstances it is called a 'misfire'. This may be due to 'misinvocation' or 'misexecution'. In the former case conventions either do not exist as appealed to or are incorrectly appealed to. There are thus two types of misinvocation: 'non-plays' and 'misapplications'. The former is where a convention does not exist although one seems to be appealed to (as, for instance, if a catholic were to stand his wife in front of him in company and utter 'I divorce you' it is a non-play); the latter is where a convention is wrongly applied (as, for example, occurs when a married man commits bigamy (Austin, 1975: 17-31; 1979: 238 cited in Halion, 1989).

The situation below also examplifies misapplication:

> a. (Curate:) Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife... and
>   forsaking all other, keep thee only unto her, so long
>   as ye both shall live?
> b. (Bridegroom:) Yes (Prasad, 2005).

In the case of 'misexecutions', the other type of misfire, the conventional procedures are not fully carried out. Here again there are two sorts: 'flaws' and 'hitches'. If bridegroom during the marriage ceremony says *I will* and the groom says *I won't*, then the marriage ceremony is *flawed*. When one offers a bet but it is not accepted by anyone, it is a *hitch*. Here, according to Austin, *one has not succeeded in betting because the conventional procedure has not been completed* (Austin, 1975: 17; 1979: 238 cited in Halion, 1989).

Performatives also may be infelitious due to internal circumstances which is related to the intentions. This kind of unhappiness is called *abuses* and there are two types of abuses: *insincerities and non-fulfillments or breaches of commitment. To promise without the intention of keeping to what one promises is to abuse the procedure* or even, as Austin sometimes puts it, to *abuse the formula 'I promise...'.* Another example for insincerity is when a jury finds defendant guilty when he knows him to be innocent. In non-fulfilment, one sincerely promises but does not fulfil one's promise (Austin, 1975: 16; 1979: 238-239 cited in Halion, 1989).

These distinctions are made clearer and more schematic in the list based on HDTW (Austin, 1975: 18) below:

- A. <u>Misfires</u>: Externally Unhappy Utterances.
  - 1. <u>Misinvocations</u>: appropriate act fails conventional criteria.
    - a. <u>Non-Plays</u>: no appropriate convention for that act.
    - b. <u>Misapplications</u>: convention misapplied, it is against conventions.
  - 2. <u>Misexecutions</u>: appropriate act rendered defective.
    - a. <u>Flaws</u>: conventional procedure partly rejected.
    - b. <u>Hitches</u>: conventional procedure not completed (no acceptance).
- B. <u>Abuses</u>: Internally Unhappy Utterances.
  - 1. <u>Insincerities</u>: appropriate intention(s) absent.
  - 2. <u>Non-Fulfillments</u>: intention(s) not fully carried out (Halion, 1989).

Austin gives the example of promising a donkey to give it a carrot. *Is this a non-play (there being no convention of promising to donkeys) or a misapplication (the convention of promising not extending to donkeys)? Austin thinks that it is perhaps both* (Halion, 1989). Considering the case that you feel a gun pointed at your head by the man standing just before you and you promise, it cannot be said to be just internal as the promiser is not free to choose or decide. If an ordinary person takes the champagne bottle at a ship's launching and utters the words *I name this ship Queen of Sun* and smashes it against the ship's bow; is it a misapplication or a hitch? Or if you try to baptise an animal a dog, also given as an example by Austin himself, is it a misapplication or non-play? And in society can it ever be the case to consider in terms of social acts? So there are no clear cuts between these typological terms as one example may be both.

> So Austin has put forward a theory of performatives which reflects the vagueness of conventions in that it refuses to categorize nicely the various ways one may make, or fail to make, a performative utterance. At this point he only seems to be certain, on the one hand, that there are meaningful utterances that cannot be either true or false but only happy or unhappy, and, on the other hand, that the only other meaningful utterances are capable of truth or falsity but not of happiness or unhappiness (Halion, 1989).

Halion goes on saying *with regard to the logic of performatives and constatives Austin considers presupposition, implication and entailment. Statements are said to imply other statements whereas acts are not said to imply other acts.* As examples he examines the sentences given by Austin.

(1) 'All John's children are bald, but John has no children.'
(2) 'The cat is on the mat, but I don't believe it.'
(3) 'All the guests are French, but some of them aren't.'
(4) 'I bequeath you my watch, but I haven't got a watch.'
(5) 'I promise to be there, but I have no intention of being there.'
(6) 'I welcome you, but get out of my house.' (Halion, 1989).

The first three sentences are constatives and the next three are performatives, so they can be analyzed in two different ways. In the first sentence, the first part of the sentence presupposes that John has children but the second part states just the opposite so it denies the presupposition of the first part. In the second sentence the cat's being on the mat is asserted and it implies that the utterer sees so or s/he believes this to be the case. In the third example first part entails that there are no people among the guests other than the French but again the second part contradicts the first part.

Austin shows that there are similarities between constatives and performatives in their relations to these meaning relations saying: *these three ways of failing to get by correspond to three of the ways in which a performative utterance may be unhappy* (1963: 18 cited in Halion, 1989). It is not difficult to see that example (4) is a misapplication because the bequeathing is not applied. Example (5) is an abuse of the institution of promising as the appropriate intention is absent (insincerity). And (6) is also an abuse as the speaker does not behave in parallel with his intentions expressed in the beginning (non-fulfilment).

Both example groups are similar in that they are contradictory in themselves. Performative infelicities show similarities with the invalid forms of reasoning associated with the constatives in the first three examples. Halion comments on these sentences saying

> Compare (1) and (4): just as 'John's children are bald' presupposes that John has children, 'I bequeath you my watch' can be said to presuppose that I own a watch. So in performatives there can be other sentences that are presupposed. With regard to (2) and (5): Austin says that
> Just as my saying that the cat is on the mat implies that I believe it is, so my saying I promise to be there implies that I intend to be there. ...If we don't hold the belief, or again don't have the intention, appropriate to the context of our utterance, then in each case there is a lack of sincerity and abuse of the procedure (1963: 18) (Halion, 1989).

Just like the constatives imply beliefs, performatives imply intentions in that both implications are within the speaker and expressed through the utterance of these sentences.

All the guests are French and *Some of the guests are not French* cannot both be true as the two parts are inconsistent with each other. Saying *I welcome you* also necessitates behaving in that way. So *just as (4) seems to involve presupposition, (5) implication and (6) entailment,… (1) seems to involve a misfire, (2) to involve an abuse of procedure (insincerity) and (3) also to involve an abuse of procedure (non-fulfilment)* (Halion, 1989).

The first sentence is void when taken as a misfire as it only seems to refer. Halion (1989) gives the quotation below for reference:

> We can take over for [the] doctrine [of the constative] the term 'void' as employed in the doctrine of the unhappiness of the performative. The statement on the subject of John's children is, we may say, 'void for lack of reference', which is exactly what lawyers would say about the purported bequest of a watch. So here is a first instance in which a trouble that afflicts statements turns out to be identical with one of the unhappinesses typical of the performative utterance (Austin, 1963: 18).

Likewise, stating what one does not believe can be considered an abuse of the convention of assertion and there is again abuse in (3) as the second part is an utterance against the truth conditions of the first part.

In (4) bequeathing something presupposes owning it, in (5) promising something shows the speaker's intention to do that act; and in (6) welcoming requires behaving accordingly. They all commit the utterer to accepting other statements or to behaving in certain ways. This does not mean that there is no constative performative distinction but as Austin proceeds, these findings lead him to the study of speech acts. And he adds that all utterances are performatives as all constatives can be preceeded by *I state* or *I assert*.

After detailed studies in that area, Austin gives up the division between constatives and performatives as it depends on how you look at it. Every constative has performative features in the same way that every performative has some constative features. And this situation leads to the claim that in fact every sentence is performative by Ross.

To Ross every sentence contains a performative. In his article "On Declarative Sentences" (1970), he uses the the emphatic reflexive pronoun to prove that every sentence in English has a performative main verb in the highest clause of their deep structure. *The paper was written by Ann and myself* is acceptable whereas *The paper was written by Ann and himself* is not. *The reflexive pronoun must be in the first person if it occurs in the main clause; or must agree with the noun phrase of the higher clause if it occurs in the subordinate clause.* Ross claims that the phrase *As for ...self* obeys the same rule. *As for myself, I am ravenous* can be used while *As for himself, Tom is ravenous* cannot; since the pronoun must be in agreement with a noun phrase in the higher clause. And according to Leech, accepting this analysis makes all statements seem indirect (1981: 324).

Take the utterance *Bull!*. It may be uttered to warn somebody that there is a bull in that field and therefore an advice to run away or hide, it may be uttered as a request for the adressee to look at the bull in a zoo, or it may be an order for a keeper to go and catch the bull. The kind of act changes depending on the context, which is the surrounding speech situation. Or it may just be an answer to a question in this case it is a constative not performative.

Towards the end of *How to Do Things with Words* Austin clarifies his terminology as he says:

What then finally is left of the distinction of the performative and constative utterance? Really we may say that what we had in mind here was:

(a) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech-act, and we concentrate on the locutionary etc.

(b)   With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts (Austin, 1975: 145-146 cited in Miller, 2001: 17).

1.2.3. Austin's Theory of Speech Acts (Three Facets of Speech Acts)

In Austin's terminology of three facets of the speech act: the speech act as meaningful utterance is the locutionary act; as meaningful utterance with a certain conventional (performative) force, it is an illocutionary act (in saying); as meaningful utterance with a certain conventional force non-conventionally bringing about a certain effect, it is a perlocutionary (by saying) act. The locutionary act is the production of certain noises and therefore, it is named the phonetic act. *Through the production of those noises the speaker intentionally produces words in syntactic arrangements and, in this respect, the act is called a phatic act.* The production of words in syntactic structures, *with certain intentions and in certain contexts*, expresses *certain messages and is in this respect dubbed a rhetic act* (Halion, 1989). In other words we can say that illocutionary acts are pretended using the phatic and phonetic acts.

With regard to the locutionary act, Austin claims that in order for there to be a speech act certain noises must be produced by the human voice: "to say anything is ... always to perform the act of uttering certain noises..., and the utterance is a phone" (1975: 92). This is not true, since one can say something by means of writing, the production of graphemes. There are also many other 'vehicles', other sign-systems such as Morse code, traffic lights, smoke signals, etc. At one point however Austin allows that utterances can be in the form of writing when he speaks of "the utterance (in writing) of the sentence" (1975: 57) (Halion, 1989).

Phones are just noises and phonemes are the sound-units of a particular language. Austin's 'phone' is not yet a phoneme. Thus, actual languages are first considered at the phatic level. To Austin one utters *certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation* in language (1975: 92).

The phones become phonemes when they intentionally express words from the lexicon of a certain language, and when they are produced in an order in accordance with the syntactic rules of that language. One can never say that there are always well pronounced or well formed sentences. One does not cease to speak a language if one mispronounces words or forms ungrammatical sentences. The listener generally corrects the mistake in his/her mind and gets the message that is intended.

For the phatic act, intentions are important. If a monkey says *go* it does not utter the word *go* as it cannot know the lexicon of English and it is not uttered intentionally (Austin, 1975: 96). So it is not a phatic act. Halion restates that Austin shows the difference between phones and phonemes, words and phrases clearly. *If one asks 'If cold water is iced water, what is cold ink?' One responds: 'Iced ink'.* The answerer intentionally produces *the phonemes /ist'ink/* but these phones *could also be interpreted as the phonemes /i'stink/* although they were not used with that meaning. Here the context identifies what is intended and what is not. So we can say the context helps one to get the phatic act from the phonetic one (1975: 124 cited in Halion, 1989).

The difference between locutionary act and the illocutionary act is in terms of meaning and force. For Austin; when one says *The book is grey,* it means that a book, which is known by the hearer which one is referred to, is grey but; when one says *I promise,* it has the force of speaker's undertaking to do something. While in locutionary act sense and reference relations are at work; in illocutionary act, force is implied. A locutionary act is simply saying something about the world. The sentence is not posing a question, promising, or commanding anything. It simply states something about the

world. The illocutionary act includes promising, questioning, admitting, hypothesizing, etc. It includes an *assertion* that is performative in nature. In other words illocutionary act is the action intended by the speaker and the term speech acts is often used with just this meaning of illocutionary act.

The perlocutionary act is the effect that is created on the hearer. It is mostly non-conventional and it depends on the hearer, so it is not easy to analyze. In the sentence *It is so hot here* means the heat is over normal conditions for the speaker (locutionary act). It may have many illocutionary acts such as a request for the speaker to open the window or stop talking or stop arguing etc (illocutionary). The perlocutionary act here is hearer's opening the window or stopping arguing. It is like when a man says 'I promise you a diamond ring' to his wife she feels pleased and in the same way she may not be pleased (if she wants to get divorced). Her feelings change nonconventionally and it is the perlocutionary act. If it is conventional, as in the case of a promise, it is illocutionary.

Austin says:

> Speaking of the 'use of "language" for arguing or warning' looks just like speaking of 'the use of "language" for persuading, rousing, alarming'; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not (1975: 103 cited in Halion, 1989).

Deciding whether an act is illocutionary or perlocutionary is not easy in some cases. Austin gives a man swinging his stick as an example.

> This act may be equivalent to his saying 'I warn you' in which case it is illocutionary or it may be equivalent to his speaking with an (unintentional) 'edge' to his voice which serves as a warning to his audience (that he is not to be trifled with, for instance) in which case the fact that the audience is warned is a perlocutionary effect of his swinging his stick. The issue here is whether swinging one's stick is conventional

and, as Austin perceptively remarks, "it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end" (1975: 119). The act could be classified either way (Halion, 1989).

Another example given by Austin is the sentence *Shoot her!* This sentence has *the illocutionary force of ordering, urging or advising the addressee to shoot her, but the perlocutionary force of persuading, forcing, frighteneing etc. the adressee into shooting her.* Different interpretations are plausable in this area since *perlocutionary effects are less conventionally tied to linguistic forms* (Saeed, 2003: 228). One can recognize an order or a warning but may not obey it. For that reason, perlocutionary acts have been of less interest to linguists.

1.3. Searle on Speech Act Theory

According to Searle, the speech act is the basic unit of meaning and force, therefore including both constatives and performatives. He accepts that there are illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts in language. In these concepts he agrees with Austin but; *Searle does not distinguish between the illocutionary act and the locutionary act but rather between the illocutionary act and both an utterance act and a propositional act* (Halion, 1989). He also devides propositional act as a reference act and an act of predication. Halion tries to show the difference as in the table below:

AUSTIN	SEARLE
(a) Locutionary Act: (i)Phonetic Act, (ii)Phatic Act, (iii) Rhetic Act.	(a) Utterance Act.
	(b) Propositional Act: (i) Reference Act, (ii) Act of Predication.
(b) Illocutionary Act.	(c) Illocutionary Act.
(c) Perlocutionary Act.	(d) Perlocutionary Act.

(1989: 23)

There is not a determinate meaning in Searle's utterance act. To perform an utterance act without performing a propositional act would be to *utter words without saying anything* (Searle, 1969: 24). Thus, it can be said that the utterance act corresponds roughly to Austin's phatic act which is the act of uttering the phones, words and syntactic units of a specific language. Halion claims that *since the utterance act is the producing of morphemes, words and sentences*, and *the phatic act is the production of vocables, words and grammatical units in a specific language,* Searle's utterance act is the same as Austin's phatic act (1989).

The propositional act can be taken under two headings: the reference act and the act of predication. The first one is a complete speech act because one can refer to an object without saying anything about it. If there is no existing reference it makes no sense; so the act of predication is an incomplete speech act.

So 'a man' in 'A man came' refers; but it does not refer in 'John is a man'. This is clear from the fact that the expression only serves to identify a man in the first example. In the second it predicates the property manness of John. Clearly then 'is a man', which is a predicate, cannot stand on its own; it must accompany some referring expression. This is why Searle says that the act of predication "is not a separate speech act at all"(1969: 122 cited in Halion 1989).

Halion gives the utterance *That man is drunk* as an example to explain that the referring expressions are recognized by their function:

'That man is drunk' said here in this text does not refer even though the expression 'that man' may look like a referring expression. It is only a referring expression when it is used in a specific context to say of a specific man that he is drunk. It is therefore the function of the expression not its surface form that defines it (Halion, 1989).

According to Searle, there is no device at the surface level to indicate what sort of illocutionary act is being performed but context makes it clear that what the force of an utterance is, thus it can be said that context helps to determine the illocutionary force.

Searle tries to show how the philosophy of language is based on the philosophy of mind and how certain features of speech acts were based on the "intentionality" of the mind. According to him, there are five different ways of using language, five general categories of illocutionary acts. They are assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. Of course such a categorization needs to be supplemented with theorotical explanation and that explanation is given in the book *Expression and Meaning* (1986). But the problem is with the cases where an utterance can be in more than one category. Searle examplifies this saying:

> Suppose I say to you, for example, "Sir, you are standing on my foot." Now in most contexts when I make a statement of that sort I am making not only an Assertive, but I am also indirectly requesting and perhaps even ordering you to get off my foot. Thus the Assertive utterance is also an indirect Directive (1986: viii).

Then he asks how one can go from the literal sentence meaning of Assertions to the implied indirect utterance meaning of Directives. That is the question of direct and indirect meaning which will be examplified later in this study.

Searle gives us twelve dimensions of variation which he uses as the base for his categorization of illocutionary acts. Here are some of these dimensions considered to be the most important:

> 1. *Differences in the point (or purpose) of the act.* The point or purpose of an order can be specified by saying that it is an attempt to get the hearer to do something. The point or purpose of a description is that it is a representation (true or false, accurate or inaccurate) of how something is. The point or purpose of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an obligation by the speaker to do something (Searle, 1986: 2).

He calls this criterion as the illocutionary point. And he states that it has nothing to do with the implication.

> 2. *Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world.* Some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly, their propositional content) to match the world, others to get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the former category, promises and requests are in the latter. The best illustration of this distinction I know of is provided by Elizabeth Anscombe (1957) (Searle, 1986: 3).

Then he mentions the example which is about a man going to the supermarket to buy the things his wife listed on a piece of paper. And a dedective follows him and writes down the things that he buys.in the first case the function of the list is to get the world match the words, in the other to make the words match the world. So the directions of fit are different. The first has world-to-word direction of fit like in a request, command, promise and the second has word-to-world direction of fit like statements, decriptions, assertions and explanations.

> 3. *Differences in expressed psychological states.* A man who states, explains, asserts or claims that *p expresses the belief that p;* a man who promises, vows, threatens or pledges to do *a expresses an intention to do a*; a man who orders, commands, requests H to do *A expresses a desire (want, wish) that H do A*, a man who apologizes for doing *A expresses regretat having done A*; etc. In general, in the performance of any illocutionary act with a propositional content, the speaker expresses some attitude, state, etc., to that propositional content. Notice that it holds even if he is insincere, even if he does not have the belief, desire, intention, regret or pleasure which he expresses, he nonetheless expresses a belief, desire, intention, regret or pleasure in the performance of the speech act (Searle, 1986: 4).

Searle tries to show the impossibility of the denial of the psychological state that the performative verb expresses. One cannot say *I state that p but I do not believe it* which is against sincerity conditons. Belief is expressed in assertions, declarations,

statements, explanations and arguments. Intention is used in promises, threats, vows, and pledges. Desire is expressed in orders, requests commands, prayers, pleadings, begging and entreaties. Pleasure is expressed in congratulations and welcomes. These first three dimensions are the most important ones for Searle.

> 4. *Differences in the force or strength with which the illocutionary point is presented.* Both "I suggest we go to the movies" and "I intend that we go to the movies" have the same illocutionary point, but it is presented with different strengths. Analogously with "I solemnly swear that Bill stole the money" and "I guess Bill stole the money" (Searle, 1986: 5).

> 5. *Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance.* If the general asks the private to clean up the room, that is in all likelihood a command or an order. If the private asks the general to clean up the room, that is likely to be a suggestion or proposal or request but not an order or command (Searle, 1986: 5).

> 8. *Differences in propositional content that are determined by illocutionary force indicating devices.* The differences, for example, between a report and a prediction involve the fact that a prediction must be about the future whereas a report can be about the past or present (Searle, 1986: 6).

> 10. *Differences between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance and those that do not* (Searle, 1986: 7).

For some acts there are necessary conditions which are also stated by Austin. The right person at the right time at the right place should do the right things with the utterance of the right words for that act to be performed. For example, in wedding ceremonies, in excommunicating, christening, sentencing declaring war etc., the speaker must have a position in an extra-linguisitic institution. Searle warns us to distingusih this from feature 5. If an armed robber orders the others to raise their hands but not request it is because of his possession of a gun, not an institutional status.

11. *Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verbs has a performative use and those where it does not.* …e.g. "state", "promise", "order", "conclude". But one cannot perform acts of, e.g., boasting or threatening, by saying "I hereby boast", or "I hereby threaten" (Searle, 1986: 7).

1.3.1. Criticism on Austin's Speech Acts

Austin has 5 types of speech acts:

1. **Verdictives**: They are assesments and judgements. e.g.: hold, calculate, describe, analyze, estimate, date, rank, assess, characterize.

2. **Exercitives:** They give a decision against or in favor of a certain course of action e.g.: order, command, direct, plead, beg, recommend, entreat, appoint, dismiss, nominate, veto, announce, warn, proclaim and give.

3. **Commissives:** They commit the speaker to do a certain act: e.g: promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, embrace, swear.

4. **Expositives** *are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments and the clarifying of usages and references* (Searle, 1986: 9). e.g.: affirm, deny, emphasize, illustrate, answer, report, accept, object to, concede, describe, class, call, identify.

5. **Behabitives** include reaction to one's behaviour, or mistake. e.g.: apologize, thank, commiserate, congratulate, felicitate, welcome, applaud, criticize, bless, curse, dare, defy, protest, challenge.

Searle criticizes Austin in that classification as for him it is a classification of illocutionary verbs. But the case is that not all the verbs listed are illocutionary. "Intend", for example, is not a performative. One cannot intend by saying "I intend". There is an act of expressing an intention. Another criticism is about the lack of a theorotical basis for the classification. Therefore, in taxonomy there is a lot of overlap from one category to another. For example, the verb "describe" is given both as a verdictive and an expositive. According to Searle there are also different kinds of verbs

in one category and many of the verbs listed in the categories do not satisfy the definitions given for that category. So he gives his alternative taxonomy with a theorotical base on the illocutionary point, its direction of fit, the psychological state of the speaker and the content of the act (which is about the restrictions). *One cannot predict or promise things that have already happened, and your promise or threat is defined according to the event's being beneficial or harmful for the adressee* (Saeed, 2003: 229). Searle symbolizes these five categories using the criteria which are basic in the taxonomy.

In *assertives*, we tell people how things are. So we are committed *to the truth of the expressed proposition*. It is symbolized as follows:

$\vdash \downarrow B\ (p).$

This means the direction of fit is words-to-world, and the psychological state expressed is Belief (that p) which can be true or false (1986: 14). With *directives,* one attempts to get the hearer to do something. The symbolism is as follows:

$!\ \uparrow W\ (H \text{ does } A)$

The direction of fit here is from world-to-words, the sincerity condition is want (wish or desire) and the propositional content is *that the hearer H does some future action A.* Searle also gives the verbs ask, order, command, request, beg, pray, entreat, invite, permit, dare, defy, challenge and advise as examples. Questions are also in this class as *they are attempts by S to get H to answer* (1986: 14). By performing an act of *commissive* one commits oneself to do a certain act.

$C \uparrow I\ (S \text{ does } A)$

The direction of fit is world-to-word and the sincerity condition is Intention. The propositional content is that the speaker S does some future action A (1986: 14). In

expressives, we express our *psychological states specified in the sincerity conditon.* There is no direction of fit here. Searle claims that *a gerundive nominalization transformation* or a nominal is used instead of *that* clauses in expressives. He proves this claim as he states the fact that

> One cannot say:
> *I apologize that I stepped on your toe;
> Rather the correct English is,
> I apologize for stepping on your toe.
> Similarly, one cannot have:
> *I congratulate you that you won the race
> nor
> *I thank you that you paid me the money.
> One must have:
> I congratulate you on winning the race (congratulations on winning the race)
> I thank you for paying me the money (thanks for paying me the money) (1986: 15).

Searle symbolizes this act as:

$$E \ Ø \ (P) \ (S/H + \text{property})$$

E here indicates the illocutionary point of an expressive, and Ø is the symbol of having no direction of fit, *P is a variable ranging over the different possible psychological states expressed in the performance of the illocutionary acts in this class, and the propositional content ascribes some property to either S or H.* (Searle, 1986: 16)

Declarations bring about some change in the status or condition of the objects by the successful performance of utterance. Such as "I resign", "You are fired", "I excommunicate you", "I appoint you chairman" etc. The performance of a declaration brings about a fit by its successful performance. Declarations also require "*extra-linguistic institution, a system of constitutive rules in addition to the constitutive rules of language, in order that the declaration may be successfully performed.*" These extra

linguistic institutions are the *church, the law, private property, the state,* and a special place the speaker or the hearer have in these institutions. The structure is:

$$D \updownarrow \emptyset\ (p)$$

D indicates the declarational illocutionary point, *the direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to-words,* there is no sincerity condition and the usual propositional variable is "*p*" (Searle, 1986: 19).

Searle also realizes that some declarations are content with the class of assertives and gives the condition where a referee uttering *You are out* or the judge saying *You are guilty.* Here they seem to have the direction in words-to-world but the reality is no matter what the case is, the moment the judge says *You are guilty* you become guilty, and whatever the case is, if the referee says *You are out*, you have to leave the field. They are assertive claims with the force of declarations. The symbolization for assertive declarations is:

$$D \underset{\raisebox{2pt}{$\underline{\ }$}}{{}^{\mathrm{a}}}\downarrow \updownarrow B\ (p)$$

D ª indicates the assertive with a force of declaration, the first arrow indicates the assertive direction of fit, the second indicates the declarational direction of fit, the sincerity condition is belief and the "*p*" represents the propositional content (Searle, 1986: 20).

1.3.2 Syntactical Aspects of the Classification

According to Searle (1986) all performative sentences have a performative in the main clause, and a subordinate clause. Thus the sentence *I predict John will hit Bill.* has the deep structure as follows:

```
                          S
                      ╱       ╲
                   NP           VP
                  ╱            ╱    ╲
                 N           V        NP
                 │           │         │
                 I         predict      S
                                     ╱     ╲
                                  NP         VP
                                 ╱         ╱  │  ╲
                                N        Aux  V   NP
                                │         │   │    │
                                │         │   │    N
                                │         │   │    │
                              John      will hit  Bill
```

The tree diagram (Searle, 1986: 21) makes it clear that the subordinate clause is connected to the main clause. But this diagram does not satisfy Searle in his theory and he gives syntactic rules as another base for his classification. The paranthesis marks the optional elements or the elements that are obligatory only for a restricted class of verbs. If there is a choice needed then it is shown with a stroke, e.g. I/you.

Assertives have the deep structure as *I verb (that) + S* such *as I state that he is running* or *I predict he will come*. Directives have *you* as the subject of the subordinate clause as the structure is *I verb you + you Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)*. In the sentence *I order you to leave* the deep structure is *I order you + you will leave*. Commissives are

similar to directives but they have *I* as the subject of the subordinate clause. In the sentence *I promise to pay you the money* the deep structure is *I promise you + I will pay you the money*. Therefore, the structure can be symbolized as *I verb (you) + I Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)*. We may not have *you* as an indirect object as in the example *I pledge allegiance to the flag* has the deep structure of *I pledge + I will be allegiant to the flag*. In the case of expressives we see the gerundive nominalization as in the sentence *I thank you for coming* and Searle gives the underlying deep structure as *I verb you + I/you VP*. We cannot use that clause here; as there is no direction of fit but instead of a gerundive, we can use noun phrase as *I apologize for behaving badly = I apologize for my bad behaviour*. Searle gives more than one syntactical form for the declarations. One of them is *I verb NP¹ + NP¹ be predicate* as in the example *I find you guilty as charged* the deep structure is *I find you + you be guilty as charged*. The second form is given as *I declare + S* which can be seen in sentences like *I declare the meeting adjourned* and the deep structure is *I declare + the meeting be adjourned*. In this form the speaker *brings about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content by saying in effect*. The last form is *I verb (NP)* as it is the case in *I excommunicate you*. According to Searle, they have the meaning of declare in them as the sentence has the meaning of declaration. It is also possible to give the deep structure as *I declare + your membership in the church is terminated*. (Searle, 1986: 21-27)

To Searle, assertive verbs as *diagnose, call, describe, class, classify*, and *identify* have the same structure as declarations. We do not say *I call him that he is a liar* using the *I verb (that) + S* structure for assertions. Instead, we say *I call him a liar* using the formula *I verb NP¹ + NP¹ be predicate* (Searle, 1986: 24).

Through Searle's explanations speech acts become clearer. It is true that one verb can be used for more than one act as "I insist that we go to the movies." is a directive whereas "I insist the answer is on page 52." is an assertive. He also considers the cases where a verb can take more than one syntax. The verbs *warn* and *advise* can be used both in assertive and directive syntax as in the examples:

I warn you to stay away from my wife.   (directive)
I advise you to leave. (directive)
I warn you that the bull is about to charge. (assertive)
Passengers are advised that the train will be late. (assertive) (Searle, 1986:
28).

1.3.3. Searle and Felicity Conditions

Austin names the enabling conditions for a performative as *felicitiy conditions*.
The name comes from the Latin root – *felix* or *happy*. If the felicity conditons are met,
the performative is called to be happy. In some conditions uttering the necessary words
is not sufficient for the act to be happy. For example, only certain people can declare
war or baptize people, to baptize somebody s/he shouldn't have been baptised
beforehand. In some cases sincerity of the speaker is important as in the case of
promising, and in some cases, external circumstances must also exist; to say *Can you
give me a lift?,* there must be an addressee who has a motor vehicle (Moore, 2001).

For Searle, Austin's notion of felicity conditions must be developed into a
classification of conditions that must hold for a successful speech act; so he
distinguishes between *preparatory, propositional, sincerity* and *essential* conditions for
an act. The conditions for the act of promising and questioning are given as:

Conditions for promising (Searle, 1969: 62ff)
[where *S* = speaker, *H* = hearer, *A* = the future action, *P* = the proposition
expressed in the speech act, *e* = the linguistic expression]
a. Preparatory 1: H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A and S
believes H would prefer S's doing A to not doing A.
b. Preparatory 2: It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the
normal course of events.
c. Propositional: In expressing that P, S predicates a future act A of S.
d. Sincerity: S intends to do A.
e. Essential: the utterance e counts as an undertaking to do A. (Saeed,
2003: 229)

Conditions for questioning(Searle, 1969: 66)
[where S = speaker, H = hearer, P = the proposition expressed in the speech act]

a.   Preparatory 1: S does not know the answer, i.e. for a yes/no question, does not know whether P is true or false; for an elicitative or WH-question, does not know the missing information.
b.   Preparatory 2: It is not obvious to both S and H that H wil provide the information at that time without being asked.
c.   Propositional: Any propositon or propositonal function.
d.   Sincerity: S wants this information.
e.   Essential: The act counts as an attempt to elicit this information from H. (Saeed, 2003: 229-230)

One should keep in mind that the conditions given above for questions do not refer to the rhetorical questions: the question of a teacher in the classroom, a lawyer in court etc. Conditions for a request are:

a.   Preparatory: H is able to perform A.
b.   Propositional: S predicates a future act A of H
c.   Sincerity: S wants H to do A.
d.   Essential: the act counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A (Searle, 1986: 44).

Taking all these conditions into consideration it can be said that the features of speaker and the hearer, the relationship between them, context and the shared info between the interlocutors are important. A similar illustration for the felicitiousness of the utterance of *Please shut the door* is given by the linguist Charles J. Fillmore:

1. The speaker and the addressee of this sentence are in some kind of relationship which allows the speaker to make requests of the addressee.
2. The addressee is in a position where he is capable of shutting the door.
3. There is some particular door which the speaker has in mind and which he has reason to assume the addressee can identify without any further descriptive aid on the speaker's part.
4. The door in question, is, at the time of utterance, open.
5. The speaker wants that door to become closed (Leech, 1981: 321).

To Leech, conditions 2, 3 and 4 are identifiable as presuppositions whereas 1 and 5 are illocutionary. And he gives the following conditions for a question to be felicitious:

a.   There is a piece of information (X) of which the questioner is ignorant.
b.   The questioner wants to know (X).
c.   The questioner believes that the addressee knows (X).
d.   The questioner is in a position to elicit (X) from the addressee (Leech, 1981: 322).

1.3.4. Direct and Indirect Speech Acts

There are 3 types of sentences on the syntactic level, and three corressponding types on semantic and pragmatic levels as given in the table below:

Syntactic level	declarative	interrogative	imperative
Semantic level	proposition	question	command
Pragmatic level	assertion	asking	impositive

If an utterance in the syntactic level means what is given in the semantic level and has the use given in the pragmatic level, it is easy to interpret the utterance. For example, an imperative is used for ordering, or requesting. Interrogatives are used for asking and getting information.

If there is not a vertical line in these levels it is called an indirect utterance. In other words, when the intended meaning is the same as its literal meaning it is a direct speech act. *The conventionally expected function is direct speech act, and extra actual function is termed the indirect speech act* (Saeed, 2003: 230). The examples below clarify the directness of Speech Act:

Are you going to see him?   Interrogative, guestion, asking = direct

Will you open the door?   Interrogative, question, imperative = indirect

Do you know that John is getting married next week? Interrogative, question, assertion = indirect

I want you to tell me a good reason for your behaviour. Declarative, proposition, asking / impositive = indirect

You must come to school on time. Declarative, proposition, impositive

Note that he is absent. Imperative, command, assertion

Could you close the door? Interrogative, question, request

I wonder if you would help me. Declarative, proposition, impositive

Have you got any idea what the time is? Interrogative, question, assertion / asking / assertion (meaning= it is late or tell me the time)

Why don't you come? Interrogative, question, impositive / asking

Illocutionary acts can either be direct or indirect depending on the meaning relations between levels. Explicit performatives are easy to define that is why they are all direct whereas implicit ones may be either direct or indirect:

I order you to lie down. $\implies$ Explicit- direct

Do it! $\implies$ Implicit- direct

You must do it. $\implies$ Implicit - indirect

Are you willing to help me? $\implies$ Implicit - direct

Will you help me? $\implies$ Implicit – indirect

Have you got a watch? $\implies$ Implicit - indirect

There is a fly in your soup⟹   Implicit - indirect

You must do it.   ⟹   Implicit - indirect

The problem is the question of how people recognize the indirect act. Hints, irony, metaphor and the indirect illocutionary acts are not easy to understand. In indirect illocutionaries the speaker says one thing and mean that but also mean something else. How can it be possible? Searle also mentions that:

> The problem is made more complicated by the fact that some sentences seem almost to be conventionally used as indirect requests. For a sentence like "Can you reach the salt?" or " I would appreciate it if you would get off my foot", it takes some ingenuity to imagine a situation in which their utterances would not be requests. … The hypothesis I wish to defend is simply this: In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. To be more specific, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts includes a theory of speech acts, certain general principles of cooperative conversation (some of which have been discussed by Grice (1975)), and mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences (Searle, 1986: 31-32).

Searle studies a case in which indirect speech act is observed.

1. Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight.
2. Student Y: I have to study for an exam (Searle, 1986: 33).

According to Searle, the utterance of 1 *constitutes a proposal* having *Let's* in its structure. The utterance of 2 in this context represents *a rejection of the proposal*. In fact the meaning of the sentence is just a statement about Y. Therefore, Searle says that in such a case there are two illocutionary acts. First is the making of such a statement

which is the secondary illocutionary act and the second is the primary illocutionary act in which it is a rejection (1986: 33).

The steps from the literal secondary illocution to primary indirect illocution starts with the fact that X made a proposal and Y made a statement. X assumes Y is cooperating in the conversation and must be relevant in his/her utterance. A relevant response is *acceptance, rejection or counterproposal,* but Y's utterance is none of these; therefore, s/he probably says more than s/he says. X knows that studying for an exam takes a long time (*background information). * So, s/he *probably cannot both go to the movies and study for the exam in one evening. The ability to perform the act*, which is *a preparatory condition on the acceptance of a proposal* does not exist and Y uttters a sentence which expresses a condition consequence of which is a rejection of a proposal. *Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is probably to reject the proposal*. The conclusion is not certain as Y can go on saying that *but lets go to the movies anyhow* or *but I'll do it when we get home from the movies.* (Searle, 1986: 35)

In indirect illocutionary acts politeness is given as the primary motivation by Searle. According to him, some sentences which have a relation to one or more of the felicity conditions for the successful performance are conventionally used in the performance of indirect directives which are also related to the face condition. He groups these sentences by the conditions they are related to.

First group of these indirect directives includes the sentences about *H's ability to perform A* which are the *preparatory condition*. He gives the examples such as: *Can you reach the salt?, You could be a little more quiet., You can go now., Are you able to reach the book on that shelf?* or *Have you got change for a dollar?* The second group is the *sentences concerning S's wish or want that H will do A*. They are related to the *sincerity condition*. Some of the sentences he gives as examples are *I would like you to go now., I would/ should be most grateful if you would/could help us out., I'd rather you didn't say that.* and *I wish you wouldn't do that.* The third group is about propositional content condition *H's doing A* is expressed in them: *Officers will henceforth wear ties at*

dinner., Would you kindly get off my foot?, Won't you stop making that noise soon?, Aren't you going to eat your cereal? The fourth group includes the sentences *concerning H's desire or willingness to do A.* The sentences like *Would you mind not making so much noise?* or *Would it be convenient for you to come on Tuesday?* are given in this group. The fifth group expresses *reasons for doing A.* Searle gives many examples for this group. Some of them are *You ought to be more polite to your mother., Why not stop here?* and *It would be better for you (for us all) if you would leave the room.* This group also includes some structures used for indirect requests in certain contexts like *You're standing on my foot., I can't see the movie screen while you have that hat on., How many times have I told you (must I tell you) not to eat with your fingers?.* And the last group he gives is the *sentences embedding one of these elements inside another;* or *embedding an explicit directive illocutionary verb inside one of these contexts* like *Would you mind if I asked you if you could post this letter for me?* or *Might I ask you to take your shoes off?* (Searle, 1986: 36-39).

Searle also points out that it is mostly possible to add "please" to a sentence used as a directive; for example, *I want you to stop, please* or *Can you please pass me the salt?.* Of course these indirect uses are not idioms like *kicking the bucket.* However, this does not mean that *they are not idiomatic. Nonidiomatic equivalents or synonyms* do *not have the same indirect illocutionary act potential.* In addition, it is not possible to use *Are you able to take it?* (though idiomatic) instead of *Can you take it?.* It is because of the fact that some certain forms are conventionally established as the standard idiomatic forms for indirect speech acts. These utterances both have the literal meaning and another meaning attached to it depending on the context, intention, intonation etc. You can use the sentence *Why not stay here?* to really elicit the reasons for not staying there. Therefore, both the primary illocutionary point of a directive (indirect) and the literal illocutionary act (direct) can be performed at the same time (Searle, 1986: 40-43).

So Searle makes a generalization that:

S can make an indirect request by either asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition concerning H' ability to do A obtains…. *S* can make an indirect directive by either asking whether or stating that the propositional content condition obtains. … by stating that the sincerity condition obtains… by either stating that or asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A (Searle, 1986: 45).

This case appeals not to all languages as in Czech translation of *Can you hand me that book?* is said to be odd when uttered in that languge. Searle also gives example sentences again to extend his analysis but this time for the indirect offer (commissive):

    I.   Sentences concerning the preparatory conditions:
    A. That *S* is able to perform the act:
        Can I help you?
         I can do that for you

         …
        Could I be of assistance?
      B.   that *H* wants *S* to perform the act:
        Would you like some help?
         …
        Would you rather I came on Tuesday?
    II. Sentences concerning the sincerity condition:
        I intend to do it for you.
        I plan on repairing it for you next week.
    III. Sentences concerning the propositional content condition:
        I will do it for you.
        I am going to give it to you next time you stop by.
        Shall I give you the money now?
    IV. Sentences concerning *S*'s wish or willingness to do *A*.
        I want to be of any help I can.
        I'd be willing to do it (if you want me to).
    V.   Sentences concerning (other) reasons for
        S's doing *A*:
        I think I had better leave you alone.
        Wouldn't it be better if I gave you some assistance?
        You need my help, Cynthia (Searle, 1986: 54-55).

To Alessandro Capone, speech acts have their effects because the thoughts have been publicly expressed by means of utterances which are socially noticeable events

which are bound to have certain conventional social consequences. He touches upon the effects of moods on the illocutionary forces and says that if there are linguistic distinctions there must be some semantic features and therefore they are related to illocutionary acts.

Capone gives the example of a game called 'hide-and-seek'. *In this game, one of the children counts up to (say) 20, with his/her eyes shut and the face facing the wall (or a tree)* or covered with his/her hands. After the count s/he has to *look for the other children.* When s/he *spots one of them, s/he has got to call out "I saw you"* and then they run *back to the place where the game started (wall or tree). The child who arrives there first wins* the game. The sentence uttered here cannot be a constative. The purpose of the utterance is to announce that the race *to the place (where the game started)* has started. It's like *Run!.* In another example he gives the teacher who notices a boy whispering the answers to his desk mate and says *I saw you.* It not only blames him but also warns him to stop whispering the answers. No matter what the teacher thinks about him in general, this sentence cannot be taken positively as a *compliment*. And thus the meaning is dependent on the context, and the *interactional sequence* determines the illocutionary force (Capone, 2004).

For Geis, the context determines the illocutionary force of a declarative sentence like *I'll be there* (Geis, 1995: 5). In his *Dynamic Speech Act Theory* he presents an alternative account of **Speech Act Theory**. The basic theses of his theory are:

> I. In uttering any sentence, a speaker necessarily performs a literal act which is conventionally associated with the type of sentence uttered.(direct act)
> II. Searlean primary speech acts (e.g., offering, promising, requesting, inviting, suggesting, etc.), which are, of course, the acts that have most interested pragmaticians and others, are social as opposed to linguistic in nature and therefore better viewed as communicative actions than as speech acts.
> III. The thesis that there exists or should exist a mapping from individual utterances to primary speech acts must be abandoned.

IV. What we do within any interaction (specifically, any communicative interaction) is constrained by the properties of the type of interaction in which we are engaged.
V. Searle's view of the structure of speech acts must be revised in several respects, including adding an interactional effect or goal, for doing so is central to understanding politeness phenomena in conversation (Geis, 1995: 9-10).

For Geis, speech acts are linguistic in nature and a helpful account of conversation can be given with the use of examples from interaction, not individual utterances. And he claims that the *properties of interactions and the contribution of utterances to the interactions in which they occur* are more important in the **Speech Act Theory** than *the actions we perform in that utterances* (1995: 10).

1.4. Face and Politeness

The basic motivation for indirect uses is the politeness. Indirect speech acts are commonly used to reject proposals and to make requests. For example a speaker asks, *Would you like to meet me for coffee?* and another replies, *I have class*. In this dialogue the second speaker uses an indirect speech act to reject the proposal. This is indirect because the literal meaning of *I have class* does not entail any sort of rejection. And the primary illocutionary act is captured getting through the steps we mentioned before.

Experiments by Clark and Schunk (1980) confirm

that the literal meaning of an indirect request is an important element in the perceived politeness of the act. Thus among indirect requests, May I ask you what time it is? is more polite than Won't you tell me what time it is? because the first sentence's literal meaning places the onus on speaker action, while the second places it on hearer action (Saeed, 2003: 234).

Negative questions may be used by Americans for requests:

(Ervin-Tripp 1976: 38):
[Motorist to gas station attendant]
You don't happen to have any change for the phone, do you?
Her study shows that the use of imperatives and *need* statements as directives is commoner from superiors to subordinates, e.g. (1976: 29):
[Doctor to nurse at hospital]
I'll need a 19 gauge needle, IV tubing, and a preptic swab. while questions with modals like *can, could, may* etc. as requests are commoner with superiors and non-familiars, e.g. (1976: 38)
[Salesman to clerk]
May I have change for a dollar? (Ervin-Tripp, 1976: 38 cited in Saeed, 2003: 234-235)

Modals are also common at school as a student asks the teacher "May I come in?" for permission. Getting the calculation right is important as while trying to be polite we may utter a less appropriate sentence and then it gets more difficult to maintain the social relations. As Ervin-Tripp remarks, *To address a familiar peer as a non-peer is to be cold and distancing* (1976: 63 cited in Saeed, 2003: 235).

The notion of face refers to a speaker's sense of linguistic and social identity. Any speech act may effect this sense, and becomes face threatening. For this reason, there are strategies for lessening the threat.

Positive politeness means being complimentary and gracious to the addressee (but if this is overdone, the speaker may alienate the other party). Negative politeness is found in ways of mitigating the imposition:
Hedging: Er, could you, er, perhaps, close the, um, window?
Pessimism: I don't suppose you could close the window, could you?
Indicating deference: Excuse me, sir, would you mind if I asked you to close the window?
Apologizing: I'm terribly sorry to put you out, but could you close the window?
Impersonalizing: The management requires all windows to be closed (Moore, 2001).

Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson (1978; 1987) have a model in which *politeness is defined as redressive action taken to counter-balance the disruptive effect*

of face threatening acts (FTAs). In that model, communication is taken as *potentially dangerous and antagonistic. The basic notion of their model is 'face'.* They define face as *the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself. In their framework, face consists of two related aspects.* One of them is negative face, or *the rights to territories, freedom of action and freedom from imposition* -wanting your actions not to be constrained or inhibited by others. In that, there is an individual desire to be autonomous, unimpeded by others. The other is positive face, *the positive consistent self-image that people have and want to be appreciated and approved of by at least some other people.* In other words it represents individual's desire to seem worthy and deserving of approval (Moore, 2001: 11).

People try to preserve both kinds of face, for themselves and the people they interact with. Brown and Levinson *argue that in human communication, either spoken or written, people tend to maintain one another's face continuously.*

> In everyday conversation, we adapt our conversation to different situations. Among friends we take liberties or say things that would seem discourteous among strangers. And we avoid over-formality with friends. In both situations we try to avoid making the hearer embarrassed or uncomfortable. Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) are acts that infringe on the hearers' need to maintain his/her self-esteem, and be respected (Moore, 2001: 11).

Threats to both face may cause the end of relations. Threats to negative face are orders, requests, suggestions and advice. Threats to positive face are disapproval, disagreements, accusations and interruptions. Speakers also can threaten their own positive face as in the case of apologies and confessions. Using apologies or indirect acts helps to avoid threatening the face. *Negative indirectness helps to diminish the threat of orders and requests* as *It is very hot in here* is politer than just saying *Open the window* which is bald on record having no dress to save face. The first is off-record as it avoids mentioning the goods or services requested and only drops a hint. *Positive indirectness weakens the threat provided by interruptions and disagreements etc.* For example, the

sentence *I am sorry but you're wrong* is better than simply saying *You're wrong* (Saeed, 2003: 236) .

Moore studies this face notion and gives the example:

> Suppose I see a crate of beer in my neighbour's house. Being thirsty, I might say:
> I want some beer.
> Is it OK for me to have a beer?
> I hope it's not too forward, but would it be possible for me to have a beer?
> I could really do with a beer in this heat (Moore, 2001: 11).

Brown and Levinson categorize "politeness behaviour" under four strategies, which correspond to the examples above: "bald on record", "negative politeness", "positive politeness", and "off-record-indirect strategy".

> The bald on-record strategy does nothing to minimize threats to the hearer's "face"
> The positive politeness strategy shows you recognize that your hearer has a desire to be respected. It also confirms that the relationship is friendly and expresses group reciprocity.
> The negative politeness strategy also recognizes the hearer's face. But it also recognizes that you are in some way imposing on them. Some other examples would be to say, "I don't want to bother you but..." or "I was wondering if..."
> Off-record indirect strategies take some of the pressure of you. You are trying to avoid the direct FTA of asking for a beer. Instead you would rather it be offered to you once your hearer sees that you want one (Moore, 2001: 12).

These conditions are of course not universal. What one needs is to learn which way of expression is appropriate in a certain condition and which is not.

Moore states that Brown and Levinson give detailed information on politeness strategies with example sentences. In the bald on-record strategy there is no struggle to be polite as in the examples like *HELP!!, Put your coat away.* and *Turn your headlights*

on! Positive politeness strategy shows one is trying to be friendly and respectful and the ideas of the other part are important for the speaker. Sentences like *You must be hungry, it's a long time since breakfast. How about some lunch?*; or diaologues such as *A: What is she, small? B: Yes, yes, she's small, smallish, um, not really small but certainly not very big.* or *So when are you coming to see us?* are in this category. Hedging opinion with exclamations like *well*, *errr*, or just hinting it in a sentence like *You really should sort of try harder* can also be included in this group. Negative politeness is the strategy of taking the hearer and the speaker on equal terms and signalling respect to hearer's face. Sentences like *You must forgive me but…, I just want to ask you if I could use your computer?* or the sentences impersonalizing the hearer like *We forgot to tell you that you needed to buy your plane ticket by yesterday* are examples for that category. Off-record sentences are indirect as there are hints, jokes or sarcasm in them. For example, *It's cold in here,* or *Yeah, he's a real rocket scientist* (2001: 12-13).

Simpson has a similar categorization for politeness strategies but he has two ways one is positive politeness and the other is negative politeness. The examples he gives are not much different from those given by Brown and Levinson. Simpson claims that compliments and using in-group markers such as *dear, -mate* also belong to positive politeness. For Simpson, pessimistic sentences like *I don't suppose you can give us a lift.* and indicating differences using *sir* or *madam* or downgrading oneself as seen in the sentence *I'm not so good at … can you help?* and apologizing are ways in negative politeness strategy (1997: 159-161).

The notion of politeness is studied by many linguists and the result is that the politeness strategies vary from culture to culture. So we cannot talk about a clear universal system. Different societies use different strategies for politeness and therefore the indirectness for politeness may be misunderstood in another language community. For example *Sifianou's (1992)* study shows *that the Greek politeness system is more oriented towards positive face strategies* whereas *the (British) English to negative face, leading to different expectations of what conversational politeness is* (Saeed, 2003: 237).

The politeness is necessary and the greater the threat to face, the greater the number of politeness strategies is, but as one can guess, the excessive use of the strategies makes the utterance odd.

1.5. Constitutive and Regulative Rules

Searle gives a distinction between what he calls *regulative* and *constitutive* rules. He claims that

> Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour. For example, the rules of polite table behaviour regulate eating, but eating exists independently of these rules. Some rules, on the other hand, do not merely regulate an antecedently existing activity called playing chess; they, as it were, create the possibility of or define that activity. The activity of playing chess is constituted by action in accordance with these rules. Chess has no existence apart from these rules. The institutions of marriage, money, and promising are like the institutions of baseball and chess in that they are systems of such constitutive rules or conventions (1969: 131).

An example Searle gives us is that *Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing(X) count as money(Y) in the United States(C)'* Here Y is the institutional status and X is a non-institutional item, and C is the context. There is a relation of constitution between X and Y. To impose the Y feature on X we need *collective acceptance* (Searle 1995, 28 cited in Hindriks, 2004: 3).

Smith gives the examples such as what we call *signaling to turn left*. He says:

> This is a product of those constitutive rules which bring it about that behaving inside moving vehicles in certain pre-determined ways and in certain pre-determined contexts *counts as* signaling to turn left. The action of lifting your finger in an auction house *counts as* making a bid. An utterance of the form 'I promise to mow the lawn' in English *counts as* putting oneself under a corresponding obligation. And as we see from

these cases, the Y term in a constitutive rule characteristically marks something that has consequences in the form of rewards, penalties, or actions one is obliged to perform in the future. The constitutive rules themselves rarely occur alone, so it may be that when applying the X counts as Y formula we have to take into account whole systems of such rules. Thus we may have to say: acting in accordance with all or a sufficiently large subset of these and those rules by individuals of these and those sorts *counts as* playing basketball (2003: 9).

For Searle, the main point of speech acts is the fact that people perform the *acts according to rules* when speaking a language. He claims that there is a relation between speech acts and constitutive rules. According to Searle, asserting something is *to express a belief* and this means that the content of the belief represents an actual state of affairs. In the same way, when we promise we express an intention to do that act in future (1969: 36-37 cited in Hindrinks, 2004: 4).

According to Smith, there are brute facts that exist independent of human institutions and there are also institutions we create. He states

Just as the moon did not come into existence with the coming into existence of the linguistic resources needed to name and describe it, so the fact that the earth is a certain distance from the sun did not become a fact because the linguistic resources needed to express this distance became available at a certain point in history. When you perform a speech act then you create certain institutional facts (you create what Reid referred to as a miniature 'civil society'). Institutional facts exist only because we are here to treat the world and each other in certain, very special (cognitive) ways within certain special (institutional) contexts. In his later writings Searle will speak of a contrast between: observer-independent features of the world, such as force, mass, and gravitational attraction, and observer-relative features of the world, which include in particular money, property, marriage and government. The latter are examples of institutions in Searle's sense, which means that they are systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional fact, for example the fact that John promised to mow the lawn, is thus 'underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of the form "X counts as Y in context C".' (1969: 51) (Smith, 2003: 11).

Smith mentions the yellow line of paint or string as a barrier for further explanation. The function of this line is attached to it by humans and the line does not have that function by itself. The status function does not always require collective acceptance as in the case of promise where the utterance is enough for the existence of the obligation to perform that act. However, sometimes rituals or ceremonies are needed as in the case of marriage (Smith, 2003: 20).

Smith explains the condition saying that in society

a certain X term begins at a certain point in time to fall under certain descriptions under which it did not fall before, and a Y term thereby emerges. The latter begins to exist because an X term, a part of physical reality, has acquired certain special sorts of status functions and therewith also certain special sorts of deontic powers (2003: 23).

In fact the X term is still the X term it was before being a Y term. But the way the entity is treated in given contexts and the descriptions of it change. To Smith *to say that X counts as Y is to say that X provides Y's physical realization because X is identical to Y* (2003: 24). Taking all these into account, we can say that there must be some physical reality to impose the institutional features and the brain is the basic physical reality for this.

Hindrinks criticizes Searle on the fact that "count as" formula has nothing to do with essential rules and thinks that there is no need for collective acceptance to turn the X of an essential rule into a Y. For him promising does not constitute obligation. It is a consequence of promising. To Hindrinks constitutive rules should be considered only in the analysis of declarative speech acts like marrying a couple or adjourning a meeting (2004: 6).

To Bach and Harnish, context and mutual belief between speakers are important in deciding which speech act is performed as they say

Suppose S says "I love you like my brother." There are various ways H could take this, depending on what he can infer S's intention to be under the circumstances, given what H believes about S and in particular what H believes S to believe H believes about S… normally H can assume that if S says "I love you like my brother," S means that he loves H as he (S) loves his own brother…. Or "I love you like my brother" might be uttered by one man to another where it is recognized that the speaker hates his brother. In this case H would no doubt take S as informing H that he hates him (1979: 5).

According to Timothy Williamson, the rule that is characteristic for assertion is *one must assert p only if one knows p.* He calls this the knowledge rule. He writes that *constitutive rules do not lay down necessary conditions for performing the constituted act.* Knowing *p* is not a necessary condition for asserting *p.* As he acknowledges, we often assert things we do not know (2000: 240-243 cited in Hindrinks, 2004: 18-19).

On Searle's view, regulative rules have the form or syntax "Do X" or "If Y do X" (1969: 34). They give the conditions in which an act is permitted. We can say that constitutive rules of Williamson are in fact regulative rules. The difference in Searle's rules is that constitutive rules cannot be broken where the regulative ones can.

To Hindrinks, constitutive rules are important in social life. He claims:

The combination of a status rule and a constitution rule is a constitutive rule on this proposal. I suggest calling such rules modified SCRs. Thus, the constitution rule forgetting married explicates what procedures are required for getting married in a particular context, whereas its status rule provides the set of rights and obligations that is definitive of that status. Similarly, the constitution rule for becoming a professor specifies the conditions that have to be met in order to be one, whereas its status rule provides a description of what that role involves. As a final example, the constitution rule for being a licensed driver makes clear what it takes to get this status, whereas its status rule states what it means in practical terms, i.e. that one is legally allowed to drive (2004: 23).
…
Consider signing a contract for a mortgage. Doing so, let us suppose, implies the obligation to pay a certain amount of money at a specified interval. This obligation figures in the status rule of signing such a

contract. Now, the obligation does not go away if one does not satisfy it, nor does the act of signing the contract lose its status because of it. This means that the status rule still applies. If one asks why, the answer is readily available: the constitution rule remains satisfied (2004: 25).

In conclusion, it is true that promising leads to an obligation to do as promised and declaring a couple to be married institutes a marriage. So we can say that the utterance of certain words or acts (X) count as a difference in the institutional or conventional status of a person or people as Y. The word and sentence meaning and the effects in commissives, directives and declaratives are conventional; but for a full analysis of the speech acts we need Searlean constitutive rules.

1.6. Bach on Speech Acts

Bach studies the speech acts in many aspects. He gives importance to the intentionality like Searle. He gives the example that *having arrived home without one's keys, one might push a button with the intention not just of pushing the button but of ringing a bell, arousing one's spouse and, ultimately, getting into one's house* and for him, it is similar to this condition that speech acts are not just acts of producing certain sounds. To give the importance of the intention he gives another example that the utterance *I will call a lawyer* could be used as a prediction, a promise, or a warning depending on the intention of the speaker. He states that the successful performance of an illocutionary act is a matter of intention (Bach, 2003).

In uttering *I apologize* one not only expresses regret but also seeks for forgiveness and it succeeds if the forgiveness is obtained. In the same way, a request expresses a desire and aims for the addressee to intend to and do it. And that gives the communicative function of language.

To Kent Bach and Michael Harnish, there are two types of speech acts in general: *the communicative illocutionary acts* and *the conventional illocutionary acts.*

They take conventions as *count-as* rules and the utterances that count as a special act are taken as examples of conventinal speech acts.

The communicative illocutionary acts divided into four types of speech acts. *Constatives* express the speaker's belief and his intention that the hearer has or forms a similar belief. The examples for these acts are accepting, advising, affirming, agreeing, announcing, answering, assuming, attributing, claiming, classifying, concluding, confessing, confirming, declaring, denying, disclosing, forecasting, guessing, identifiying, informing, insisting, judging, objecting, rejecting, reporting, stating, predicting, telling, etc. *Directives* express the speaker's attitude toward some prospective action by the hearer and his intention that his utterance should be taken as a reason for that action. Directives are advising, asking, begging, dismissing, excusing, forbidding, instructing, ordering, permitting, requesting, requiring, suggesting, urging, warning, etc. In *commissives* the speaker obligates him to do something as in agreeing, guaranteeing, inviting, offering, promising, swearing, volunteering. *Acknowledgments* express feelings regarding the hearer or the speaker's intention that his utterance satisfies a social expectation to express certain feelings such as accepting, apologizing, bidding, condoling, congratulating, greeting, thanking (1979: 40-55).

| Illocutionary act	Attitude expressed	*Intended hearer attitude*
Statement	Belief that p	*Belief that p*
Request	Desire for H to D	*Intention to D*
Promise	Firm intention to D	*Belief that S will D*
Apology	*Regret for D-ing*	*Forgiveness of S for D-ing*

The table above shows the criteria for the taxonomy for four communicative illocutionary acts. The conventional illocutionary acts are divided into two as *effectives* and *verdictives*. They are different from communicative ones as they are based on conventions. Effectives affect changes in institutional states of affairs and produce facts.

They achieve their effects only because they are mutually believed to do so such as banning, bidding, censuring, dubbing, enjoining, firing, indicting, moving, nominating, pardoning, penalizing, promoting, seconding, sentencing, suspending, vetoing, voting. Verdictives are judgements by convention and they are official in the context they occur such as acquitting, assessing, calling (by an umpire or referee), certifying, clearing, convicting, grading, judging, ranking, rating, ruling. They are determinations of fact, natural or institutional, with an official consequence (1979: 110-119).

Bach explains the effect of the effectives saying:

Whether or not the defendant actually committed the crime, the judge's determination that he did means that the justice system treats this as being the case. However, in performing the effective act sentencing him to a week in the country jail, the judge is not ascertaining that this is his sentence but is actually making it the case (2003).

According to the speech act model, there is a contaning framework from words to perlocutionary utterances. Therefore we have the model as

(taken from http://www.rdillman.com/HFCL/TUTOR/Relation/relate2.html)

1.7. Literal vs. Non-literal Speech Acts

In nonliteral uses of speech acts people mean something different from what their words mean. One may utter *I love the sound of your voice to tell someone nonliterally (ironically) that she cannot stand the sound of his voice and thereby indirectly asking him to stop singing.* Yet, the utterances like *You can stick that in your ear* or *My mind got derailed* are also nonliteral (Bach, 2003).

Being nonliteral is different from the expansion and completion processes. *I will be home later* does not mean some time in future but that night. The utterance of *You are not going to die* to a child who is crying because of a minor injury does not mean that he will never die, but he will not die from that injury; so what is meant is get by the expansion of what is said. In the utterances *Jack is ready* and *Jill is late* one needs to know what Jack is ready for or Jill is late to. The meaning of the utterances is possible to get *with the completion of what one says.* There is not indirectness nor being nonliteral in these cases (Bach, 2003).

According to Searle, the *direct use is literal* and *the indirect use is the non-literal use* (1975 cited in Saeed, 2003: 231). The primary illocutionary act is therefore non-literal and the secondary one is literal. In the case of indirectness, the direct meaning also can be taken into consideration but in the nonliteral one it cannot.

1.8. Speech Acts in Fictional Discourse

Speech Act Theory can be applied to many areas but, the basic field to study them is the literature where we see the use of language at first hand. Literature can be fictional as it is in the forms of novels, plays, poems, or stories and also it can be factual as in the newspapers, or history books. Fiction and literature are different concepts and as most literary works are fictional it is possible to confuse these two terms. There are works of literature which are not fictional and works of fiction which are not the examples of literature. We can take the Bible as literature but cannot take it as a fiction.

The problem arises from the fact that there is no trait or set of traits which all works of literature have in common and which constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a work of literature. Whether a work is literature or not is for the readers to decide and whether the work is fiction or not is for the author to decide.

In fictional and also in figurative speech semantic rules are altered or suspended in some way. A metaphor, for example, which is very common in fiction is also used in everyday language. Searle gives us the jargon saying that *metaphorical uses of* language is *nonliteral* and *fictional utterances are nonserious.* If the author of a novel says that it is snowy outside, it does not have to be the case in reality, therefore it is nonserious. If one says, while reading this paper, *I am reading a paper on Speech Acts*, it is literal and serious. If one says *Hegel is a dead horse on the philosophical market,* it is serious but nonliteral. If one says in the beginning of a story *Once upon a time, there was a great king living with his three beautiful daughters in a faraway country*, it is nonserious but literal (1986: 60).

Then we have the question of what the work of fiction is in **Speech Act Theory**. In novels or poems the writer naturally does not perform the illocutionary acts meant in their assertions but the illocutionary act of writing a novel, a poem, or a play with intentions behind or with no intention at all.

In real life the act of pretending aims to deceive, but in fiction the situation is different. The fiction cannot be a lie since the writer makes assertions the truth of which s/he is not committed, and s/he does not have any intention to decieve the readers. In dramatic texts, the playwright gives a kind of recipe how to perform the acts on stage and it is the actors and actresses on the stage who pretend to do the acts. But none of them has the intention of deception as Searle states that *in the terminology of Speech Acts, the illocutionary act is pretended, but the utterance act is real. In Austin's terminology, the author pretends to perform illocutionary acts by way of actually performing phonetic and phatic acts* (Searle, 1986: 68).

Writing a fictional work of art is in fact doing something with words and it has a meaning for both the writer and the reader. Although Austin says for an utterance to be felicitious *"I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem"* (1975: 9); he adds later that we *"must bear in mind the possibility of 'etiolation' as it occurs when we use speech in acting, fiction and poetry, quotation and recitation"* (1975: 92 cited Miller, 2001: 18). He is of course aware of the fact that the acts are used in fiction too; but most probably he wants to deal with the speech in everyday language only. But the problem is that the examples given become literature and especially the conditions given as an example for the infelicitious utterances are fictional in one sense. For example, no one attempts to marry a monkey or baptize an animal and this case makes the examples given by Austin fictional.

Austin says that *a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem or spoken in soliloquy.* And he adds that *language in such circumstances is in special ways— intelligibly—used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language* (1975 cited in Miller, 2001: 34-36).

To Miller, exclusion of parasites is not normal as even Austin uses them to say what he wants to say. There is no bull in the field when he utters the words or there is no cat on the mat etc. We use idioms, idiomatic usages and nonliteral utterances to express what we mean. The problem is which one is the base. Do we use language which is based on parasites which are jokes, citations, poems or parasites which are based on everyday language? Take romanticism for example, it is not certain whether we learn it from the novels and poems or we know it and then write about romanticism.

Jacques Derrida (1977) claims that there is the notion of "iterability" in which he means every mark (he uses mark for any sign, trace or word including gestures, mimics etc.) can be repeated and *function as a meaningful mark in new contexts that are cut off entirely from the original context.* The maker of the mark may be dead,

unconscious or unknown; but the mark still functions even if the intended recipient is dead (Miller, 2001: 78). Derrida also discusses this notion as the following:

> I repeat, therefore, since it can never be repeated too often: if one admits that writing (and the mark in general) *must be able* to function in the absence of the sender, the receiver,the context of production, etc., that implies that this power, this *being able*, this *possibility* is *always* inscribed, hence *necessarily* inscribed *as possibility* in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark (1977: 184 cited in Mulligan, 1991: 11).

To Derrida, when uttered in different contexts, the same utterance does not remain the same. It alters and gains different meanings. So it gives us the hint that one and the same utterance can have different meanings in different speech areas and at the same time the utterance has a certain meaning independent of the intention of the utterer. Any utterance in the absence of the sender has still a meaning including locutionary and illocutionary acts and also the readers may get different impressions of the text unaware of the utterer let alone the intentions of the utterer.

In a theatre the actors and actresses may change. They say the same utterance with the same directions in mind but every different actor or actress give a different feeling and watching the same play every single person get another message. So there is some reality in Derrida's argument which says we never say what we mean or mean what we say. Miller mentions that Paul de Man in a seminar at Yale comments that *a speech act makes something happen all right, but it is never what is intended or what is predicted beforehand*. One aims *at a bear and some innocent bird falls out of the sky* (2001: 144).

Miller states that *the center of Derrida's argument is the claim that "Je t'aime" is a performative.* First of all, the addressee really has no way to verify whether it is true or not. We have no access to the mind or heart of the utterer. The hearer has to take it as the case. The feelings and thoughts are only available to their owners. It may be a lie, a joke or the fact but we cannot know which. And to Derrida it creates the event it names.

This means you cannot love until you say you love. Whether the words or the feelings are important is not known. But the explanation is given by Derrida saying *Je t'aime is always true, deemed to be true, immediately true, and . . . , I tend to affect the other, to touch the other, literally or not, to give the other or to promise the other the love that I speak to him or her...* (Miller, 2001: 134-138).

For Derrida, love begins once it is declared. At least, it forms the belief and reciprocal love in the adressee. It is like the way one cannot promise till s/he says *I promise* or the fact that "*I know he is angry" is a declaration, not a statement* (Miller, 2001: 175). Miller mentions that for Derrida *a felicitious utterance of "Je t'aime" requires something more than words. It requires a breath, a gesture, a touch or the insuniation of a touch* (2001: 138). It makes sense of course, but the problem again is the way we take it. It is like taking the book *How to Do Things with Words* as constative or performative. If we take it as a constative, it is only a set of assertions with no indirect illocutionary act inside, however, if we take it as a performative, it has an illocutionary act of teaching a new idea which tries to change the way of thinking about language, which is a kind of offer in illocutionary acts.

1.9. Metaphor

The utterances like *Sally is a block of ice* or *Sam is a pig* are used metaphorically and no one takes them as uttered literally. Many times the meaning we intended is not clear in the utterances we use. This is the case with irony, metaphor and indirect speech acts. In all what we mean *is not identical with what the sentence means* but it is *dependent on what the sentence means*. Searle claims that *metaphorical meaning is always the speaker's utterance meaning* (Searle, 1986: 77).

In these meaning relations we take the utterance meaning rather than the meaning of the words, expression, and sentence. In order to understand a literal utterance knowledge of language (lexicon and syntax) is enough, but for the indirect,

ironical and metaphorical utterances, awareness of the conditions of the utterance (context-speech situation) and background assumptions shared with the speaker are also necessary.

In literal utterances the speaker meaning and the sentence meaning are the same. The sentence *it is getting hot here* can be uttered to say that it is getting hot in the place of utterance (literal utterance), but also as a request for the hearer to open a window (indirect speech act), to complain about the argument getting vituperative (metaphorical utterance), or to say that it is really cold (ironical utterance) (Searle, 1986: 81).

Searle paraphrases the following sentences as an example of the metaphorical usage:

(MET) Sally is a block of ice.
(PAR) Sally is an extremely unemotional and unresponsive person.
(MET) Richard is a gorilla.
(PAR) Richard is fierce, nasty, and prone to violance (1989: 82).

As seen in the examples some meaning is lost in the paraphrases and they are approximate meanings of metaphors so we cannot say that they are the same. To say that similarity and comparison is vital in metaphors is also false. Gorillas are known to be shy and sensitive creatures but when using the metaphor one does not think about the real gorillas and the similarity between Jack and them. It is only with the associations that we utter the sentence and get the meaning as it is uttered.

In the example about Sally being unemotional has nothing to do with block of ice. If we are trying to mean the feature of being unresponsive, we may also say *Sally is a table* but this utterance cannot give the meaning we intended. It is, in fact, related to the word "cold" which we use for people who are unemotional. Even though it is intended to be used metaphorically, the dictionary takes the meaning of cold as *not showing affection, kindness or emotion and not friendly* (CALD).

Temperature metaphors for emotional and personal traits are very common in English such as *heated argument, warm hug, a lukewarm friendship* etc. (Searle, 1986: 98). For example, when one says "You are my sun", we take the feature of the sun as being the source of life but not as giving heat and light or being a planet so far away from the Earth etc.

In poems the meaning is much more complex. Emily Dickinson writes

My Life had stood – a Loaded Gun -
In Corners – till a Day
The Owner passed –identified-
And carried Me away-

The paraphrase given by Searle is *My life was one of unrealized but readily realizable potential in mediocre surroundings until such time when my destined lover came recognized my potential, and took me away* (Searle, 1986: 82-83).

The paraphrase, of course, is easier to understand but most of the meaning is lost as the paraphrase in some way limits the possible meanings of the utterance. According to Searle, *a speaker utters a sentence of the form "S is P" and means metaphorically that "S is R".* (1986: 83) For Searle, *an analysis of metaphor must show how similarity and context play a role in metaphor different from their role in literal utterance* (1986: 93).

To understand an utterance, first the utterance which does not make sense in literal meaning should be taken into account and studied through illocutionary speech acts, opposite meaning (irony) or metaphorical meaning with the properties shared by the reference and the real object. When you say to someone who broke a very valuable vase "That's great", it is an ironical use. In a dinner table when you say "Can you pass the salt?" you do not ask about the ability of the hearer but something more asking about the preparatory condition on the act of request. When you say "Joe is sweet" you do not

mean the literal meaning of sweet which is about tasting nor the opposite of it; but use it to mean that he is kind, gentle and pleasant.

For these meaning relations Searle gives us the figure 1.1. in which **P** is sentence meaning, **R** is utterance meaning and **S** is object (Searle, 1986:115).

Literal Utterance: A speaker says *S* is *P* and means *S* is *P*. Thus the speaker places object s under the concept *P*, where *P=R*. Sentence meaning and utterance meaning coincide.

P,R

S

P = R

Metaphorical Utterance (simple) Speaker says *S* is *P*, but means metaphorically that *S* is *R*. Utterance meaning is arrrived at by going through literal sentence meaning.

R

P

S

$P \neq R$

Metaphorical Utterance (open ended) Speaker says S is P, but means metaphorically an indefinite range of meanings, S is R^1, S is R^2 etc. As in the simple case, metaphorical meaning is arrived at by going through literal meaning.

R^1 R^2 R^3 R^4

P

S

$P \neq R^1$ or R^2 or R^3 or R^4

Ironical Utterance Speaker means the opposite of what he says. Utterance meaning is arrived at by going through sentence meaning and then doubling back to the opposite of sentence meaning.

P

S

R

R = opposite of P

Dead Metaphor Original sentence meaning is bypassed and the sentence acquires a new literal meaning identical with the former metaphorical utterance meaning. This is a shift from the metaphorical utterance diagram above to the litaral utterance diagram.

Old P   New P, R

$R \neq$ old P

S   R = new P

Indirect Speech Act Speaker means what he says, but he means something more as well. Thus utterance meaning includes sentence meaning but extends beyond it.

P is included in R,

but $P \neq R$

P

R

S

Figure 1.1   (Searle, 1986:115)

CHAPTER II

THEATER OF ABSURD

2.1. Theater of Absurd

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      Theatre of Absurd begins in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The term was created by the critic Martin Esslin, who made it the title of a book on the subject in 1961. To him these plays show that life is inherently without meaning and one must find one's own meaning as illustrated in the work of Albert Camus' (1913-1960) *The Myth of Sisyphus.* In the book Camus talks about the 'out of harmony' with the universe dealing with the Sisyphus who was condemned to push a rock up a mountain peak every day only to have it roll back down to the valley every night. The story explains the idea that there is no philosophical justification for human's presence in universe and from this fact arises the awareness of the futility of human activity.

Theatre of Absurd was a reaction to the conservative society that emerged after World War Two. It is non-realistic, which means that the settings, characters and action do not resemble normal, everyday life. We are not certain about the time, place, and identity. It is realised mostly with its repetitive and nonsensical dialogue in dream-like moods. But in essence they have a meaning and the message is given through the utterances which are random and meaningless on the surface.

To French philosopher Albert Camus, in his *The Myth of Sisyphus*, written in 1942, the human situation is as basically meaningless and absurd. And there is no purpose in life and the human is troubled and threatened when he faces this truth. It is not answered why we are alive, why we have to die, why there is injustice and suffering.

Camus describes the situation of realisation and understanding in saying

"Rising, streetcar, four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm-this path is easily followed most of the time. But one day the "why" arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. ... ". "The workman of today works of everyday in his life at the same tasks, and his fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious." In another words, absurdity arises from moments when all the acts of life that flow mechanically stop, and when consciousness starts to wake up and move. This means that the non-sense of life has been opening in the only one incomprehensible feeling. "Beginning to think is beginning to be undermined." (1961 cited in http://samuel-beckett.net/Absurdity.htm)

Camus' Sisyphus is an absurd hero. Sisyphus is the best symbol for the real quality of an absurd life. He is absurd in his passion and suffering, trying to complete a work that can never be finished.

The Gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labour (Camus, 1961: 88 cited in http://samuel-beckett.net/Absurdity.htm).

These lines again show how it is difficult to live in the monotony of life with nothing changing from one day to the another. He tries to push it up the hill thousands of times. Finally, he reaches his aim but he sees the boulder rolling down back to a place from where he has to push it up a long way again. To Camus,

> It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests me. A face that toils so close to stones is already stone itself! I see that man going back down with a heavy yet measured step toward *the torment of which he will never know the end. That hour...is the hour of consciousness* (1961: 89 cited in http://samuel-beckett.net/Absurdity.htm).

The Second World War influenced the societies and the values lost their validity thus making life seemed meaningless. Living under the threat of nuclear annihilation was like waiting for death. The religious dimension of life began to disappear and as a reaction this new theatre emerged. In it, the aim was to shock the reader or the viewer and to get him out of the conventional life of everyday concerns and bring a different point of view into the mind.

Absurd Theatre dramatizes

> the idea that human life is absurd and lacks meaning. Influenced by existentialism, such works, in reality, hint at human responsibility in that absurdity, i.e. if life is absurd and meaningless it is so because humans fail to exercise their own reason and independence, to take charge of their own lives and create their own meanings. Instead, characters in absurdist works are often seen caught in meaningless routines and / or hopelessly expecting help from imaginary outside forces, putting their faith in empty beliefs and problematic traditions (adopted from http://fajardo-acosta.com/worldlit/glossary.htm).

Ionesco defines the absurd as *devoid of purpose. . . . Cut off from his religious, metaphysical, and transcendental roots, man is lost; all his actions become senseless, absurd, useless* (cited in Esslin, 1961: xix). In the American heritage dictionaries,

Absurd Theatre is defined as *a form of drama that emphasizes the absurdity of human existence by employing disjointed, repetitious, and meaningless dialogue, purposeless and confusing situations, and plots that lack realistic or logical development* (adopted from http://www.answers.com/topic/theatre-of-the-absurd). It is plotless, surreal and illogical.

Most people find **Theatre of Absurd** nonsense in the beginning; as it is not giving the message in ordinary ways the people are accustomed to in plays; it has a different reasoning and invites us to think about the meaning behind words as the words are not enough to get the idea in these plays. Language is seen as a vehicle for meaningless exchanges in absurdism. Sentences are cliches and repeated over and over with no idea in them; therefore, language becomes an insufficient tool for communication and people cannot understand each other. By ridiculing these patterns, the playwrights make us aware of the possibility of going beyond everyday speech conventions to communicate better. The writers try to make us stand and think about our situation: what we are doing, in what ways and why.

In the **Theatre of Absurd** the main characteristics of the conventional Aristotelian model of drama—plot, characters, and dialogue—are either discarded or subverted. There is no plot to emphasize the futility of human existence. There is no motivation in characters, and they seem to spend their time waiting for something to happen while having meaningless exchanges of words. The dialogues are nonsensical. There is cause-effect chain in events and this makes events appear arbitrary and unpredictable. The plots seem to move in a circle, ending the same way it begins. The characters cannot communicate with each other and their language is ludicrous. There is no way to change the things. Nothing changes in the end as time is non-linear.

The objects and the acts are more important than the words in absurd theatre. The implied meaning, the primary acts are in fact the most important thing in them. We should consider what is meant or implied instead of what the words say. As having a

name makes us different from other beings and there are names in language; having no name and the loss of logical language are supposed to unite the people.

The underlying idea in **Absurd Theatre** is that every human being, as an individual, is responsible: responsible for his/her actions, responsible for who s/he is, responsible for the way s/he faces and deals with the world, responsible, ultimately, for every event in the world. It is, in other words, the philosophy of 'no excuses!'. One cannot blame God, or nature for anything.

In these plays, nothing happens to change one's existence. One always waits for more and for the death living with the fear of it. Then what would stop a man from suicide? Why do people think about it in times? What will be today? Will it be different from yesterday? The periodic consciousness depresses and empowers. And this is what makes life absurd. Nothing happens in these plays, all we see is a pattern of poetic images. The objects and visual experience are prior to language, as in **Speech Act Theory** more than what is said is important. The sentences, ideas and pictures must be apprehended in their totality as they gain meaning by interaction in context.

The important absurdist playwrights are Samuel Beckett, Arthur Adamov, Eugene Ionesco and Edward Albee. Jean Genet, Harold Pinter Fernando Arrabal, Jean Tardieu, Harold Pinter, Tom Stoppard, Gunter Grass, Peter Weiss, Israel Horovitz, and Sam Shepard and Vaclav Havel also write in this genre.

We have three different kinds reflecting three different points in absurdism:

Ionesco's *La Cantatrice Chauve* (written 1948, produced 1950), Beckett's *En attendant Godot* (written 1947-9, produced 1953), and Adamov's *La Parodie* (his third play, produced 1952). These plays express significantly different world-views. Beckett emphasizes the meaninglessness of existence. Ionesco highlights non-communication and the uncomfortable contingency of the material world. Adamov communicates a tormented sense of multilation and separation (adopted from http://www.answers.com/topic/theatre-of-the-absurd).

Absurdist writers are said to be influenced by the philosophy of existentialism. In this philosophy it is believed that our existence as human beings has no purpose. All that we can know in life is that we will die. When people realise that fact, they suffer terrible anguish and then behave in a variety of ways in order to shield themselves from this knowledge. We create busy lives and fill it up with important jobs. We form complex systems of laws, rules and regulations to feel that we have control of our destinies. We do things in the same way; for example, we always sit in the same seats in class. We also develop institutions of family and society, and create myths and stories to explain the world and we need a superior power to belive and sometimes to put the blame upon.

To existentialists, one needs to live in a way that nothing should be taken of their freedom. We are free but at the same time responsible for our actions and if we harm others, we must carry guilt.

2.1.1. Features of Absurd Theatre

In the **Absurd Theatre**;

- ❖ characters do not have names, jobs or backgrounds
- ❖ characters enter and exit with no purpose
- ❖ characters behave in illogical ways and they are unmotivated
- ❖ characters cannot control the things that happen to them
- ❖ characters' behaviour changes (at the end of the play they may behave the opposite of how they behaved at the beginning)
- ❖ justice is not always proved, and happy endings do not always come to those who deserve them
- ❖ settings are non-realistic, and could be anywhere
- ❖ action is minimal and illogical
- ❖ dialogues and actions are confusing and circular repeated over and over

❖ sound effects does not match the action.

❖ the plays start at an arbitrary point and seem to end just as arbitrarily

❖ the meaning is mostly left uncovered.

❖ There are unexplained pauses in the action

❖ elements of circus clowning that highlight the silliness of a situation.

❖ the events do not ocur logically as in the dreams, they are only associated within themselves.

These features of this genre may seem far away from the **Speech Act Theory**, but the relation becomes clear when an intense study is carried out.

The important thing in these plays is the answer to the question of what we seek. If we know that it is easy to live and communicate; but if not, it gets absurd. If we lose the communication skills, life becomes threatening. Some people only talk about weather and that in some way shows that they are not in fact exchanging ideas or really communicating, they only hide the truth that they do not want to share anything at all and just want to keep in touch or maintain the social relations.

There is also ambiguity in **Absurd Theatre.** For example; Ionesco's *Amédée, or How to Get Rid of* It (1954) is about a middle-aged couple who have not left their flat for years. The wife operates some sort of telephone switchboard and the husband writes a play. In their bedroom there is a corpse which has been there for many years. It may be a thief or a lover whom the husband killed when he found his wife and him together, or a stray visitor. The identity of the corpse is never certain in the play. And the fact that the corpse grows larger and larger like in a dream and even his foot comes in to the living room may show the effect of one's mistakes in the past on the present or the waning of love by the time. There is a poetic image like in a dream and the ideas are not given directly.

Another important thing is the difference between appearance and the reality. The words and utterances may be much more different than the words themselves,

likewise **Theatre of Absurd** says and implies more than it seems to tell. One may say that the plays are completely nonsense and have no message across. But from another point of view, they say more than a play says since they are not limited in their interpretations.

Absurdity is a struggle in its essence. According to Camus, to commit suicide means to agree with absurdity because the sense of life is seeked in another world. We have to disagree with it to survive or agree with it and give up living. To Eva Navratilova,

> It seems that it is impossible to escape from the absurd fate, to stay here means to face it, to commit suicide means to consent to it, and therefore it must be accepted. That is the basis of human freedom. Absurdity does not have any sense, does not have any reasons, any aims, that is why it does not reflect yesterday, nor tomorrow (adopted from http://www.samuel-beckett.net/Absurdity.htm).

2.2. Speech Acts in Absurd Theatre

In the first chapter the basic terms in the theory were covered. At the beginning of this chapter the basic characteristics of **Absurd Theatre** were mentioned, and now the **Speech Act Theory** is going to be studied in literary texts. In other words, the dialogues from **Theatre of Absurd** in terms of speech acts are going to be dealt with.

As stated before; the important thing in this genre is that all absurdist plays contains ideas on how the individual feels when confronted with the human condition. Experience is vital to feel strong at the time of this confrontation. Likewise, one should know that the experience in a language is much more important to be able to communicate in that means of communication.

The dialogues in absurd plays are *productive tools for foregrounding the routine and commonplace in verbal interaction.* The written language is different from the spoken language. Spoken language mostly includes *dysfluencies, non-sequiturs, false*

starts and hesitations. This does not mean that there is no rule in speech. We have expectations in spoken language as one utterance is supposed to bring another utterance in relation to itself such as *questions evince answers, requests anticipate reactions, and comments require some acknowledgement from other interactants*. Conversation is structured and complex. When the structure collapses there occur *communicative breakdowns* (Simpson, 1997: 130-131). Misinterpretations cause this breakdown as in the example:

A: Are you hungry?

B: No, of course not. Why should I?

A: What?

B: What?

This conversation fails as there is a misunderstanding of A's question. B takes it as "Are you angry?" and tries to elicit the reason why A has said so. Not getting what B understood, A asks what he means and B does the same in surprise. The response to the first question is not coherent, therefore the communication fails.

There is exchange of ideas, needs, feelings etc. in communication. There is an act in all our sayings. There is a reason behind all utterances. Exchange necessiates two parties. The parties may be singer and the audience, teacher and the students, two friends or the writer and the readers of his papers. The utterances with the acts performed can give us clues about the two parties as in the example given by Simpson

    *A:Hi! How is it going?
     B: Oh, not so bad, and yourself?
   **A: Right now, have the bowels been working OK?
     B: Mmm . . . yeah . . .
 ***A: Come on now, eat up your Crunchy Nut Cornfalkes.
     B: No want it! No want it! (1997: 132)

The first dialogue is most probably an introduction to a conversation and the *second is from a doctor-patient encounter*. But there is also the possibility that it may occur between two close friends and one is going to the WC so often that the other teases him saying this. The last one is again supposed to be between *an adult and a toddler*. Of course these assumptions are not the only possible conditions. The situations and parties may vary; but mostly, we encounter these utterances in the situations mentioned above.

When we change the responses to these utterances, they sound weird as shown below:

     *A:Hi! How is it going?
      B: No want it! No want it!
     **A: Right now, have the bowels been working OK?
      B: Oh, not so bad, and yourself?
   ***A: Come on now, eat up your Crunchy Nut Cornfalkes.
      B: Mmm . . . yeah . . . (Simpson, 1997: 133).

According to Simpson (1997: 135), there are familiar pairings such as *question-answer* or *statement-acknowledgment*. However; there are also exchanges encompassing non-verbal behaviour as it is the case in request-reaction pairing. We can say *Open the window* which is a direct request and we can make the addressee do the action; but it may insult the addressee so it is better to be more polite by saying *Could you open the window, please?*. This sentence also includes the necessary items such as 'open' and 'window'; but it is less direct than the first one. One can even utter "It is hot here." which is more oblique than the other two. It is the setting of the interaction that gives hints on which form is best to the point.

Another example given by Simpson is an actual exchange between two speakers:

     A: er . . . you have to go to head office . . . please
     B: [nods rises to go] (1997: 136)

Here the particles like 'er. . .' and 'please' give hesitation and *mitigate the overall force of the request function*. The 'have to' phrase gives the meaning that the obligation is free from the speaker (1997: 136).

To show the relation between context and the utterances, Simpson gives three possible scenarios for an utterance. The scenarios are:

> Setting 1
> A chance encounter between two middle-aged strangers at a bench in a public park.
> Setting 2
> An eight-year-old child in conversation with her father's adult friend whom he has met for the first time.
> Setting 3
> A doctor engaged in a diagnosis of a patient illness (1997: 138).

Afterwards, assigning the utterance below to one of the given settings is required. The utterance is *I've been to the zoo. I said, I've been to the zoo. MISTER, I'VE BEEN TO THE ZOO!* (1997: 138).

The best setting seems to be the second one for this utterance; but in fact, it is an extract taken from the play *The Zoo Story* and the setting is the first one. After this example, we cannot say that setting cannot be guessed or known from the utterances. It can be known; but the problem here is that the utterance used here is not the usual introductory utterances in a conversation between two people not knowing each other. This is why the **Absurd Theatre** is the best to study the dialogues and **Speech Act Theory** as there are no routines but unusual cases which urge us to think on the theory more. Of course the mood and intonation also change the act of the speech. To Simpson, *we do not even need a recognizable mood at all to get things done in language.* (1997: 142) There is no verb in the sentence *The door, please* however the request function is not hard to get.

The functions of language are different in different contexts. For example, in a teacher-student interaction the teacher asks a question which s/he knows. In real speech conditions one does not ask a question the answer to which is known. It may even be a bit sarcastic or ironical in some cases such as the question: *Do I look like a monster?.*

In the **Absurd Theatre**, dialogues help us to get what is right and what is wrong with the conversation and the reasons for the problems in exchanges. One may say that it is not the same as the real communication as it is more complex having more than one layer as there is a communication between the characters; but also between the playwright and the reader or the audience. And because of this complexity, many writers write on these plays to get the message intended or to make the meaning satisfactory for the reader or the audience.

The dialogues and the messages behind the utterances are not difficult to understand in **Theatre of Absurd**. Looking from a perspective searching for the right or most probable meanings intended or implied is necessary. In the play *Waiting for Godot* Pozzo says *Godin ... Godet ... Godot ... anyhow you see who I mean* (24). Looking at the meanings of the words, in other words locutionary act, it is an affirmative sentence with a proposition. But the illocutionary act is to let the addressee understand the person who is being talked about. In addition, the implication that names are not important but the references proves the fact that language and names are not enough for the references in mind.

In the play *Waiting for Godot* nothing really happens and emptiness is omnipresent. Some sentences are repeated over and over to emphasize the emptiness of their speech. The play is based on the utterances about the fact that they cannot go as they are waiting for Godot. The title of the play is stated during the play as Estragon forgets what they are doing (WG 10, 31, 44, 45, 50).

Malekin and Yarrow point out that in the emptiness of meaning waiting is

the ever-repeated moment which precedes beginning. The moment in which beginning is possible; the moment, as at the beginning of the play, when performers and spectators are most awake to the newness of it all. Godot hauls its participants back again and again to this launching-place, from which, as in life, everything always has to be improvised anew (139 cited in Haney, 2001: 3).

Another idea given about waiting is when Vladimir says *We are not saints, but we have kept our appointment. How many people can boast as much?* And Estragon replies *Billions* (WG 51).

These utterances show that everyone can live in the same or similar situations. The characters are not unique in that condition. The problem is with their mind and their way of thinking. They are not ignorant of the sameness of everyday and they wait for *Godot* who is even not known to exist or if so, again we do not know in what forms it does. It can be said that the word *Godot* refers to a dead dog with the reversed form *tod-dog.* It is also strange that the word *dog* is the reverse form of the word *God.* The song of Vladimir in the beginning of Act II, *And dug the dog a tomb* (WG 57), may refer to the death of God. In that case, Estragon and Vladimir are waiting for an impossible thing (Haney, 2001: 4).

Pozzo says: *"Godet...Godot...Godin...anyhow you see who I mean, who has your future in his hands..."* (WG 24) Godot is something the characters wait for but will never come in the way they expected, and that causes the vicious circle in absurdity. People all wait for something and Godot is a symbol for all of them which can be an event, a person, a thing or death. The characters are dependent on that being; but there is no sign of it and even they do not know its face or anything that belongs to it.

The characters in the play are all complementary with one side existing on the other person. They depend on each other and have to stay together. For example, no matter how sadistic Pozzo behaves Lucky is with him as his submissive slave. Pozzo is

rich and his values of grace and beauty are taught to him by Lucky. They are like body and mind in Descartes' dualism. Lucky which represents the mind is a slave of the body which is represented by Pozzo.

Another strange happening is the situation when Pozzo asks Lucky to think. (WG 28) At first, he dances; and later he starts to speak. Of course it is not a logical event for a slave to talk but the more interesting point is Pozzo's ordering it to think. Lucky talks but says the words not related to one another and with no relation between their functions to form a message. Can this be called thinking? There is another message here which states the utttering of words does not mean thinking in that way. Even a slave can utter correct words; but the important thing is the message, the intention and the communication between people. Thus, no difference can be seen between a slave talking illogically and the people who speak words one after another with no meaning.

The slave is called Lucky in the play as he is the only one who finds his Godot. The name sounds ironical first but in fact it is not. There is a paradox here that he is happy as he has nothing to think of and he wants nothing from life. He is not lost in the objectives and not waiting for his Godot to come and be with him. So he is shown to be luckier than the other characters in the play.

Another important concept in the play is time. It has no meaning since it does not change anything.

> Vladimir: Time has stopped (WG 24).

> Vladimir: And it's not over.
> Estragon: Apparently not.
> Vladimir: It's only beginning.
> Estragon: It's awful (WG 23).

Do those utterances really mean that the time does not flow? Of course they mean so when we take them literally. We have to take them as nonliteral here; because the idea behind it is the fact that if nothing changes as the time goes by, there is no

meaning or difference whether it stops or not. Not knowing the ideas lying behind **Theatre of Absurd**, one can find the utterances nonsensical. This case is similar in everyday conversations. One may not give any meaning to a dialogue that s/he overhears but the meaning comes when one knows the general point of view of the speakers or the characteristics of these people. Sometimes even these data cannot be enough to understand what is intended. The speakers may use a word as a code between them to refer to something they have talked about before; so it seems absurd to the others listening to them.

The time stops in the plays; for this reason, the characters have to wait endlessly. In the *Waiting for Godot, Endgame* and *Happy Days* they are all destined to wait. While Vladimir and Estragon are waiting for Godot to come; Hamm, as the main protagonist, his son Clov and his parents Nell and Nagg are waiting for the end of their suffering, in other words for the death; Winnie is waiting for the bell to ring and the "night" to come and even Peter in *The Zoo Story* is waiting for the end of the dialogue as he does not move even though he is disturbed.

The proof of life is another problem. The characters are isolated even from themselves. They cannot control their minds and words and even their existence. They even have to prove the existence to themselves in a way:

Estragon says *We always find something, eh Didi, to give us an impression we exist?* (WG 44) Do we need to do something to prove our existence? According to Descartes, the answer is yes. We exist on the condition that we think and it is the basic connection between subject and the object, which is a principle of dualism. According to him, *human being is composed of two different substances: body (res extensa) and mind (res cogitas)* (Collinson, 1997: 58 cited in http://www.samuel-beckett.net/CH_4.HTM). But what is the function of these words in a conversation? We see that the characters here do not think that there is the concept of time and they are suspicious of even their own existing. Consequently, they do something which is in fact nothing but waiting. They talk nonsensically to kill time. If they become silent, they get depressed. Thus,

they need to do something to talk to forget about the monotony of life which is the result of being between the birth and death.

Another strange event in the play WG is when the dialogue below is produced:

Vladimir: The tree, look at the tree. (Estragon looks at the tree.)
Estragon: Was it not there yesterday?
Vladimir: Yes, of course it was there. Do you not remember? We nearly hanged
ourselves from it. But you wouldn't. Do you not remember?
Estragon: You dreamt it.
Vladimir: Is it possible that you've forgotten already?
Estragon: That's the way I am. Either I forget immediately or I never forget.
Vladimir: And Pozzo and Lucky, have you forgotten them too?
Estragon: Pozzo and Lucky?
Vladimir: He's forgotten everything! (WG 39)

Although they were there the day before, Estragon cannot remember anything. Life seems like a dream for him. The question *Do you not remember?* is like an exclamation here. In fact, Vladimir does not want to ask whether he remembers or not; but more of that. He tries to show his surprise at Estragon's being ignorant of the events. It is sensed even when he chooses the negative form instead of the sentence *Do you remember?*. Again the answer *you dreamt it* is not an answer to a question if someone remembers or not. There is no "yes" or "no" as Estragon is aware that he does not remember a thing but Vladimir does. Both of them try to prove that the other is wrong. The following question is not asking, either. It is in the interrogative form; but there is no asking in function. It is an assertion indirectly that means it is not possible that he has forgotten. Forgetting is like an escape from the reality in a way. We can take the sentence about his forgetting immediately or never forgetting as literal and direct. But of course there may be other meanings attached or intended by the playwright like the message that forgetting is dependent on the importance of the event.

Estragon claims the fact that everything changes. Waiting makes them aware of the time that is passing and they experience the changes in life. The people are different each day and no one can be sure of that they are the same people. The trees change, the colours change even the boots which are hurting one day may fit the other day. The things that make you so happy may seem meaningless the other day and the things that seem unimportant may leads you into a kind of depression in another occasion.

Estragon cannot remember why they are there and asks again and again:

Estragon: …I'm tired! (Pause.) Let's go.
Vladimir: We can't.
Estragon: Why not?
Vladimir: We're waiting for Godot.
Estragon: Ah! (Pause. Despairing.) What'll we do, what'll we do!
Vladimir: There's nothing we can do.
Estragon: But I can't go on like this! (WG 44)

Vladimir remembers the past and has the concept of time unlike Estragon who complains about the situation and then forgets about his complaint. They are both in a nonsense dialogue since they have no idea of the meaning of life.

Another absurdity is the break between language and actions.

Estragon: Well, shall we go?
Vladimir: Yes, let's go. (They do not move.)(WG 35)

In the first utterance above, we see a question used indirectly for a request. It has the illocutionary act of request. It is used indirectly and therefore is not an order and it leaves the decision to the hearer. The negative face strategy is used here as the hearer's ideas are going to determine what to do. The hearer responds to the utterance both in direct and indirect ways. He says "yes" taking it as a question and also offers to go. The perlocutionary act is their leaving the place and going somewhere; but they do not move

as the language they use is not used in an ordinary dialogue. It is what makes the dialogue absurd that there is an abuse here because of the fact that they act against the essential condition of the act. They are unable to move anywhere as they are not successful in their diologue. It brings to our minds the fact that they are homeless strangers. They have nowhere to go and such an offer is impossible to perform. They only express their wish which is unattainable and this condition gives them a reason to live and wait.

Pozzo is different from them since he has a watch and he moves around unlike them. He comes and goes in times. Surprisingly, after he meets with Vladimir and Estragon he changes and even cannot think or speak sensibly without concentrating and he loses his watch, which symbolizes his losing the concept of time:

> Pozzo: What was it exactly you wanted to know?
> Vladimir: Why he-
> Pozzo: (Angrily.) Don't interrupt me! (Pause. Calmer.) If we all speak at once we'll never get anywhere. (Pause.) What was I saying? (Pause. Louder.) What was I saying? (WG 20)

Pausing and then speaking loudly is not normal and does not help to communicate. He asks a question but when Vladimir starts for an answer he takes it as an interruption. There is an order in speech and in the normal flow of it. Generally the answer follows the question but it is different here. There are two possibilities. Either Vladimir cannot understand the *primary speech acts* or Pozzo cannot utter the words for his real intention. They do not have a background, they do not know each other so there may be breaks in the conversation; but the attitude Pozzo performs is not one that is preferable.

Vladimir and Estragon has the death in their minds so often that they think it is the only escape from suffering.

Estragon: Let's hang ourselves immediately!
Vladimir: From a bough? (They go towards the tree.) I wouldn't trust it.
Estragon: We can always try.
Vladimir: Go ahead.
Estragon: After you.
Vladimir: No, no you first.
Estragon: Why me?
Vladimir: You're lighter than I am.
Estragon: Just so!
Vladimir: I don't understand.
Estragon: Use your intelligence, can't you? (Vladimir uses his intelligence.)
Vladimir: (Finally.) I remain in the dark.
Estragon: This is how it is. (He reflects.) The bough...the bough...(Angrily.) Use your head, can't you?
Vladimir: You're my only hope.
Estragon: (With effort.) Gogo light - bough not break - Gogo dead. Didi heavy - bough break - Didi alone. Whereas - (...)
Estragon: Don't let's do anything. It's safer. (WG 12)

They want to die immediately as they are aware of the fact that waiting for an impossible thing is not worthwhile. They are away from happiness. These words following each other randomly seem irrelavant. Vladimir changes the topic saying that he does not understand after uttering that Estragon should do it first giving his being lighter as a reason for this ordering. They are absurd and, in a way, comic in the discussion of such an important matter. When suggested to use his intelligence he falls in the dark as there is no hope for them, no chance for using intelligence in such a condition. They cannot use words effectively let alone their reasoning. The reader confronts the concept of duality here as head is suggested for use and Vladimir says Estragon is his only hope. The things seem to have become upside down here. Feelings are related to the mind not the head. Feeling is not something physical. Language is not physical, either. It is physically absorbed but the production and the interpretation of these voices or images or signs are in mind. If people do not have logic, it does not matter if they have a head or not.

Vladimir and Estragon are waiting for Godot during the play. If there is no change or no aim, it is worthless to wait or to go on living. They think about hanging themselves but it is their hope that attaches them to life and they give up the idea of suicide. If one of them dies, the other will be all alone in the absurdity of life. Likewise; if we cannot get our ideas through, we will be alone and nonsensical in our remarks.

In the play everything changes though they seem the same. The last words uttered in each act are the same but spoken by different characters. Estragon and Vladimir go on waiting and this waiting is a habit which prevents them from realizing the reality. Pozzo and Lucky also change. Pozzo is greedy for power and his being ignorant of the importance of the value of logic is given symbolically in his being blind in the second act. Lucky becomes dumb and cannot think any more as one needs to see the world to think and make comments.

The Zoo Story is a play which is mostly recognized and used for the study of dialogue. The play *is about how a man who is consumed with loneliness starts up a conversation with another man on a bench in Central Park and eventually forces him to participate in an act of violence.* There are both realistic and absurd elements in this work dealing with issues of *human isolation, loneliness, class differences*, social disparity, lack of communication between individuals and dehumanization in a commercial world. (adopted from http://www.enotes.com/zoo-story/) Albee focuses on the need for people to understand the differences between themselves and communicate to get a better point of view about the world.

The play has an ironical tone. Jerry has the problems in making contact with others and we see his suffering in that situation during the play. He says he is living in "the greatest city in the world. Amen." (ZS 37), which is ironical in fact as he is not satisfied with his life. In fact, what he calls for is the revival of love.

The first words uttered in the play are *I've been to the zoo. (Peter doesn't notice) I said, I've been to the zoo. MISTER , I'VE BEEN TO THE ZOO!* (ZS 12).

This utterance cannot be an assertion. People do not start a conversation like this. These kinds of sentences are mostly seen among children and show their need for recognition. Likewise, Jerry is in desparate need for communication as he is in complete loneliness. He also announces that *every once in a while I like to talk to somebody, really talk; like to get to know somebody, know all about him.* (ZS 17) He is eager to identify with someone, anyone really. But unfortunately he has trouble dealing with real life situations and struggles with social skills which is observed in his utterances changing from comic to serious or from noble to slang at times. He says *I had tried to love, and I had tried to kill, and both had been unsuccessful by themselves.* (ZS 34) and this is the confession of his failure in social life.

Jerry lives in a large apartment building where the tenants are all outcasts of one kind or another. There is no contact among the people, and Jerry characterizes it as a *humiliating excuse for a jail* (ZS 35). There are bars which cause their isolation and being non-communicative. The landlady in the apartment is given closely identified with the dog and it makes it possible for us to use the lady and the dog as interchangeable symbols. Both the dog and its mistress are hideous and seem to have sexual desire all the time. The dog is also said to make *sounds in his throat like a woman* (ZS 31) and the lady has eyes which *looked like the dog's eyes* (ZS 33). They both attack Jerry in the entrance which is a Freudian image about the relation between sexuality and violence. Jerry rejects their attempts to make contact. For him they are threats to himself as they will spoil his isolation which he has believed as the norm of human existence.

He offers the dog food to avoid contact and when this fails, he attempts to kill it. After this incident, the dog no more tries to make contact and becomes indifferent to him which is the same case in human relations. He recognizes that the dog's violence was in fact an act of love:

> We neither love nor hurt because we do not try to reach other… was the dog's attempt to bite me *not* an act of love? If we can so misunderstand, well then, why have we invented the word love in the first place? (ZS 36).

Jerry gets a vision from that event and goes out to find someone to pass his insight. This insight has the meaning that violence is a sign of love and if there is no love there will be no violence but ignorance. In the park, Jerry plays the role of the dog and Peter plays the role of Jerry in the rooming house. Peter is a middle-class American who lives in ignorance of the world outdoors. He responds to Jerry's intrusion by kindly condescension in the beginning (like Jerry gives the dog a hamburger), but then he becomes violent (like Jerry tries killing the dog).

Peter lives a responsible life and takes responsibility of his actions but only for the ones in his family or maybe at his work, too. He is a publishing executive. He has no dreams but rules in his mind. He thinks he will not have a son and agrees with that reality. He has a wife, kids, cats and parakeets but isolates himself from them every Sunday afternoon to read his book on his bench in the deserted part of the park in solitude. He wants to be alone completely without being bothered. He does his work and his responsibilities and the escape through reading is his reward. He is moderate in his life and does not need to contact with other people or animals. Like in a play of cards, he is playing with the hand he has without complaint.

Communication is an art which has to be learned and improved. People have to begin somewhere in their lives to communicate. Children talk to their babies, guns, cards, clouds or to themselves to practise the skill without being aware of why they do so. If an adult is making his/her contacts with something but not a person then there starts the problem of communication. A similar idea is represented in the words of Jerry:

> It's just that if you can't deal with people you have to make a start somewhere. WITH ANIMALS! … A person has to have some way of dealing with SOMETHING. If not with people … SOMETHING. With a bed, with a cockroach … with pornographic playing cards, with a strongbox…(ZS 34).

This case may be an attempt for communication; but at the same time may be an escape from real communication and reality of the world as it is the case for the people who live in a world of internet and games or who get insane and talk to themselves or objects, all of which seem to have no sense but in fact they have.

The first page of *The Zoo Story* seems like a dialogue between an adult and and a hyperactive child since Jerry talks as if he were a child. The sentences obviously differ in length. In dialogues, generally, the longer sentences belong to those who want to go on conversation and if a person wants to end it, s/he uses shorter ones. In the play, Peter tries to answer in minimal but gentle words while Jerry tries to control the conversation giving no chance to Peter. Jerry wants to talk whereas Peter is not content with the dialogue.

Entering someone else's space, especially if he is a stranger, necessiates politeness but Jerry is not aware of that social rule. He starts conversation like a child in need for help. He shouts as it is one of the ways how the children try to get attention. Another way they use is crying but it shows emotions. Jerry is on an experiment in his mind during the play so he cannot cry but shout to see the animal features in Peter.

The initial sentences in a dialogue, especially between two strangers, are about common objects such as weather conditions, greetings, time etc. The first sentence in the play is about Jerry. There may be two reasons behind this case. The first one is that he sees his deeds as the most important thing in the world and the second is that he finds himself so common and thinks that his experiences should have been known by anybody. Again, these two ways of thinking are observed in children. They see themselves as the center of the world and think that everybody knows the details about their life. In short, Jerry's behaviour is the same as a child's, which hints that he had the problems in his childhood.

It is not hard to say that Jerry is not successful at communication. He himself admits that fact too. However, the real problem is that he is not the only one who is

unsuccessful. Most people can easily say Jerry is rude, and it cannot be falsified but Peter is not very good at conversation, either. He cannot see why Jerry behaves so or maybe he does not care about him and for this reason finds it unnecessary to talk to him or listen to him. He is also a bit selfish as he begins to be interested in speech when Jerry starts to talk about his not having a son. He tries to defend himself saying"*Well . . . naturally, every man wants a son, but . . .*" (ZS 16) To Peter, his status is very important and no one should deal with his personal life. Thus, he forms bars around himself for protection.

Peter can think of having a son or daughter; but Jerry does not have such a chance as he even does not have a wife. He has no family. He most probably behaves like a child as he has never been treated like a child in affection beforehand. His need for communication is clear but the response is not a positive one in fact. Jerry irritates Peter so much that he even is commented on as an *unpredictable and consequently threatening interlocutor* by McCarthy (1987:45 cited in Simpson, 1997: 170).

The social distance which is ought to be maximum at the first meeting is not maintained in the play. The questions Jerry asks are about Peter's private life such as if he ever wanted to have a son instead of daughters, whether he will have any more children, and if it is because of his wife. He questions his psychology in a way. These are not suitable questions in their condition; but there is no way for him to take attention of Peter, either.

Jerry threats Peter's negative face too much. He uses bald, on-record strategy. There is no hedge or hesitation. Although clear and unambigious, his sentences are rude as he even says *Well, boy!* (ZS 13) at the beginning. Talking about prothesis and cancer is also not common between two strangers. This is not a suitable topic for getting close to each other. All these facts enlarge the interactive gulf between the two interlocutors and their communication becomes harder to achieve.

Peter, on the other hand, tries to be polite paying attention to face. He uses modals and hedging verbs like *well* (ZS 13), *I think, oh* (ZS 12), *I must say I don't.* (ZS 17) etc. Peter also tries to show his respect using *My dear fellow* (ZS 20) and *sir* (ZS 13) minimizing his own position and even apologizes for his not hearing his utterance. But he clings to his ideas desperately and does not want to share anything with a stranger. He shouts *I DON'T WANT TO HEAR ANY MORE* (ZS 37) and then stands up to leave. At that moment, he cannot sense the connection which Jerry tries to give between the zoo and the nature of contemporary life. Jerry uses the same strategy with the dog, which is violence. But that violence will not return to indifference, which has been the situation between the dog and Jerry. He provokes Peter into a fight for the bench which represents the privacy and property rights. He throws a knife at Peter's feet and Peter picks it up not to attack but to defend. With a rush Jerry impales himself on the knife. They lose their solitude in that action and Jerry takes this feature from him saying that Peter has been dispossessed. He cannot sit at that bench after this event. He will have a different point of view about communication and will not shout *leave me alone* any more.

Jerry tells Peter that *What I am going to tell you has something to do with how sometimes it's necessary to go a long distance out of the way in order to come back a short distance correctly* (ZS 30). And this is proved at the end of the play.

Although it is a short play, the insight to human condition here is one of the greatest. It draws a picture of human isolation and lack of communication in our contemporary life. Both the intellectual reasons for this alienation and the emotional reaction to this position are well depicted. Peter is both attracted and frightened by Jerry's desperate need to make contact. The conversation is sometimes comic sometimes serious, sometimes noble and sometimes wretched. The inconsistency in the conversation and the stories told by Jerry help him to reveal his real self.

Peter is unable to make a concious choice whether to stay and talk to him or stand up and walk away. He is disturbed by the questions of Jerry but does not go away. It is like the way we live. We live in the way we prefer and follow the routines until we

die and that end is inevitable. Knowing the end does not change the process much. If there is no belief in religion, people find themselves in the position of either of these characters. They have no spiritual comfort and this effects their life.

Jerry has the idea that God has abondened him like his parents and there is no point in connection with someone or something in his isolated world. The people in the rooming house are representatives of God for him and therefore he shows contempt for them saying:

> … WITH GOD WHO IS A COLORED QUEEN WHO WEARS A KIMONO AND PLUCKS HIS EYEBROWS, WHO IS A WOMAN WHO CRIES WITH DETERMINATION BEHIND HER CLOSED DOOR… with God who, I'm told, turned his back on the whole thing some time ago…with…some day, with people (ZS 35).

Jerry tries to make a connection with the dog and refers to it as his friend after his attempt to poison it. He tells Peter that he and the dog now *…regard each other with a mixture of sadness and suspicion, and then we feign indifference… we neither love nor hurt, because we do not try to reach each other* (ZS 35-36). In these words, we see his ideas about communication and his emotions with regard to community. Jerry thinks this is the way of his relationship to everyone. His life is futile and has no meaning. He does not commit suicide but forces Peter in a violent act and throws himself on his own knife. He takes choice from Peter as he thinks his choice has been taken from his hands long ago.

Jerry is happy in his dying and Peter removes the evidence that would tie him to this death. Peter can do nothing but say repeatedly, *Oh my God* (ZS 48). He has the chance to walk away but he does not. He listens, even when he believes that Jerry is a raving lunatic. He stays because although he seems to choose isolation, the human needs to communicate. Just before Jerry dies, he mimics Peter saying *Oh…my…God* (ZS 49).

Who is the hero? Do we want to be like Peter or Jerry? What if we are both at times? Peter is a man from middle-class, neat and well off, while Jerry is a dirty, dishevelled outcast and asking silly questions. But it is Jerry who tries to teach the realities of human existence and Peter is the one who ignores. Through their misinterpretations and lack of sense, Jerry tries to see whether middle class Americans are animals or not. He succeeds in getting Peter to put down his book and have a conversation with him. Jerry also learns about his life without Peter's awareness. In the play there is no action till the violent end. The actions are in the form of speech acts. They also see the reality that although they have different lives they have more in common than they think.

Albee has said that all his plays *confront being alive and how to behave with the awareness of death. Every one of my plays is an act of optimism, because I make the assumption that it is possible to communicate with other people* (adopted from http://www.insightamerica.org/zs-the%20show.html). He shows that language does indeed have the potential to *facilitate authentic communication* even between Jerry and Peter and that the communication is not as difficult as it seems.

It is evident that give-and-take is integral in true communication. The use of language works only for two, or more, individuals; one cannot communicate with himself. Peter tells Jerry *I don't mean to seem . . . ah . . . it's just that you don't really carry on a conversation; you just ask questions. and I'm . . . I'm normally . . . uh . . . reticent* (ZS 19). He also reveals his thoughts about the conversation saying *I'd rather not talk about these things* (ZS 26). He tries to stop Jerry talking private things in an indirect way. Jerry is so adamant and more than willing to put forth various issues, but for the successful communication his bench mate must also be willing to discuss them. Peter does not want to discuss certain things and perhaps he cannot. His world is too safe, too secure to be disturbed by unpleasantness. He cannot imagine life outside of his own. Jerry tells stories one probably does not want to listen- a weeping neighbour, empty picture frames, his relationship with a dog etc. The stories reflect contemporary modern life and noone can deny this reality.

Jerry is unable to communicate with anyone because no one wants to communicate with him. After Jerry's tirade Peter yells *I DON'T UNDERSTAND . . . . I DON'T WANT TO HEAR ANYMORE* (ZS 37). He has only listened to Jerry because Jerry *wanted to talk to somebody* in his opinion (ZS 42), not because he actually wants to talk or desires to know him. In the end, they two people reach a point where words have lost the potential for communication. Jerry asks Peter, *Don't you have any idea, not even the slightest, what other people need?* (ZS 45). Peter does not and Jerry does not, either. Jerry says *And now I've told you what you wanted to know, haven't I?* (ZS 48), but in fact he hasn't.

In the play Jerry acts out his own murder drifting and prompting an editor. And having a small cast makes it possible to dig deep into the characters. Our feelings, identities and way of thinking are shaped by our surroundings and this makes the communication between two people from different parts of the world difficult. The world is a zoo and the people in it are separated from each other by bars and in addition to this fact, they are separated from their own animal nature. Peter is separated from his own animal nature till the end of the play. Towards the end, he turns into an animal fighting for a park bench revealing the animal side in himself from a statue in the park just reading a book.

Peter and Jerry represent the modern society. People are either men hungry to the communication or men who want to read only without being disturbed. In fact we are all Jerry or Peter at times. There is a distinction between possession and communion. Like the bank in the Zoo Story, language is an example of communion and also becomes possession when one uses it. So the solution is to be aware of the communion facts and adopt the parts necessary for you without giving harm to communion.

Towards the end Peter asks, *Why did you tell me all of this?* Jerry responds quietly, *Why not?* (ZS 36). That is the main point in fact we ignore in social relations. The lack of communication brings even death or murder to the people. Language is just

as important as life since it is vital for survival. There is lack of contact and love in modern life and Jerry tries to change this on a personal level.

The first lines of the play can be analysed to show what is behind words to be able to express the idea that we mean more than words in an utterance. The first sentences are

> JERRY: I've been to the zoo. [PETER doesn't notice.] I said, I've been to the zoo. MISTER, I'VE BEEN TO THE ZOO! (ZS 12).

The sentences show Jerry's desire to talk to someone like a child. In fact he says "pay attention to me, talk to me, care for me". It seems like an assertion but in fact a declaration of a deed to gain attention so it is indirect.

> PETER: Hm? . . . What? . . . I'm sorry, were you talking to me? (ZS 12).

The sign of indifference is observed in these utterances. They seem like questions but they are not. There is the idea in the utterance that "what if you have been to the zoo". Does he really apologize? Of course not. He is not interested in the conversation. He is not sorry. Thus, it is not an expressive which makes the utterance indirect again.

> JERRY: I went to the zoo, and then I walked until I came here. Have I been walking north? (ZS 12).

He begins with some assertives which he knows that the addressee does not try to learn about. But the aim is to keep the conversation go on. He asks whether he has been walking North. He does not try to learn that; in fact he only wants to talk to him so

he needs a topic to get into a conversation and make it interesting for the other. So he means it indirectly again.

> PETER: [puzzled] North? Why . . I . . . I think so. Let me see. (ZS 12).

Peter tries to understand why he asks such a question. At this point he is expected to understand that the other wants to talk but unfortunately he cannot and begins to think about the directions. He answers Jerry's need without noticing. His utterance is again indirect here. *Let me see* is not an attempt for asking for permission. It is a commissive that he commits himself to think about the situation.

> JERRY: [pointing past the audience] Is that Fifth avenue?
> PETER: Why yes; yes, it is. (ZS 12).

Jerry asks a question trying to get an answer. It is the fifth sentence between them. Peter asserts that it is the fifth avenue. This may be the proof of Jerry's counting of sentences between them as a part of his experiment.

> JERRY: And what is that cross street there; that one, to the right?
> PETER: That? Oh, that's Seventy-fourth Street.
> JERRY: And the zoo is around Sixty-fifth Street; so, I've been walking north.
> PETER: [anxious to get back to his reading] Yes; it would seem so. (ZS 12).

Then they go on with assertions about the streets and directions. But they use so much utterance for just a little point, that is whether he has been walking north or not; but they do not use enough sentences to express themselves, and most probably if Jerry said directly " *I need someone to talk to, I am lonely.*" Peter would not be answering him as he has nothing to do with others' lives. It is in fact the message the playwright wants

to give us about what is wrong in communication among modern society. It is the assertion and the directive at the same time which is given indirectly.

In the play Peter and Jerry fail to communicate as they take all utterances directly. They do not think about the surrounding features. Taking words as they are and saying them for just the sake of saying something lead them to non-communication.

Having mentioned all the details, looking at the greater picture is needed. In *The Zoo Story* there are two different characters using two different acts in two different ways. Jerry seems to use utterances so directly and rudely but his real intention is different and therefore he speaks indirectly. The words he uses may not make sense but the way he says acts in fact. He thinks acts are more important than words and he is right on that. Peter seems polite and indirect but his way of speech is direct in fact. He is rude for not paying attention to a man who has nothing but just needs to defend a meaningless park bench. Peter is so adamant that he does not want to give it. Telling Peter to think about the other people that are homeless and unemployed may be forgotten in seconds but Jerry walks a long way to come a short distance right. He gives his ideas to Peter successfully and has his bank forever.

Peter and Jerry fail as they take their sentences at the locutionary level and cannot see the illocutionary acts and reasons giving rise to their conditions. By not getting the illocutionary acts, it becomes impossible to get the perlocutionary acts and they cannot treat one another in the way the other wants. The conversation chain is broken again and again and all the time they have to get it from the beginning. Jerry initiates the topics and Peter responds or ignores from time to time. Jerry changes the topic to find a suitable one but none of the topics remain satisfied as there is always ignorance or simplification on the part of Peter.

CHAPTER III

APPLICATION OF SPEECH ACTS ON EXTRACTS
FROM WG AND ZS

3.1. Activities to Apply Speech Acts in ELT Classes

This chapter is separated for the application in which some terms in the **Speech Act Theory** are asked to be explained using the samples given from the **Theatre of Absurd.** WG and ZS are analyzed through the theory in the previous chapter to make the meaning clearer. This time the extracts are used for understanding the theory and the basic terms in it better.

The dialogues that are given in the questions are taken randomly. The questions are selected to be exemplifiying the terms in the Speech Act Theory. The only areas that are not touched upon are constitutive and regulative rules. They are not mentioned in this part as there are no examples of them in the plays. However, the basic terms are searched through a creative reading of the plays. The answers that are given may vary and can be accepted on the condition that the necessary explanations are supplied.

1. Explain the Positive and Negative Face using the sentences given below.

Peter: Well . . . naturally, every man wants a son, but …
Jerry: (Lightly mocking) But that's the way the cookie crumbles. (ZS 16).

Face means the public image a person seeks to project. This image has to be maintained and whenever it is threatened the person also feels threatened and tries to

defend his/her face. Threats cause the person to be rigid and communication gets in danger of being broken. In *The Zoo Story* Peter and Jerry are two men who met in a park and they do not know each other. The extract may help to analyse the face strategies they use and may give hints on their ability in communication in terms of face strategy.

Well and *but* are the examples of hedging which shows that the speaker does not want to seem patronizing. Peter uses this strategy and respects the other's face. He also tries to show his ideas indirectly by impersonalizing the idea which is another strategy. It is sensed that he is irritated by the sentence or question. He gives a reason from his point of view as the way one thinks about male child is natural. He hesitates and tries to hide his idea as the general view of the society. By impersonalizing the ideas he both finds the reference for his ideas and has a choice to reject that he also wants a son if he is in any challenge. Peter is careful for both Jerry's and his own face. He tries to protect the public image he has and in doing this avoids any possible attacks giving the reasons as natural. Jerry, on the other hand, does not care about Peter's face. He speaks in the way he wishes. He impersonalizes his mocking giving a cliche to express his ideas but the sentence is not an acceptable one in their condition where they hardly know each other.

There are two kinds of face: positive and negative face. The positive face is the self-image that people want to have and want to be approved of by other people. Peter tries to protect this face. He avoids dissapproval and tries to make himself right in his ideas. He tries to keep his status secure. Thus, Peter can be said to have positive face. Negative face wants to be free from any kind of inhibition or constraint. Jerry protects negative face as he does not care much about politeness and behaves in the way he wishes. He loves freedom in speech and does not think about politeness strategies. Thus, Jerry can be said to have negative face.

Peter and Jerry both try to keep their face alive. The communicative break stems from their not trying to appreciate the other's face as their own face is more important than the other's. Peter uses positive politeness strategy to be on good terms

and save his status in society. Jerry does not try to be polite except for his impersonalizing as a positive politeness strategy. He wants to be free in every area of life and speaks directly with no veils on his sentences.

2. Show the five different Speech Acts (given by Searle) using the dialogue below.

> Jerry: And fact is better left to fiction. You're right, Peter. Well, what I have been meaning to tell you about is the dog; I shall, now.
> Peter: (nervously) Oh, yes; the dog.
> Jerry: Don't go. You're not thinking of going, are you?
> Peter: well . . . no, I don't think so.
> Jerry: (As if to a child) Because after I tell you about the dog, do you know what then? Then . . . I'll tell you about what happened at the zoo.
> Peter: (laughing faintly) You're . . . you're full of stories, aren't you?
> Jerry: You don't have to listen. Nobody is holding you here; remember that. Keep that in your mind.
> Peter: (Irritably) I know that.
> Jerry: you do? Good (ZS 29).

Five types of illocutionary acts suggested by Searle are assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. Assertives are the sentences that can be verified or falsified. For example, the sentence *And fact is better left to fiction is* an assertive. This sentence can be either true or false. Directives are the sentences which tries to get the hearer to do something. The sentence *Don't go* is a good example for this as the utterer of the sentence (Jerry) tries to get the hearer (Peter) stay. The following sentence *You're not thinking of going, are you* is also a directive in the form of a question. It is a rhetorical question which does not require an answer. Peter's answer *well . . . no, I don't think so* includes hedges as Peter does not want to seem controlling. He says his thoughts and this shows his feelings in a way. Therefore, we can take it as an expressive which expresses psychological states.

Jerry tells Peter *Because after I tell you about the dog, do you know what then?*. This is another rhetorical question. It is in fact an assertive and as it is in the form of a

question but does not ask anything, it is indirect. The following sentence begins *with I'll tell you about*. This sentence may seem as an assertive but this is a commissive as Jerry promises by uttering these words. He commits himself to the realization of the act that is mentioned. Peter's asking Jerry *You're . . . you're full of stories, aren't you?* shows his feelings on his talking too much. It may be in the form of a question but there is criticism here which is given in an indirect way. We can also say that Peter is a bit sarcastic here. We may take it as an expressive again as it deals with feelings. In another point of view this may be taken as meaning "do not tell me your stories". In this case it is a directive which tries to stop the hearer talking. Again if we are bored of listening it may be taken as both a directive and an expressive at the same time as being bored is the reason for this indirect order.

If one says *You don't have to listen,* this may be an assertive to inform the hearers that there is no obligation for them. But it is not difficult to see the irony here. Apart from being an assertive it calls for an audience as a directive. This is the indirect way of saying "listen to me". Jerry goes on saying *Nobody is holding you here; remember that. Keep that in your mind.* These sentences are in the imperative form and they express a command on the semantic level. But on the pragmatic level they are not orders but assertives and in addition, they are expressives in hints. There is a subtle sense of offence here. Their speech becomes like a teacher-student like conversation and this case irritates Peter.

Both Jerry and Peter know that Peter does not have to listen to Jerry. Peter states his awareness of this fact and shows he does not like the conversation and this utterance can be taken as an expressive. The last sentences are like comments on Peter in an ironical way. Jerry says *you do? Good.* Criticism and sarcasm is obvious here. It is expressive as the words reflect feelings. He makes fun of Peter and shows the absurdity in the relation between Peter's words and actions. There is not an example of declarations in the dialogue as the characters are not in a condition to change a status officially or there is no person to actualize such an act.

3. Show direct and indirect utterances.

Peter: (Lightly) Well, I must confess that this wasn't the kind of afternoon I'd anticipated.
Jerry: You mean, I'm not the gentleman you were expecting.
Peter: I wasn't expecting anybody (ZS 38).

Direct and indirect utterances are related to the three moods and related semantic and pragmatic levels of these moods. The levels can be shown as in the table below:

Syntactic level	*declarative*	*interrogative*	*imperative*
Semantic level	proposition	question	command
Pragmatic level	assertion	asking	impositive

First the mood of the sentence is defined and the semantic level is always in accordance with the syntactic one. Syntactic level is the sentence structure independent of any meaning relations. Semantic level refers to what the sentence means. The pragmatic level is independent of structure and refers to what the speaker means by that utterance. If the common pragmatic level is intended the sentence is called a direct utterance and if not it is indirect.

The first sentence in the dialogue is a declarative on syntactic level and expresses a proposition on the semantic level. On pragmatic level, it is an assertion as most declarative sentences are. For that reason this is a direct utterance. Jerry's sentence has the same line as the first sentence in syntactic and semantic levels but on the pragmatic level it asks whether if he gets the meaning right or not. The sentence fulfils the function of asking in the declarative form rather than an interrogative which makes it

indirect. The last sentence given above is again an assertion in declarative form and expresses a proposition which makes it direct.

4. What is the role of "Zoo" concept as a motif in the story? (use Jerry's words)

> Jerry: Now I'll let you in on what happened at the zoo; but first, I should tell you why I went to the zoo. I went to the zoo to find out more about the way people exist with animals, and the way animals exist with each other, and with people too. It probably wasn't a fair test, what with everyone separated by bars from everyone else, the animals for the most part from each other, and always the people from the animals. But, if it's a zoo, that's the way it is. (He pokes Peter on the arm) Move over.
> Peter : (Friendly) I'm sorry, haven't you enough room? (He shifts a little) (ZS 40).

There is a metaphorical usage in the using of the word zoo so much. In Jerry's mind humans are not any different from the animals that live in a zoo. He does not say a forest but the zoo. In the natural life animals interact one another, they share life, they fight, they help, they run away or they chase the others. In the zoo they are in a condition that they neither can help nor give harm. There are bars among them which hinder their natural life. According to Jerry, this is also the case for the people in modern society. There is the validity of truth in zoo metaphor as the contemporary life is so full of works and necessities that people cannot interact. The dialogues become meaningless as the other part either does not listen as there are some more important things in his mind or sees every word as a threat to his life. People begin to see each other closer than before but with a question mark in their mind searching for the intended meanings behind the utterances.

Trust is lost, caring is unknown. People become so mechanical that they live a monotonuous life and they are even not aware of this fact themselves. One has a traffic accident and the others may pass by in order not to be late for the meeting or a beloved one dies and the one in pain has to go to work and smile at people as if nothing has

happened. This makes the life look like a zoo. Animals smile at each other knowing that a little harm to another will bring great harm to them or the weak ones can irritate the strong ones knowing that they will not be able to touch each other because of the bars. Therefore, they start to behave different from their real selves.

People also treat each other depending on their social status and there are social bars between them causing them to hide their real feelings. Sometimes it is even the case that they lose their own feelings because of their status. Hiding feelings and the struggle to survive make the face more important and whenever it is threatened, defense mechanisms work at once. Thinking that the center of the world is oneself and the monotonuous life of work everday cause people to forget thinking about the others. The important idea is to be able to get rid of these bars and communicate in the way it should be. People will be free when they can manage to see the natural reality and think emphatically as a community.

People and animals are not only separated within themselves, they are also isolated from each other and these bars are the ones that make people separated from nature, too. People cannot see or treat each other appropriately. The bars which exist in people are the most dangerous ones since these people cannot know themselves and even cannot see the animal side in their minds. Mind and body seem inseparable but at times they may be divided and each part can act on its own which is really dangerous and makes life chaotic.

Zoo is the basic term Albee uses to reveal his ideas through the lips of Jerry as he is the closest one to nature and animal side in human kind. The play is not the zoo story but the story of people who are not aware of the fact that they live in a zoo. This idea is never uttered explicitly in the play but just hinted for the readers who can see the similarity between the zoo and the modern society as Jerry does.

5. What is an ironical use in this dialogue? Who does this irony belong to?

> Jerry: I said I want this bench, and I'm going to have it. Now get over there.
> Peter: People can't have everything they want. You should know that; it's a rule; people can have some of the things they want, but they can't have everything (ZS 42).

Irony is a means of expression which suggests a different meaning, usually humorous or angry, for the words used. In other words, irony is saying something and meaning just the opposite of what the sentence means. At first sight there seems to be no irony in the dialogue above so reading between the lines and the background knowledge about the play are necessary to explain the irony in these sentences.

In the dialogue Jerry starts to try to get the bench Peter sits every Sunday. That bench is at the park and it belongs to the community. Every person has the right to sit and rest on it. Jerry insists on getting the bench because he is on an experiment to find out whether Peter can fight for it or let it go. The interesting thing and the irony is in Peter's words. He says people cannot get everything they want. That is a true idea but the problem is the one who gets everything he wants is Peter not Jerry. During their conversation it is seen that Peter has many things. He has a family, daughters, parakeets, a job, money and many more. When it comes to Jerry, he has no family, he is unemployed, he has even no single person to put his/her picture in his frames. That's why he has got empty picture frames in his room.

The only thing Jerry wants is a friend maybe even just somebody to talk to but unfortunately he even cannot communicate with a dog. Peter's words are ironical but the irony is himself who does not mean the opposite of what he says. His speaking the ironical words is the contribution of the playwright to the concept of irony. In fact the words should be spoken by Jerry but Albee gives them as Peter's words to show how greedy humans are. Peter cannot see what he has and how valuable they are in fact. If the sentence *People can't have everything they want* were said by Jerry, it would only be

said and would not be as effective as they are but giving it in Peter's words Albee makes the readers think about their own utterances. The absurdity is criticising the things one does without knowing or putting the blame on the others whereas it is the utterer who is responsible for that problem.

Peter should not utter these words and fight for the bench as he cannot have everything he wants. He has to learn to be satisfied with his belongings and think about other people. The bench which is just a little point in his life may be vital for another (for Jerry) but he misses this point. He is too ignorant to see the world outside. He does not know the meaning of an empty room, he does not know the meaning of having no family, he does not know what hunger is, what unemployment is or what being an outcast means. He just utters the words *People can't have everything they want.* He even does not know what this sentence means as he has only one point of view and there is not any other point of view for him. The words and the situation are contradictory. In an absurd life no one is expected to sound logically and those words are used ironically to show the reader the absurdity in life. The playwright uses a great irony in which he not only makes the sentence comic but also interesting and worth discussing.

6. Explain the Three Facets of Speech Acts in the sentences.

Peter: POLICE! I warn you, I'll have you arrested. POLICE! (Pause) I said POLICE!(Pause) I feel ridiculous. (ZS 43).

Peter: I WARN YOU!
Jerry: Do you know how ridiculous you look now? (ZS 44).

There are three facets in speech acts: Locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act. Locutionary act refers to the meanings given by the words and sentence. In other words, it is the dictionary meanings of the items in a sentence structure. Illocutionary act refers to what the speaker means using these words, what causes speaker to use that sentence and what is intended by using these words. The

intention and therefore the speaker are included in this act. Every sentence is said for some reason to change some case and that makes the speech act important in communication. Perlocutionary act is the effect that is created on the hearer and this act includes not only speaker but also the hearer by making the speech two dimensional.

The first utterance in the extract, *POLICE!* is a shouting and calls the police in its locutionary act. It has been uttered by Peter to warn Jerry and it is a warning in the illocutionary act. Perlocutionary act is the effect of the sentence on the hearer therefore we have to take it on Jerry's part. Jerry is supposed to be threatened through this utterance and he may go away at that point but the perlocutionary act is never guaranteed and it is the case here as Jerry does not do anything related to this sentence. This sentence has no perlocutionary effect on him.

In the second sentence Peter tells Jerry that he will have him arrested. It is another warning for Jerry which has again no perlocutionary act at work. Peter's stating that he calls out *police* is the repetition of what he has just said. In the illocutionary act there is complaint as his utterances do not produce the effect he intended. He tries his first utterance again and then recognizes how ridiculous his condition is. He uses these sentences to explain the way he feels. His intention is to drive Jerry away by stating his psychological states. As feelings are involved, the last sentence is an expressive in its illocutionary act. Peter still tries to change the condition but whatever does he fails.

In the second extract the utterance *I WARN YOU!* gives information in its locutionary act that is the speaker who warns the hearer at present time. In the illocutionary act we see that it is a warning which is explicit using the word *WARN* in it. The perlocutinary act is again not seen. The perlocutionary act is important but unfortunately there is no way to guarantee this act and it is never certain. That is most probably the reason why **Speech Act Theory** is especially based on the illocutionary act.

In speech people do not use the words just to state some realities or just for asking some questions. People try to do something every time they utter sentences. For this reason, taking the words just as they are is not enough, the more one needs is to be able to get the illocutionary acts, ironical and metaphorical uses behind those utterances to communicate successfully. Furthermore it would be better if the speaker tries to check the perlocutionary effect on the addressee to see whether the act s/he has performed works or not.

7. What is wrong with the dialogue below in terms of Speech Acts? Why?

> VLADIMIR: Where was I . . . How's your foot?
> ESTRAGON: Swelling visibly.
> VLADIMIR: Ah yes, the two thieves. Do you remember the story?
> ESTRAGON: No.
> VLADIMIR: Shall I tell it to you?
> ESTRAGON: No.
> …
> ESTRAGON: I'm going.
> *He does not move.* (WG 9)

The dialogue here seems normal in the beginning as there is a question and there is an answer as a supportive act. Beginning with the *Ah yes* the conversation becomes absurd and abnormal. Vladimir changes the topic unexpectedly. He asks a question but does not mind what the answer is. He seems to care for Estragon but the change in the topic after hearing his foot is swelling is not normal and it makes the question rhetoric, just uttered with no reason. He asks another question to learn whether Estragon remembers the story about the two thieves. He answers *no* and there is nothing wrong with that exchange. The sentence *Shall I tell it to you?* is an interrogative on syntactic level and a question on semantic one but it does not function as a question. It does not ask anything since it is a request and an impositive on the pragmatic level. Vladimir wants to tell him the story and offers it without expecting the answer as *no*. Estragon rejects Vladimir's request and breaks the communication but in fact he does

not have an intention to listen to him talking about the thieves in the Bible. He only states that he does not want to hear the story.

Generally such a dialogue does not occur as the parties may sense what the other party may like to talk about or listen to. Although they are friends, Vladimir and Estragon do not seem to know each other much as they want to talk about different issues or it can be just because both parties want to be dominant and their struggle in topics continues.

The last sentence of Estragon is an assertive which tells Vladimir that Estragon is going. But the interesting and the absurd thing is his staying still. He should behave in the direction he states but he does not move. This makes the dialogue wholly absurd. They talk about something and in fact say nothing. It is absurd in real life that people also seem to do and talk about everything but they do not do anything. The important thing is the act, not the words and it is best shown above. The words are nonsensical if they do not perform what they ought to. Language is a means to an end and every word must be uttered for some reason. Speaking words without an aim cannot be called speech. Animals also may give sounds like the phonemes or words in a language but this does not mean that they have the ability to speak. Meaning and intention are vital in language. Vladimir and Estragon abuse language as they use it randomly and they portray the loss of meaning in everday speech.

The starting point for the study of **Speech Act Theory** is the idea that the sentences cannot be evaluated through a true - false dimension. There are sentences which should be evaluated on their being felicitious or not and these sentences are called performatives. The problem in the dialogue stems from the fact that performatives are infelicitious, not happy in Austin's terms. Estragon rejects Vladimir's request to tell him the story by a simple *no*. When the request which one makes is rejected, it is called to be a hitch which is a misfire. The utterance is infeliticious as it fails to work. Estragon's saying *I'm going* is also problematic. He says this but he does not move which makes the acts and words contradictory. He states that he is going to do something with no

intention. Hence, it is an abuse as one utters the words without the necessary intention and the action is not fulfilled.

As stated before, language is for communication and for use. It should act as intended it should do something but in this dialogue it does nothing. Vladimir and Estragon utter words just to hang in the air. Nothing is listened and the utterances are given with no intention but to talk and this case leads to the problems in their communication.

8. Explain these sentences using Searle's taxonomy of Speech Acts.

> ESTRAGON: (*restored to the horror of his situation*)*.* I was asleep!
> (*Despairingly.*) Why will you never let me sleep?
> VLADIMIR: I felt lonely.
> ESTRAGON: I had a dream.
> VLADIMIR: Don't tell me!
> ESTRAGON: I dreamt that.
> VLADIMIR: DON'T TELL ME! (WG 11).

The dialogue above resembles an argument between two children who need affection and care. Estragon tells that he is asleep in the first sentence. It is an assertion as it states a fact. The horror is meaningless in their condition as there exists no reason for horror in waking up unless he has a nightmare. The second sentence is a question but it also includes some complaint and therefore it is a directive. It has the meaning of *let me sleep* but it is indirect as Estragon does not give the order using an imperative. The answer Vladimir gives he *felt lonely*, expresses his feelings and it is an example of expressive. Estragon makes an assertion that he *had a dream* but the primary illocutionary act is the request (directive) to tell Vladimir the dream. It can also be taken as an assertive to explain the dream as one says s/he had a dream to tell how it was. Vladimir understands the primary act of the sentence and states that he does not want Estragon to tell him. He uses an order, a directive and it is bald on record without any effort to respect the other's face. Estragon goes on as if Vladimir asked him what he saw

in his dream. He begins to tell it and his words are interrupted by Vladimir's shouting. Vladimir orders him to stop and in his shouting it also becomes an expressive since he shows his anger.

Looking just at the sentences Vladimir seems aggressive but it is Vladimir who is logical and there are reasons for his anger. Estragon keeps forgetting even what they are waiting for. Vladimir is the one who tells why they are there and what they are waiting for and also who talks to the boy before Estragon wakes up. Vladimir is angry since he is tired of waiting for Godot. He cannot talk to Estragon as he is only talking nonsense. They live monotonuously everyday under the tree waiting for somebody who will probably never come. As Vladimir is depressed, he wants to wake Estragon up. Taking all these into consideration Estragon's trying to tell his dream does nothing except for irritating Vladimir and his shouting at Estragon is not an unexpected reaction.

In the dialogue Vladimir and Estragon do not listen to each other and their words become a misfire as the intentions are not understood. The utterances are infeliticious and the conversation fails. They can not empathize with each other and they are self-centered. They seem to be engaged in a dialogue but theirs is nothing more than a multi-monologue.

9. Which face is used in the dialogue? Why?

POZZO: Which of you smells so bad?
ESTRAGON: He has stinking breath and I have stinking feet. (WG 31).

The dialogue is between Pozzo and Estragon. Pozzo comes to the scene as Vladimir and Estragon are waiting for Godot. He has a slave, Lucky, carrying all his things on himself and Pozzo treats him as if he is an animal. Pozzo is rich and bored with Lucky and going to sell him. On his way he stops near Vladimir and Pozzo and they have a conversation.

Pozzo asks a question which is really rude among the people who have just met. He asks a really downgrading question and it is bald on record paying no attention or using no mitigation for the face of the others. He speaks directly most probably because of the fact that Vladimir and Estragon are homeless while he is a rich man even with a slave to carry his boxes. He has an upper status and does not care whether he offends them or not. The answer by Estragon is even more strange. He says his feet and Vladimir's breath stink. This is another irritating sentence but Estragon uses it easily and directly. Thus, the utterances in the dialogue are bald on-record. They do not need any mitigator to keep the distance between them as they do not have respect.

Vladimir and Estragon are two homeless unemployed man with nothing to do and they are hungry. They are waiting for Godot who has never come and who they have never seen before but he is the only hope they have. Godot may be God for them or luck but the truth is that he will never come. Nothing will change, nobody will come or go. They are in such a bad condition that they are not thinking of face. Pozzo likes using others as he uses Lucky to do everything for him but even Lucky is not valuable for him since he has forgotten to give people any value. He treats Vladimir and Estragon badly but they do not care as they do not have a status but hungry stomach. All they want is Godot, waiting for him is their only work and this work becomes their lives. They do not have a social profile to maintain and protect so there is no need for caring about face condition.

10. Are these sentences felicitious? Why or why not?

ESTRAGON: Well, shall we go?
VLADIMIR: Yes, let's go.
They do not move. (WG 35).

Felicitiousness is a term related to performatives's being happy or not. In other words, if the performative works, it is called to be felicitious and in the other case it

becomes infelicitious. By saying *Well, shall we go?* Estragon offers to go and the intention to go is the sincerity condition for a request. One intends to go and offers it to the other and they act depending on the answer. In this dialogue the preparatory condition does not exist as they have nowhere to go. The request is not possible to be put into action in their condition. Vladimir accepts the request with his words and maybe also with his heart but he is aware that they cannot perform the act requested. The utterances cannot act properly and that causes their not acting, not moving. Their situation is the basic impediment to their acts.

The sentences given in the extract are infelicitous as the necessary conditions for the performance of the act are not existent. If the information that they do not move were not given, making comments by the reader would not be possible and no one would know how they act. The stillness is given on purpose to show the uselessness of language in their situation. Vladimir and Estragon live in a world of words with no action. They wait and while waiting they hang themselves, they watch the sky and the tree by which they stand. During the play the boots begin to fit, the tree begins to give blooms, Pozzo and Lucky come and go but the reality that they are waiting for Godot never changes and they will go on waiting till they become aware of the fact that their waiting is endless and in vain. Their waiting is not any different from Sisyphus' struggle to push the rock up the hill. Nature never brings the reality to those who just stand and wait. They should try to begin doing something in some way. All people wait for something but they do other things while waiting and in fact everyday is the same as the previous one although there is the truth that everything changes in every second. This may sound paradoxical but that is the absurdity of life.

In the dialogue since the sentences are examples of both insincerity and nonfulfillment, Vladimir and Estragon have no intention to go as the conditions for their going do not exist. It may be claimed that they are really tired of waiting and they wish they had somewhere to go, and in that case the sentences only become examples of nonfulfillment as the act is not fulfilled. Vladimir and Estragon abuse the language since they use it for nothing. They do nothing but talk during the play without any action. The

absurdist playwrights do not try to give a lesson with a plot and actions but use language to make readers and spectators think about their own life and the absurdity which makes the lives of people monotonous and sometimes unbearable. Yet, the life gains meaning when the language and acts begin to exist in accordance with each other.

CONCLUSION

This thesis studied the speech acts in **Theatre of Absurd** as it is one of the most important theories in pragmatics. Language learners have difficulty using the language because most of them are not aware of the **Speech Act Theory**. This study tried to be an alternative source for this reason. Despite of the fact that these acts are acquired intuitively in the native language, information on them is needed in the foreign language learning. The principles behind speech change from language to language. This leads to the need for original scripts to study on. And the best examples can be found in drama as it gives the speech in written form and in the most realistic way.

To Esslin *theatre is always more than mere language* (1961: 230). In theatre the events are given in action. Language is also given by actions and the picture the play draws makes the language meaningful. The plays have a deep meaning especially in Absurd Theatre and they express more than a language could as the meanings can be derived in every reading as there is no one certain truth and the reader or the audience must fill in the blanks. There are two sides and sometimes more than two sides to derive an idea out of the play. The playwright, the actors and actresses, the readers and audience are all active in a play as if they are in a conversation. In speech there is need for at least two sides and the listener / addressee makes the meaning out of the sentences uttered by the speaker. Thus, interaction also requires at least two sides. This similarity makes the study of speech acts in drama easier and more applicable. **Absurd Theatre** also makes the characters seem comic and illogical to prevent identification. As people cannot identify themselves with comic characters they can see the picture objectively and subjectivity in the analysis is prevented which makes the study more reliable.

Dialogues in textbooks and the daily speech differ from each other. The speakers of that language may not obey some grammatical rules and may depend on

Speech Act Theory to communicate better. Therefore the instruction on grammar becomes insufficient. Especially teachers of English have to know the theory and its applications to be able to teach the language appropriately. The theoretical knowledge is mostly forgotten in one or two years but the application gives a chance to use the theory appropriately. The application should be the basic aim in the theory since knowing the terms may not help at all if one cannot make use of it in his/her teaching. Thus, this study tried to give an example of the application of the **Speech Act Theory** to the **Theatre of Absurd.**

Our contemporary life is full of misfires and abuses as most people are ignorant of the speech acts. The communication techniques including SMS and MSN discussion forums begin to use many abbreviations and most of the sentences even words are given incomplete. This causes the lose of meaning and people become mechanical too. When acts are used they may be misunderstood as the people are not accustomed to applying them to a foreign language. In this case the **Speech Act Theory** becomes more valuable to learn and apply. In most discussion forums, and data bases and many other computer systems, **Speech Act Theory** is applied and the use of technology should not cause to forget about the intentions behind the use of language.

This thesis tries to give a broader view of the **Speech Act Theory** different from a text book but with applications on literature. Literature and theory may be understood better when they are applied to each other. Literary texts may become more meaningful through the philosophy of language and the theories may be more useful when the application to literature is shown since literature is a natural example where the theory is used with no intention to explain any theory. The literature texts gain more importance if there is limited access to native speakers and instructors must use them in every area. If one begins to think in the language that is being learnt, and can comment on the meanings and intentions beneath utterances then one can talk about the acquisiton of the language. The language learning and teaching are not limited to grammar rules and vocabulary, therefore, one can use the language and communicate in that language appropriately only when functions are really acquired..

In this study **Speech Act Theory** is applied to the plays from the **Absurd Theatre** and the meaning relations are analysed using the theory. The plays are also used as a means to explain the theory to show that they can be used to teach each other interchangibly. The sample questions are given as a basis for the activities that can be used with the extracts from the plays and suggested answers are given. The constitutive and regulative rules are not touched upon as there are no examples in the plays which are studied. The study is restricted to only two books considered to be good sources for the study of the **Speech Act Theory:** *The Zoo Story* and *Waiting for Godot*. This can serve as a pre-study. A wider and much more comprehensive study may be done in the future.

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