

T.C.
DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZCE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER PROGRAMI
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

THE NORTHERN IRAQ POLICY OF TURKEY

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Danışman

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2010

YÜKSEK LİSANS
TEZ/ PROJE ONAY SAYFASI

2007800437

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Savunma Tarihi : 10.08.2010
Danışmanı : Yrd.Doç.Dr.Ali Şevket OVALI

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Ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel konuların yanında güvenlik endişelerinin Türk dış politika gündemini domine etmesi sebebiyle Kuzey Irak ilgi çekici bir dış politika meselesi olmuştur. Bununla beraber, Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'a olan ilgisi, güvenlik kaygılarıyla sınırlı değildir. Bunun yanı sıra tarihsel ve sosyokültürel bağlar da bu ilginin önemli bir parçasını oluşturur. Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi ile Türkiye arasındaki mevcut ilişkileri anlayabilmek ve Türk dış politikasının Kuzey Irak politikalarını masaya yatırabilmek için, bu konunun tarihsel ve teorik altyapısına yönelik çok boyutlu bir analiz yapılması gerekmektedir. Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi ile Türkiye arasındaki mevcut ilişkileri anlayabilmek ve Türk dış politikasının Kuzey Irak politikalarını masaya yatırabilmek için, bu konunun tarihsel ve teorik altyapısına yönelik çok boyutlu bir analiz yapılması gerekmektedir. Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak politikalarını detaylıca açıklamak amacıyla, bu çalışma; Anavatan Partisi, Refah Partisi ile Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi iktidarları dönemlerini içerecek şekilde ortaya konan dönemselsel bir araştırma ve bu konunun teorik altyapısı üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu çalışma ile, Kuzey Irak politikası incelenerek, bu hükümetlerle birlikte Türk dış politikasının Kuzey Irak politikalarının daha aktif hale geldiği, bölgeye yönelik politikaların, barışçıl, pragmatik ve İslami bir kimlik sebebiyle gerçekleştirildiği ortaya çıkmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kuzey Irak, Türk Dış Politikası, Anavatan Partisi, Refah Partisi, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, PKK

ABSTRACT
Master Thesis
The Northern Iraq Policy of Turkey
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Northern Iraq has been an interesting foreign policy area for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy due to the fact that security concerns have dominated the foreign policy agenda besides economic and socio-cultural issues. However, Turkish interest in Northern Iraq is not limited to security domain; there are other aspects of Turkish interest in Northern Iraq such as historical ties and socio-cultural bonds. Moreover, in order to understand the current relationships between the Kurdish Regional Government and Turkey to analyze Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq, a multi-dimensional analysis on the historical and theoretical ground should be asserted. To assess the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey comprehensively, this study represents the analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq on the periodical and theoretical basis which consists of the Motherland Party, the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party periods. As a result of the periodical and theoretical assessment of Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq, this study has revealed that Turkish foreign policy witnessed foreign policy activism towards Northern Iraq in these periods through the introduction and a peaceful, pragmatist and Islamic identity.

Key Words: Northern Iraq, Turkish Foreign Policy, Motherland Party, Welfare Party, Justice and Development Party, PKK

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP/JDP	Justice and Development Party
CENTCOM	The United States Central Command
CFP	Comparative Foreign Policy
CGS	The Chief of General Staff
CHP/ RPP	The People’s Republican Party/Republican People’s Party
CPA	The Coalition Provisional Authority
CTF-PC	Combined Task Force- Provide Comfort
EC	The European Community
FP	Felicity Party
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FPC	Foreign Policy Context
GOI	The Government of Iraq
IGC	The Iraqi Governing Council
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KADEK	Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
KDP	The Kurdistan Democratic Party
KDPD	The Kurdistan People’s Democratic Party
KNA	The Kurdistan National Assembly
KONGRA-GEL	Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
MP/ANAP	The Motherland Party
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	Nationalist Democracy Party
OHAL	Emergency Rule
OIF	The Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPC/OBC	The Operation Provide/Bring Comfort
OPEC	The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE	The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
p.	Page Number
PP	The Populist Party
PASOK	The Kurdistan Socialist Party
PEJAK	The Free Life Party of Kurdistan
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PUK	The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SBS	Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin
TAL	'Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period' or Transitional Administrative Law
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TIG	Transitional Iraqi Government
UN	The United Nations
UNHCR	The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	The UN Security Council
UNSCOM	The United Nations Special Commission
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VP	The Virtue Party
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP	The Welfare Party

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Middle East has witnessed clash of civilizations, wars, murders, rapes, exoduses, pillages and massacres, conflicts over the interests and distribution of vast resources. As a part of the Middle East region, Northern Iraq has experienced most of them; thus it attracts attention of international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts especially in terms of foreign policy analysis of Turkey since Northern Iraq has been a security concern for Turkey. As Northern Iraq has been an interesting area of foreign policy implementation, the dynamics behind the Turkish foreign policy (TFP) decision making towards Northern Iraq have been attempted to be analyzed in a historical fashion within the framework of theoretical approaches and perspectives in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), one of the subfields of the international relations. The general research question that guided this thesis is “What are the causes of Turkish foreign policy concerns towards the Northern Iraq?” and “How the Turkish foreign policy towards the Northern Iraq was shaped for the last thirty years?”. Throughout the discussion, specific research questions related to main themes, Northern Iraq and TFP were posed and examined such as “What are the general traits of TFP”, “Where is the place of Northern Iraq in TFP” and “How is the political structure of Northern Iraq and how does it affect TFP”.

Throughout this thesis, Northern Iraq will imply both region and de facto Kurdish state emerged in the north of Iraq following the Gulf War as a result of the creation of safe havens for Kurdish refugees after a humanitarian crisis. The causes and process of Northern Iraq’s emergence will be described in detail in relevant chapters. The Northern Iraq policy of Turkey is an interesting subject to analyze because it requires multilevel and multidimensional analysis as it has both domestic and international aspect. Moreover, Northern Iraq has been wrapped by the security concerns of Turkey since Turkey has been fighting against the PKK terrorism which has been located in Northern Iraq and has used it as a base for the incursions into Turkey from the Turkish-Iraqi border for last twenty five years. In addition, the Kurdish separatism provokes the fear of integration of the Northern Iraq with the southeast Turkey by creating an independent Kurdish state. Recognizing Kurdish

identity, granting cultural rights and the provision of social cohesion under the framework of protection of minority rights are another aspect of the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey that should be taken into consideration when conducting the analysis.

Since the conduct of foreign policy analysis requires a theoretical framework to be applied, the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey has to be analyzed on the theoretical perspective ground. Therefore, the first chapter attempted to assert the theoretical framework for the analysis of TFP towards Northern Iraq. To introduce theoretical perspectives on foreign policy analysis, this chapter examines the historical evolution of FPA, which is a meta-theoretical perspective and a sub-field of international relations domain, as it provided necessary theoretical means. The significance of this field of study is that it provided the examination of foreign policy decision making process while predecessor studies focused merely on the structure when searching for the explanations of foreign policy outcomes by ignoring the foreign policy decision making process. The FPA emerged as a reaction to deterministic approach of structuralist theories by the claim that the analysis of foreign policy decision making process is needed in order to obtain the exact explanations of state behaviors as the foreign policy decision making is implemented on the actor level rather than the systemic level through human political choice. While actor general theories cannot explain political choices, events, trends and policies, the most importantly, changes since they assume states as unitary actors while ignoring domestic differences and focusing on systemic events, FPA analysts can explain foreign policy choices, policies and changes through actor-specific theories on individual level.

Historically, the FPA has been developed through three branches which are “Comparative Foreign Policy, “Foreign Policy Decision Making”, and “Foreign Policy Context” in three generations. The first generation starts with the Comparative Foreign Policy research branch of FPA which was firstly introduced by James Rosenau. This branch mainly focused on the production of cross-national behavioral generalizations of nation-states’ foreign policies via gathering of aggregate

information at several levels of analysis. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (known as SBS) are the founders of Foreign Policy Decision Making branch of FPA. This branch emphasized the prominence of individual level analysis for FPA and the need for specification of actors involved in making foreign policy. SBS mainly interested in the role of groups in foreign policy decision making; hence, their efforts were generally concentrated on the process of foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision maker group formation as well as the group structure. This branch will be explored in detail by the close examination of Irving Janis, Charles Hermann and Graham Allison who are the other representatives of Foreign Policy Decision Making branch. Lastly, the last branch of FPA which is Foreign Policy Context represented by Harold and Margaret Sprout, focused on the conditions of decision making and decision makers as they affected by the social context decision makers are in. When conducting FPA, the Sprouts conceptualized the division of psychological and operational environments of the decision-maker which will be emphasized also in the later parts of this section. Besides the Sprouts; Margaret Hermann and Michael Brecher, who analyzed the psychological environment and social context of decision maker, will be also studied in detail in this section.

Apart from these three strands of FPA, International Political Economy (IPE) approach which asserts the assumption that economic relations and economic policies, concerns and calculations constrain and determine foreign policy decision making, will be analyzed. IPE approach claims that economic policies, calculations and relations constitute structural constraints on foreign policies of states; hence, IPE approach argues that states do not pursue national interest on the ground of power and structural forces; instead, states are concerned about their legitimacy and capital accumulation. Therefore, IPE approach will be benefited in theoretical perspective implementation to Turkish foreign policy. Lastly, in the first chapter, the second generation of FPA which criticized the first generation scholars by revealing their problems and deficiencies, and the present situation of FPA will be briefly discussed.

The second chapter will reveal factors that determine the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey such as historical, terror and socio-cultural factors. In historical factors section, the historical background of the relations will be highlighted through the assertion of traditional features of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East region like traditional non-involvement principle. The historical bounds between Turkey and Northern Iraq will be emphasized by the introduction of Turkish interest in the region regarding Kirkuk and Mosul. Besides, the evolution of security based foreign policy understanding will be demonstrated while underlining the history of TFP towards Northern Iraq.

Another factor which has shaped TFP towards Northern Iraq is terrorism that has a unique place in the relations and important concern for Turkish foreign policy decision makers. To analyze terrorism factor, the evolution of the PKK which is a terrorist organization launched its first assault in 1984 and continued its terrorist activities up until now. When the PKK was established, its aim was to create an independent Kurdish state in south-eastern region of Turkey. However, the efforts of the PKK in order to force Turkey to abandon its south-east territories failed; thus, the PKK reconsidered its objectives at the beginning of 2000s and decided to revise its aim into the creation of a democratic Turkey in which the cultural rights of Kurds will be protected. In addition to the evolution of the PKK, its effects on the relations of Turkey with its neighbor states such as Syria, Iraq and Iran will be analyzed in detail.

As socio-cultural factors, considerable Turcoman minority in Northern Iraq and its links with Turkey will be mentioned throughout this section in a historical fashion. The status of Kirkuk has always been crucial for Turkey since Kirkuk was declared as the capital of prospect independent Kurdish state. As Turcoman minority has been regarded as the barrier of Kurdification of Kirkuk, Turkey has claimed itself as the protector of Turcoman minority in Northern Iraq. This section concludes that still Turkey is concerned about referendum which will be organized to determine the status of Kirkuk.

The third chapter will concentrate on the actors which affect and shape Northern Iraq policy of Turkey. These actors consist of the parties which constitute the political system of Northern Iraq, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and their charismatic and influential leaders subsequently Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and states located or involved in the region such as the US, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The historical evolution of both the KDP and the PUK will be examined in detail in order to explain the formation of current political structure in Northern Iraq. Special attention will be paid to the first Gulf War since it was a turning point for Turkey-Northern Iraq relations by creating Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) unintentionally. The process of the Gulf War and developments after it will precisely be set out.

Turkey's relations with regional states and the US at least affect Turkey's relations with Northern Iraq or TFP can be regarded as to be indexed to these states, especially to the US, as witnessed in the Gulf War. Therefore, the following section of the Gulf War will focus on Turkey's relations with these states. The dynamics, conflicts, issues, interests and foreign policy calculations will be discussed in detail in this section. Specifically, the process of the Iraq War will be described precisely in order to reveal its effect on the formation of current political structure and relations between Turkey and Northern Iraq. Besides, the impact of the Iraq War on the PKK and Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq will be examined in this section. Regarding the relations with Iran and Syria besides representing a short introduction of the history of relations with an emphasis on the PKK factor, current situation of the relations will be discussed.

In the last chapter, the theoretical and periodical analysis of TFP towards Northern Iraq will be conducted. Besides specifying the general traits and patterns of the Turkish foreign policy, this chapter will aim to demonstrate the anomalies to traditional features of the TFP emerge in the Motherland Party (MP), the Welfare Party (WP) and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) periods in which TFP has become active and peaceful towards Northern Iraq by introducing an Islamic identity which stipulates peaceful coexistence with Muslim states and activism in order to

establish good relations with those states. In the light of first chapter which will present theoretical perspectives for the foreign policy analysis, this chapter will attempt to provide the implementation of those perspectives to the periods of the MP, the WP and the JDP respectively. The analysis of the MP period will be based on the assumption that TFP activism started in this period in which Turgut Özal as a charismatic leader with a new vision for TFP stipulated a Turkish leadership in the Middle East region and among Turkic states. Moreover, Özal by appealing Islamism initiated a process of foreign policy activism via asserting the soft power of Turkey and highlighting the Islamic and conciliatory identity of Turkey in addition to pragmatist foreign policy understanding instead of security dominated, neutral and only Western oriented traditional foreign policy. Özal's activism and policies included an emphasis on developing economic ties with the region and these ties will be briefly discussed later. The Welfare period perpetuated this activism and intensified appeal to Islamic and conciliatory identity. However, differently from its predecessor, the WP attempted only developing relations with Muslim states by abandoning Western oriented foreign policy. The JDP which emerged out of the WP since old WP members established the JDP. Therefore, the JDP has had some features of the WP such as developing close ties with Muslim states; yet, the JDP foreign policy diverged from the WP line because although the foreign policy activism was the same, the vision of the JDP was broader than the WP since it stipulated the establishment of cooperation with all states rather than only Muslim states. Moreover, the pragmatism of the JDP has been more eminent than the WP.

To sum up, the last chapter aims to set out the foreign policy decision making and implementation in three periods, the MP, the WP and the JDP. Especially, their approach to Northern Iraq will be highlighted. The dynamics behind their attitudes towards Northern Iraq will be analyzed in a historical fashion. When conducting the analysis and throughout the thesis, the main methodology will be gathering the first and secondary sources such as articles and books written on TFP and Northern Iraq. To create a strong basis for this work, as much as the literary studies will be attempted to be covered by gathering first and secondary resources. As a result of this analysis, main features of Turkey's Northern Iraq policy will be revealed which

will enable the prediction and the assessment of Turkey's future foreign policy choices and outcomes regarding Northern Iraq.

FIRST CHAPTER
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NORTHERN IRAQ
POLICY OF TURKEY

1.1 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Conducting foreign policy analysis is a troublesome task because it requires a comprehensive analysis of theoretical perspectives on foreign policy analysis. Generally, all perspectives assess the foreign policy on two grounds. While some theoretical perspectives focus on ‘agency’, which is affiliated with individual, cultural and psychological determinants on decision making; the others emphasize ‘structure’, which symbolizes the constraining effects of domestic and systemic structure.¹ In addition to these bases, process is one of the frameworks in the conduct of foreign policy analysis.

1.1.1 The Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

In 1960s, lack of a theory of human political choice in International Relations (IR) was realized and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) evolved as a meta-theoretical perspective to fulfill this need. FPA proposed that as nation-states are composed of human collectives and foreign policy decision making is controlled by humans, foreign policy analysis should examine foreign policy decision making on the individual level.² However, the emergence of FPA as the subfield of IR led to a debate concerning the scope of the FPA which was discussed by social theorists of both the US and Europe. While American social theorists approached the debate in micro/macro aspect, European scholars centered the debate on the relationship

¹ Walter Carlsnaes underlines that the historical development of conflicting dichotomies between ‘individual and society’, ‘action and structure’, ‘actor and system’, ‘part and whole’, ‘individualism and holism’, ‘micro and macro’, ‘voluntarism and determinism’, ‘subjectivism and objectivism’, and so forth has become the central problem in social and political theory; therefore, structure-agent debate has dominated also the foreign policy analysis as human agents and social structures are interrelated entities. Moreover, Carlsnaes expressed the properties of both agents and social structures are required for a proper understanding of social behavior, although there is a lack of self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship as Alexander Wendt argued.

See Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:36, No:3, September 1992, pp.245-246

² Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol:39, No:2, October 1995, pp. 209-238

between 'agency' (or 'actors') and 'structure'.³ Moreover, American social theorists defended the analysis of social phenomena, whether they are empirical or analytical, on the large and small scales whereas European theorists focused on the specific relationship between individual or collective actors (agents) and social structures such as bureaucracies, institutions, or the state.⁴ Although there is a clear difference between two approaches to the level of analysis of foreign policy as American approach preferred much broader aspect while European approach was interested in the effect of the relationship between agents and social structures on any level of social analysis; two approaches dealt with the agency-structure problem in the explanatory framework of social theory; thus, foreign policy analysis also.

FPA was born as a field of study in the early 1960s in the US by criticizing the traditional research for its inadequacy.⁵ Critics of classical realists by foreign policy analysts for the study of foreign policy included the need for more scientific theory and the analytical priority previously given to the international level. In response to these criticisms, classical realists argued that the international level was quite different from domestic politics, thus there is no international theory and FPA had completely different purpose and subject matter from domestic politics.⁶ However, FPA connected international relations and political science by removing the traditional distinction that classical realists made, and as a result, FPA has been placed under the political science branch of public policy.⁷

³ Carlsnaes, p.246

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Sten Rynning and Stefano Guzzini underline the irony behind the emergence of Foreign Policy Analysis by saying "That sentence (appearance of FPA as a field of study) should in itself be read as a paradox: what else, if not analyzing foreign policy, had a large bulk of scholars been doing?". Sten Rynning and Stefano Guzzini, "Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis", Working Papers, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2001, p.2

⁶ Michael Mastanduno reminds the separation of international and domestic politics as fields of scholarly inquiry despite their interrelation by quoting Robert Putnam who said "domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangles". Moreover, Mastanduno attracts attention to the focus of structural realism on international politics and the exclusion of domestic politics in the explanations of international outcomes while assessing international outcomes as a function of international attributes, principally the distribution of power. Furthermore; according to Mastanduno, the study of domestic politics generally lacks systematic attention to international relations.

Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:3, No:3, 1989, p.458

See also Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

⁷ Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

The importance of FPA was revealed after the end of Cold War because mainstream IR theories failed to predict and explain the demise of the Cold War due to the fact that they purposed to define and explain major influences over the state behavior as well as constraining effects of the system over the state interactions during the Cold War without reference to human actors.⁸ However, IR as a field of study has grounded in human decision makers acting alone or in groups, and therefore, IR requires a theory of human political choice which will rely on the basis of prediction and explanation of human collectives' -such as nation-states-behaviors.⁹ FPA is the required sub-field of IR which provided such a theoretical perspective to inquire the dynamics behind the foreign affairs of states which depend on the foreign policy decisions of human beings. In other words, FPA intended to analyze the process of foreign policy decision making on the actor-level basis because the source of much behavior and most change in international politics is human beings, acting individually or in collectivities.¹⁰

1.1.2 FPA's Critics of Mainstream Theories

FPA opposes the level of analysis choice of mainstream theories which mainly apply state level and systemic level to analyze international events, trends, and policies.¹¹ According to FPA, 'black-boxing' or 'billiard ball model' of

⁸ Valerie Hudson and Christopher Vore signified that the bipolar system of the Cold War period was suitable for the actor-general theoretical perspectives and generalizations of the mainstream IR theories, thus Cold War period can be considered as the golden age of such theories. However, Hudson and Vore remind that even during such periods 'actor-general' theories of IR, which accepted the state as a primary and unitary actor and focused on systemic as well as relational variables as determinants of action, explained and predicted state behavior limitedly, only including exploration of ahistorical, noncomplex, global trends and issues that affect the system as a whole.

See Hudson and Vore, p.210

⁹ Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol:1, 2005, pp.1-2

¹⁰ See Hudson and Vore, p.210

¹¹ Christopher Farrands represents the environment as a general framework which affects policy; or as a pattern which positively shapes policy; or as a relatively rigid constraint. Farrands expresses that some writers have regarded the environment as a determining force which can in itself explain foreign policy output. The examples of the theories which regard structure as a determining force are structuralist theories which emphasize either the international power structure determines the structure and process of international politics; or, the structure of the international economy determines the nature of international politics. The common point of these theories is that both of them claim that the foreign policy is externally determined by the structure. Christopher Farrands argues that foreign policy analysis is simply incompatible with determinist theory and the analysts have to choose whether to develop a view of international relations grounded on determinist ideas or on ideas which accept the element of choice in human affairs. Nevertheless; according to Farrands structuralist theories are still important for the analysis of foreign policy. In addition, Farrands reminds that traditional foreign policy

mainstream theories, which are called also ‘theory of actors-in-general’ or ‘actor-general theory’, cannot explain events, trends and policies by treating the state as a unitary actor while ignoring domestic differences and focusing on systemic events because they should be examined in individual level through actor-specific theory instead of a grand theory of international politics, by avoiding the parsimony of systemic theory.¹² Through actor-specific theoretical perspectives, FPA is able to investigate the specifics that actor-general theories generally assume but do not specify, via conducting research. Moreover, FPA is able to explain “the causes of change in the conditions under which actor-general theory is applicable, besides the sources of diversity within a given international system-both among individuals and among various collectivities”.¹³ FPA opposes the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors and attracts attention to sub-units which constitute the state including individual actors such as the president, ministers, state departments, institutions and bureaucratic agencies that consisted of people involved in decision-making.¹⁴ By unpacking the ‘black-box’ model in order to disclose the dynamics behind the outcomes of foreign policy through the analysis of decision-making process and decision-makers, FPA obtains a more concrete theoretical perspective to deal with complexities of real life than ‘abstract theorizing’ of mainstream IR theories which have grounds in actor-general theory.¹⁵ As FPA is engaged in actor-specific theorizing, the concepts and theories of FPA are useful both the analysis of domestic

analysts analyze foreign policy on the grounds of domestic and international environment. In international politics there is no international sovereign therefore, there is no single source of law despite the fact that international law exists and constrains nation states. On the contrary of international environment, in domestic environment there is a single source of law and power which controls the channels of policy implementation.

See Christopher Farrands, “The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: Environment and Structure”, **Understanding Foreign Policy**, Michael Clark and Brian White eds., Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1989, pp.85-86, 97-98

¹² Arthur A. Stein opposes systemic theories of international politics which represent predictions and explanations of states’ foreign policies based on systemic interactions and systemic determination. Stein says “The anarchic state system is described as setting the context within which states interact. Given this anarchic environment, states must be self-reliant in order to survive. Yet international systems theory can only vaguely delineate the resulting patterns of state behavior and can offer no specific deduction about it”. Moreover, Stein states that systemic theories cannot provide detailed information to analyze narrowly focused strategic decision while trying to explain them via international factors. Furthermore, according to Stein, although the international system generates constraints on state behavior, it does not determine its behavior, yet there is a set of behavioral responses whose constraints are set by the international system.

See Arthur A. Stein, “Constraints and Determinants: Structure, Purpose, and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy”, **Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International Politics: Crossing Boundaries**, Harvey Starr ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp.190-192

¹³ See Hudson and Vore, p.210

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.211

and foreign policy choice and they can be benefited in the operationalization of all policymaking.

To conduct foreign policy analysis, mainstream theories applied the rational choice theory, especially its general assumptions about human rationality to foreign policy decisions. The rational choice theory argues that humans are benefit maximizer and they seek for the choices which give the best utility.¹⁶ However, FPA rejects this generalization because according to FPA analysts, people cannot be assumed simply benefit maximizers as people can be affected by factors such as emotional and ideological motivations, historical experiences, personal characteristics, and cultural and social features. Moreover, FPA scholars argue that people can settle for the other options rather than the benefit maximizer option as aforementioned factors undercut the rational cost-benefit analysis.¹⁷ Therefore; decision-making cannot be equalized to simple cost-benefit analysis of rational choice because human rationality is bounded.¹⁸

¹⁶ Arthur Stein expresses that rational choice theory accepts an actor as rational being who have a fixed hierarchy of values and interests created as a result of assessment of all alternatives and their expected utility and believe in the choose of best option by this rational actor. However, according to Stein, these assumptions of rationality are used to change purposive explanations into structural ones by ignoring the analysis of goals, purposes, and calculations. See Stein, p.197

¹⁷ Hudson and Vore represent the challenge of FPA researchers to the concept of 'rationality' generated by the rational choice theorists as the 'cognitive revolution'. Hudson and Vore assert that as people satisfice rather than optimize and they neither possess nor seek perfect information, human rationality is bounded. They underline the importance of process and conditions of decision-making as decisions can differ when they are taken under stress from under routine conditions. Moreover, they attract attention to other factors that can affect decisions such as hidden agendas which would be the needed to maintain group consensus, can undermine a rational cataloging of expected costs and benefits. Furthermore, they state that emotional and ideological motivations can similarly undercut a rational cost/benefit analysis. Lastly, Hudson and Vore says "the greater the number of people involved in a decision, the greater the complexity of the decision calculus" in order to prove inefficiency of rational choice theorizing in reducing decision-making to cost/benefit analysis.

See Hudson and Vore, p.211

Concerning the rational decision making, John Vogler says that "Process of selective perception and distortion operate to prevent the decision-maker acquiring a full range of pertinent information" in order to show that rational behavior cannot be assumed due to some conditions.

See John Vogler, "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches", **Understanding Foreign Policy**, p.158

¹⁸ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow define rationality as "consistent and value maximizing choice within specified constraints". Allison and Zelikow remind Herbert Simon's distinction between comprehensive and bounded rationality. According to comprehensive rationality, the actor has a utility function that consistently ranks all alternatives that actor faces and to choose the alternative that provides the highest utility. When considering the alternatives the actor cares only expected utility rather than the consequences. Moreover, comprehensive rationality accepts the actor having assessed all of alternatives and their consequences in order to make a value-maximizing choice while ignoring content of actor's objectives. On the contrary to comprehensive rationality, bounded rationality recognizes the need for specification of action-objectives, alternatives, consequences and choice rules by representing empirical evidence about the specific actor with the awareness of inescapable limitations of knowledge and computational ability of the agent. Allison and Zelikow underline that while

1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FPA

For a comprehensive understanding of FPA, historical development of the area should be given in detailed. The historical development of FPA can be divided in three generations.

1.2.1 First Generation of FPA

The first generation of FPA can be limited by the works of FPA scholars starting with 1960s until 1980s. It is composed of founding scholars of FPA who are James N. Rosenau with his book “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” (1966); Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin with “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics” (1954); and, Harold and Margaret Sprout with “Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics” (1956).¹⁹ The importance of these scholars is that each of them engaged in different aspect of FPA and led to three strands in this systematic FPA and three areas of research in FPA theorizing.²⁰ These three main research areas are “Comparative Foreign Policy”, “Foreign Policy Decision Making”, and “Foreign Policy Context” with their representative scholars Rosenau, Snyder et al., and the Sprouts respectively.²¹

1.2.1.1 Comparative Foreign Policy

Comparative foreign policy research branch of FPA was firstly launched by James Rosenau who searched for cross-national behavioral generalizations of foreign policies of nation-states.²² Rosenau tried to achieve a cross-national, multilevel

behavioralist and empiricists employ bounded rationality models, and other theorists- including many rational choice scholars- utilize comprehensive rationality.

See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow , “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis”, Longman, second edition, 1999, p.20

¹⁹ Hudson and Vore, p.212

²⁰ Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

See also Hudson and Vore, p.212

²¹ Hudson and Vore, p.214

²² Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

middle-range theory which would provide testable propositions for wider comparative studies of foreign policy input and output in a systemic and scientific fashion via aggregate statistical exploration and confirmation.²³ This area of FPA study is the one inherited behaviorist approach as it gives information about relations among nation states by stating "who does what to whom, and how" through comparison of states along behavioral dimensions in a theoretically meaningful fashion.²⁴ When comparing states "who does what to whom, and how" questions provide information about the means used to affect the relationship among states such as friendly or hostile attitudes, or instruments like statecraft that controls diplomatic, military and economic relations, as well as commitments of resources.²⁵ James Rosenau emphasized that FPA should be conducted via gathering of integrate information at several levels of analysis including the individual or actor level and the international systemic level; thus the explanations of foreign policy would require multilevel and multi-causal synthesizing of information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.²⁶ Besides Rosenau, other scholars engaged in comparative foreign policy pursued the goal of reaching a 'grand unified theory' which would include "a variety of foreign policy behaviors across different types of states and points in time".²⁷ This type of grand theory would require huge task of inventing "some set of master equations would link together all the dependent and

See also Hudson and Vore, p.212

See also Hudson (2005), pp.9-10

²³ Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

See also Hudson and Vore, pp.212-213

²⁴ Hudson and Vore, p.215

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ James Rosenau asserts that IR needs socialists especially their micro-macro theories, methods, and approaches. Rosenau says "Their system-subsystem orientations – their premises, hypotheses, and data that seek to draw the links between people at the micro level and collectivities at the macro level – are woefully lacking in the study of IR today. Aside from a few efforts to focus on agent-structure dynamics, most IR practitioners either take them as given or they ignore them altogether, whereas the sociological literature is rich with formulations and studies founded on micro-macro analysis. To be sure, in a political context the problem is especially difficult to resolve, but the need to address it is all the more urgent as globalization accords ever greater consequence to the attitudes and actions of nongovernmental actors, both private individuals and advocacy groups as well as multinational corporations and many other types of organizations. Equally important, the IR field needs a deeper involvement on the part of sociologists because their discipline is much more flexible and broad-gauged than is political science, history, and economics". Rosenau's emphasis on the premises and possible contributions of the socialists can be accepted as valid for FPA because it is one of the sub areas of the IR.

See James N. Rosenau, "IR needs socialists" in chapter 4: Rigid boundaries- States, societies, and international relations, **The Study of World Politics- Volume 1: theoretical and methodological challenges**, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.23

See also Hudson and Vore, pp.213 and 215

²⁷ Hudson and Vore, p.215

independent variables” along with massive data bases which would be obtained by the collection of events data. The methodology of CFP scholars is conducting empirical testing across different types of nations and across time by gathering events data and developing ‘integrated multilevel explanations’, instead of the methodology of applying case studies.²⁸ Despite attempts to run aggregate empirical testing, the empirical results of studies did not lead to creation of a grand theory and this resulted in the loss of enthusiasm towards CFP approach to FPA starting with the late 1970s.²⁹

1.2.1.2 Foreign Policy Decision Making

Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (known also as SBS) by “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics” which was published in 1954, emphasized the importance of individual level analysis for FPA and the need for specification of actors involved in making foreign policy. SBS, for the first time, were concerned by the issues of the agent-structure problem in the analysis of international relations, the capture of cultural influences in international affairs, the relationship between rational choice and decision-making models, the problem of dynamism and change in IR theory, the two-level game, interrelating domestic and foreign influences on nation-state action, the need for integration in theory-building and lastly broader methodological issues concerning choice of unit analysis, preferred modes of satisfactory explanation, and appropriate data collection.³⁰ While dealing these issues, SBS concentrated on the decision making process instead of foreign policy outcomes. The main concern of SBS was the role of groups in foreign policy decision making; therefore, they are interested in the process and structure of different types of group involved in foreign policy decision making.³¹

²⁸ Hudson and Vore, p.215

²⁹ Ibid, p.216

³⁰ Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making- A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-first Century”, **Foreign Policy Decision-Making by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (Revisited by Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier)**, Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2002, pp.1-2

³¹ Hudson (2005), p.7

See also Hudson and Vore, p.216

SBS underlined that there are two distinct approaches to IR which are “the description and measurement of interactions” and “decision making – the formulation and execution of policy”.³² According to SBS, these two distinct approaches to IR need each other to make IR a complete social science because the first approach cannot answer why questions while decision making analysis provide answers; yet, the second one should be complemented by the first approach.³³ SBS believed that decision making can be best explained by the inquisition of actors involved in foreign decision making as the spheres of competence of these actors which are statecraft, their flow of communication and information which contain diplomacy, and their motivations can determine the foreign policy outcomes.³⁴ Therefore; SBS accepted decision makings as ‘organizational behavior’ on which actors have influence. Like other FPA scholars, SBS believed that explanations of behavior were of necessity both multi-causal and interdisciplinary.

Instead of excluding the rational choice, SBS argued that predictive power of rational choice theory can be used if the necessary conditions are fulfilled such as accurate and detailed information about specific decision makers and their social context is obtained.³⁵ In addition, SBS underline that rational choice theory and decision making approach need each other because the rational choice theory can be vague without study of human decision-makers although it would be accurate, and without rational choice, decision making approach cannot provide the conceptualization of the strategic elements of choice.³⁶ SBS claimed that the style of analysis which they used would enable the analysis of all kinds of decision making, thus all rational choices.

³² See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "The Decision-making Approach to the Study of International Politics," Michael Brecher in James N. Rosenau ed., **International Politics and Foreign Policy** (second edition), New York: The Free Press, 1969, p.192

³³ Hudson (2002), pp.7-8

³⁴ Actor-specific approach of SBS surfaces by their definition of state because SBS says “State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers”. See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "The Decision-making Approach to the Study of International Politics", **International Politics and Foreign Policy**, p.189

See also Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

See also Hudson and Vore, p.213

³⁵ Hudson (2002), p.8

³⁶ Ibid.

The other scholars who pursued the “Foreign Policy Decision Making” approach to FPA apart from SBS were Irving Janis, Charles Hermann and Graham Allison. Irving Janis introduced a new research tradition through examining social and psychological dynamics of small decision making groups of foreign policy such as “the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group” which can affect decision-making quality negatively.³⁷ Charles Hermann was interested in categorization of groups according to their size, role of leader, rules for decision, autonomy of group participants and by this categorization he tried to reach general predictions about “the likely outcome of deliberations in each type of group”.³⁸

Graham Allison was the most influential scholar among the scholars who studied “Foreign Policy Decision Making” strand of FPA because although Allison accepted that foreign policy decision making was organizational behavior, his work “Essence of Decision (1971)” by proposing to study foreign policy making as decision making process, took one step ahead the work of Snyder et al (1962). Therefore, his work enabled the creation of a middle-range field of systematic foreign policy analysis which would be different from ‘diplomatic history’ and ‘behaviorist science’.³⁹ In order to show his conceptions about the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics on FPA, Allison and Zelikow developed three models and applied these models on one case, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.⁴⁰ In the first model, Allison and Zelikow criticized the unitary rational actor model of mainstream theories by arguing that foreign policy decisions cannot be explained through structural balances of power even though the decisions are rational ones; thus, international theory and foreign policy cannot be separated each other.⁴¹ In addition, Allison and Zelikow oppose the general input-output models of

³⁷ Hudson and Vore, p.216

³⁸ Rynning and Guzzini note that Allison contributed to the literature with “systematic treatment of approaches in forms of frameworks of analysis, which would be conceptual and not empiricist, yet historical-qualitative and not behaviorist”. See Rynning and Guzzini, pp.2-3

See also Hudson and Vore, p.216

³⁹ Rynning and Guzzini, p.3

⁴⁰ For three models created by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis”, Longman, second edition, 1999, pp.13-407

See also Hudson (2005), p.8

⁴¹ Allison and Zelikow, p.15

systemic theories by asserting that although it seems that actual behavior fits in the balance of power constraints and shaped by its imperatives, this behavior can be caused by other reasons different than the assumption of ‘rational action’; therefore, FPA requires the inquisition of foreign policy decision making process through careful ‘process-tracing’ method.⁴² The second and the third models, which are represented as second and third ‘cuts’ in his book, are the organizational behavior model and the governmental politics model.⁴³ The organizational behavior model by focusing on intra-organizational factors and the governmental politics model via concentrating on inter-organizational factors attempted to reveal organizational dynamics such as psychological, even cognitive variables for the analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.⁴⁴ The work of Graham Allison inspired other studies over the bureaucratic politics and the process of foreign policy decision making on the individual, group and discursive levels.⁴⁵

See also Rynning and Guzzini, p.3

See also Hudson and Vore, p.216

⁴² Rynning and Guzzini, p.3

⁴³ Hudson and Vore, p.217

⁴⁴ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow represent model II and model III which are organizational behavior and governmental politics. Both models oppose unitary rational actor assumption of the first model, the rational actor model. Allison and Zelikow asserts that in the second model subjects are organizations and “their behavior is explained in terms of organizational purposes and practices common to the members of the organization, not those peculiar to one or another individual”. Moreover, Allison and Zelikow emphasize two important factors which affect decision making which are constraining behavior of existing programs and routines of organizations, and organizational culture shaping the behavior of individuals in the organization. Model III further looks for the explanations of international events on the individual level. This model assumes each individual in the organization as a player in a central and competitive game, in this case politics in which individuals in the intra-national political system compete and bargain for affecting and shaping foreign policy formulation. Model III depends on “the proposition that knowledge of the leader’s initial preferences is, by itself, rarely a sufficient guide for explanation or prediction”. However, although the leaders are the final decision makers; thus their preferences, experiences, and values should have known, still they are affected by interaction with many other individuals in the organization.

See Allison and Zelikow pp.143-324

See also Rynning and Guzzini, p.3

See also Hudson and Vore, p.216

⁴⁵ Although the work of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow has been inspiring for other studies, it has been exposed to various criticisms. Steve Smith, as one of the leading scholars in critical approach, criticizes ‘Essence of Decision’ in his chapter in “Understanding Foreign Policy”. Smith argues that Allison and Zelikow do not introduce one correct version of Cuban Missile Crisis analysis; instead, they provide different explanations of the event on different levels; thus, they are interpreting evidence in line with the model which they apply. Moreover, although Allison and Zelikow claim that Model II and Model III are required for better explanations, Smith states that both models can be beneficial much more in explaining routine decisions where organizational and bureaucratic factors would have greater influence. Smith identifies six main categories of Essence of Decision’s criticisms. The first one is that Allison and Zelikow are accused of deriving two alternative models from the works of other scholars; for example, the third model is derived from the work of Richard Neustadt; therefore, the ‘Essence of Decision’ is not original. The second is that Allison and Zelikow misinterpreted the evidence and reflected events incorrectly in order to show the two models are useful. The third criticism is that in addition to underestimation of model three the capacity of the president by reflecting it as one of the player among many despite the fact that the president establishes bureaucratic structure through the

1.2.1.3 Foreign Policy Context

The last scholar of the first generation is Harold and Margaret Sprout who introduced a new aspect to FPA by adding social context to the analysis of foreign policy decision making. Harold and Margaret Sprout asserted that the analysis of foreign policy outcomes requires the analysis of the conditions of decision making and decision makers because the decision maker is affected by its societal context.⁴⁶ The Sprouts argued that in order to provide a full understanding of foreign policy outputs, which requires the explanations of achievement and estimations of power capabilities within the system, foreign policy undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings such as strategies, decisions, and intentions have to be represented, otherwise nothing can be explained or estimated.⁴⁷ The Sprouts introduced the psychological and operational environments of the decision-maker⁴⁸ and operationalized the psycho-milieu of foreign policy decision makers as “the international context as perceived and interpreted by decision makers”.⁴⁹ Moreover, they reminded that when the perceived and the objective international environments

choice of personnel, Allison and Zelikow fail to take none-electoral bureaucratic elements in governmental arena into consideration. The fourth one criticizes Allison and Zelikow on the normative ground by claiming that alternative models remove responsibilities from government through presenting “foreign policy making in terms of the ‘pulling and hauling’ of various non-elected bureaucratic groups”. Smith questions this representation by asking “if bureaucracies really run the show, what is the point of elections”. The fifth criticism of Smith emphasizes tendency to ignore values of participants in the foreign policy process by focusing on bureaucratic and organizational factors. The last criticism underlines inapplicability of two alternative models to the analysis of the foreign policy behavior of developing states.

See Steve Smith, “Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Bureaucratic Politics Approaches”, **Understanding Foreign Policy**, pp.109-122

See also Rynning and Guzzini, p.3

⁴⁶ Hudson and Vore, p.217

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.213

⁴⁸ Christopher Farrands also introduces the distinction between the psychological and the operational environments of policy. Farrands asserts that psychological environment consists of the perceptions, images, assumptions and expectations of policy makers about the world. Operational environment, on the other hand includes social structure, culture, physical and economic environments and the structure of the international system. Farrands further probes deep into the operational environment by emphasizing that social structure and culture provide the framework of values which policy-makers are likely share; thus, they can be guidance for the analysis of foreign policy choice and behavior of nation states. Moreover, Farrands states that ideologies and values have implications for foreign policy because they can generate demands for actions as well as constrains on the kinds of strategies that policy makers can pursue. Furthermore, Farrands reminds that patterns in domestic structure are accepted as the sources of patterns in foreign policy by comparing open and closed societies.

See, Farrands, pp.87-89

⁴⁹ John Vogler underlines the distinction made by the Sprouts by quoting the Sprouts who said “What matters in the process of policy-making are not conditions and events as they actually are (operational environment) but what the policy-makers imagines them to be (psychological environment)”. See Vogler, p.136

are not compatible to each other, FPA requires multicausal and interdisciplinary explanations.⁵⁰

Similar to Sprouts, Michael Brecher, with his work (1972) “The Foreign Policy System of Israel” researched contextual perspective of foreign decision making. In his study he explains Israel’s foreign policy behavior through the psychocultural environment within Israel.⁵¹ While Michael Brecher approached the psychological milieu broadly, the other works which examine the psychological milieu in FPA research area, generally only observed the impact of broader social and cultural factors on foreign policy decision making or interested in the psychological aspects of foreign policy decision making.⁵² While analyzing the psychological aspects of foreign policy decision making, researchers paid attention to leaders’ individual characteristics as well as situations that affect the leaders’ decisions such as high stress, high uncertainty, the position of the leader in foreign policy decision making.⁵³ Moreover, these scholars attempted to indicate how decision makers' core political beliefs, their personal ability to change events, their way of pursuing goals, motivations, and decisional styles could shape foreign policy. Margaret Hermann is one of the most important scholars worked in this area because Hermann achieved creating a more holistic picture through integrating information about individual characteristics, as well as describing a set of orientations toward foreign policy which enabled obtaining specific projections about a leader's behavior in a variety of foreign policy circumstances.⁵⁴ Apart from leaders’ characteristics examination, the role of elites in foreign policy decision making, as their perception about international events and environment affects the foreign policy formation, is

⁵⁰ Hudson and Vore, pp.213-214

⁵¹ Ibid, p.217

⁵² Hudson and Vore, p.217

⁵³ Valerie Hudson and Christopher Vore give information about other scholars studied social context such as Harold Lasswell (1930, 1948) whose writings on political leadership inspired successive scholars studying the effects of leaders on foreign policymaking and Joseph de Rivera (1968) with his book “The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy” which was a survey and integration of early attempts to apply psychological and social psychological theory to foreign policy cases. See Hudson and Vore, p.218

⁵⁴ See Hudson and Vore, p.218

analyzed by first generation scholars who specialized on social context research area of foreign policy decision making.⁵⁵

In the second half of first generation time period, the 1970s and 1980s, the researchers, asserted the importance of social context's influence on foreign policy and cognitive and psychological factors shaping decision making.⁵⁶ Explanations focused on the issues of the motivations of leaders; leaders' cognitive maps, scripts, and schemas; leaders' cognitive style and their life experiences.⁵⁷ Moreover, they studied another aspect of social context which is the national attributes of a country that includes size, wealth, political accountability, economic system of have impact on the foreign policy of that specific country. While, before the social context researchers, CFP scholars had dealt with these national attributes and tried to reveal the relationship between types of states and their foreign policy behavior; FPA analysts studied various aspects of national attributes' impact on foreign policy formation such as size, culture, particular nationalistic, economic and societal characteristics and institutions.⁵⁸ Regarding the size and national features, FPA

⁵⁵ According to Valerie Hudson and Christopher Vore, concerning the role of elites and mass opinion in the FPA, scholars of the first generation probed more deeply into the attitudes of elites and the coherence and structure of public opinion with regard to foreign policy issues. They found that elites and public opinion do not have a large impact on the nation's conduct of foreign policy. However, in the second half of the first generation, researches regarding the role of elites and mass opinion, reexamined the data collected and found more stability in American public opinion concerning foreign policy and international involvement than their predecessors had. Various scholars in the second half of the first generation showed that although the public may change their opinions on international issues, they do so for rational reasons and they revealed recognizable ideological positions to which the public subscribes on foreign policy issues. Moreover, they identified the constraining effect of public and elite opinion as they set the parameters for what government officials view as permissible actions to undertake in the foreign policy domain.
See Hudson and Vore, pp.218 and 219

⁵⁶ Social context analysts argue that decision makers can misinterpret and misrepresent their operational environment as their images can mismatch reality sometimes due to decision maker's stressful, complex, uncertain, threatening, and insecure environment. Moreover, according to Vogler, social context researchers explain misperception of decision makers through the psychological theories of cognitive dissonance and decisional conflict. See Vogler, pp.136-138

For description and detailed information about cognitive dissonance See Vogler, pp.145-146

⁵⁷ Hudson and Vore represent Kal Holsti (1970) as the scholar who successfully explored interaction and relationship between the psychological and the social contexts. They emphasize Holsti's conception of "national role conception," which describes how a nation viewed itself and its role in the international arena by underlining that how a nation regards itself results in different national behaviors. See Hudson and Vore, pp.218 and 219

For national role conception of Holsti see K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:14, No:3, September 1970, pp. 233-309

See also Hudson (2005), p.12

⁵⁸ Christopher Farrands laid out the factors of operational environment which include national attributes such as social structure, culture, physical and economic environments. Regarding size, Farrands specified that small states can also play an important role in international politics if they are located in a strategic position or if they are supported by a major power. However, the level of development can

researchers worked on the issue of relationship between these attributes and war by making war a dependent variable, with the questions of “Are large nations more likely to go to war than small nations?”, “Are rich nations more likely to go to war than poor ones?”, “Are authoritarian regimes more bellicose than democracies?”.⁵⁹ However, researches over these questions failed to give expected generalizations about foreign policy behaviors of states, except that democracies do not fight among themselves while they are tend to fight against non-democracies. Related to economic attributes’ effects on foreign policy formation such as economic structures and conditions, only few studies targeted this aspect which is International Political Economy (IPE).⁶⁰ Domestic pressure groups are examined as the societal groups that play role in foreign policymaking by revealing the relationships between domestic

also be a major determinant of a state’s position in international politics. Farrands underlines that modernization can change the level of development and it can affect foreign policy formulations. Farrands explains physical environment of foreign policy as including landscape, physical size and location, climate and defensibility of borders, which attract the attention of military strategists rather than foreign policy students. In addition, Farrands opposes the acceptance of physical environment as ‘given’ because according to Farrands, technological changes can change the significance attributed to physical environment. Yet, this does not change the fact that physical environment is an important element in foreign policy analysis. Lastly, economic environment of foreign policy can have impact on foreign policy as economic resources and relations can constrain foreign policy choices and behavior.

See Farrands, pp.89-93

Arthur Stein approaches domestic environment differently by representing domestic factors in domestic environment as they can determine foreign policy. Stein claims that domestic factors and characteristics can constrain and control state behavior; therefore, the analysis of domestic factors is required for a precise prediction about state behavior as well as foreign policy choice. To support his claims, Stein gives the need for expansion of states which have large population and high level of technology but lack of resources. See Stein, p.194

⁵⁹ Regarding the national attributes of states, Maurice A. East represents two models of large and small states’ behaviors which are conventional and alternative models. According to East, small states are defined by one or more of their ‘small land area’, ‘small total population’, ‘small total GNP’ (in other words production capacity), and ‘a low level of military capabilities’. East displays the conventional model’s assumed general foreign policy behavior patterns of small state as follows: “Low levels of overall participation in world affairs”, “high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations”, “high levels of support for international legal norms”, “avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecraft”, “avoidance of behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system”, “a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities”, “frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues”. After revealing these misperceptions, East analyzes the different assumptions of both models about the issues of “level of international activity”, “low-cost foreign policy techniques”, “high-risk behavior”, and “relative importance of foreign policy issues” by comparing and contrasting small and large states. East concludes that statistical analysis of events data obtained from CREON Project supports alternative model’s assumptions. As alternative model supposed, small states aim to minimize costs through initiation of joint or multiple-actor actions and engage in non-verbal behavior rather than verbal action as conventional model claimed. Moreover, small states are generally involved in economic issues by the utilization of economic techniques conducted by economic bureaucracies.

See Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models", *World Politics*, Vol:25, No:4, July, 1973, pp. 556-576

See also Hudson and Vore, p.218

⁶⁰ For IPE study area of FPA, Valerie Hudson and Christopher Vore give the works of Neil Richardson (Richardson and Kegley, 1980) and of Peter Katzenstein (1985) as valuable example works in this study area.

political pressures and foreign policy choice by the governments.⁶¹ Although cultural factors were studied by the first generation scholars in addition to other national attributes, the intellectual capacity for accessing indentifying concepts was insufficient at that time. Nevertheless, the works on cultural factors laid the foundation of latter studies by addressing the consideration of cultural influences.⁶²

“Political Economy Approach” or IPE approach to foreign policy making is represented as an alternative to ‘nomothetic’ comparative analysis of traditional theoretical approaches by adding a political economy perspective based on the theoretical approach that aims to explain what the others consider given and unchangeable.⁶³ IPE theoretical perspective underlines structural constraints on foreign policies of states with the special emphasis on economic relations. According to this view, states do not pursue national interest on the ground of power and structural forces; instead, states are concerned about their legitimacy and capital accumulation.⁶⁴ In addition, IPE approaches aims to predict state behavior by considering four dimensions of behavior which are “affective relations, position taking on global issues, problem-oriented behavior, and economic policy” by centering the structure of the economy as a significant predictor of behavior.⁶⁵ Moreover, IPE approaches try to conceive foreign policy by the analysis of periphery and semi-periphery states through the explanatory factor of their position and regards foreign policy as a tool to achieve domestic goals rather than a means to the outcomes traditional approaches assumed.⁶⁶

⁶¹ See Hudson and Vore, p.219

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Bruce E. Moon, “Political Economy Approaches to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”, **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, Herman, Kegley and Rosenau eds., p.34

⁶⁴ Moon, p.38

Bruce E. Moon criticizes realist conception of state as a undifferentiated unitary actor which pursue national interest because of its ignorance of states’ origins, composition and its relations with society. Moon asserts that realist arguments are invalid for outside of core states (or democratic and developed countries) which are dominated by the twin structural imperatives of capital accumulation and legitimacy instead of national interest defined in terms of power as realist assumed.

See Bruce Moon, “The State in Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy”, **Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change In Its Second Generation**, Laura Neack Jeanne A. K. Hey, Patrick J. Haney eds., NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985, pp. 188-191

⁶⁵ Moon, pp.43 and 47

⁶⁶ For detailed information about core, periphery and semi-periphery states conceptions see Immanuel Wallerstein, “World- Systems Analysis- An Introduction”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004

Moon defines these domestic goals as capital accumulation, state legitimacy, social stability, and government maintenance. See Moon (1985), p.198

The main common point of these three works and their successive studies of the first generation in the historical development of FPA is that all of them specifically analyzed foreign policy choice and behavior.⁶⁷ The theoretical contributions of these works are their propositions about the generalization of state behavior.⁶⁸ They underlined the importance of specification of decision makers and their impact on foreign policy formation through their foreign policy choice. All of them supported the creation of cross-national, middle-range and multilevel foreign policy theory which would benefit from all social sciences. Moreover, all theoretical perspectives in the first generation suggested that the foreign policy decision making process should be analyzed as much as the foreign policy outcomes are analyzed to reach a complete foreign policy analysis.

1.2.2 Second Generation of FPA

The second generation of FPA developed as a result of critical evaluation and self-reflection building on the first generation researches beginning in the late 1970s and continued until the 1990s.⁶⁹ The criticisms and self assessment mainly concentrated on Comparative Foreign Policy by leading theoretical and methodological developments and revealing the inconsistencies in the approach that hinder progress. One of problems that CFP had is the dilemma of reaching a grand unified theory while it leads to loss of micro-level detail which is required to explain and predict foreign policy behavior.⁷⁰ Therefore, the contradiction is that while the parsimony is necessary for the methods of CFP that guided research, there should be

Jeanne Hey analyzes the foreign policy of dependent state by defining the concepts of dependence, dependency, dependent foreign policy and methodologies which are used for the analysis of dependent foreign policy, case studies and UN voting and quantitative analysis. According to Hey, between these methodologies, although case studies aim to reach a comprehensive analysis of foreign policy, they provide an understanding of dependence-foreign policy relationship and allow in-depth examinations of dependence and foreign policy behavior. Moreover, the other methodology enables the exploration of dependent state's compliance to its dominant economic partner as generally dependent states support dominant states through UN voting in General Assembly. However, Hey criticizes this methodology due to its inability to reflect the preferences of dependent state because the support of weak state for a dominant one can be caused by the state's preferences rather than its dependency.

See also Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Foreign Policy in Dependent States", **Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change In Its Second Generation**, pp.201 and 205-207

⁶⁷ Hudson and Vore, p.214

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.220

⁷⁰ Ibid.

detailed explanations in the methods CFP uses.⁷¹ The other problem that CFP researchers face is the quantification of aggregate data and variables. This problem indicates the difficulty of operationalization and measure of concepts such as perception, memory, emotion, culture⁷², and history. Realizing this problem, CFP researchers are concerned that their methods can hinder achieving their theoretical goals.⁷³ The last inconsistency is policy relevance that whether the events data sets could provide information to foreign policymakers although these data sets could not be used without a theory to explain and predict their occurrence and their implications for future actions.⁷⁴ Therefore, CFP researchers have to choose to focus on whether theory or application as well as dealing with general theoretical propositions or specific issues. The CFP researchers try to overcome these problems through creating a middle-range theory which will provide both general assumptions and necessary detailed information about foreign policy decision making.

Regarding “Foreign Policy Decision Making” strand of FPA, the problem was raised by task of gathering too much information about domestic influence groups and bureaucratic structures in order to analyze foreign policy choice.⁷⁵ Moreover, to reach accurate information about foreign policy choice, which is kept

⁷¹ Hudson and Vore, p.220

⁷² Concerning the culture, there are various studies which discuss the effects of culture on the foreign policy formulations and behaviors. One of these works is Martin Sampson’s article on “Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy” which asserted that the culture has influence on foreign policy directly or indirectly as respectively it shapes organizational behavior, or determines variety of settings such as businesses, educational institutions, voluntary organizations, and the like. By setting the features of national culture, Sampson argues that certain characteristics of specific cultures can display foreign policy choice of those societies as certain values would prevail in those cultures and so in individuals who control foreign policy making. Sampson underlines that studies which focused on the structure while examining the culture and organization relationship found little or no connection whereas studies concentrated on process instead of structure found strong relationship between culture and organizations. Therefore, the work of Sampson emphasized the link among “the ways of individuals of a particular culture operate”, “the consequent characteristic aspects of the organizations within that culture”, and “the implications of those characteristics for the outputs of those organizations”. Throughout the article, Sampson highlights the certain features of French and Japan cultures. Sampson reveals that Japan has only one basic kind of social group, the family, and all of other organizations are the replication of this institution with the cultural attributes of collectivism, interdependence and group orientation. Therefore, foreign policy formulation in Japan involves many people and conducted in a slow-moving process. Unlikely, in French culture, top decision maker- generally the president- is supported by lower levels to dominate the foreign policy arena. Through these examples, Sampson is able to show the culture’s impact on organizations and foreign policy formulation process as well as outputs.

See Martin W. Sampson, “Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy”, **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, Herman, Kegley and Rosenau eds., pp.384-404

⁷³ Hudson and Vore, p.220

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.221

secret due to security considerations, is troublesome task because of various primary sources and viewpoints. Furthermore, the other problem that scholars have to solve is doing case studies that will be both theoretically and policy relevant. Scholars have come up with solutions to these problems currently. They attempted to solve these problems through obtaining patterns of group/bureaucratic processes in a set of historical case studies that can be generalized and will guide present day foreign policy decision making and analyzing the indicators of present-day group/bureaucracy processes which will enable obtaining more current explanations/predictions of foreign policy choices.⁷⁶

In the research area of “Foreign Policy Context”, the problem was over-focusing on psychological level while the societal level was overlooked by the FPC scholars. The main reason of this problem was methodological advantage of psychology which already has effective and available tools for studying political sociology.⁷⁷ Although analyzing the socio-cultural and political context is necessary for understanding foreign policy making, thus comparative politics; there are still requirement of the conceptual and methodological tools to end artificial division of international relations and comparative politics in order to allow theory development which will include social context.⁷⁸

1.2.3 Present Situation of FPA

Currently, all strands of FPA have specific commitments to actor-specific level of analysis, building a middle-range theory which will provide general assumptions about foreign policy behavior and choice by reflecting the complexity of the real world, pursuing multi-causal explanations through multiple levels of analysis, gathering data from all social sciences besides benefiting from their theory and findings, and when conducting the analysis focusing equally both on foreign

⁷⁶ Hudson and Vore, p.222

⁷⁷ There are studies which searched for the decision making and psychology relationship for FPC scholars still can benefit from. To see one example, See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice”, *Science, New Series*, Vol:211, No:4481, January 1981, pp.453-458

See also Hudson and Vore, p.222

⁷⁸ Hudson and Vore, p.222

policy decision making process and decision making output.⁷⁹ However, still the branches of FPA have challenges ahead. There is still need for development of innovative new methods which will enable the creation of middle range theory and ‘computational modeling’ which is one of the most promising methodological innovations.⁸⁰

Although the first two generations of Foreign Policy Decision Making branch of the FPA were able to establish the legitimacy and show the importance of analyzing the role of group structures and process in the formulation of decision making as well as developing theoretical perspectives to reveal “typical patterns of small and large group behavior observed in the real world”, the challenge that recently scholars face is “unpacking the cognitive tasks that groups engage in”.⁸¹ In addition, related to the analysis of groups’ impact on decision making process, there is a growing number of works in a newly developed sub-area of research regarding the organizational and bureaucratic analysis of less developed countries.⁸²

The current trend in Foreign Policy Context is centering on the determination of necessary conditions of foreign policy context analysis. Especially, psychosocial context of foreign policy is under scrutiny with the emphasis on individual characteristics, perceptions, society and culture, the polity, and the international system.⁸³ Among these aspects of foreign policy context, perceptions and images

⁷⁹ Hudson and Vore, p.222

⁸⁰ Valerie Hudson emphasizes that the methods of FPA are content analysis, in-depth case study, process-tracing, agent-based computational models and simulations. Moreover, the variables of FPA are non-quantifiable which includes culture, small group dynamics, and bureaucratic politics. See Hudson (2005), p.14

Computational modeling is the method that a computer is used to process data because computers are similar to human as they are able to integrate and synthesize a vast amount of information, most of which is unquantifiable, and apply rules of judgment to this information in order to produce a choice. Computational models can also be used to analyze meaning structures within textual data, and, thus, are often employed in discursive analysis in order to provide the simulation of human reasoning. Therefore; according to this model for theorization of the role of reasoning, problem representation, learning, memory, discourse, or analogy in foreign policymaking, the reasoning power of a computer can be programmed to function as an analog to a human reasoner.

See Hudson and Vore, p.223

⁸¹ Hudson and Vore, p.224

⁸² Ibid., p.225

⁸³ For the analysis of psychological factors affect decision makers, FPC researchers generally used operational code and cognitive mapping approaches in order to outline belief systems of various political leaders and predict decision making behavior. For definitions and further detailed information about operational code and cognitive mapping approaches See Vogler, pp.139-142

See also Hudson and Vore, p.226

attract attention of the researchers of FPC more as they are analyzed under the framework of war and deterrence, but there seems to be a need for the exploration of conditions under which and when perceptions and images play an important role in foreign policy calculations.⁸⁴ FPC research area still has the 'national role conception' as one of the few conceptual tools which has been used to show how society and culture serve as a context for a nation's foreign policy.

Apart from the research over democracies and war, small numbers of FPC scholars are interested in the effects of regime change over foreign policy. One of the contributors of this research area is Joe Hagan with his innovative work which constituted a large database on the study of the role of accountability and domestic political constraints on foreign policy formulation that is effected by existing political oppositions to regime.⁸⁵ According to Hagan, regime level opposition consists of regime fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes which is caused by executive and legislative structures".⁸⁶ Through aggregate statistical analysis, Hagan tries to conceptualize the impact of political opposition on foreign policy choice through two sets of measure of regime level opposition, fragmentation and vulnerability.⁸⁷ In his analysis of regime fragmentation, Hagan claims that there

See also Hudson (2005), p.11

⁸⁴ Hudson and Vore, p.226

⁸⁵ Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", C.F. Hermann, C. W. Kegley and J. N. Rosenau eds., **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1987, p.339

⁸⁶ Joe Hagan defines regime fragmentation as the division of central government's power because of influencing political groups, competing personalities, institutions or bureaucracies. Moreover, Hagan describe regime vulnerability as the likelihood that the current leadership will be removed from political office.

See Hagan, p.339

See also Hudson and Vore, pp.227-228

⁸⁷ Concerning the general political influences over the foreign policy formulation, Hagan make a general distinction between open and closed, in other words, democratic and authoritarian regimes by claiming that although open regimes are assumed to be have more intense opposition from various groups and closed regimes as immune from domestic constraints; in fact, closed regimes have domestic constraints to a considerable extent. Therefore; according to Hagan, opposition can occur in any type of regime.

See Hagan, pp.342-344

In addition to Hagan, Christopher Farrands makes a general distinction between open or democratic societies and closed or authoritarian societies. Farrands reminds Smith and Williams' distinction between open or closed models of society in order to explain 'viability' of foreign policy. According to this models, while closed societies can accommodate changes in international system more quickly as they can get over domestic political constraints, open societies confront with opposition in the democratic regime however, in the long term they have the capacity to maintain a viable relationship between foreign policy and the domestic public. Farrands finds these models as too general and refutable and argues that the relationship between social structure and domestic politics is very complex and should be analyzed in detail and with sophistication.

are five basic levels of political fragmentation which are “Regimes dominated by a single, individual leader”, “Regimes dominated by a single, cohesive party/group in which there exist established, autonomous bureaucracies and institutions”, “Regimes dominated by a single party/group that is itself internally divided by established political factions”, “Regimes in which the ruling party/group shares power with one or more minor parties/groups”, “Regimes in which there is no clear dominant party or group- there exist a coalition of autonomous political groups”.⁸⁸ As a result of his aggregate statistical analysis which is different from other researchers who applying more country-specific case study approach, Hagan concludes that democracies have more intense effects of regime fragmentation and regime vulnerability because various political actors able to form the opposition; and, regime fragmentation and vulnerability are positively correlated.⁸⁹

To sum up, FPA is a developing research area with future prospect. Although decision making studies are assumed as only descriptive supplementary information to other explanations instead of being alternative to them, they are in fact more than just descriptive knowledge as they both take into account the causal importance of procedure and knowledge of the purpose.⁹⁰ Along with describing the decision-making process with the specific information about “where the idea originated, who talked to whom, what groups or governmental agencies took part, and the nature and course of debate and discussion”, FPA studies claim that knowledge of objectives and purposes is not sufficient enough to explain foreign policy choice and behavior because different procedures can generate different outcomes as the specific response is determined by the process of arriving at a decision.⁹¹ Nevertheless, not all of the FPA studies proceeded to include an alternative explanation for state behavior with specific reference to causality.⁹² However, this does not imply that the contribution of FPA to IR is insignificant; on the contrary, FPA has been able to introduce the analysis of both material and ideational factors that determine foreign policy choice

See Farrands, pp.88-89

See also Hudson and Vore, p.228

⁸⁸ Hagan, p. 345

⁸⁹ Hudson and Vore, p.228

Hagan, p.358

⁹⁰ Stein, p.199

⁹¹ Ibid., pp.199-200

⁹² Ibid., p.200

and behavior of states on the individual level.⁹³ Moreover, FPA provides more satisfying explanations than traditional approaches by taking human beings into considerations.⁹⁴ Furthermore, FPA research by examining both domestic political constraints and contexts, establishes a common ground between IR and other fields such as comparative politics and public policy.⁹⁵ To summarize, the contribution of FPA scholarship to IR is undeniable.

The significance of FPA for this thesis is that it will be the main framework in terms of theoretical and periodical analysis of the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey. Since FPA includes different strands and theoretical approaches, the Northern Iraq policy will be assessed in the light of this chapter which provides general theoretical perspectives and patterns for the conduct of FPA. However, before theoretical and periodical analysis, the historical background of the relations between Turkey and Northern Iraq should be asserted; hence the next chapter will attempt to introduce a brief representation of the historical background of relations and factors that cause Turkish interest in Northern Iraq.

⁹³ Hudson (2005), p.3

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.4

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.5

SECOND CHAPTER

FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE NORTHERN IRAQ POLICY OF TURKEY

2.1 FACTORS AFFECTING THE NORHTERN IRAQ POLICY

Northern Iraq has always attracted the attention of Turkish foreign policy makers and has been an important asset in foreign policy calculations. It can be assumed that its prominence emanates from various factors including historical factors, terror and socio-cultural factors. As security concerns prevail in foreign policy calculations, Northern Iraq has dominated the agenda due to Kurdish problem in Turkey which was escalated by the establishment of terrorist organization PKK, *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-* Kurdistan Workers' Party in 1984. Due to multiple aspects of the relations between Northern Iraq and Turkey, a number of issues have to be considered when analyzing the factors that affect the relations; but firstly, factors should be introduced successively before the evaluation of relations on theoretical and periodical ground.

2.1.1 Historical Factors

After Turkish Republic was established, its first foreign policy concern towards Middle East and Northern Iraq became the incorporation of Mosul and Kirkuk to Turkish territory as National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) stipulated. However; Mosul issue could not be solved at the Lausanne Conference, which would conclude Turkish War of Independence, and then by bilateral negotiations of Turkey and Britain. As a result, the issue submitted to the League of Nations and solved through its commission which decided the incorporation of Mosul and Kirkuk to Iraq. Finally, the Ankara Agreement in 1926 set the border between Iraq and Turkey by

incorporating Mosul and Kirkuk to Iraq.⁹⁶ Since then; Turkey, to protect and enhance territorial and state power, pursued the aim of Westernization, therefore relations with the Middle Eastern states were not as important as relations with Western states were. Especially after the Second World War, Turkey pursued a passive policy toward Middle Eastern states. Turkish foreign policy toward Middle East was shaped by the principles of non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of all countries in the region.⁹⁷ There are various imperatives behind Turkey's decision of non-involvement in the Middle East issues. The first reason is cultural and ideological which is caused by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's ideological determination of break off ties with Islamic community in the Middle East in the process of nation-state building.⁹⁸ The second reason is driven by security, economic and political concerns which led Turkey to prefer Western states' stable and peaceful relations to relations with insecure and unstable Middle Eastern states.⁹⁹ Turkish foreign policy was in the line of Atatürk's foreign policy principles which aimed the preservation of state and reforms in order to promote Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations via realistic and peaceful means in foreign policy actions.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, it can be said that Turkish foreign policy reflected the famous idea of Ataturk 'Peace at home peace in the world'. Turkish foreign policy aimed to prevent any attempt to interfere domestic politics of Turkey by not interfering any domestic politics of states.

Although Turkey pursued the policy of non-involvement and non-interference towards the Middle East after the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk, Turkish request for Mosul and Kirkuk did not expire. Turkish desire for Mosul and Kirkuk was revealed during and after the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, President Turgut Özal and then his successor Süleyman Demirel declared that Iraqi border was artificial and Mosul

⁹⁶ Mesut Özcan, "Border Concept and Turkey-Iraq Border", Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, No:13, 2002, p.79

⁹⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, "The Future of Turkish Policy toward the Middle East" in **Turkey in World Politics** by Barry Rubin- Kemal Kirişçi, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002, p.130
See also William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol:68, No:4, October 1992, p.681

⁹⁸ Hale, p.681

⁹⁹ Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol:35, No:4, October 1999, p. 170

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.171

and Kirkuk had been taken away from Turkey unjustly.¹⁰¹ This demand for the return of Mosul and Kirkuk was caused by the policy change in Turkey. During the President Turgut Özal's period, Özal initiated new activism in foreign policy formulations. In foreign policy matters, Özal created 'Neo-Ottomanism' or 'Özalist Foreign Policy understanding' which will be later on analyzed in detail. Regarding this specific understanding of foreign policy, Özal claimed that "Turkey was the protector of the Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens in its capacity as the 'big brother' of these peoples arguing that a federation between these peoples was possible under Turkish sponsorship".¹⁰² Despite declarations of Turkish officials regarding Turkey's 'historical rights' on the *Vilayet* of Mosul signified a drastic change in Turkey's traditional stance and suspected as a revival of its historic claims in that region, active foreign policy ceased to exist with the death of Turgut Özal until the Welfare Party period and then the Justice and Development period.¹⁰³

The preliminary purpose of Turkey and its foreign policy has been the survival of the state via the consolidation of territorial integrity. This aim was inherited from the Ottoman Empire which collapsed through the loss of territorial integrity because of the minorities' separatist attempts and rebellions for independence despite struggles for the survival of the state. Particularly Balkan Wars, by which ethnic minorities living in the Ottoman Empire gained their independence, fostered the sense of isolation and mood of xenophobia.¹⁰⁴ As the Turkey was established upon the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, the fear of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire transmitted to new republic and territorial

¹⁰¹ Asa Lungren interprets these declarations as the signs of an undercurrent of irredentism in Turkish foreign policy.

See Asa Lundgren, "Defining and Defending the Turkish Nation", in **The Unwelcome Neighbour-Turkey's Kurdish Policy**, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, New York, 2007, p.36

¹⁰² Sedat Laçiner states that speeches of Turgut Özal indicate change in the traditional pacific policies and Özal's activist Kurdish policy. Moreover, he argues that the Özalist policy challenged the principle of non-involvement in the regional inter-state conflicts and domestic politics of the other countries which are the basics of Turkey's passive foreign policy.

See Sedat Laçiner, "Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?", *Journal of Administrative Sciences* Vol:1, 2003

¹⁰³ O. Bengio and G. Özcan, "Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:37, No:2, 2001, p.70

¹⁰⁴ Feroz Ahmad argues that Sèvres Treaty created a phobia which provokes hostile attitudes towards Kurdish and Armenian questions today.

See Feroz Ahmad, "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy", **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy**, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis eds., MIT Press, 2004, p.12

integrity became the primary objective of the state. This fear was also exaggerated by the Sèvres syndrome which was created by Sèvres Treaty in 1920 imposed on the Ottoman Empire to divide state territories into the zones of influence among Entente powers in addition to creation of an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan with future prospect of independence.¹⁰⁵ Although the treaty was never implemented, it created a phobia which has provoked suspicion towards minorities as they were granted independence or great autonomy by the agreement.¹⁰⁶ Asa Lundgren also mentions the Sèvres syndrome by describing it as a suspicion that Western powers still nourish intentions of dismantling the Turkish territory.¹⁰⁷ Moreover; despite the fact that the treaty was not ratified by the Turkish Parliament as a result of a resistance and liberation movement initiated by Kemal Atatürk and the resistance movement, the impact of the treaty was so intense that its effect still on the agenda when minority rights discussions rise and the suspicion that European powers undermine Turkish territorial integrity still lingers.¹⁰⁸

Besides foreign policy, security perception also shaped by the Ottoman Empire legacy. Security perception was mainly affected by the transformation from multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into a nation state after the First World War. The transformation changed the outlook of the Turkish political elite and the subconscious of the Turkish population.¹⁰⁹ Subsequently, the perception of security of Turkish political elite and Turkish population affected the formulation of Turkish foreign policy objectives.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the traumatic impact of the treaty and the

¹⁰⁵ M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party", *Middle East Policy*, Vol:13, No:1, Spring 2006, p.102

¹⁰⁶ Ahmad, p.9

¹⁰⁷ Lundgren, p.21

¹⁰⁸ Pınar Tank argues that Sèvres syndrome revealed itself in European involvement in Iraq by stating suspicions over the Kurdish insurgency in the early years of the republic that they were instigated by external powers especially by British support to claim Mosul and Kirkuk.

See Pınar Tank, "Analysis: The Effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish Issue in Turkey", *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol:5, No:1, April 2005, p.72

¹⁰⁹ Cengiz Çandar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq" **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy**, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis eds., MIT Press, 2004, p.55

¹¹⁰ Cengiz Çandar describes a 'defensive spirit' in the Turkish foreign policy by underlining the concept of 'security' interlinked by 'foreign policy'. Çandar reveals the xenophobia of founding fathers of the new Turkish Republic which was created by the process of the Ottoman Empire disintegration. According to Çandar, as founders of the Turkish Republic had experience in the Ottoman Empire as civil servants or military commanders, they carried their fears of dissolution and suspicion over the intentions of foreign powers- especially Western states- to the new republic and hence; Turkish foreign

rationale of security shaped by the Ottoman legacy enabled military influence over the politics and foreign policy formulation.¹¹¹

2.2. SECURITY AND SOCIAL FACTORS

2.2.1. Security Concerns and Terror Factor

The most important reason of Turkey's interest in Northern Iraq has been the suffering that Turkey has experienced from the terrorism for about thirty years. The establishment of PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-* Kurdistan Workers' Party) under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan dates back to 1978.¹¹² While the main drive for the establishment of this terrorist organization was establishing an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern Turkey by claiming that it is struggling against state repression and racism¹¹³, state repression against Kurdish activities during the martial law in Kurdish provinces played also an important role for the PKK to find broad support in the Southeast Turkey by radicalizing Kurdish movements.¹¹⁴

policy has been shaped by a defensive spirit and concentrated on the preserving the 'territorial integrity' of the country as foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire attempted to preserve remaining of the territories and achieve the survival of the empire. Furthermore; Çandar exposes the reasons of the overstated influence of military and the ministry of foreign affairs through defensive spirit and the history of the Ottoman Empire which produced an unhealthy, obsessive and paranoid mindset among governing elite. He emphasizes Turks' tendency of regarding military and ministry of foreign affairs not as 'representatives of government policy', but as the 'state' itself.

See Çandar, pp.55-57

¹¹¹ In parallel to Çandar, Philip Robins asserts that the reason for the enduring centrality of security in Turkey is the historical experience of the Turkish state, particularly the traumatic impact of Sèvres Treaty despite the fact that Turkish army was successful to prevent its implementation. In addition, he points out that this rationale of security is used to justify large army of Turkey and excessive and unquestioned power of the military.

See Philip Robins, "Security and Foreign Policy", **Suits and Uniforms**, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., United Kingdom, 2003, pp.161-163

¹¹² David L. Phillips, "Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker's Party", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 30, 2008, p.73

¹¹³ Niyazi Ekici, Murat Özkan and Oğuzhan Ömer Demir, "Turkish Government Policies and the Rise of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL", **Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series)** by O. Nikbay, ISO Press, 2007, pp.346-347

¹¹⁴ Martin van Bruinessen discloses the reasons behind the establishment of the PKK and argues that the traumatic legacy of the Ottoman Empire led Turkish bureaucracy and military elite to an obsession with territorial integrity and national unity and caused their reaction to all forms of Kurdish nationality expression with repression. Moreover, Bruinessen states that the suspicion of foreign powers manipulating Kurds to disloyalty intensified repressive measures over Kurds. Furthermore, he argues that as the legitimization of the state power shifted from religion to the ideology of national unity,

PKK was the most radical of the Kurdish movements which emerged as a small group out of Dev Genç branch of Turkish left movement in 1974 and turned into a party in 1979 to conduct an armed struggle against feudalism and colonialism.¹¹⁵ The PKK was different from other Kurdish parties because while other Kurdish parties have emerged from more traditional Kurdish circles and represented least assimilated Kurdish population with the emphasis upon regional and traditional orientation, the PKK, on the contrary, emerged out of left-wing Turkish groups many of whom were violent.¹¹⁶ The PKK pursued the goal of independent Marxist Kurdistan by declaring the PKK charter which called for a Marxist proletarian revolution and commissioned the PKK as the ‘vanguard of the global socialist movement’ while condemning ‘the repressive exploitation of the Kurds and calling for a ‘democratic and united Kurdistan’ to stop this exploitation.¹¹⁷ The PKK presented itself as a ‘liberation movement’ and voiced the desire to restore Kurdish identity and justice through terrorizing public via violent means.¹¹⁸ Therefore, the PKK purposed to establish a Kurdish state in southeast Anatolia which would be the first step in the establishment of united ‘Greater Kurdistan’ spread over a vast territory including Kurds with different dialects from different countries which are Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.¹¹⁹ When the PKK held its congress in 1978 and established itself under the leadership of Öcalan¹²⁰, its organization was designed in a hierarchical fashion with Stalinist discipline under the strict leadership of Abdullah Öcalan who obtained and maintained his leadership through brutal suppression of dissents and opponents.¹²¹ Abdullah Öcalan has been known as Apo (a diminutive for Abdullah; the word also means ‘uncle’ in Kurdish). Owing to centrality of Öcalan’s

Kurdish nationalism was perceived as a threat posed to state integrity and security. The other reason of the establishment of PKK proposed by Bruinessen is migration from the Kurdish provinces to the cities of western Turkey in 1970s which resulted in the growth and radicalization of the Kurdish movement.

See Martin van Bruinessen, “The Kurds in Turkey”, MERIP Reports, No:121, State Terror in Turkey, Feb. 1984, pp.7-10

¹¹⁵ Bruinessen (1984), p.11

¹¹⁶ Henry J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, “Enter the PKK”, **Turkey’s Kurdish Question**, Rowman & Littlefend Publishers, Inc., 1998, p.21

¹¹⁷ Phillips, p.73

¹¹⁸ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol:7, No:3, 2001, p.12

¹¹⁹ Yavuz, p.12

See Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol:30, No:10, 2007, p.904

¹²⁰ Barkey and Fuller, p.22

¹²¹ Phillips, p.73

leadership which was brutal and intolerant to any opposition, the group referred to itself as the “Apocus” (Apoists), reflecting Öcalan’s central role in shaping the PKK’s identity and destiny.¹²² Moreover, his followers were also called as *Apocu* (Apo-ites) and his movement *Apoculuk* (Apo-ism), terms which became synonymous with the PKK, the terrorist organisation he dominated until his capture in 1999.¹²³

To realize its objective, as the first action, PKK pursued the way of putting pressure on Kurdish elites, landlords and even Kurds have duty in state institutions to force them to choose between loyalty to Turkey or the PKK.¹²⁴ Although PKK was able to make a name for itself as a fighter for the disenfranchised, Abdullah Öcalan had to flee to Syria before 1980 Coup due to the attention of security forces following the success of the PKK in southeast Turkey.¹²⁵ By his flee; Abdullah Öcalan could escape from state repression during the Coup but remaining members of the PKK suffered from human violations of military rule, especially prisoners in Diyarbakır Prison.¹²⁶ The PKK benefited from the conditions constituted by the military regime because the oppression of the military rule led to further politicization and strengthening of Kurdish nationalism.¹²⁷

After real training of PKK recruits in Lebanon, making a name for itself and consolidation of the position in southeast Turkey, PKK initiated its first military attack against the state in August 1984.¹²⁸ Its acts of terrorism ranged from bomb attacks on tourists to armed attacks on vehicles carrying civilians.¹²⁹ As violence was

¹²² Soner Çağaptay and Düden Yeğenoğlu, “Left-Wing Monster: Abdullah Öcalan”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006, p.2

¹²³ Andrew Mango, “Separatist Terror”, **Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone**, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.32

¹²⁴ Mango, p.32

¹²⁵ Barkey and Fuller, p.22

¹²⁶ Aliza Marcus, “The Flight to Survive, 1980–1982”, **Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence**, New York University Press, New York and London, 2007, p.67

¹²⁷ Yavuz, p.10

See also Lundgren, p.47

¹²⁸ Barkey and Fuller, pp.22 and 28

See also Yavuz, p.10

¹²⁹ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, “Türkiye’de Kürt Sorunu ve Son Gelişmeler” **Kürt Sorunu Kökeni Gelişimi-The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict**, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 1997, p.131

regarded as an effective way of obtaining results¹³⁰, between 1984 and 1987, the PKK committed the acts of kidnapping or killing 217 teachers and burning hundreds of rural schools to block the education system as well as the health care system through attacking hospitals and killing doctors and nurses.¹³¹ To combat terrorist activities of PKK, Turkey assumed a heavy burden on its scarce resources. Especially, after the creation of Safe Heaven in Northern Iraq, PKK was able to benefit from absence of military control to establish bases and therefore; Turkey conducted various military operations to Northern Iraq to prevent incursions of PKK. According to a report prepared by the Turkish Treasury, the cost of cross-border operations to Northern Iraq between 1991 and 1997 was \$1 billion.¹³²

The PKK has been an ultra-nationalist organization with the goal of the creation of a unified and independent Kurdish state¹³³ but it also had a political agenda to trigger a social and political revolution among the Kurds in order to transform their society's feudal structure.¹³⁴ For this Marxist-Leninist social and political revolution purpose, the PKK created two other organizations apart from the party. These organizations were the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan¹³⁵ (ERNK) created in 1985 for recruiting new members, providing intelligence and engaging propaganda activities in Turkey and abroad, and People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) formed in 1986.¹³⁶ To provide centrality in the ruling of the organization and to impede the dissolution of power, the PKK adopted a tight paramilitary structure and Leninist 'democratic centralism' which denied any internal debate and any transparency of organization and activity.¹³⁷ Moreover, although the PKK abandoned Marxist and Leninist revolution dream following the dissolution of

¹³⁰ Barkey and Fuller, p.28

¹³¹ Phillips, p.73

See also Barkey and Fuller, p.28

See also Kirişçi and Winrow, p.131

¹³² Kirişçi (2002), p.124

¹³³ Ülkümen Rodoplu, Jeffrey Arnold, and Gürkan Ersoy, "Terrorism in Turkey: Implications for Emergency Management" (Special Report), *Prehosp Disast Med*, Vol:18, No:2, 2003, p.153

¹³⁴ Barkey and Fuller, p.23

¹³⁵ Mehmet Varınlı, "Turkey's Crucial Contributions to the War Against Terrorism", Strategy Research Project, 9 March 2006, p.4

¹³⁶ Barkey and Fuller, p.22

See also Varınlı, p.4

¹³⁷ Barkey and Fuller, p.23

the USSR, tight paramilitary structure and Leninist ‘democratic centralism’ remained. Despite this undemocratic attitude, Barkey and Fuller underline democracy in the organization’s regular congresses in which decisions are taken by democratic procedure. However; they also argue that this democratic approach does not prove the total democratic situation of PKK because it is still controlled by one leader and these activities only confirm that PKK is a political organization which pursues political objectives via political means¹³⁸ and also uses violence to achieve its political goals.¹³⁹ When explaining the structure of the PKK, Phillips mentions that the PKK was financed like a criminal gang ‘through revolutionary’ tax provided from Kurdish businessmen in Turkey via forcing them to pay by means of murder, kidnapping, ransoming and the destruction of personal property.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, financial aids also came from Kurdish Diaspora in Europe through cultural associations and information centers such as the Kurdish Employers Association, the Kurdish Islamic Movement, and the Kurdish Red Crescent in various European countries like Switzerland, Britain, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and Cyprus.¹⁴¹ Since 1984, the Soviet Union, Cyprus, Greece, Armenia, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Bulgaria, and Cuba have also provided logistical and moral support at various times.¹⁴² Apart from these financial sources, the PKK is also financed through drug and arms smuggling, human trafficking and extortion.¹⁴³ Lundgren lists financial sources of the PKK as “the support given by some neighboring countries, the income from illicit drug smuggling, and large sums of money collected from Turkish citizens living abroad.¹⁴⁴ Besides controlling the transportation process of drugs via the Balkans route, the PKK has benefited from heroin production and trafficking to support its terrorist activities as 1996, 1998, and 1999 annual reports of *The International Narcotics Control Strategy*, prepared by the U.S. State Department proved.¹⁴⁵ In the period of time when the PKK was financed most, its annual income was \$500 million and

¹³⁸ Barkey and Fuller, p.24

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.26

¹⁴⁰ Phillips, p.73

¹⁴¹ Svante E. Cornell, “The Land of Many Crossroads: The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics”, *Orbis*, Vol:45, No:1, 2001, p.40

See also Phillips, pp.73-74

¹⁴² Roth and Sever, p.907

¹⁴³ Phillips, p.74

See also Barkey and Fuller, p.30

See also Roth and Sever, p.907

¹⁴⁴ Lundgren, p.70

¹⁴⁵ Roth and Sever, p.907

despite its annual income has declined in 2005; it has still \$150 million annual revenue.¹⁴⁶

During 1990s, the struggle with the PKK reached its peak. One of the reasons behind this rise in struggle with PKK was its change of rhetoric. Despite its Marxist-Leninist stance, the PKK has been a nationalist organization. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it abandoned its Marxist goals and take over a nationalist stance. In addition, after 1995, it changed its approach toward Islam and left its externalization of Islam. Moreover, the PKK gave up the target of creating an independent Kurdish state through forcing Turkish government to increase the cost of counter-terrorism to the extent that Turkish government would not bear and abandon the east and southeast.¹⁴⁷ The PKK started to pursue the policy of political settlement within the existing borders of Turkey with a sort of federalism.¹⁴⁸ These policy changes enabled the PKK to gain the support of moderate views which were troubled with the radical stance of the PKK. Therefore; after 1995, the political influence of the PKK increased while its military power decreased.

Turkey has pursued various acts of counter-terrorism to defeat the PKK. The first precaution Turkey implemented was putting several southeastern provinces under martial law and declaring state of emergency in the late 1980s.¹⁴⁹ When Regional State of Emergency Governorate (known as *OHAL* in Turkish) was introduced in 1987, the region covered by the governorate was including the Kurdish-inhabited zone of southeastern Anatolia.¹⁵⁰ The *OHAL* region included Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van and subsequently expanded to Adıyaman, Bitlis, and Muş and in 1990, Batman and

¹⁴⁶ David L. Phillips argues that it is the revenue concerns PKK leaders most besides terrorism and to prove his idea he quotes an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who says: 'PKK leaders are concerned about survival power, and money-not just about terrorism'. See Phillips, p.74

¹⁴⁷ Barley and Fuller, p.26

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p.25

¹⁴⁹ Phillips, p.74

¹⁵⁰ Yavuz, p.13

Şırnak were added to the region.¹⁵¹ To impede the PKK legally, two laws were stipulated which were article 125 of penal code to preserve the territorial integrity of the state, and Article 8 of the ‘Law for Fighting against Terrorism’ to define terrorism.¹⁵² To counter the guerrilla operations of the PKK, Turkey introduced a massive new Turkish military and security presence into the southeast; however, this presence made the lives of ordinary Kurds far more difficult than before because the PKK forced the state to engage in counterinsurgency tactics that were violent and indiscriminate.¹⁵³ In order to prevent the PKK from using villages near to the borders with Iraq and Iran, until 1996, about 3000 villages were evacuated and many of them burned.¹⁵⁴ Hakan Yavuz claims the number of the evacuated villages was 4000 and one million people were dislocated and had to immigrate to the big cities where they face new and more problems.¹⁵⁵ Differently from Yavuz, Phillips remarks that villagers evacuated from these 3000 villages numbered 378,000.¹⁵⁶ Counter terrorism tactics caused human rights violations and resulted in more radicalization of Kurds and to choose the PKK side.¹⁵⁷ The other way of counter terrorism conducted by Turkey was creating a village guard system. This system was established to cut off PKK access and supply routes; yet as Phillips points out the village guard system, by which the state hired and equipped 60,000 paramilitaries to serve, intended to help villagers defend themselves; but provided only polarization of communities because some of village policemen misused their power.

Another way of Turkey to deal with terrorism has been conducting massive military operations. First major operations were initiated in 1989 and in 1992. In

¹⁵¹ Yavuz, p.13

¹⁵² Phillips argues that the latter was used to criminalize any free discussion about Kurdish problem. See Phillips, p.74

¹⁵³ Barkey and Fuller, p.28

¹⁵⁴ Lundgren, p.48

¹⁵⁵ Yavuz, p.14

¹⁵⁶ Phillips, p.74

¹⁵⁷ Lundgren claims that the state’s counter terrorism tactics were violent and indiscriminate including mass arrests, beatings and torture directed to anyone who was suspected of being a collaborator by the state as a way of counter-terrorism. See Lundgren, p.48
Barkey and Fuller agree with Lundgren that these tactics only served for the more radicalization of Kurds and to choose the PKK side. See Barkey and Fuller, p.28
See also Lundgren, p.48

1993 there were 4,198 clashes between Turkish military forces and the PKK.¹⁵⁸ Kemal Kirişçi asserts that due to hard liners' approach to the Kurdish problem, or in other words terrorism as hard liners assume, prevails, a long series of security operations were conducted.¹⁵⁹ According to hard liners, there is no Kurdish problem but problem of terror which is caused by economic and social problems of southeast Turkey and the support given to the PKK by the international community.¹⁶⁰ Asa Lundgren also exemplifies this hardliner approach through the speech of İsmail Cem, who was Foreign Minister in 2001.¹⁶¹ According to İsmail Cem, 'separatist terror' and backwardness was interlinked. Cem argued that separatist terror supported mainly by Kurdish landlords; therefore, the feudal system and the separatist terror organization have become de facto allies. Moreover, Cem explained that as both the feudal system and terrorism strengthen themselves by feudal values such as 'race', 'kinship' and 'tribal links', they are common enemies of the state which should be eliminated.¹⁶² Hardliners assume that terrorism is caused by economic and educational backwardness; thus, they try to solve the problem through economic development and education activities besides military operations. Most important indicator of these attempts has been the Southeastern Project (known as *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi-GAP*- in Turkish) which was designed to create various dams on the Tigris and Euphrates to benefit from rivers in the region for massive irrigation and hydroelectric scheme.¹⁶³

Turkey's most peculiar way of counter-terrorism has been the usage of Mafia style ultranationalist figures to fight against PKK in coordination with the state institutions such as government, army, corrupt politicians, police force and bureaucrats which constitute so called 'deep state'.¹⁶⁴ Benefiting from manipulative

¹⁵⁸ Phillips, p.74

¹⁵⁹ Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy", **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy**, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis eds., MIT Press, 2004, p. 283

¹⁶⁰ Kirişçi(2004), p.283

¹⁶¹ Lundgren, p.45

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Phillips, p.74

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p.75

Philip Robins gives detailed information about deep state also. See Philip Robins "Back from the Brink: Turkey's Ambivalent Approaches to the Hard Drugs Issue" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol:62, No:4, Autumn 2008, p. 637-638

form of the constitution, which makes constitution open to breaches¹⁶⁵, and inefficiency of the central government, deep state has pursued the ways of asserting and maintaining its privileges and power.¹⁶⁶ Michael Gunter expresses that deep state was revealed by a car accident on 3 November 1996 near the Turkish city of Susurluk, 100 miles southwest of Istanbul, which uncloaked striking connections between the Turkish government's intelligence community and internationally-organized criminal activity involving political assassinations, drug trafficking, and political corruption at the highest levels.¹⁶⁷ As Gunter reported, Susurluk accident involved Hüseyin Kocadağ who was the director of the İstanbul Academy and former deputy director of the National Security Police in İstanbul, Abdullah Çatlı who was an international criminal responsible of various murders, drug trafficking and escaped from the prison; Gonca Us who was a gangster's moll as Gunter described, and lastly Sedat Bucak, the only survivor of the accident, who was deputy and the leader of a Kurdish tribe which included 2000 strong militia deputized as village guards and received more than \$1 million for a month revenue in order to combat against Kurdish separatists.¹⁶⁸ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also

Moreover, Richard Giragosian also defines 'deep state' and underlines Süleyman Demirel's admission of deep state. See Richard Giragosian, "Redefining Turkey's Strategic Orientation", *Turkish Policy Quarterly* Vol:6, No:4, 2007, p.38

¹⁶⁵ Phillips underlines that the Turkish constitution gives extensive privileges to National Security Council to take necessary steps regardless of they are moral or respectful to human rights to protect the state's territorial integrity which is regarded as sacred. See Phillips, p.75

¹⁶⁶ Phillips, p.75

¹⁶⁷ Michale Gunter asserts that Susurluk symbolized the phrases of 'deep state', 'mafia state', 'state within a state' and 'uniformed gangs'.

See Michael M. Gunter, "Susurluk: The Connection Between Turkey's Intelligence Community And Organized Crime", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol:11, No:2, 1998, p.119

See also Robins (2008), pp.637-638

See also Gunter (1998), p.120

¹⁶⁸ Michael Gunter considers deep state as the responsible of thousands of unsolved 'extra-judicial deaths and disappearances' of Turkish civilians of Kurdish ethnic heritage. He argues that the Turkish state ignores crimes of deep state like drug trafficking, murdering their opponents and engaging other illegal activities in return of their services. Their services mainly consisted of murdering civilian Kurdish leaders who help the PKK. Gunter reminds one report which claimed there were as many as 225 assassinations by the end of January 1992, while giving information about another report which added 360 'unsolved murders'- 140 of them in the small city of Batman alone- in the southeast in 1992. Gunter underlines that apart from Kurdish people, ethnic Turks also have become the victims of the deep state. He says 510 people were murdered in 1993, 423 in 1994, while number of murders dropped to 99 in 1995. Besides, Gunter emphasizes that none of these murders resulted in the arrest of the criminal due to certain officials' attempt to cloak the cases while more than 4,000 'separatist suspects' had been captured since January 1992 until 1998.

See Gunter (1998), pp.119-124

admitted the existence of ‘deep state’ and expressed government concerns and efforts to put an end to ‘deep state’.¹⁶⁹

The PKK factor has affected Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, the European Union and the United States. Cengiz Çandar even says “Nearly the whole scope of Turkey’s bilateral relations with any country was fixated on the issue of the PKK”.¹⁷⁰ When the PKK initiated its first strike in 1984, it was backed by Syria and it was using main camps in Syria and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.¹⁷¹ However, as the border between Turkey and Syria was heavily mined and terrain was mountainous, PKK militants preferred to infiltrate into Turkey from Northern Iraq. Nevertheless, main training bases located in Lebanon and Syria during 1980s.¹⁷² After the Coup in 1980, the PKK leaders tried to obtain the protection of Syria to refuge from security forces in Turkey.¹⁷³ Until his flee from Syria, Öcalan managed the PKK from Syria. Until late 1990s, Syria was defined as the foremost supporter of the PKK because of its support in training and protection of PKK leadership.¹⁷⁴ Apart from Syria Iraq and Iran backed the PKK against Turkey especially during 1980s.¹⁷⁵ As the PKK became more active in the political arena in 1990s, it sought the ways of mobilization in Europe. Moreover, in mid-1990s, Turkey accused eight states of directly aiding the PKK and more than these of indirect aiding like helping members of the PKK and its organizations.¹⁷⁶ According to Robins, although foreign support

¹⁶⁹ Emrullah Uslu, "Ulusalçılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey", Turkish Studies, Vol:9, No:1, 2008, p.89

In addition to Susurluk incident, Phillips indicates Şemdinli affair as the exposition of the deep state. Şemdinli affair was the event that a bomb was thrown to a book store from a car and killed its owner in Hakkari province in 2005. The car was belonged to the gendarmerie and bombers were exposed that they were security officers. The incident was also complicated when it was revealed that General Yaşar Büyükanıt made bombers to exonerate through tampering with the judiciary. Moreover, removal of Şemdinli prosecutor from his post and suspension of his license to practice law because of his attempts to unearth Yaşar Büyükanıt’s tampering expanded the extent of the scandal. The incident resulted in great criticism of the military impunity and caused mass protests especially in cities across the Southeast. See Phillips, p.75-76

¹⁷⁰ Çandar, p.57

¹⁷¹ "Turkey and the PKK", Strategic Comments, Vol:14, No:4, 2008, p.1

¹⁷² Philip Robins (2003), p.173

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Marcus, p.99

See also Barkey and Fuller, p.31

¹⁷⁵ Robins (2003), p.173

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

was important for the survival of the organization, support from the Southeast of Turkey was crucial for the PKK.¹⁷⁷

Due to Syrian support for the PKK, relations between Turkey and Syria deteriorated and resulted in reciprocal accusations of both sides. While Turkey accused Syria of becoming a motherland for the PKK, Syria accused Turkey reducing the water flow of Euphrates through constructing dams over the river to punish Syria because of the PKK. Gunter states that Syria had been a heaven for the PKK especially after the Coup in 1980 as Syria enabled the PKK remnants to ensemble and recreate the organization in the territory of Syria.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, Gunter reminds that first three of the PKK congresses were held in Syria.¹⁷⁹ Gunter analyzes the reasons behind cool relations between Turkey and Syria and introduces the factors which spoil the relations. According to Gunter, problematic relations were caused by Syrian dissatisfaction about Turkish annexation of Hatay (Alexandretta) province in 1939; Turkish construction of Atatürk dam over Euphrates which limits the flow of water to Syria; the memories of the harsh Ottoman rule which led to antipathy for Turkey; disagreements over Cyprus, Israel and the PLO leadership; ambitious leader of Syria, Hafez Assad, who aim to occupy dominant role in the region; and lastly friendship between Öcalan and Hafez Assad's brother Rifat.¹⁸⁰ In 1987, between Turkey and Syria a water protocol was signed and in 1993 another protocol was annexed to the 1987 protocol which stipulated cooperation between Turkey and Syria over the issue of security.¹⁸¹ By this protocol Syria promised not to

¹⁷⁷ Robins says "the PKK could not have grown so rapidly and prospered so extensively without the co-operation of Kurdish communities in the south-east of Turkey in particular". Furthermore, in terms of Turkish Foreign Policy, Robins claims that Kurdish insurgency was interlinked with the problematic relations with its difficult neighbors and their support for the PKK. To prove his claim, Robins gives the comment of Mehmet Ali Birand, who is one of the leading journalists and commentators, as an example. As Robin reported Mehmet Ali Birand asserts that Turkey indexed its relations with key states on their stance towards the PKK. In addition, Robins argues that when Kurdish insurgency intensified between 1989 and 1995, the number of countries with whom Turkey had problematic relations increased. See Robins (2003), pp.174-175

¹⁷⁸ M. Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency", *Conflict Quarterly*, Spring 1991, p.9

Phillips, p.76

¹⁷⁹ Gunter (1991), p.9

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ G. E. Gruen, "Turkish Waters: Source of Regional Conflict or Catalyst For Peace", *Water, Air, & Soil Pollution*, Vol:123, No:1-4, 2000, p.569

See also Gunter (1991), p.10

permit terrorist activities in its territory against Turkey. However; Syria could not keep its promise because although Syria enabled the move of the PKK center of operations from Syria itself to Lebanon's Beqaa valley, which was under Syrian military control, Öcalan, the PKK political leader continued to reside and move freely within Syria, despite repeated Turkish demands for his extradition.¹⁸² Due to security concerns of both sides, Turkey and Syria sought to develop military cooperation with other states in order to confront each other. Kemal Kirişçi states that Syria was one of the important factors that led to Israel-Turkey approach and cooperation in security matters especially.¹⁸³ Moreover, Syria attempted to establish military ties with Greece and Cyprus to obtain defense cooperation.¹⁸⁴ This mutual distrust persisted until October 1998 when Syria signed the Adana Memorandum due to Turkish threats of cutting water supplies to Syria¹⁸⁵ and taking military action against Syria unless it stops supporting the PKK.¹⁸⁶ By this memorandum Syria accepted to evict the PKK from Syrian territory and both sides promised to cooperate in security matters such as establishing a hotline between Turkish and Syrian military commanders to prevent unintended incidents.¹⁸⁷ It is argued that in Syria's decision to expel Öcalan, Turkey's determination to end the Syrian support for the PKK by all means including the threat of invasion and showing how Turkey was determined through mass troops on border played very important role.¹⁸⁸ This serious crisis was overcome without any appeal to violence as a result of intensive mediation by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and high level interventions by the Iranians and Americans, who backed Turkey's stance and forced Damascus to agree Turkey.¹⁸⁹ After Öcalan was expelled from Syria, he travelled from country to country to find a place to take refuge. Öcalan's flight was ended when he was eventually captured by Turkish agents in Nairobi, Kenya, and then brought to Istanbul and placed on trial for

¹⁸² It is argued that Syria used Öcalan as a card against Turkey when it had territorial and water disputes with Turkey.

See Gruen, p.569

See Barkey and Fuller, p.32

See also Gunter (1991), p.10

¹⁸³ Kirişçi (2002), p.126

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Phillips, p.76

¹⁸⁶ Gruen, p.569

¹⁸⁷ Phillips, p.76

See also Gruen, p.570

¹⁸⁸ "Kurdish Militancy in Turkey", Strategic Comments, Vol:11, No:5, p.1

See also Kirişçi (2002), p.126

¹⁸⁹ Gruen, p.570

treason in May 1999.¹⁹⁰ When Abdullah Öcalan encountered the fear of capital punishment, he offered to end the PKK's armed struggle in exchange for his life.¹⁹¹ Moreover, after Öcalan was convicted to capital punishment by a Turkish state security court and then his death sentence were switched to life sentence at a maximum security facility on İmralı Island in the Marmara Sea because of European Union's prohibition of capital punishment and Turkey's adaptation of laws to comply with EU norms, he drastically changed his political stance and argued that Kurdish problem can be solved through greater democratization and pluralism rather than armed struggle which aimed secession or federating arrangements.¹⁹² During his imprisonment, on 2 August 1999, Öcalan announced a ceasefire to end Kurdish insurgency.¹⁹³ In addition, he ordered militants to leave Turkey and withdraw to Northern Iraq.¹⁹⁴ Besides, Öcalan expected to be forgiven and take part in politics but instead he faced the death penalty and then life sentence. Therefore; he tried to take part in politics through indirect ways such as putting on a peaceful façade for the PKK by changing the organization's name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and altering the goal of the organization from 'independent Kurdistan' to a 'democratic Turkey' on April 4, 2002.¹⁹⁵ In addition, at the 7th Extraordinary Congress of the PKK in Northern Iraq on 7 February 2000, the leadership of the PKK had decided to give up the armed struggle and adopt a democratic struggle.¹⁹⁶ KADEK planned to reach this goal of 'democratic Turkey' through writing a new constitution for Turkey which would guarantee Kurdish rights and declare Kurds as one of Turkey's two constituent nations together with Turks.¹⁹⁷ To achieve this planning, KADEK avoided from using intensive violence, and gave up earlier armed propaganda tactics such as blocking highway traffic and attacking prestigious military bases, villages, and police stations.¹⁹⁸ Following the ceasefire of the PKK, a period of relative peace began in the southeast and consequently, the state of emergency which was declared in 1987, was removed from the last remaining

¹⁹⁰ Gruen, p.570

¹⁹¹ Phillips, p.76

¹⁹² Kirişçi (2002), p.127

See also Phillips, p.76

¹⁹³ "Kurdish Militancy in Turkey", p.1

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Çağaptay and Yeğenoğlu, p.5

¹⁹⁶ Yavuz, p.16

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

provinces in November 2002.¹⁹⁹ As time goes by, Öcalan started to pursue also violent ways to expand the power of the organization. Çağaptay and Yeğenoğlu argue that KADEK's usage of both political and violent means proved that KADEK was really the PKK; thus, KADEK was added to Foreign Terrorist Organizations List by the State Department on May 1, 2003.²⁰⁰ In 2003, KADEK dissolved itself and created a new, moderate and democratic organization which is called Kongra-Gel, Kurdistan People's Congress.²⁰¹

Relations with Iran have been also intensified over the issue of the PKK. While Turkish officials frequently accused Iran of giving the PKK logistic support and encouraging its attacks inside Turkey in 1980s-1990s, Iranian officials continuously rejected these claims. During 1980s, Iran provided strategic support for the PKK. The relations between Iran and the PKK were so close in the late 1980s that in 1989, Abdullah Öcalan's brother Osman opened a liaison office in Iran and the next year he negotiated the establishment of twenty operational bases from which to strike at targets in Turkish provinces bordering Iran.²⁰² As after Iran- Iraq War and then the Gulf War, the conditions were changed in Iraq and a chaos was created in Northern Iraq, PKK turned its attention towards Northern Iraq and cooperation between Iran and the PKK decelerated. Nevertheless, the PKK used Iranian border to infiltrate to Turkey and it had facilities, including a hospital.²⁰³

Especially, after the capture of Öcalan and end of Syrian support for the PKK, Iran would be a more important target of Turkish criticism for the support for the terrorists and its granting of shelter to the PKK in Iran.²⁰⁴ In this line, Bülent Ecevit, who was the Turkish Prime Minister, accused Iran of 'continuing its efforts to export its revolution and of supporting the PKK', in spite of the recent border security

¹⁹⁹ Lundgren, p.50

²⁰⁰ Çağaptay and Yeğenoğlu, p.5

²⁰¹ Michael M. Gunter, Denise Natali, Robert Olson, Nihat Ali Özcan, Khaled Salih and M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Kurds in Iraq", Middle East Policy, Vol:11, No:1, Spring 2004, p.107

²⁰² Mango, p.37

²⁰³ Mango, p.43

²⁰⁴ Robert Olson, "Turkey- Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: the Kurdish and Islamist Questions", Third World Quarterly, Vol: 21, No: 5, 2000, p. 875

agreements.²⁰⁵ Moreover, Bülent Ecevit accused Iran of taking over Syria's role as the main supporter of the PKK by indicating Iran's host for the 6th annual congress of the PKK.²⁰⁶ It was revealed that Iran's support was not limited to holding congress, besides; Osman Öcalan who was the brother of Abdullah Öcalan was given asylum in Iran and along with several other PKK commanders.²⁰⁷ In addition, the Turkish media exposed several PKK guerrillas confessing that they had been trained in Iran.²⁰⁸ To counter Turkish accusations, on 22 May 1999, Iranian media announced that Turkish border soldiers had killed nine Iranians out of a group of 45 who had been trying to cross into Turkey and dumped their bodies next to a border fence.²⁰⁹ Turkey's bombing raid of 18 July 1999 targeted PKK military bases but Iran claimed Turkey bombed sites in Iran and killed five people.²¹⁰ Besides, Iran arrested two Turkish soldiers who passed the border.²¹¹ Although this incident troubled relations further more but on August 1999 by mutual efforts relations were recovered and two soldiers were released. In this recovery the earthquake of 1999, which caused 20000 people's death and Iran's loss of the PKK card after the capture of Öcalan played an important role.²¹²

After the establishment of the PKK, Turkey's attention has been attracted to Northern Iraq where the PKK militants infiltrate into Turkey. Concerning Iraq, Turkey's first priority, as a result, has been to ensure the existence of a stable government in Baghdad, which will prevent the Kurdish plans for independence or federation in Northern Iraq.²¹³ Moreover, Turkey and Iraq had long term cooperation over the issue of counter terrorism during 1980s. Furthermore, by the authority of cooperation agreement between Turkey and Iraq, Turkish troops routinely entered

²⁰⁵ Olson, p.876

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid. p.877

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Kirişçi (2002), p.126

²¹² Olson, p.888

²¹³ Henri J. Barkey, "Hemmed in by Circumstances: Turkey and Iraq Since the Gulf War", Middle East Policy, Vol: 7, No: 4, October 2000, p.110

Iraqi territory in hot-pursuit operations.²¹⁴ However, Iran-Iraqi War between 1980 and 1988 left a vacuum on the Turkish border, thus; Turkey was periodically to make use of this right of hot pursuit by launching bombing raids into Northern Iraq during the second half of the Iran-Iraq war.²¹⁵ Turkish military operations continued through 1990s until the present. In 1995, Iraq condemned Turkey's military operations to Northern Iraq which, Iraq claimed, was a violation of Iraq's sovereignty and intervention in Iraq's domestic affairs.²¹⁶ After Öcalan initiated cease-fire on 1 August 1999, which continued until June 2004, and most of the PKK retreated to the mountains of Northern Iraq, an area controlled by the Iraqi Kurds but in spite of the cease-fire, PKK terrorist attacks lasted at a low intensity and then increased from 584 in 2000 to 1500 in 2003.²¹⁷ By the end of the cease-fire, the PKK changed its tactics and started to pursue rural insurgency in southeast and urban bombing campaign in the western Turkey.²¹⁸ Moreover, since 2004, the PKK has main training camps and operational headquarters in the Qandil Mountains of Northern Iraq near the Turkish border.²¹⁹ Furthermore, the top commanders of the PKK's military wing still located in Northern Iraq.²²⁰ As the PKK lost its primary supporter, Syria, it lost power and its capability to confront Turkish army, it switched its strategy to hit and run strategy including the tactics of harassing fire, mines, sabotage and bombs.²²¹ It is believed that there are about 3,000-4,500 PKK fighters in northern Iraq, which operate from 65 bases, some right across the Turkish border and others encamped on the Iranian side.²²²

²¹⁴ Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol: 69, No: 4, October 1993, p. 672

See also Barkey (2000), p.110

²¹⁵ Robins (1993), p.672

See also Barkey and Fuller, p.51

²¹⁶ Ramazan Gözen, "Operation Provide Comfort: Origins and Objectives", *Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Periodical*, 1995, p.183

Asa Lundgren also criticizes the policy in Northern Iraq which is described as 'legitimate self-defense for its territorial integrity' but violates Iraq's, sovereignty, and threatens another country's, Iraq's, territorial integrity.

See Lundgren, p.64

²¹⁷ Emrullah Uslu, "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Steps Toward a Solution", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol:30, No:2, p.159

²¹⁸ Turkey and the PKK, p.1

²¹⁹ Roth and Sever, p.906

See also Turkey and the PKK, p.1

²²⁰ See also Turkey and the PKK, p.2

²²¹ Ibid. p.1

²²² Henri J. Barkey and Ellen Laipson, "Iraqi Kurds and Iraq's Future", *Middle East Policy*, Vol:12, No: 4, Winter 2005, p.71

The PKK has been backed by various countries in Europe. Russia, for example, supported the PKK whenever Turkey acted against its interests by hosting the PKK conferences.²²³ Moreover, Germany was the main host of Kurdish Diaspora whose 90 percent support the PKK.²²⁴ Furthermore, the PKK recruits its militants from Kurdish Diaspora in Europe, especially in Germany.²²⁵ To create sympathizers, the PKK benefited from media channels specifically Med-TV which have major studios in Brussels and near Brussels and auxiliary facilities in Köln and Stockholm.²²⁶ Med-TV provides daily news and commentary on the Kurdish world in both Kurdish and Turkish, besides news about the PKK.²²⁷ Turkey was disturbed by the existence of Med-TV and tried to persuade leaders of European countries to prevent broadcast of the Med-TV.²²⁸ Moreover, Turkey attempted to persuade also the Independent Television Commission that Med-TV was a PKK propaganda outfit and that it provokes terrorist violence and succeeded it.²²⁹

The Kurdish Parliament in Exile has been one of the main factors which determine relations between European states and Turkey. The Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE) is in fact a conference which is coordinated occasionally.²³⁰ KPE was established in 1995 and organized its first meeting in the Netherlands.²³¹ Later on, it was called as National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK).²³² It was established as a part of the PKK's attempt to pursue its goals in the political arena.²³³ It purposed placing Kurdish question on the European political agendas and complicating

See also Phillips, p.81

See also Kurdish Militancy in Turkey, p.1

²²³ Barkey and Fuller, p.32

²²⁴ Ibid., pp.32 and 165

²²⁵ Ibid., p.32

²²⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, "Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question", Working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2000, p.15

²²⁷ Barkey and Fuller, p.33

²²⁸ Bruinessen (2000), p.15

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Robins (2003), p.177

²³¹ Bruinessen (2000), p.18

²³² Robins (2003), p.177

²³³ Ibid.

relations between Turkey and European countries.²³⁴ The goal of the KPE was serving as the 'authoritative representative of the Kurdish people' and conducting negotiations with the Turkish state to reach a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.²³⁵ KPE was designed to be diplomatic representative of Kurds in the world; thus, it established various contacts with numerous parties and personalities in Europe.²³⁶ The parliament is transnational because it includes members from Iraqi Kurdistan, members who have asylum in different European states, and Kurds from Turkey.²³⁷ Moreover, its trans-nationality of the KPE derives also from its plenary sessions in different countries of Europe such as the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Russia and Italy in spite of its permanent offices in Brussels. Despite the KPE's broad representative character, its diplomatic successes remained limited.²³⁸ In 1998, for the prospect of the KPE Barkey and Fuller presumed that the KPE would have a major impact on the form of future PKK would take.²³⁹ However; due to limited diplomatic success of the KPE, in 1998 the PKK initiated the preparations of establishing a more broadly representative platform and permanent body higher than the KPE, a Kurdish National Congress which would be modeled on the Palestinian National Congress or Jewish National Congress.²⁴⁰ Although the two large Iraqi Kurdish parties, PUK and KDP, rejected the invitation to join the Congress, Kurdish National Congress appeared to be remarkably pluralistic by containing prominent, influential and charismatic personalities such as experienced politicians, academics, and religious leaders.²⁴¹ The Kurdish National congress held its first session in Amsterdam on May 24, 1999.²⁴²

²³⁴ Bruinessen (2000), p.18

See also Robins (2003), p.177

²³⁵ Barkey and Fuller, p.34

²³⁶ Bruinessen (2000), p.18

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Barkey and Fuller, p.34

See also Bruinessen (2000), p.19

²³⁹ Barkey and Fuller, p.41

²⁴⁰ Bruinessen (2000), p.19

See also Barkey and Fuller, p.38

²⁴¹ Bruinessen (2000), p.19

²⁴² According to Bruinessen, since the establishment of Kurdish National Congress, it was able to represent a major step in Kurdish nation-building that, Bruinessen considers, is not have been possible in Kurdistan itself but only in the diaspora See Bruinessen (2000) pp.19-20

2.1.3 Socio-Cultural Factors

The most important socio-economic factor that causes Turkish concern in Northern Iraq has been Kirkuk and its Turkmen population. In the process of incorporation attempts of Turkey for the Mosul-Kirkuk in 1920s, Turkey based its claims, which were renounced officially in 1926, on the earlier Ottoman rule and remarkable Turkmen population in the region which constitutes 2 to 3 percent of the total Iraqi population, about 300,000 to 500,000.²⁴³ Kirkuk has always been a problematic issue for Turkey because the Kurds claimed Kirkuk as a Kurdish city and further their historical capital until they were expelled from the city during the Ba'at Regime after the monarchy regime ended in 1958 because of Arabization policy.²⁴⁴ During Saddam Hussein's rule, more than 100,000 Kurds were moved from Kirkuk by the policy of Arabization.²⁴⁵ Moreover, while Kurds were being expelled, Turkmen were also driven from Kirkuk and Arabs settled down to places left by Kurds and Turkmen.²⁴⁶

Rather than, or besides kinship, Turcoman minority in Northern Iraq has been important for Turkey because Turkey has regarded Turkmen minority as an obstacle for the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish state as it would prevent it by the protection of Turkmen minority which is heavily populated in Northern Iraq but does not constitute majority.²⁴⁷ In the last reliable census which was conducted in 1957, Turkmen population in Kirkuk town was the biggest while Kurds were majority in the surrounding countryside, however; after the Arabization policy and then the Gulf War, Kurds has pursued a policy of 'Kurdification' which aimed changing the demography of Kirkuk in favor of Kurds which would enable the incorporation of Kirkuk to autonomous Kurdish region. A demographic battle over Kirkuk began

²⁴³ Graham E. Fuller and Lan O. Lesser with Paul B Henze and J. F. Brown, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation", **Turkey's New Geopolitics From the Balkans to Western China**, Westview Press/a Rand Study, 1993, p.60

²⁴⁴ Tank, p.81

See also Lundgren, p.112

²⁴⁵ Tank, p.81

²⁴⁶ Lundgren, p.112

²⁴⁷ Tank, p.80

after the invasion of Iraq by the US forces and Kurdish peshmerga entered the city in coordination with the US forces.²⁴⁸ After the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey increased its attacks on Iraqi Kurds' claims on Kirkuk, accusing Iraqi Kurds of forcibly changing the demographics of Kirkuk and oppressing Turkmen minority with whom Turkey has kinship.²⁴⁹ Moreover; William Park also underlines that the rights and the protection of Turkmen became one of the Ankara's 'red lines' in its opposition to US war plans in Iraq and since then Turkey is still concerned about Turkmen minority and the status of Kirkuk.²⁵⁰

US support for Kurds in Iraq during and after the Iraq War in 2003 led to Kurds to be more assertive in their claims over Kirkuk and pressure non-Kurds to accept their dominance over the region. Kurds in Kirkuk attempted to assert their hegemony over minorities by renaming streets and institutions, flying the Kurdish flag at various places in the city and seizure public buildings.²⁵¹ Turcoman and other minorities are disturbed by the objective of the Kurdish parties which is to incorporate Kirkuk into the federal Kurdish region as its capital; instead, they prefer Kirkuk having a special status as a federal region which is governed by neither Baghdad nor the Kurdish regional government.²⁵² Turkish fears about Kurdish controlled Kirkuk do not only derive from Turkmen minority but also substantial oil wealth of Kirkuk which, Ankara suspects, can be used as a source for independence of autonomous Kurdistan.²⁵³ While some sources claim that the oil resources of Kirkuk region produced 1.5 million barrels per day in 1990, some state the oilfields of Kirkuk contain around 15 percent of Iraq's oil, about 113 million barrels in possible reserves.²⁵⁴ Both Lundgren and Fuller believe that Kirkuk oil can be a very important factor in determination of Kurdistan's future. As Turkey is also concerned

²⁴⁸ Lundgren, p.113

²⁴⁹ Henri J. Barkey, "Kurdistanoff", *The National Interest*, Jul/Aug. 2007, p.52

²⁵⁰ William Park, "Turkey, Northern Iraq and the Kurdish Problem", *Regional In/Security: Redefining Threats and Responses*, Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe (eds.), Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Publication, No: 593, Ankara, 2007, pp.211-212

²⁵¹ Lundgren, p.113

²⁵² Tank, p.81

²⁵³ Lundgren, p.113

²⁵⁴ Fuller, p.60

See also Tank, p.82

See also Lundgren, p.115

about the future of the region, it is anxious about Kirkuk referendum which would be organized in 2007 but postponed and could not be conducted up to now.²⁵⁵ Turkey fears that Kirkuk referendum will enable the establishment of independent Kurdistan by providing the incorporation of Kirkuk to Kurdish Regional Government.

As it is seen throughout the chapter, the most preminent factor that affects the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey has been PKK terror emanates from Northern Iraq since it has been dominated the agenda of foreign policy decision making. Therefore, this chapter has focused mainly on the explanation of this factor rather than emphasizing the historical or socio-cultural factors. Since going deep into the historical and socio-cultural factors would transcend the scope of the thesis, historical and socio-cultural sections are intended to be a brief introduction. Nevertheless, socio-cultural factors, especially the Turcoman minority, will be mentioned again later, although limited information has been introduced in this chapter. After examining the factors that affect TFP towards Northern Iraq, actors also shaping TFP should be analyzed. The next chapter is intended to do so.

²⁵⁵ Barkey (2007), p.52

THIRD CHAPTER

ACTORS THAT AFFECT THE NORTHERN IRAQ POLICY OF TURKEY

3.1 ACTORS AFFECTING THE NORHTERN IRAQ POLICY

Turkey's foreign policy towards Northern Iraq has been shaped by various actors. These actors include Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and political figures in its political structure, Iran, Syria and the United States especially after the Iraqi invasion in 2003. Political figures in KRG political system consist of two main parties which are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and their charismatic and influential leaders subsequently Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Among these components, most effective ones over the formation of Turkish foreign policy have been political figures in the KRG and the United States, which is dominant power in world politics. Therefore, when analyzing the actors in Turkey's Northern Iraq Policy through this chapter, the emphasis will be the roles of these actors on the Kurdish question from 1940s to 2010.

3.1.1 The Kurdistan Democratic Party and The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

3.1.1.1 Historical Background of KDP and PUK

Two headstones of the Kurdish political system are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Kurdistan Democratic Party is the party which was established first in the political system.²⁵⁶ In 1946, the party was established under the presidency of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, although he

²⁵⁶ Gareth R. V. Stansfield regards the establishment of the KDP as the most important event in the development of the Kurdish political system. See Gareth R. V. Stansfield "The Development Of The Party Political System", **Iraqi Kurdistan-Political Development And Emergent Democracy**, RoutledgeCurzon, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2003, p.61

was in exile, under the name of Kurdish Democratic Party.²⁵⁷ Kurdish Democratic Party arranged its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946.²⁵⁸ The party changed its name to Kurdistan Democratic Party in the Third Congress of 1953 in order to express the nationalist characteristic of the party and departure from the Government of Iraq (GOI).²⁵⁹ After the Mullah Mustafa Barzani's movement collapsed in 1975, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was established on 1 June 1975 under the leadership of Jalal Talabani.²⁶⁰ The PUK declared its aim as 'organizing the revolutionary, patriotic and democratic forces of the Kurdish people in the form of a broad democratic and patriotic front that allows the fighting for unity and coexistence of the different progressive tendencies under the leadership of a Kurdish revolutionary vanguard'.²⁶¹ These two parties have played a very important role in the form of political structure of the Iraqi Kurdistan and the determination of its future. In order to understand the current political dynamics of the Iraqi Kurdistan, the chronological analysis of the events which resulted in the current political structure of Iraqi Kurdistan is needed.

Kurds, for the first time, had been promised an independent state by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and then the Treaty of Sèvres.²⁶² In the Middle East, Kurdish people are accepted as the nation without a state since the failure of the promised state by the Treaty of Sèvres as the treaty could not be applied. Treaty of Sèvres which was signed by the Allied Powers and the Ottoman government in 1920, envisaged an independent Kurdish state.²⁶³ Article 62 of the Treaty enabled the creation of a Commission consisted of the French, Italians and British, which would, within six months of the treaty entering into force, draft a scheme of local autonomy

²⁵⁷ Carole A. O'Leary, "The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol:6, No:4, December 2002, p.23
See also Stansfield, p.66

²⁵⁸ Stansfield, p.66

²⁵⁹ O'Leary, p.23

See also Stansfield, p.66

²⁶⁰ Alexander Dawoody The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq's Statehood, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol:41, No:5-6, 2006, p.489

See also Stansfield, p.80

See also O'Leary, p.23

²⁶¹ Stansfield, p.80

²⁶² Dawoody, p.485

²⁶³ Kerim Yıldız, "The Kurds in Iraq The Past, Present and Future", Pluto Press, London, 2004, p.10

for the Kurdish covering the east of the Euphrates, south of Armenia and north of Syria and Mesopotamia with safeguards for other minorities within these areas.²⁶⁴ Moreover, Article 64 of the Treaty enabled the call for independence of Kurdish population through a referendum after one year of the implementation of the treaty. After the referendum, if the majority of the Kurdish population in this area called for independence, Kurds in Mosul would be citizens of the newly independent Kurdish state and the Kurdish state would be a member of the League of Nations.²⁶⁵ The Treaty also stipulated Ottoman Empire's agreement to renounce all rights to the area. However, the Treaty of Sèvres was not implemented and became a disappointment for Kurds in terms of accessing an independent Kurdish state. Northern Iraq, which was supposed to be independent, was incorporated to Iraq by the Lausanne Treaty after the discovery of oil.²⁶⁶

Spread over the border region of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria about 25 million Kurds make up of the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East after Arabs, Persians, and Turks.²⁶⁷ As Kurds could not have their own state they had to be a minority among other nations in Middle Eastern States that are Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.²⁶⁸ Kurds have claimed that they experienced different kinds of repressions from the authoritarian regimes of Iran, Turkey and Syria; however, Iraq has been mostly associated with repression and genocide.²⁶⁹ Although Iraq became independent state in 1932, it was under the mandate of Britain until 1958 and during this period Britain provoked Kurdish nationalism but not independence to keep Iraq

²⁶⁴ Yildiz, pp.10-11

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p.11

²⁶⁶ Dawoody, p. 485

²⁶⁷ Michael Rubin asserts that systematic censuses of the Kurdish population are not available but it is agreed that there are approximately 12 million Kurds are in Turkey, 4.5 million in Iraq, 6 million in Iran, 1 million in Syria, and 500,000 in the Caucasus. The Kurdish diaspora numbers approximately 1 million. Moreover; Rubin underlines that many Kurds claim their population exceeds 30 million. See Michael Rubin, "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?", *Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Research*, Vol:70, No:1, 2003, pp.295 and 324

²⁶⁸ In the Middle East, the world's 25 million Kurds have endured a long and bitter history of either real or de facto statelessness, straddling the upland border region of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.

See Bill Berkeley, "Stateless People, Violent States", *World Policy Journal*, MIT Press, 2009, p.7

Alexander Dawoody argues that although Kurds have a distinct language, common culture, ancient land, shared history, and a large population, they are deprived of a nation-state; and, this statelessness has created a sense of pessimism within the Kurdish psyche that they see no remedy for except through some form of self-rule.

See Dawoody, p.485

²⁶⁹ Lundgren, p.107

in its control.²⁷⁰ However, this supported Kurdish nationalism resulted in various Kurdish revolts. Although Kurds started to revolt in early 1920s, rebellions against Iraqi Government intensified in 1960s after the July 1958 Revolution in Iraq which toppled monarchy. As a result of intermittent warfare of Government of Iraq (GOI) and Kurds, GOI had to promise providing autonomy for Kurds within four years by the March Agreement in 1970.²⁷¹ This agreement was negotiated by Saddam Hussein and by Mahmoud Othman on behalf of the KDP and then announced on 11 March 1970.²⁷² By this agreement most of Barzani's demands were met such as adoption of Kurdish language as the official language in areas where the majority of the population was Kurdish alongside Arabic, the right of education in Kurdish, full participation to the government of Iraq, a Kurdish vice-president of Iraq, reallocation of funds for the development of Kurdistan and lastly unification of Kurdish majority areas as one self-governing unit.²⁷³ Thanks to this success, Mullah Mustafa Barzani was recognized as the legitimate leader of the Kurds and therefore, Talabani had to dissolve his militia and political faction and joined Mullah Mustafa Barzani's forces.²⁷⁴

Fighting between GOI and Kurds resumed in 1973 when Barzani realized that Saddam Hussein lacked the will to implement the manifesto. Meanwhile, in 1974 Saddam Hussein imposed his own Autonomy Law which included articles of 1970 Manifesto to some extent.²⁷⁵ Although the agreement fulfilled certain demands, it felt short of Barzani's expectations because it did not incorporate Kirkuk to the Kurdish region besides imposing a vastly more central government control over the region than was envisaged by the March Manifesto.²⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the Autonomy Law of

²⁷⁰ Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992, p.476

²⁷¹ Dawoody, p.488

²⁷² Yıldız, "Kurds under Barzani", p.18

See also O'Leary, p.25

²⁷³ Yıldız, p.18

²⁷⁴ Dawoody, p.488

²⁷⁵ Yıldız, p. 19

See also Stansfield, p.76

²⁷⁶ Natasha Carver, "Is Iraq Kurdistan a State such that It can be said to Operate State Systems and Thereby Offer Protection to Its Citizens", *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Oxford Univ Press, 2002, p.66

See also O'Leary, p.26

1974 allowed the creation of Kurdistan which would be an autonomous area governed by an elected legislative and executive council besides the participation of the Kurds in the central government of Baghdad with five ministers while there had previously been two.²⁷⁷ Therefore, it enabled Kurdistan to be established as a self-governing region that had considerable authority over its own social and economic affairs.²⁷⁸

While Autonomy Law was expected to consolidate peace between Kurds and GOI, as 'Iraqi concessions to the Kurdish minority were more seeming than real'²⁷⁹, the tension between Kurds and GOI rose by the end of 1973 and then turned into armed conflict in April 1974²⁸⁰. During this armed conflict, Iran and the US supported Iraqi Kurds. Iran was supporting Iraqi Kurds because of its border and water disputes with Iraq²⁸¹. The US was supporting Kurds in order to put pressure on the Iraqi Government.²⁸² To end the dispute between Iraq and Iran, in early 1975, a peace agreement was signed at a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Algiers.²⁸³ By this agreement Iran gained the control over the half of the disputed waterway besides Iraq would give up its claim on Khuzestan which was one of Iran's oil-rich regions.²⁸⁴ After this agreement was signed, Iran withdrew its military support of the Kurds and the US ceased supporting Iran to back Kurds indirectly. The loss of supporters led to the collapse of the Kurdish nationalist leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani's armed struggle against the Baghdad regime.²⁸⁵

See also Yıldız, "The 1974 Autonomy Law", p.20

²⁷⁷ Saad Naji Jawad, "The Kurdish Question In Iraq: Historical Background And Future Settlement", Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol:1, No:1, 01 January 2008, p.31

²⁷⁸ Yıldız, p.20

²⁷⁹ Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, "The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq", Focus on Islamic Issues, Cofie D. Malbouisson ed., Nova Science Publishers, 2007, p.32

²⁸⁰ Jawad argues that the policy of centralization of Baathist Regime, which made Kurdish decisions subject to the control of GOI, was one of the main reasons of Kurdish rebellion. See Jawad, p.31

See also O'Leary, p.26

²⁸¹ Yıldız, p.23

²⁸² O'Leary, p.26

²⁸³ Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran's Transformation from Revolutionary to Status Quo Power in the Persian Gulf", retrieved www.wilsoncenter.org (19 August 2009), p.2

See also O'Leary, p.26

See also Yıldız, p.23

²⁸⁴ Yıldız, p.23

²⁸⁵ Tozun Bahçeli and Peter Fragiskatos, "Iraqi Kurdistan: Fending Off Uneasy Neighbours", International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol:2, No:1, 2008

See also David McDowall, "The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review", **The Kurds- A Contemporary Overview** Philip G.Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl eds., Routledge Press, London and New York, 1992, p.21

Following the end of rebellion, Kurdish supporters of the rebellion had to leave Iraq and move to refugee camps mainly in Iran but many who could not escape were murdered.²⁸⁶ Once Mullah Mustafa's Movement collapsed in 1975, Talabani found a change to retake the stage in politics of Iraqi Kurds and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the protection of Syrian intelligence.²⁸⁷

At the beginning of 1960s, Baath government initiated the policy of Arabization especially in the areas of strategic, economic or political importance to Iraq.²⁸⁸ When Barzani refused to accept 1974 Autonomy Law and started armed struggle against GOI, more than 100,000 refugees fled to camps across the border with Iran.²⁸⁹ Subsequent to collapse of the Barzani movement, Baath government commenced the second phase of Arabization policy.²⁹⁰ Arabization policy of the government was applied especially at Kirkuk region due to its economic importance. This policy stipulated deporting or murdering Kurds, including deportation of Shi'a Kurds living in Baghdad to Iran, in addition to removing them to refugee camps by force, or resettling them in collective towns.²⁹¹ Moreover, in the framework of this policy the usage of Kurdish language in schools and in media was banned.²⁹² Kurdish villages and wells in border areas were destroyed and Arabs were transplanted into Kurdish areas. The border area was restricted and anyone found entering this 20-km. strip was imprisoned and executed.²⁹³

On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein initiated a full-scale attack against Iran which led to an eight years war between Iran and Iraq.²⁹⁴ During the Iraq-Iran

See also Jawad, p.32

See also Dawoody, p.489

²⁸⁶ O'Leary, p.26

²⁸⁷ McDowall, p.22

See also Dawoody, p.489

See also Carver, p.66

²⁸⁸ O'Leary claims that Iraqi Government, in addition to Arabization Policy, implemented ethnic cleansing to Kurdish populated areas. See O'Leary, p.26

²⁸⁹ Yıldız, p.23

²⁹⁰ Vanessa Acker, "Religion Among The Kurds: Internal Tolerance, External Conflict," Kennedy School Review, Vol:5, 2004, p.102

See also O'Leary, p.26

²⁹¹ O'Leary, p.26

²⁹² Acker, p.102

²⁹³ O'Leary, p.26

²⁹⁴ Stansfield, p.89

war, in general Iraqi Kurds allied with Iran.²⁹⁵ However, both Iran and also Iraq benefited from Kurdish factions. Close to the end of the war, as the Iranian–Kurdish collaboration achieved considerable success, Iraq appealed to lethal counter-measures including the use of chemical weapons in 1987, and the infamous al-Anfal Campaigns of 1988.²⁹⁶ Anfal was the term which was used by the Baath Government to refer to a series of eight military offences against Iraqi Kurds, but the term originally comes from one of the verses of Koran which means ‘spoils of (holy) war’.²⁹⁷ Through al-Anfal Campaign, Iraqi government tried to punish the Iraqi Kurds for their collaboration with Iran following the conclusion of the eight-year Iraq–Iran war.²⁹⁸ Michael Gunter defines al-Anfal Campaign as ‘the officially administered mass murder of ... at least 100,000 noncombatant Kurds, perhaps more, beginning no later than February 1988 and ending sometime in September of that same year’.²⁹⁹ This extensive, devastatingly cruel campaign against the Kurds which lasted from February until September 1988 caused the annihilation of hundreds of Kurdish villages in northern Iraq while about two hundred thousand Kurds were killed in air strikes, chemical weapons attacks, and mass executions.³⁰⁰ Al-Anfal Campaign led to the destruction of an estimated 3,000 villages, the displacement of approximately 1.5 million people and the mass execution of civilians.³⁰¹ Among the casualties, estimated as 100,000, noncombatant Kurds attracted the attention of international society because 5,000 Kurds were killed by systemic use of chemical weapons in the Kurdish town of Halabja in 16 March 1988.³⁰²

²⁹⁵ Acker, p.102

²⁹⁶ Bahcheli and Fragiskatos, p.76

See also Stansfield, p.90

²⁹⁷ Yıldız, p.25

See also Stansfield, p.46

²⁹⁸ Bahcheli and Fragiskatos, p.76

²⁹⁹ According to Michael M. Gunter by naming the operation ‘Anfal’, the Iraqis were providing a religious justification for the Kurds’ slaughter.

See Michael M. Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State In Northern Iraq”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol:14, No:2, 1993, pp.295-296

³⁰⁰ Acker, p.102

³⁰¹ According to Kerim Yıldız, while exact figures have yet to be established, there are about 180,000 people were killed as a result of the Anfal campaigns. See Yıldız, p.25

³⁰² On the contrary to most of the analysts, Alexander Dawoody claims that the Kurdish tribal leadership manipulated the Halabja incident and instantly blamed the Iraqi government for the bombings while analysts in the US Army War College reported that actually Iran gassed Halabja not Iraq. See Dawoody, 490

See also Quil Lawrence, "The accidental nation", *Media, War & Conflict*, Vol:1, No:141, 2008, p.142

See also Olson, p.477

See also Stansfield, p.90

3.1.1.2 The First Gulf War and KDP and PUK

On 2 August 1990, in order to recover from debts of the war with Iran, Iraq invaded Kuwait for its oil reserves.³⁰³ After the invasion, international society reacted unexpectedly jointly. The most striking response to the invasion of Kuwait came from the US. Besides putting a freeze on all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets; the US banned all trade and financial relations with Iraq.³⁰⁴ After Saddam Hussein's refusal to give up the invasion of Kuwait the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 660 under the influence of the US, which condemned the invasion and demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.³⁰⁵ On August 6, 1990, the UNSC passed Resolution 661 which imposed comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq.³⁰⁶ These sanctions were realized upon the United Nations experts' recommendation because after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq got the access of 10 percent of the world's oil supply and a production capability of four million barrels per day.³⁰⁷ As Iraq have exported most of its oil through its pipelines with Turkey, like the 600-mile Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, Turkey's role in the implementation of the sanctions was vital.³⁰⁸ Turkey was dependent on the pipelines as well as Iraq; thus, Turkey's foreign policy elites refrained from closing the pipelines while President Turgut Özal regarded the situation as a chance to reassert Turkey's strategic importance through enabling the application of sanctions.³⁰⁹ Due to Özal's domination in the foreign policy formulation, the government decided to close Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline on 8

³⁰³ Lawrence, p.141

³⁰⁴ Cameron S. Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Turkish Studies*, Taylor & Francis, Vol:8, No:1, March 2007, p.85

³⁰⁵ Phyllis Bennis argues that the United States obtained the change of reasserting its superpower thanks to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

See Phyllis Bennis, " 'And They Called It Peace': US Policy on Iraq", *Middle East Report*, No:215, Summer 2000, p.5

See also Brown, p.86

³⁰⁶ William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", *International Affairs*, Vol:68, No:4, October 1992, p.683

See also Brown, p.86

³⁰⁷ Brown, p.86

³⁰⁸ William Hale asserts that without Turkish cooperation, any effective embargo would have been quite impossible.

See Hale, p.684

³⁰⁹ Cameron Brown states that besides realizing that it could be a threat to Turkey's long term security, Özal wanted to prove anew Turkey's value to its Western allies while every other group including the Foreign Ministry, military, parliament and the public was concerned about preserving the country's historic neutrality which enabled securitization of territorial integrity. See Brown, pp.86-87

August 1990.³¹⁰ In addition to closure of the pipeline, when UN Security Council passed a resolution which supported the ‘interdiction’ policy of the US to enforce the UN embargo legally, Özal wanted to send one warship in order to demonstrate active Turkish participation; but, he later changed his mind due to the fear of an appeal to the Constitutional Court.³¹¹

When it was revealed that economic embargo could not force Iraq to leave Kuwait, the United States and its allies decided to appeal military options to force Saddam Hussein to evacuate Kuwait.³¹² From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and its allies in coalition forces conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, a campaign in which air operations played a preeminent role and defeated Iraq rapidly. The US-led forces air strikes resulted in the loss of estimated 200,000 military and civilian lives.³¹³ On February 15, US President George H. W. Bush called Iraqi people to topple Dictator Saddam Hussein.³¹⁴ Despite devastating defeat by the coalition forces in the war, Saddam Hussein stayed in power and confronted with rebellions of Shiite in the south and Kurds in the north.³¹⁵ Kurdish insurgency could not live long because of Iraqi government’s massive and quick

³¹⁰ Hale, p.684

³¹¹ Brown, p.87

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Phyllis Bennis argues that the reason why international society accepted the economic sanctions and years of illegal air strikes was the demonization of Iraqi population supposed to be consisted of 23 million Saddam Husseins. Moreover, Bennis states that public passivity which was created by the lack of information about civilian suffering played also important role in the determination of public approach to the war. See Bennis, p.5

See also Olson, p.485

³¹⁴ Colonel Donald G. Goff claims that President Bush’s press statements gave hope to both the Kurds in the north and Shiite Muslims in the south of Iraq that they had the support of the US to topple Saddam Hussein but they misinterpreted this support and believed in US military support for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein while President Bush intended only to offer moral support.

See Donald G. Goff, “Operation Provide Comfort”, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, May 1992, p.2-3

See also James Cockayne and David Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003”, Security Dialogue, Vol:37, No:123, 2006, p.124

Daniel Byman also asserts that Washington avoided any formal commitment to either the Kurds or to the Shiites and direct military support. According to Byman, in both cases the US waited until an outcry in domestic and international public opinion before acting. See Daniel Byman, “After the Storm: U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Since 1991”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol:115, No:4, Winter 2000-2001, p.499

³¹⁵ Sami Zubaida, "Introduction", **The Kurds A Contemporary Overview**, p.2

See also Olson, p.485

See also Yıldız, p.34

response to the rebellion, which was led by KDP and PUK, within days.³¹⁶ Western states had to choose whether help the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions or not. If they support the rebellions, Iraq might face the threat of disintegration in the lines of ethnic enclaves which would endanger the territorial integrity of Syria, Turkey, and Iran, and result in regional instability. If they did not support the rebellions, Saddam Hussein might commit human rights violations when dealing with the rebellions.³¹⁷ While Western powers had to decide what to do, Iraqi operations which were turned from Kuwait were sent over the Kurdish factions in the north.³¹⁸ The counter-insurgency of Iraqi government caused 1.5-2 million Kurds, which made up the half of the entire Kurdish population, flee for their lives into the snowy mountains on the Turkish and Iranian borders³¹⁹. When Iran opened its borders, Turkey hesitated because of its own Kurdish problem in the southeast.³²⁰ Moreover, Turkish government worried about the long term responsibility of Kurdish refugees especially their care and accommodation without any aid from the international community.³²¹ The exodus of Kurds resulted in a humanitarian crisis which attracted the attention of international society.

Although before the Gulf War the UN had pre-positioned supplies and facilities in all three of Iraq's neighbor countries which are Turkey, Syria and Iran, to accommodate the estimated 300,000 refugees which would or could have been created during the war, in the war the refugees outnumbered the predictions and created the 'highest rate of influx' in the forty-year history of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).³²² During the war, only 65,000 Kurds fled after the coalition bombing started and insufficiency of the pre-positioned supplies was revealed by the crisis created after the fighting had ended between Iraq and the allies.³²³ As time goes by, the refugees' situation became worse as the half million Kurdish refugees attempted to reach Turkey through mountain passes where there

³¹⁶ Jawoody, p.489

³¹⁷ Cockayne and Malone, p.125

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Hale, p.687

See also Cockayne and Malone, p.125

³²⁰ Lawrence, p.148

³²¹ Hale, p.688

³²² Yıldız, pp.36-37

³²³ Ibid., p.36

were inaccessible areas with little shelter, water or cover while the lack of roads made the provision of supplies almost impossible.³²⁴

The flood of Kurdish refugees forced Turkish government to take action against heart rendering humanitarian crisis. The influx of Kurdish refugees into Turkey during March and April 1991 complicated Turkey's own Kurdish problem as there were already 30,000 Iraqi Kurds still in Turkey as a result of the al-Anfal campaigns.³²⁵ By the middle of April, Turkey decided to refuse Kurdish refugees to move from the mountains into more hospitable terrain on the Turkish side of the border, despite most of the refugees being hopelessly under-prepared for the winter conditions of the mountains; therefore, they have to be sent back to Northern Iraq.³²⁶ Turkey called for the establishment of refugee camps in Iraq, but the security of Kurdish refugees was at stake and hence their protection should be primary concern. While Iran opened its borders and let the greatest number of refugees cross into its borders, where they enjoyed a better welcome than Turkey, Turkey let a tiny number of refugees to cross the border each day.³²⁷ Iran hosted around a million Iraqi refugees crossed the border, and approximately 150,000 camped on the border.³²⁸ Moreover, Iran provided ninety-four camps and reception areas were established, many within towns destroyed during the Iran–Iraq War.³²⁹

3.1.1.3 Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Safe Haven

On 5 April, United Security Council declared Resolution 688 by which Iraq agreed to ensure safe passage of relief supplies and provide forms of logistical

³²⁴ Yıldız, p.37

³²⁵ Sabri Sayari, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol:26, No:3, Spring 1997, p.46

³²⁶ Hale, 688

See also Yıldız, p. 37

³²⁷ Lawrence, p.148

³²⁸ Yıldız, p.37

See also Lawrence, p.147

³²⁹ Yıldız, p.37

support besides creating no-fly zone in Northern Iraq.³³⁰ By claiming that the Security Council was exceeding its powers with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security between states, Yemen, Zimbabwe and Cuba opposed the resolution while China and India abstained for the same reasons.³³¹ Nevertheless, the resolution passed because it aimed to prevent the creation of further refugees which was a threat to international security and it took into consideration the crime against humanity which was an international concern in those circumstances.³³² By this resolution, for the first time the UN Security Council demanded improvement of a human rights situation as a contribution to international peace and security.³³³ The resolution reaffirmed the territorial integrity and did not mention any autonomous right that the Kurds might have; the US-British led force including France and supported by Turkey which declared a 'safe-haven' in a small part of Dohuk in order to place the mass of refugees at the Turkish border by the Operation Provide Comfort and they started to patrol a 'no-fly zone' north of the 36° parallel by depending on the Resolution 688, but the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII which permits the use of force.³³⁴ The same day with the pass of the Resolution 688, President Bush announced that the US military would provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees.³³⁵ The 10th Special Forces Group organized and identified camps and drop zones to provide medical assistance as needed and made plans for security requirements and then on 6 April 1991 the 10th Special Forces Group formed 'Combined Task Force Provide Comfort' and deployed

³³⁰ Byman, p.499

See also United Nations Security Council documents
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement>
(retrieved at 26 August, 2009)

³³¹ Carver, p.76

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Natasha Carver underlines that the resolution 'condemns' the repression, 'demands' an end to this repression, and 'insists' on access by international humanitarian organizations, it only 'requests' that the Secretary General 'pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq', and makes no mention of military presence. See Carver, p.76

See also Cockayne and Malone, p.126

³³⁴ Carver, p.76

³³⁵ Daniel Byman emphasizes that the coalition forces' efforts to protect Iraqi Shiites and Kurds were limited to humanitarian objectives. Therefore; the US backed the UN Security Council Resolution 688 which demanded that Iraq respect the human rights of its communities, and has been enforcing a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq (and later in southern Iraq) in part to protect Iraq's communities; but the efforts of the US was limited by diplomatic efforts and the US refrained from any formal commitment or direct military aid to Iraqi Shiites and Kurds.

See Byman, p.499

See also Goff, p.6

to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to conduct humanitarian operations in northern Iraq.³³⁶ Combined Task Force Provide Comfort was commanded by Maj. Gen. James L. Jamerson, the USAFE deputy chief of staff for operations, and then by Lt. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili.³³⁷ In order to contribute to the UN-led attempt to address the humanitarian crisis, the US planned to start humanitarian relief drops to the Kurds in Northern Iraq and the US announced the unilateral creation of a 'no-fly zone' for Iraqi aircraft in Northern Iraq airspace above the 36th parallel in order to protect US aircrafts which conduct the humanitarian relief drops.³³⁸ The task force dropped its first supplies to Kurdish refugees on 7 April.³³⁹ The formation of Combined Task Force- Provide Comfort (CTF-PC) completed on 16 April 1991 with the arrival of multinational forces.³⁴⁰ In general, 'Operation Provide Comfort' (called as also Operation Bring Comfort) (OPC or OBC) involved the provision by land but mostly by air, of 15,500 tons of relief supplies, administered by over 20,000 personnel from 13 nations under the control of the Coalition Task Force.³⁴¹ The OPC conducted by a coalition of 13 nations with material contributions from 30 countries while its primary contributor states were the US, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey.³⁴²

Meanwhile, Turkey was worried about 'how to feed half a million freezing Kurds without letting them take over southeastern Turkey.'³⁴³ To fix this problem, on 7 April President Turgut Özal offered the establishment of a safe haven in Northern Iraq which would be created through the UN take-over the territory in Northern

³³⁶ James L. Jones, "Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq", *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol:75, pp.99-100

See also Goff, p.6

See also "Operation Provide Comfort", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm (retrieved at 26 August. 2009)

³³⁷ Jones, p.100

³³⁸ Cockayne and Malone, pp.126 and 132

³³⁹ Goff, p.5

³⁴⁰ Goff, p.10

³⁴¹ Yıldız, p.39

See also Cockayne and Malone, p.128

³⁴² Kerim Yıldız asserts that the operation did not meet the needs of the refugees because it was clear that they would have to be persuaded to return to Iraq if aid was to be adequately supplied. See Yıldız, p.39

"Operation Provide Comfort" http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm

See also Lawrence, p.150

See also Goff, p.10

³⁴³ Lawrence, p.148

Iraq.³⁴⁴ By Turgut Özal's suggestion to John Major, on 8 April UK Prime Minister John Major proposed a plan to the European Community to create a safe haven for Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.³⁴⁵ As a result of these calls for the creation of safe enclave for Kurdish refugees, on 13 April 1991, the US in coordination with the Turkish government initiated 'a relief operation for refugees caught in the border area as a stop-gap measure, up to and until the UN was able to meet the humanitarian need'.³⁴⁶ On 16 April 1991, President George Bush declared that US military forces motivated by humanitarian concerns would move into Iraqi Kurdistan and establish refugee camps to shelter and feed the refugees massed in the border areas between Iraq and Turkey acting in coordination with UNSC Resolution 688 and working closely with the United Nations and other international organizations and with European partners.³⁴⁷ Abide by the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution 688, the US joined by the UK and France decided to expand Operation Provide Comfort to include multinational forces with the additional mission of establishing temporary refuge camps in northern Iraq.³⁴⁸ By sending troops to Iraq in order to establish a safe haven for the Kurds, the US, the UK and France initiated the Operation Safe Haven on 16 April.³⁴⁹ The first camp established as a result of the Operation Safe Haven, was at the border town of Zakho, and it was financed by the European Community and by the Dutch government.³⁵⁰ The Operation Safe Haven became successful and expanded the safe haven to stretch as far as Amadiyya in the east and Dohuk in the south, although the troops of the Allies faced the interventions of Iraqi troops and police.³⁵¹

³⁴⁴ Hale, p688

See also Tank, p.74

See also Yıldız, pp.39-40

³⁴⁵ Cockayne and Malone, p.127

See also Yıldız pp.39-40

See also Goff, p.5

³⁴⁶ Yıldız, p.39

³⁴⁷ Ibid., p.40

³⁴⁸ Cockayne and Malone, pp.127-128

See also "Operation Provide Comfort" http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm

³⁴⁹ For further detailed information about the Operation Safe Haven, James Paul, Martin Spirit and David Carter "Operation Safe Haven Northern Iraq 1991" <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/SafeHaven.htm> (retrieved at 28 August 2009)

See also Lawrence, p.151

³⁵⁰ Yıldız, p.40

³⁵¹ Ibid.

The Operation Provide Comfort and the Operation Safe Haven were justified under the customary doctrine of humanitarian intervention; however, these kinds of operations, which involved humanitarian intervention against the will of a sovereign state, were never authorized by the international community.³⁵² This lack of authorization was criticized by Iraq although Iraq agreed with the UN on Iraq's permission for humanitarian assistance of the UN to displaced Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Kurdish refugees. Moreover, Iraq regarded the presence of Western troops as interference in Iraq's internal affairs and in order to protest this violation of sovereignty, the Baghdad government protested in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that 'Operation Safe Haven' constituted 'a serious, unjustifiable and unfounded attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq'.³⁵³ Especially by the Operation Safe Haven Iraq's sovereignty was restrained by the prohibition of Iraqi aircraft to fly north of the 36th Parallel, and armed forces were not to be sent into the 36-by-63-mile zone created by the operation for the safety of its Kurdish inhabitants.³⁵⁴ As a result of the efforts to create a safe haven for refugee Kurds, Iraq lost its authority in Northern Iraq. Iraqi sovereignty on Northern Iraq was replaced by the UN when the administration of the Zakho camp was handed over to the UN authorities on 13 May and then on 7 June 1991, humanitarian relief efforts were taken over by the UNHCR.³⁵⁵

The Operation Provide Comfort and the Operation Safe Haven were organized and then conducted so successfully that by September almost all of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees had been persuaded to return.³⁵⁶ Moreover, fifty non-

³⁵² Cockayne and Malone argue that the Operation Provide Comfort and the Operation Safe Haven were conducted thanks to the US unilateral action justified as humanitarian intervention. Moreover, according to Cockayne and Malone the US regarded and described their efforts as different from the UN effort and more like as complementary to the UN efforts. Therefore, due to the US unilateralism, the Western efforts had only basis on the UN efforts and they were not the same efforts. See Cockayne and Malone p.128-129

See also Lawrence, p.151

³⁵³ Cockayne and Malone, p.128

See also Yıldız, p.40

³⁵⁴ Goff, p.6

See also Yıldız, p.40

³⁵⁵ Yıldız, p.40

³⁵⁶ Kerim Yıldız states that there were reasons behind this quick return of the Kurdish refugees apart from the success of the operations. Yıldız underlines Turkey's obvious discomfort at accommodating refugees and its refusal to grant asylum put pressure on those that had crossed the border to return

governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations contributed the success of the operations by providing expertise and capability in humanitarian relief and assistance.³⁵⁷ However, there were also hardships during the conduct of the operations such as refusal of refugees to return to areas outside of the protected zone below the 36th Parallel, sporadic attacks by Iraqi troops which resulted in displace upwards of 200,000 people from Sulaimaniya and Erbil in October and December 1991 respectively, and a further 40,000 from Erbil the following March causing half a million people remained internally displaced within Iraq.³⁵⁸ In July 1991, the Operation Provide Comfort was succeeded by ‘Operation Poised Hammer’ which was designed to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq from a second assault of Iraq against the Kurds by the overwhelming coalition air power and some ground support.³⁵⁹ By the Operation Poised Hammer, coalition troops were withdrawn from Iraqi territory and replaced by a coalition duty force of 2,000 men from five different countries, including 800 Turkish troops stationed at the border town Silopi.³⁶⁰ However, the Poised Hammer force at Silopi was gradually withdrawn from Silopi during the autumn because of its futility; nevertheless, the special air detachment at Incirlik base stayed stationed.³⁶¹ Operation Poised Hammer required the renewal of its mandate by the Turkish Grand Assembly at the end of September and then in every six months’ time period until the invasion of Iraq by the US forces in 2003.³⁶² The operations enabled the refugees’ return by the assurance that they would be safe from further attacks by Iraqi forces; but international community had to face the challenge that lay ahead was to find a long-term method of ensuring the safety of the returnees without a major military presence.³⁶³ To provide long term security of the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq, US-British led force including France and

played an important role in persuading refugees. In addition; Yıldız reminds that while refugees remained for some time in a number of camps in Iran, virulent attacks of food poisoning, thought to have been the responsibility of Iraqi agents, caused large numbers to re-cross the border.

See Yıldız, p.41

³⁵⁷ Goff, p.42

³⁵⁸ Yıldız, p.41

³⁵⁹ Hale, p.688

³⁶⁰ Mehmet Özkan states that following the withdrawal of coalition troops from northern Iraq in July 1991, Turkey approved the stationing of some 4,000 troops in southeast Turkey under Operation Poised Hammer that could be deployed back to Iraq in the event of the attacks on the Kurds.

See Mehmet Özkan, “Turkish Activism in the Middle East after the 1990s: Towards a Periodization of Three Waves”, *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, International Affairs*, 2000, p.169

See also Hale, p.688

³⁶¹ Hale, p.688

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Yıldız, p.41

supported by Turkey created a safe haven through the Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Safe Haven and started to patrol a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel until the Iraq War in 2003.³⁶⁴ However, humanitarian intentions of Western states, especially the US, led to the accidental creation of de facto Kurdistan.³⁶⁵ It was not a foreseen political outcome for both Turkey and Western states that by the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991 and the withdrawal of Iraqi army beyond the 36th parallel in Northern Iraq, where a safe haven for the Kurds was established thanks to the Allied coalition's efforts, a de facto Kurdish state was created.³⁶⁶ This de facto Kurdish state could not be de jure because no other country ever recognized this de facto state as its independence could threaten neighbor countries territorial integrity as well the existing regional state system.³⁶⁷ Turkey, as one of the states threatened by the existence of an independent Kurdistan, in the past had opposed the creation of a Kurdish state but facing the humanitarian crisis of Kurdish refugees, it had to accept the creation of a de facto Kurdish state dependent on the Operation Provide Comfort despite its fears of an independent Kurdish state would mobilize ethnic Kurdish nationalist sentiments within Turkey.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁴ Carver, p.76

See also Lawrence, p.152

³⁶⁵ Regarding the accidental creation of the Kurdish state, Quil Lawrence quotes the American Ambassador Morton Abramowitz's speech. Abramowitz said "That was the beginning of the de facto state of what I call the law of unintended consequences". Lawrence argues that nobody involved suspected this was anything but a humanitarian mission and years later Abramowitz realized they had accidentally created Kurdistan. Moreover, Lawrence says "The USA kept patrolling the safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan for 12 more years, until the American invasion in 2003, when another President Bush accidentally finished the job his father had accidentally begun".

See Lawrence, p.150

See also Olson, p.485

Michiel Leezenberg also states that from 1991 onwards a de facto independent area under international protection emerged in the north of Iraq despite external interference and internal infighting.

See Michiel Leezenberg, "Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4–5, 2005, p. 631

³⁶⁶ Robert Olson underlines that it was in fact the creation of a de facto Kurdish state which was established under the protection of UN forces, including mainly European and American support. Olson reminds that it was the first time in history that an international force had been deployed to protect the Kurds. See Olson, 485

Sabri Sayari also says that the Kurds of Northern Iraq under the protection of the West and beyond Baghdad's control laid the foundations for a new Kurdish political entity. See Sayari, p.46

³⁶⁷ Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan", *Middle East Policy*, Vol:12, No: 1, Spring 2005, p.123

³⁶⁸ Sayari, p.46

3.1.1.4 Establishment of De Facto Kurdish State: Kurdish Regional Government

After the Government of Iraq (GOI) voluntarily withdrew its civil administration in October 1991, and the citizens of the Kurdish safe haven were left to govern themselves, a power vacuum came into being in Northern Iraq. It was an opportunity of establishing a de facto government for the Kurdistan Front which was a rainbow alliance of Kurdish parties formed in the aftermath of the al-Anfal campaigns in 1989 including the KDP, the PUK, the Kurdistan People's Democratic Party (KDPD), the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PASOK), the Kurdistan Branch of the Iraqi Communist Party, the Assyrian Democratic Movement and the Kurdistan Toilers' Party.³⁶⁹ Benefiting from this power vacuum in the areas of safe haven established through the operations led to the elections which held in 19 May 1992 for 105-member provisional government in the newly established Kurdish safe haven with international observers in attendance.³⁷⁰ While Massoud Barzani expected the elections would solve the decision making crisis in the Kurdistan Front, Jalal Talabani "hoped that the elections will result in the establishment of a legitimate, constitutional, and legal entity embodied in a council that will represent the Kurdish people and will be the political decision making body in Iraqi Kurdistan."³⁷¹ Different expectations of KDP and PUK from the elections reflected in their future preferences and plans. While Barzani preferred some type of autonomy in agreement with Baghdad as he suspected that the coalition forces would leave Iraq soon, Talabani preferred self-determination within a democratic Iraq that would be better off for Kurds than Barzani's simple autonomy.³⁷² In the elections while the KDP won 50.22%, the PUK 49.78% of the vote.³⁷³ Regarding the results of the elections the

³⁶⁹ Yildiz, p.44

³⁷⁰ O' leary, pp.19-27

Regarding the elections, Jawad states that in order to prove that Iraqi Kurdistan enjoyed a better 'democracy' than the rest of Iraq, both KDP and PUK agreed to conduct general elections in 1992. See Jawad, p.33

Michael Gunter reminds that the PKK did not participate in the elections because of the Kurdish Front's exclusion of the PKK from the elections. Gunter argues that the Kurdish Front's fear of antagonizing its new Turkish ally played an important role in its exclusion of the PKK. See Gunter (1993), p.298

³⁷¹ Gunter (1993), p.297

³⁷² Gunter (1993), p.297

³⁷³ Ibid., p.299

KDP claimed success in the elections, but the PUK rejected the result and claimed it was close.³⁷⁴ As there is no clear victory of both sides, the KDP and PUK agreed to apply the ‘fifty-fifty’ joint rule solution.³⁷⁵ By this resolution, The KDP and the PUK each gained 50 seats; another five seats allocated to the Assyrian-Chaldean Christian groups consist of most of Iraq’s 900,000 person Christian community resides in Northern Iraq or in Baghdad.³⁷⁶ Joint rule of the KDP and the PUK stipulated the division of power between the two parties in such a way that a minister appointed from one party would have a deputy minister from the other.³⁷⁷ After the members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (the Parliament) were elected, the regional Kurdish government was split into two separate governments, one in Erbil and the other in Sulaimaniya.³⁷⁸ In October 1992, the newly established Kurdistan National Assembly called for “the creation of a Federated State of Kurdistan in the liberated part of the country” but the parliament underlined the Kurdish commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity. Nevertheless, this declaration of the Kurdistan National Assembly did not prevent the fears of Iraq’s Arab leaders and the Northern Iraq’s neighbors which are Turkey, Iran and Syria, which have large Kurdish populations; that the Kurds would drive for full independence.³⁷⁹ Turkey did not welcome the creation and then the declaration of Kurdistan Regional Government because the diminishing of the Iraq’s sovereignty in Northern Iraq and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state would endanger the territorial integrity of Turkey.³⁸⁰ Despite its discontent, Turkey

³⁷⁴ Jawad, p.33

³⁷⁵ Kenneth Katzman, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, April 6, 2009, p.2

See also Jawad, p.33

³⁷⁶ Katzman, p.2

See also Yildiz, p.45

³⁷⁷ Saad Naji Jawad asserts that this type of division of the power resulted in the paralyzing of regional government activities due to the sharp division and differences between the two Kurdish parties. Moreover, Jawad expresses that power share and balance in the Kurdistan National Assembly did not last long as each party tried to seize opportunities to destroy the other’s influence, and this resulted in an armed conflict which took place mainly in Erbil and which did not cease until foreign parties intervened to put an end to it.

See Jawad, p.33

³⁷⁸ O’leary, p.19

³⁷⁹ Michael Gunter reminds that on 4 October 1992 the parliament of the *de facto* Kurdish state in Northern Iraq declared Iraqi Kurdistan a constituent state in a federal Iraq and both KDP and PUK embraced the federal Iraq.

See Michael M. Gunter, “Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol:23, No:1, April 2003, p.10

See also Katzman, p.2

³⁸⁰ William Hale claims that in an ideal world, Turkey would almost certainly like to see the overthrow of Saddam, and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in which the Kurds would enjoy full participation, but no territorial autonomy; but in the real word, Turkey did not welcome the unofficial

had to accept that Iraqi Kurdistan would probably continue to enjoy de facto independence from Baghdad and she had to maintain a working relationship with the main Kurdish leaders in order to use leverage on them to prevent their support to the PKK.³⁸¹ During the Gulf War, Turkey had feared of the collapse of the Baath Party would enable the Kurds of Northern Iraq to establish an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and Turkey had to prevent this independent state by all necessary means because it would be too attractive to its own Kurds.³⁸² Turkey had also feared that Kurds in Northern Iraq would gain full autonomy and as they were weak due to struggle against the Government of Iraq, they would be compelled to give sanctuary to PKK terrorists fleeing Turkey.³⁸³

Turkey's fears regarding the PKK usage of Northern Iraq due to power vacuum were realized throughout 1991, thus Turkey staged military incursions and air raids into northern Iraq to destroy the PKK camps.³⁸⁴ Meanwhile, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds became de facto allies due to various reasons.³⁸⁵ First, Talabani and Barzani recognized that their own position in the federated Kurdish Regional Government is heavily dependent on Turkish goodwill as their supply routes passed through Turkey and Turkey is capable of controlling the region via its enormous military power in the area; so they have to avoid supporting the PKK in order to maintain good relations with Turkey.³⁸⁶ Second, if Turkey became enemy with Iraqi Kurdish de facto state, it could start to support the PKK or make territorial claims on southeast Turkey; or if Turkey cooperated with Iraqi Kurds, Turkey would have influence on Iraqi Kurds and make them pro-Turkish in terms of finding solution to its own Kurdish problem.³⁸⁷ Third, Turkey wanted to refrain from another refugee

Kurdish government as it might lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state which would probably weaken the Turkish government's authority over its own Kurdish minority. See Hale, p.690

³⁸¹ Hale, p.690

³⁸² Olson, p.492

³⁸³ Ibid., p.492-493

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p.493

³⁸⁵ Gunter (1993), p.302

³⁸⁶ Hale, p.690

See also Gunter (1993), p.302

³⁸⁷ Michael Gunter describes Turkish position as a realistic manner to allow the Operation Poised Hammer to continue because although Turkey was reinforcing de facto Kurdish state by allowing the Operation Poised Hammer, it kept the control of the events regarding the Northern Iraq's situation and

crisis which would occur by Saddam Hussein's attempt to crush the Kurds once more.³⁸⁸ Fourth, Turkey should prevent Iran gaining the control of the region and keep Iran away from Kirkuk oil fields while it achieves greater access to the oil fields besides having a greater regional influence.³⁸⁹ Finally, Turkey aimed to be regarded as the protector of the Iraqi Kurds because in this way Turkey would be respected and supported by the Western powers, especially by the European Community (EC) members in its accession process.³⁹⁰ As a result of these factors, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds cooperated starting with the beginning of 1990s in various areas but mainly for the control of the PKK. In 1992, both KDP and PUK cooperated with the Turkish military in a sweep of the area but later on when the two factions' relations worsened, Turkey had to rely increasingly on its forces to fight the PKK in Iraq.³⁹¹

Duality in the political system caused by the elections which gave equal seats to the KDP and the PUK led to two separate power centers. After the election Massoud Barzani became the leader of the upper portion of Iraqi Kurdistan and set up his government there, headquartered in the city of Erbil while Jalal Talabani commanded the lower portion of Iraqi Kurdistan and established his government headquarters in the city of Sulaimaniya.³⁹² Although the elections were regarded as a triumph for Kurdish democracy, in fact it was a sign of the problematic future of the Iraqi Kurdistan's political system.³⁹³ Both the KDP, which ruled the western part of the Iraqi Kurdistan, and the PUK, which held the control of the eastern part,

future. Gunter explains the renewal of the Operation Poised Hammer by this realistic manner. See Gunter (1993), p.303

³⁸⁸ Gunter (1993), p.303

³⁸⁹ Olson, p.493

³⁹⁰ Robert Olson claims that the threats of the Baghdad regime against the KDP and PUK paradoxically facilitated the development of relations between the two major Kurdish nationalist parties and Ankara. See Olson, p.495

Gunter (1993), p.303

³⁹¹ Robert Olson states that the consequences of the Gulf War and the need of the Kurdistan Nationalist Front for protection from Iraqi forces and their need for food, fuel, medicine and other supplies forced the KDP and PUK to accept aid from Turkey; therefore, Turkish humanitarian aid continued during 1992. In return of the aid, the KDP and PUK had to accept Turkish military incursions and air raids into Northern Iraq in order to destroy the PKK camps and militants. See Olson, p.496

See also Barkey (2000), p.119

³⁹² Dawoody, p.489

³⁹³ Kerim Yildiz expresses that the equal split between the two main parties resulted in the initial difficulty which was not conflict but paralysis, with the two factions operating not so much in league with each other, but in parallel.

See Yildiz, p.46

dominated the political system by involving in patronage and corruption.³⁹⁴ Massoud Barzani inherited the party from his father and has already monopolized its key functions with his many Barzani clansmen but both benefited from family and tribal ties although the PUK was less clan-oriented of the two, and neither has a coherent ideology.³⁹⁵ The main source of the tension between the KDP and the PUK was the oil revenues obtained from the transit trade of oil smuggled through Turkey.³⁹⁶ Current tensions were worsening by the double embargo imposed on the region, Saddam Hussein's economic siege and the UN sanctions against Iraq.³⁹⁷ Moreover, Iraqi Kurdistan as an emerging democracy in a hostile environment was facing challenges such as lack of recognition by the international community and mistrust of the KDP and the PUK to each other and accusations of both sides the other of letting themselves be manipulated by regional players Iraq, Iran and Turkey.³⁹⁸ Moreover, the PUK accused the KDP that it is gaining over a million dollars a day on transit fees obtained from the oil going out and the consumer goods coming in.³⁹⁹ The tension between the KDP and PUK escalated in 1994 with the snowball effect of a land dispute over north-east Sulaimaniya and resulted in the eruption of civil war.⁴⁰⁰ Although both sides claimed that the other side resorted to military action first, regardless of which side started the conflict, the civil war caused thousands of casualties as estimated 3,000 people, including both fighters and civilians, lost their

³⁹⁴ Christian Parenti, "The Question of Kurdistan- Will Iraq Split Apart? Perhaps but Powerful Forces are Keeping It Together", *The Nation*, November 14, 2005, p.18

³⁹⁵ Parenti, p.18

³⁹⁶ David Aquila Lawrence, "A Shaky De Facto Kurdistan", *Middle East Report*, No:215, Summer 2000, p.25

See also Leezenberg, p.638

³⁹⁷ Yildiz, p.48

³⁹⁸ Matan Chorev, "Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semi-state", *The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization* Fall 2007, p.4

See also Yildiz, p.48

³⁹⁹ Matan Chorev underlines that the two parties' asymmetric access to revenue heightened competition in addition to historical animosity. According to Chorev as the KDP controlled the western portion of Iraqi Kurdistan, including the strategic Ibrahim Khalil (Khabur Bridge) border crossing with Turkey, the customs fees on licit and illicit trade with Turkey provided the regional authorities with their seemingly sole source of income, estimated at approximately \$750 million annually while the PUK controlled the eastern part of the Iraqi Kurdistan and had a pale trade with Iran. See Chorev, p.4

See also D. Lawrence, p.25

⁴⁰⁰ Inga Rogg and Hans Rimscha, "The Kurds As Parties to and Victims of Conflicts in Iraq", *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol:89, No:868, December 2007, p.829

See also Parenti, p.18

See also Leezenberg, p.638

See also Yildiz, p.48

See also Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurds Ascending- The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey", Palgrave Macmillan Press, the United States, 2008, p.14

lives and while tens of thousands were displaced.⁴⁰¹ During the inter-Kurdish civil war both sides tried to overwhelm the other by allying with neighboring countries.⁴⁰² When the clashes reached its peak in 1996 and the PUK captured Erbil with the support of Iran as the KDP claimed, the KDP made an alliance with the Iraqi Government and even received military support from the Iraqi government to expel the PUK from Erbil.⁴⁰³ In 1998, the KDP and the PUK ended their conflict as a result of United States organized a cease-fire by bringing Barzani and Talabani together in Washington in September.⁴⁰⁴ After their conflict ended, the KDP and the PUK decided to unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July 1999.⁴⁰⁵ Although the cease-fire had been organized, the KDP and the PUK started to cohabit in a 'cold peace' relationship and the reunification measures were long delayed and but did not manage either to reunite their two administrations or to exchange the thousands of citizens displaced during the fighting.⁴⁰⁶ The civil war between Kurdish fractions resulted in the establishment of two sub-governments in Erbil and Sulaimaniya by the KDP and the PUK respectively.⁴⁰⁷ Iraqi Kurdistan's political structure duplicated by the KDP and the PUK as each had its own regional Cabinet, all ministries. In addition to political system, the KDP and the PUK had

⁴⁰¹ Alexander Dawoody states that the war between the two Kurdish factions caused by the conflict over territory and profit generated from the smuggling of Iraqi oil through Turkey. Moreover, Dawoody underlines that custom duties from legal and illegal goods transported through northern Iraq to and from the rest of Iraq added to the territorial split. As Iraqi Kurdistan virtually divided into two zones between the KDP and PUK, both raising revenue through customs duties on goods moving across Kurdish frontiers with Turkey and Iran, relations between the two factions reached their lowest level. Dawoody quotes Makiya who calls these relations as 'fighting among thieves'. Dawoody indicates the refusal of the KDP to share this revenue with its rival, the PUK as the real cause of the war. When the PUK launched a wide-scale offensive in May 1994, more than 1000 Kurds were killed and then by September 1995, the violence claimed 3000 lives, with the PUK gaining the upper hand. After the PUK made a deal with Iran for weapons, supplies, and advisers, on 17 August 1996 and with Iranian support, the PUK launched a major offensive that tore into KDP territory and the KDP resorted to Iraqi Government's aid in order to remove PUK forces from the KDP territory. See Dawoody, pp.489-490

See also Rogg and Rimscha, p.829

See also D. Lawrence, p.25

⁴⁰² Rogg and Rimscha, p.829

⁴⁰³ Dawoody, p.489

See also D. Lawrence, p.25

See also Parenti, p.18

See also Dawoody, pp.489-490

⁴⁰⁴ Gunter (2008), p.14

See also Yıldız, p.50

See also Rogg and Rimscha, p.829

See also Dawoody, p.490

See also Leezenberg, p.639

See also D. Lawrence, p.25

⁴⁰⁵ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Iraq: Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2002", Human Rights Review, Vol:4, No:4, March 31, 2003, p.9

⁴⁰⁶ Rogg and Rimscha, p.829

⁴⁰⁷ Gunter (2008), p.14

incompatible cell phone systems, two sets of TV and radio stations, and two separate sets of universities controlled by two parties.⁴⁰⁸ After 1992 elections for the first time, the PUK held municipal elections in February 2000 and the KDP held municipal elections in May 2001.⁴⁰⁹ The division between the two Kurdish factions and regional governments continued until June 2005 when Talabani went to Baghdad to become the ceremonial president of occupied Iraq and Barzani became the President of a unified Kurdish region in Northern Iraq.⁴¹⁰

3.2 GLOBAL ACTORS

3.2.1. The United States

The United States as unchallenged superpower in the world has pursued three long-standing goals regarding the Middle East which are the protection of Israel, the control of access to oil and stability.⁴¹¹ Regarding Iraq, after the Gulf War, the US goals consisted of preventing any Iraqi regional aggression, stopping Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs, and removing Saddam from power.⁴¹² Moreover, a negative objective, which guided U.S. actions, was preventing the spread of regional instability.⁴¹³ In order to achieve its objectives, the United States used the instruments of economic sanctions, weapons inspections, a large military presence, a strong military strikes, and mobilizing the Iraqi opposition against the Government of Iraq.⁴¹⁴ Following the First Gulf War, the policy of the United States towards Iraq aimed to realize the containment of Iraq through enforcing no-fly zones in both the north and south, and sanctions with the purpose of preventing Saddam from producing chemical and nuclear weapons, and launching any more attacks.⁴¹⁵

⁴⁰⁸ Parenti, p.18

⁴⁰⁹ "Iraq: Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2002", p.9

⁴¹⁰ Dawoody, p.490

⁴¹¹ Eric Watkins, "The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol:73, No:1, Jan, 1997, p.1

See also Bennis, p.4

⁴¹² Byman, p.495

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., pp.495-496 and 500

⁴¹⁵ Yıldız, "U S Foreign Policy Towards Saddam: Pre-September 11", p.89

3.2.1.1. Economic Sanctions and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Among the containing instruments, the most debatable one has been the economic sanctions over Iraq. It was the humanitarian aspect of the sanctions that exposed to strong criticisms. While pro-sanction scholars defend the economic sanctions on the basis of its utility to limit Saddam Hussein's capacity to produce chemical and nuclear weapons, and in addition to launching any more attacks against Kurds or regional states. According to pro-sanction scholars, the containment policy of US toward Iraq between 1990 and 2003 worked so well that intelligence agencies misjudged the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capacity of Iraq which was estimated wrong as intelligence agencies and policymakers disregarded considerable evidence of the destruction and deterioration of Iraq's weapons programs, the result of a successful strategy of containment in place for a dozen years.⁴¹⁶ Moreover, they argue that since the beginning of the economic sanctions in the system of containment operated so well and did much to erode Iraqi military capabilities in addition to compelling Iraq to accept inspections and monitoring and winning concessions from Baghdad on political issues such as the border dispute with Kuwait.⁴¹⁷ Furthermore, economic sanctions also drastically reduced the income available to Saddam which allowed the prevention of the Iraqi defenses' rebuilding after the Persian Gulf War, as well as blocking the import of vital materials and technologies for producing WMD.⁴¹⁸

On the contrary to sanction supporter scholars, opponents underlined the devastating effects of the sanctions over Iraqi people as blocking of imports hampered the efforts of reconstruction of water and sanitation infrastructure, electrical power generation and transportation, and continued to damage to the

⁴¹⁶ George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol:83, No:4, July/August 2004, p.90

⁴¹⁷ Lopez and Cortright, p.90

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.90-91

civilian economy while trying to prevent Saddam Hussein developing WMD.⁴¹⁹ Moreover, anti-sanctionist scholars argued that pro-sanctionists disregarded the humanitarian aspect of sanctions and focused only on the containment of Saddam Hussein in order to prevent the production of WMD while sanctions were damaging public health and economy.⁴²⁰ Although the sanctions were justified by the prevention of WMD, anti-sanctioners claim that sanctions caused more deaths than WMDs.⁴²¹

In order to lessen the negative effects of the sanctions, on 14 April 1995 the United Nations Security Council declared Resolution 986 which allowed Iraq to sell oil to obtain food, medicine and other necessities.⁴²² In 1996, the oil for food program was put into practice and under this program Iraq was able to sell its oil for obtaining food and other humanitarian stuff.⁴²³ By the agreement of oil for food program between the UN and Iraqi Government, 13% of the revenues obtained from the program were allocated to Kurdish Regional Government and Iraq was able to gain 57 billion dollars from the program.⁴²⁴ According to some measures, the Oil for Food program whose aim was to provide humanitarian assistance and prevent Iraq from obtaining resources that might be used to purchase weapons or luxury goods, was the largest humanitarian relief program in world history as by the time the program ended in 2003, the Oil for Food Program had provided considerable number of humanitarian supplies to Iraq.⁴²⁵ Nevertheless, the program was exposed to strong

⁴¹⁹ Neil Arya and Sheila Zurbrigg, "Operation Infinite Injustice: Impact of Sanctions and Prospective War on the People of Iraq", *Canadian Journal of Public Health*, January– February 2003, p.10

⁴²⁰ While giving detailed information about the impact of sanctions, Arya and Zurbrigg say that through the 1990s, the impact of pervasive destitution was documented by UNICEF in soaring rates of child malnutrition and hospital deaths. See Arya and Zurbrigg, p.10

Daniel Byman reminds that 500,000 Iraqi children died as a result of sanctions. See Byman, p.500

See also Bennis, p.5

⁴²¹ John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol:78, No:3, May-June 1999, p.50

⁴²² See United Nations Security Council Resolution 986 at UN documents.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement> (retrieved at 22 September 2009)

⁴²³ See also Joy Gordon, "Cool war: Economic sanctions as a weapon of mass destruction", *Harper's* November 2002, pp.44-45

See also Rogg and Rimscha, p.829

⁴²⁴ Leezenberg, p.639

See also Gunter (2008), p.14

⁴²⁵ Chang-tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti gave the number that the Oil for Food program had provided as \$32 billion in humanitarian supplies to Iraq.

See Chang-tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti "Did Iraq Cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, Bribes, and the Oil for Food Program, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November 2006, pp.1211-1212

criticisms like the sanctions. The oil for food program was criticized on the basis that it obstructed the efforts of creating a self sufficient economy in addition to undermining the rehabilitation of agricultural production.⁴²⁶ Moreover, the oil for food program was criticized by the claim that it undermined the Iraqi state's sovereignty over its own population while strengthening the special status of the north.⁴²⁷

The United States has been suspicious of Iraqi aggression and cautious about the stability in the Middle East which has enabled the protection of long term interests of the US. Therefore, Saddam Hussein was regarded as a potential threat to the stability in the region and should be removed from the power. As the US was cautious about the Iraqi aggression through the production and use of WMD, the US was sensitive about Iraqi compliance to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of WMD in Iraq; thus, "in August 1998 Congress had described Iraq's WMD program as threatening the US's vital interests and constituting a 'material and unacceptable breach of Iraq's international obligations'".⁴²⁸ In October 1998, the new US-UK goal of Iraqi regime change, already approved by Congress through the Iraq Liberation Act, which provided further funds to opposition groups in Iraq in order to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace Saddam Hussein's regime.⁴²⁹ After the terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, the US declared war on global terror and the regime change in Iraq became more urgent for the US as Saddam Hussein was assumed to have ties with Al-Qaeda.⁴³⁰ The US decision of fighting against global terror showed itself in the President Bush's speech on 29 January 2002. By

⁴²⁶ Leezenberg, p.639

⁴²⁷ Ibid., pp.639-640

⁴²⁸ Dunne says "The logic of this next move in the American 'war on terrorism' was that Saddam's hatred of the United States and his possession of WMD created a ready source of state-based weaponry for a dangerous, ubiquitous but stateless enemy such as bin Laden's al-Qaeda network."

See Michael Dunne, "The United States, the United Nations and Iraq: 'Multilateralism of a Kind'", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol:79, No:2, March 2003, pp.268 and 270

⁴²⁹ Dunne, pp.268-269

⁴³⁰ Jeffrey Record, "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism", Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, p.1

Michael Dunne asserts that following the suicide airborne attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and after the successful overthrow of the Taleban in Afghanistan by unsuccessful search for Osama bin Laden, the United States would focus on the disarming of Iraq, the ousting of Saddam Hussein and 'regime change' in a 'liberated' Iraq. See Dunne, p.270

this speech President Bush represented Iraq as a constituting element of a tiny but lethal 'axis of evil' of whom other elements are Iran and North Korea.⁴³¹ This speech and other speeches that President Bush made constructed 'The Bush Doctrine' which theorizes the threat on the basis of the combination of "radicalism and technology", in other words, political and religious extremism joined by the availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁴³² Moreover, according to the Bush Doctrine, there are three threat agents which are terrorist organizations with global reach, one of which or the most important one was Al-Qaeda, weak states that harbor and assist such terrorist organizations one of whom was Afghanistan, and rogue states, like Iraq.⁴³³ Furthermore; in the process of the construction of the Bush Doctrine, President Bush represented the concept of preemptive strike in his West Point speech by claiming that the war on terror will not be won by the defensive strategy, instead it requires confrontation with the threats before they emerge and acting when preemptive action becomes necessary to defend national interest of the US.⁴³⁴

After these speeches of the President Bush, which constructed and expressed the Bush Doctrine, the United States searched for the support of other states for its stance towards global terrorism and its fight against Al-Qaeda. Tony Blair's government was supporting the Bush administration in its fight against global terrorism since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The common approach of the US and the UK revealed in speech of Prime Minister Tony Blair to the House of Commons on 24 September 2002 by which Blair claimed that Saddam possesses chemical and biological weapons and he searches for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.⁴³⁵ Only one day after, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, said "There clearly are contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq.... There clearly is testimony that some of the contacts have been important contacts and that there's a

⁴³¹ Dunne, p.270

⁴³² Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq", *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol:33, No: 1, Spring 2003, p.4

⁴³³ Record, (Bush Doctrine), p.5

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.4

To see the full text of the President Bush's West Point Speech on 1 June 2002 see <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=339&paper=380> (retrieved 27 September 2009)

See also Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, James B. Steinberg "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption", *Brookings Policy Brief*, 2002, pp.1-2

⁴³⁵ Dunne, p.270

relationship there.”⁴³⁶ While the Bush administration tried to persuade public opinion by the claim of Saddam Hussein’s acquisition of WMD, it also required other supporter states in addition to the UK in order to take the next step against the global terrorism and prevent Saddam Hussein to acquire WMD. Turkey was one of the most crucial states that the United States needed support of.

3.2.1.2. Relations between Turkey and the US

Since the end of the Second World War, Turkey has been an important ally for the United States in the Middle East Region. The cooperation between Turkey and the United States has taken different forms of partnerships. However, the relationship changed drastically after the end of the Cold War and alliance between Turkey and the United States characterized as ‘Enhanced Partnership’ term symbolizing the comprehensive relationships between Turkey and the US from the beginning of 1991.⁴³⁷ ‘Enhanced Partnership’ stipulated “extended cooperation in the political field, an increase in diplomatic consultations, and an emphasis on enhanced economic partnership in compensation for the decreasing emphasis on security and defense-related matters”.⁴³⁸ In the framework of ‘enhanced partnership’, Turkey tried to reassert its importance to the United States by giving its full support to America and coalition forces during the Gulf War.⁴³⁹ During the war Turkey’s support consisted of opening Incirlik Air Base for Coalition Forces, obeying all of the UN Resolutions taken against Iraq, taking initiatives for the establishment of safe havens for Kurdish refugees through the Operation Provide Comfort and then Operation Northern Watch in 1996 including the launch and then the extension of Rapid

⁴³⁶ James P. Pfiffner, “Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol:34, No:1, March, p.27

⁴³⁷ Ömer Göksel İşyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations From 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol:4, No:3, Fall 2005, p.33

See also Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From “Cold War” to “War on Iraq”", *Turkish Studies* Vol:6, No:3, September 2005, p.345

⁴³⁸ Güney, p.345

⁴³⁹ İşyar p.33

See also Güney, p.345

Reaction Force (so called ‘the Poised Hammer’) by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.⁴⁴⁰

By 1999, the United States started to name the partnership between Turkey and her as ‘Strategic Partnership’. This term was emphasized especially during the visit of American President Clinton for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Summit conference when he also visited Gölcük region where an earthquake disaster happened in 1999 in order to organize an international aid campaign.⁴⁴¹ This ‘Strategic Partnership’ concept referred Turkey to be one of the strategic partners of the United States in all of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Central Asia regions with whom the US had common interests and aims in the areas of defense, security and economic-commercial relations.⁴⁴² Strategic partnership between Turkey and the US enhanced after the September 11 attacks as “American foreign and security policy has been transformed in ways that have changed the nature of the United States as a partner for Turkey” and there was a convergence between security concerns and strategies of both because Turkey has been already suffering from the terrorist organization, the PKK, and they both focused on counter-terrorism.⁴⁴³ Moreover, in accordance with the counter-terrorism strategy, the US started greater activism in the Middle East and Turkey became one of the key states that supported the US stance against global terrorism because of Turkey’s familiarity with the fight against terrorism.⁴⁴⁴ However, common fight against the terrorism did not mean Turkey’s foreign policy

⁴⁴⁰ At the end of 1996, the Operation Provide Comfort replaced by Operation Northern Watch which was a combined US-UK operation enforcing the no-fly zone above the 36th paralel. See Cockayne and Malone, p.130

Ömer Göksel İşyar asserts that the aim of the Operation Northern Watch was to apply all the resolutions taken by the UN about Iraq. It has not aimed at any arbitrary attack to Iraq. It focused mainly on observatory and defense flights jointly campaigned by British-US air forces. There was no precise deadline of this operation. It was possible to extend it in every 6 months. However, the Turkish Grand National Assembly extended it until March 20, 2003, that was the beginning date of the Iraq War.

See also İşyar, p.33

See also Güney, p.345

⁴⁴¹ İşyar, p.36

See also Güney, p.346

⁴⁴² İşyar, p.36

See also Güney, p.346

⁴⁴³ Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics”, *Survival*, Vol:48, No:3, Autumn 2006, p.90

See also İşyar, p.37

⁴⁴⁴ Lesser, p.90

was indexed to the US's; because, in the past, both Turkey and the US pursued regional status quo through the conservative foreign policies; yet, after September 11 attacks the United States tried to reach more dynamic, even revolutionary objectives in areas of shared interest, and divergence in the objectives revealed by the Iraq War in 2003.⁴⁴⁵

When the United States initiated the Operation Infinite Justice - Operation Enduring Freedom against Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Turkey became the leading supporter of the United States and exhibited cooperative behavior as the operations conducted on the basis of the resolutions of the UN Security Council, numbered 1368 and 1373, and it was basically a NATO operation.⁴⁴⁶ Turkey's cooperation in war against Taliban in Afghanistan included permitting the usage of air corridors for coalition aircrafts with 'blanket permission' on 21 September 2001, sending military personnel to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and taking the commandment task of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan for six months from the beginning of 20 June 2002.⁴⁴⁷ Unlike the war in Afghanistan, although the UN has not taken a resolution to legalize any operation against Iraq, the United States insisted on unilateralism, in other words fighting against Iraq alone and the American Congress gave the president the power to declare war against Iraq on 11 October 2002, without waiting for any UN Security Council resolution; after the President Bush asserted its Bush Doctrine through his speeches on January 29, 2002 and later on 1 June 2002 when President George W. Bush described Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as constituting an 'axis of evil'.⁴⁴⁸ Although the United States attempted to justify its unilateralism by the concept of preemptive action in the framework of Bush Doctrine, as its action against Iraq did not depend on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Turkey resisted the US demand of opening the northern front before the operation.⁴⁴⁹ Moreover, there were other dynamics behind Turkey's refusal of supporting the United States in its

⁴⁴⁵ Lesser, p.91

⁴⁴⁶ İşyar, p.37

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ François Heisbourg, "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences", The Washington Quarterly, Vol:26, No:2, Spring 2003, p. 75

See also İşyar, p.39

See also Charles V. Peña, "Iraq: The Wrong War", Policy Analysis, No:502, December 15, 2003, p.3

⁴⁴⁹ İşyar, p.39

incoming operation to Iraq. The US tried to persuade Turkey especially during the Washington visit of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit on 16 January 2002 and lasted its insistence for the deployment of American ground troops in the northern front which would be opened in Iraqi border of Turkey until March 2003. Despite America's efforts, Turkey had some redlines about Iraq and hesitations about American war plans.⁴⁵⁰ The reluctance of Turkey was caused by its economic loss from the first Gulf War in 1991, which was not compensated fully by the US, the fear of an independent Kurdish state which could be established through the military strike on Iraq, the possibility of another refugee flood and then a possible humanitarian crisis and lastly the new foreign policy stance of the newly formed government of the Justice and Development Party.⁴⁵¹ Nevertheless, Turkey conveyed its red lines regarding the Iraq War which were the protection of Iraq's territorial unity after the war, prevention of Mosul and Kirkuk's incorporation to the Kurdish region and protection of Turcoman's rights.⁴⁵²

In spite of the US efforts to persuade Turkey to open Turkish front from north even by offering economic aid, because of negative signals from the Turkish side, by February 2003, the U.S. recognized the necessity of a 'Plan-B', which was described as 'harder and uglier' as Saddam Hussein would be toppled without access to land bases in Turkey; so, the operation would be more problematic and difficult.⁴⁵³ The failure of American efforts to convince Turkey was revealed by the rejection of the

⁴⁵⁰ Güney, p.348

See also İşyar, p.38

⁴⁵¹ Güney, p.348

⁴⁵² Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol:14, No:2, August 2006, p.188-189

See also İşyar, p.38

⁴⁵³ Aylin Güney states that in order to convince Turkey the U.S. at the end of intense negotiations offered an aid package of about \$6 billion in grants and up to \$20 billion in loan guarantees, to secure Ankara's support for a possible invasion of Iraq. However, Washington conditioned the aid to fall under the terms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-backed economic program. Yet, for Turkey the amount was not sufficient and at one point Ankara asked Washington for close to \$50 billion in aid - an amount US officials dismissed as excessive. On the other hand, the US also started to use the threat of a cancellation of possible military aid to Turkey if the latter did not immediately allow the US army to deploy troops intended for the strike. This carrot and stick approach resulted in the anti-Americanism in public opinion because the public started to interrogate Turkey-US alliance as the United States offered money in return of blood according to Güney. See Güney, pp.348-350

See also İşyar, p.40

Cameron Brown also states that the U.S. offered \$15 billion aid and after the decline of the motion in 1 March 2003, she withdrew its aid and its request to use Turkish territory. See Brown, p.100

Aylin Güney gives the exact number of the aid as credit worth as much as \$14 billion; but, this "carrot policy" was not welcomed either in Turkey or in the US. See Güney, p.349

motion, which gave military permission to the U.S. troops to use Turkish lands and send Turkish troops to abroad, by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on March 1, 2003.⁴⁵⁴ The rejection of the motion, which blocked the creation of a northern front, was caused by 264 votes for the motion, 250 votes against it and 19 abstains among 533 parliamentarians which led to the motion become short of a constitutionally mandated full majority.⁴⁵⁵ The opposition of the motion included 99 deputies of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in addition to all the deputies of the opposition party, the People's Republican Party (CHP).⁴⁵⁶ The rejection of the motion turned to be a turning point in the relations of Turkey and the United States as well as symbolizing the clear divergence of strategic interests between the United States and Turkey.⁴⁵⁷ Although the vote itself was nominally in favor, it fell short of approving the motion because of the opposition party and JDP deputies who opposed to the motion, so the JDP government seemed not controlling its deputies as 99 of them voted against the motion.⁴⁵⁸ The decline of the motion resulted in a very important disappointment in America and deterioration of relations. For the worsening of the relations due to the rejection of the U.S. troops, some American

⁴⁵⁴ Joshua W. Walker, "Reexamining the U.S.-Turkish Alliance", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol:31, No:1, Winter 2007-2008, p.94

See also Brown, p.100

See İşyar, p.40

See Güney, p.350

See Altunışık, p.189

See Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a 'Post-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State", *International Affairs*, Vol:83, No:1, 2007, p.295

See also Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?", Revised Draft-December 2004, pp.1 and 13

⁴⁵⁵ Altunışık, p.189

See also Brown, p.100

See also Güney, p.350

See also Walker, p.98

⁴⁵⁶ Altunışık, p.189

⁴⁵⁷ Joshua Walker argues that the decline of the motion was used to demonstrate the anti- American bias of the AKP. See Walker, p.94

Moreover, Walker reminds that although the TGNA had voted on U.S. military action involving Turkey before, it was the first time that the parliament had explicitly opposed the requests of its strategic ally in spite of government pressure. See Walker, p.98

⁴⁵⁸ Philip Robins argues that the reason behind the rejection of the motion was maneuvering of the Turkish military and the JDP government to cover their reluctance to accept the U.S terms. Robins says that as a result of the decision, Ankara was relieved and embarrassed in equal measure. See Robins (2007), p.295

Meliha Altunışık emphasizes that both the proponents and the opponents had a common point: neither side was convinced that Iraq posed an immediate threat and neither accepted the Bush administration's logic for launching a preventive war. See Altunışık, p.186

Cameron Brown underlines that the rejection of the motion was in JDP's advantage; therefore, Brown says "if the leadership had decided that it must win the vote it would have enforced party discipline". Moreover, Brown represents the decline of the motion as a 'democratic' way to politely say no to an offer they were not supposed to refuse. See Brown, p.101

officials blamed the new Turkish government as it failed to prepare its public for a war because of its lack of leadership experience.⁴⁵⁹ However, the public opinion was already against the war and it affected the stance of the government by leading to the indecisiveness of the Turkish government on taking a decision to cooperate with the US in a possible operation against the Iraq regime.⁴⁶⁰ Anti-Americanism was revealed by nationwide polls which showed that while the popularity of the US was 52 percent in 2000, this popularity dropped to 30 percent in 2002, and to 12 percent in March 2003.⁴⁶¹ In Turkish public opinion the concept of strategic partnership has been questioned whether the strategic partnership died or not.⁴⁶²

3.2.2. Iraq

3.2.2.1 Iraq War and Its Effects on Iraq and Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq

Without using Turkish territories and having a basis on the UN Security Council Resolution, the United States initiated a military campaign against Iraq on 20 March 2003.⁴⁶³ The operation has been called as Operation Iraqi Freedom in the US; Operation Telic in the UK; and Operation Falconer in Australia.⁴⁶⁴ Until the present day, the Operation has had no formal conclusion. Bush Administration defined the goal of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime including destroying its ability to use WMD or to make them

⁴⁵⁹ Aylin Güney emphasizes that many people in the American administration were of the opinion that the AKP administration had failed to demonstrate good leadership and even had suspicions that they did not sincerely want to have the motion approved by the party's 264 parliamentary deputies.

See Güney, pp.348 and 351

⁴⁶⁰ Güney, p.348

⁴⁶¹ As Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz reported, in a survey conducted for researching the US image in the aftermath of the Iraqi war, 83 percent of the respondents replied that they have a negative image of the US and another found that 88 percent of Turks opposed a new war across the southeastern border and almost two out of three believed that Turkey should stay out of it.

See Öniş and Yılmaz, p.23

See İşyar, p.43

⁴⁶² İşyar, p.42

⁴⁶³ Timothy Garden, "Iraq: The Military Campaign", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol:79, No:4, July 2003, p.701

See also Katzman, p.2

⁴⁶⁴ Garden, p.701

available to terrorists.⁴⁶⁵ Moreover, the long term objective of the operation was declared as building ‘a new Iraq that is prosperous and free’ by enforcing all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.⁴⁶⁶ Although initial combat operations resulted in a symbolic victory when the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled by Iraqi people in the centre of Baghdad on 9 April and most of the military action was over by 14 April, the United States had to revise its objective regarding Iraq and change its focus on the regime change into preventing growing sectarian violence caused by Shi’a and Sunni extremism, and ethnic clashes; via helping new Iraqi leadership to improve security, to establish a system of governance and to promote economic development.⁴⁶⁷ Major combat operations of the United States finished on 1 May 2003 when Bush declared during his high-profile arrival on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of California; yet, this did not mean that all of military operations in Iraq finished, instead there was a long road for the US ahead.⁴⁶⁸

The US justified the Operation Iraqi Freedom on the grounds of enforcing the UN Resolutions which Iraq was believed to breach and conditions must be met if it wanted to avoid retaliatory action.⁴⁶⁹ The US intervention to Iraq especially depended on the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1441 by which the Council decided that “Iraq remained in ‘material breach’ of its obligations; that the Council would afford Iraq ‘a final opportunity to comply’; that failure to comply would ‘constitute a further material breach’; and that in that case, Iraq would ‘face serious consequences’”.⁴⁷⁰ Although the language of the Resolution was strong by UN standards, most observers oppose that the resolution did not imply ‘automaticity’ that if Iraqi did not comply, it would automatically trigger a UN-authorized response

⁴⁶⁵ Catherine Dale, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, April 2, 2009, pp.1 and 31

⁴⁶⁶ Dale, p.2 and 31

⁴⁶⁷ Garden, p.701

See also Dale, p.2

⁴⁶⁸ Garden, p.701

⁴⁶⁹ Charles Pena criticizes heavily the justification of the United States by saying “President Bush asserts that U.S. military action against Iraq was justified because Saddam Hussein was in material breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. But even if Iraq was in violation of a UN resolution, the U.S. military does not exist to enforce UN mandates. It exists to defend the United States: its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, the population, and the liberties that underlie the American way of life. So whether Iraq was in violation of Resolution 1441 is irrelevant.” See Pena, pp.1-2

⁴⁷⁰ Dale, p.30

under Chapter VII which allow the use of force in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.⁴⁷¹ The US military intervention did not have basis on any additional UN Resolution explicitly authorizing military action under Chapter VII because the Bush administration knew that some permanent members of the Council were prepared to veto it.⁴⁷² As the military action of the US was not authorized under the Chapter VII, after the end of major combat, on 22 May 2003, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1483 which recognized the US and the UK as ‘occupying powers’ besides calling them to comply with all the ‘authorities, responsibilities and obligations under international law’ stipulated by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.⁴⁷³

After the invasion, the primary objective of the US-led coalition become establishing a democratic Iraq.⁴⁷⁴ However, it was a forcible task as it required ‘the institutionalization of consensual political regime which would be capable of establishing compliance among the ethnic-sectarian divides while promoting the

⁴⁷¹ Catherine Dale asserts that regarding the causality of the OIF, though the Iraqi government eventually provided a large quantity of written materials, the Administration deemed Iraqi compliance to be insufficient. Dale, p.30

Regarding the content of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, Charles Pena argues that although President Bush represented Saddam Hussein’s material breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 as *casus belli*; the Resolution 1441 never really set forth grounds for military action, nor did it make clear that military action would be an explicit consequence of noncompliance. See Pena, p.2

⁴⁷² Dale, p.30

⁴⁷³ Simon Chesterman, "Bush, the United Nations and Nation-building", *Survival*, Vol:46, No:1, 2004, p.108

See also Dale, p.45

Charles Pena asserts that because of the United States’ invasion, Iraq has become the central front in the war on terrorism. While the US tried to prevent Iraq to become a hotbed for Al Qaeda under Saddam Hussein’s brutal rule, it enabled Al Qaeda to use the Iraq war skillfully to rally more people for its cause. See Pena, p.15

Moreover, regarding the effect of the US invasion, Pena says “The U.S. occupation of Iraq makes the radical Islamists’ case that the West is invading Islam which only encourages the Muslim world to unite against the United States.” See Pena, p.15

Furthermore, Pena underlines that while Al Qaeda established its infrastructure in Afghanistan and knew how to operate, U.S. military action in Iraq has had little or no direct effect on the ranks of Al Qaeda or its infrastructure in Iraq as it did not have any in there. In addition to its ineffectiveness, Pena expresses the defects of the US military occupation. According to Pena the U.S. insistence on creating a democracy in the image of this country has created anti-American sentiment in Iraq that breeds hatred and leads to violence, including terrorism. See Pena, pp.16-17

⁴⁷⁴ In order to show the determination of the US to establish a democratic Iraq, Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson quotes the speech of President George W. Bush who said “the transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq”.

See Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson, “The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol:6, No:2, 2005, p.190

positive image of the US.⁴⁷⁵ Regarding the establishment of democracy in Iraq, Daniel Byman represents the challenges that might arise as “a weak government that engenders security fears, a lack of a cohesive identity to unify Iraq's different communities, a risk of meddling from Iran and Turkey, bellicose elites who pursue adventurism abroad and whip up tension at home, a poorly organized political leadership, and a lack of a history of democracy”.⁴⁷⁶ Despite these challenges, the process Iraqi transition to democracy started on November 15, 2003, by the agreement of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to the transfer the authority to a Transitional Iraqi Government (TIG) by June 2004.⁴⁷⁷ The efforts of transferring the authority was proceeded by ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’, or Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was a document that outlined the basic constitutional tenets of the future Iraqi government while setting a timetable for the transfer of the authority to Iraqi government, when it was ratified by Iraqi Governing Council and Coalition Provisional Authority on March 8, 2004.⁴⁷⁸ Transitional Administrative Law, which was a provisional constitution, while underlining the federal structure of Iraqi transitional administration, it also recognized the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as the official government representing the three ethnically Kurdish Northern Iraqi provinces since 1992 by preserving its autonomy in the federal structure of Iraq.⁴⁷⁹ Besides the preservation of Kurdish peshmerga forces as internal security and police force in the KRG zone and permission to increase its number, TAL allowed the usage of Kurdish as the second official language of Iraq along with Arabic.⁴⁸⁰ TAL stipulated Iraqi federal system as divided

⁴⁷⁵ Salamey and Pearson, p.191

⁴⁷⁶ Daniel Byman, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities”, International Security, Vol:28, No:1, The MIT Press, 2003, p.49

⁴⁷⁷ Salamey and Pearson, p.191

See also Bill Park, "Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy", Parameters, 2004, p.18

⁴⁷⁸ Gunter (2008), p.15

See also Katzman, p.2

See also Bill Park, p.18

See also Salamey and Pearson, p.192

⁴⁷⁹ Katzman, p.2

See also B. Park, p.18

⁴⁸⁰ According to Bill Park due to some provisions of the TAL which enabled the assertion of Kurdish preferences such as recognition of the KRG, TAL was generally regarded as favorable to the Kurds. See B. Park, p.18

Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson also criticize TAL by claiming that the document fell far short of gaining the consensus of Iraqis, and instead it became an issue for exploiting the ethno-religious divide

into two separate regions which are Kurdish region in the North and Arabic region in the South that would have 18 regional districts.⁴⁸¹ In this federal system Kurdish self government enhanced its autonomy by inserting its ability to revise federal laws when there was a contradiction between federal laws and domestic laws of the KRG, besides protecting KRG parliamentary democracy consisting of two divided governments dominated by Kurdish political parties which are KDP and PUK.⁴⁸² Although TAL did not give the control of Kirkuk to Kurds, it gave the permission of Kurdish resettling Kirkuk to reclaim their homes which they had to leave due to Arabization policy of Saddam Hussein.⁴⁸³ Apart from TAL, Governing Council of Iraq had decided that direct elections would take place on 31 January 2005 and after the elections a permanent constitution would be created by the elected National Assembly during 2005.⁴⁸⁴ By the TAL, Kurds obtained the chance of vetoing the permanent constitution during the referendum; therefore, the permanent constitution had to meet the demands of Kurds.⁴⁸⁵

After the invasion, Iraq was governed by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)⁴⁸⁶ and one of the main goals of the CPA which was to draft an interim Iraqi constitution which would be called as the Law for the Administration of Iraq in the Transitional Period, also called as “Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)”. After the dissolution of the CPA, an interim Iraqi government was created to conduct preparations for the election of the Iraqi National Assembly in April 2004 and when the preparations for the elections completed, the general national election for an interim government in Iraq was held on January 30, 2005 while the referendum regarding the approval of the constitution would be organized in the October 15, 2005.⁴⁸⁷ The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) both supported and

via preparing the ground for national fragmentation by allowing any three administrative governorates in Iraq to establish a federal region. See Salamey and Pearson, pp.192-193

See also Katzman, p.3

⁴⁸¹ Salamey and Pearson, p.196

⁴⁸² Salamey and Pearson, p.197

⁴⁸³ Katzman, p.3

⁴⁸⁴ B. Park, p.18

⁴⁸⁵ Katzman, p.3

See also B. Park, p.19

⁴⁸⁶ Coalition Provisional Authority, An Historic Review Of CPA Accomplishment, Baghdad, Iraq, 2004, p.2

⁴⁸⁷ Katzman, p.3

B. Park, p.18

participated in the Iraqi elections in 2005, including the provincial elections and for the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), as well as constitution referendum for which Kurds gave full support due to the fulfillment of their demands in the constitutional draft.⁴⁸⁸ As Sunni organizations and the rest of Shiite groups apart from the election participant Shiites, such as Mahdi Militia, boycotted the election by claiming that the elections were illegitimate due to Iraqi invasion by the coalition forces under the leadership of the US, a coalition of Shiite political groups were able to win the majority of the seats in the new Iraqi National Assembly while the KDP/PUK obtained a third of the seats.⁴⁸⁹ After the Iraqi National Assembly members were elected, they conducted the task of drafting Iraq's permanent Constitution while the Sunnis and some Shiites were left out of the drafting process due to their protest of the election.⁴⁹⁰ The completion of the constitution draft was long delayed due to Kurdish leadership's efforts for the incorporation of Kirkuk and Khanaqine to federated Kurdish region; however, Kurdish leadership could not achieve to include Kirkuk and Khanaqine as the determination of their status was postponed to a referendum which would be held on December 31, 2007 as specified in Article 149, Section 2 of the new Constitution (yet, up to now the referendum could not be held).⁴⁹¹ The draft of the Iraq's permanent constitution was finally completed in September 2005.⁴⁹² The draft of Iraq's permanent constitution was voted by only 9.17 million Iraqi citizens out of 15.5 million registered voters because 5.7 million registered voters boycotted the referendum which was held on 15 October 2005 and

Dawoody, p.492

⁴⁸⁸ Katzman, p.3

⁴⁸⁹ Dawoody, p.492

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid, pp.492-493

⁴⁹¹ Barkey and Laipson, p.67

Katzman, p.6

⁴⁹² Alexander Dawoody asserts that the vagueness and contradictions in LAITP inherited to permanent constitution in addition to complicating the process of writing Iraq's permanent Constitution. Dawoody criticizes the Kurdish leadership by blaming it as using the federal experiment for its own political advantage rather than to safeguard the integrity of the Iraqi political state. Moreover, according to Dawoody, the Shiites also benefited from vagueness and contradictions as well as various legal loopholes of the TAL to insert their own form of federalism, and creating a Shiite sectarian region in southern Iraq. To prove his claim that ambiguous and contradictory articles of LAITP were reflected in the new Iraqi Constitution, Dawoody shows Article 116 (Sec. 2) as example. The article says: "The regional authority has the right to amend the implementation of the federal law in the region in the case of a contradiction between the federal and regional laws in matters that do not pertain to the exclusive powers of the federal authorities". By showing this article as example, Dawoody examines the TAL because there is a contradiction. If the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, it should not be possible for a region to amend such a law. Furthermore, Dawoody also criticizes the priority of regional governments' law when there is a case of dispute. See Dawoody, pp.493-494

the results were announced on 25 October 2005.⁴⁹³ As both Kurdish and Shiite leaders motivated their people to support the constitution, the result of the referendum was 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against, while 7 million of nationwide voters approved the draft Constitution, only 2.10 million voted 'no'.⁴⁹⁴ Although the Sunni provinces opposed to the Constitution in high rates like Anbar, Salahuddin and Nineveh which had a 97%, 82% and 55% 'no' vote, respectively, the draft was approved because only two provinces, not three, voted 'no' by a 2/3 majority and for the rejection of the draft two-third of the voters have to say 'no' to the draft.⁴⁹⁵ The Iraqi administration tried to represent the result of the referendum as an evidence of Sunnis support the political process.⁴⁹⁶

The permanent Iraqi Constitution became another source of confrontation among Turkey, KRG and the US. Turkey had been already disturbed by the alliance between the KRG and the US after 2003 as well the legalization of a federal Kurdish state as part of a democratic and decentralized Iraq.⁴⁹⁷ One of the most important problems that the new Iraqi Constitution created was that it allowed inclusion any number of provinces by the regions such as the inclusion of Kirkuk and Khanaqine into the Kurdish region which would enable KRG to obtain sufficient oil revenues to search for secession from Iraq.⁴⁹⁸ As Turkey defined itself as the protector of

⁴⁹³ Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution" The Library of Congress. Congressional Research Report for Congress, 2006, p.4

See also Dawoody, p.498

Henri Barkey and Ellen Laipson state that the draft was essentially a Kurdish-Shia pact on power-sharing.

See also Barkey and Laipson, p.66

⁴⁹⁴ Katzman (2006), p.4

See also Dawoody, p.498

⁴⁹⁵ Katzman (2006), p.4

See also Barkey and Laipson, p.67

See also Dawoody, p.498

⁴⁹⁶ Katzman (2006), p.4

See also Barkey and Laipson, p.67

⁴⁹⁷ Michael Gunter, "The Permanent and New Realities Facing the Kurdistan Regional Government: Options and Prospects", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol:28, No:2, August 2008, p.238

Kenneth Katzman argues that rather than focusing on central government politics, Massoud Barzani preferred to deal with Northern Iraq politics and after the election on June 12, 2005, the naming decision of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) Barzai as 'President of Kurdistan', according to Katzman, symbolized Barzani's strategy of separating the Northern Iraq politics from the central politics of Iraq. See Katzman (2009), p.3

⁴⁹⁸ Alexander Dawoody argues that Massoud Barzani's visit in Washington and meeting with President Bush, and Bush's addressing him as 'Mr President' of a Kurdish entity during the visit was a sign of Kurdish secessionist agenda. However, according to Dawoody, the success of Kurdish leadership is unlikely because even they achieved secession they cannot defend or maintain its future independent state among continuous internal, local, and regional costly conflicts. See Dawoody, pp.499-501

Turcoman minority in Iraq, especially in Kirkuk region, Turkey concerned about Turcoman minority because Kurds tried to change the demographic of the Kirkuk region before the Kirkuk referendum, which was planned to be organized in December 31, 2007 but could not be held up to now, by pressuring the city's Arabs, both Sunni and Shiite, and Turcoman minority to leave via using their intelligence service the *Asayesh*.⁴⁹⁹ In order to prevent Kurdish claim for Kirkuk, Turkey asserted that the prevention of incorporation of Kirkuk and Mosul oilfields to KRG is one the 'red lines' of Turkey and represented Turkey as guardian of Turcoman ethnic minority in Northern Iraq.⁵⁰⁰ Apart from Kurdish demand for Kirkuk region, Turkey was disturbed by the alliance between Kurdish leadership and the US, as Turkey had doubts about the US policy towards Kurdish groups in Iraq since it was sensitive

Kenneth Katzman also underlines that Turkey was one of the countries which was concerned about possible independence of the KRG; and as the top Kurdish leaders feared of any possible armed conflict with neighbors, they declared that they would search for independence despite they are at odds with mainstream Kurdish opinion.

See Katzman (2009), p.5

⁴⁹⁹ Kenneth Katzman states that Kirkuk issue was considered as 'existential' by Turkey, because its incorporation to KRG could lead to a Kurdish drive for independence with having 10% of Iraq's overall oil reserves of about 112 billion barrels. Katzman reminds that Turkey also sees itself as protector of the Turcoman minority in the city and its environs. See Katzman (2009), pp.5-6

Bill Park underlines that in the Kirkuk region Kurds have struggled for reversing Saddam's policy of Arabization and resettle displaced Kurds. However, these efforts of Kurds resulted in tensions which periodically turned into violence, notably in August 2003 and in the following December and January. Moreover, as Park noted in the latest tension Arabs and Turcoman fought alongside each other against Kurds, and the US forces were obliged to impose a curfew. In order to enhance their position, the Kurdish leadership organized a petition demanding a referendum on Kurdish autonomy which attracted almost two million signatures. See B. Park, p.21

⁵⁰⁰ Bill Park expresses that Ankara had also objected to the TAL partly because of the insufficient attention it pays to the rights of Turcoman. See B. Park, pp.26 and 27

Henri Barkey and Ellen Laipson argued that partly because of Turkey's interference in Northern Iraq, Kurdish-Turcoman relations have been problematic. In order to enhance its influence over Northern Iraq, Ankara created and directly supported the Iraqi Turcoman Front (ITF) in 1990s. However, according to Barkey and Laipson, as the ITF has taken a hard-line stand on such issues as Kirkuk and has also fanned the flames of sectarianism by accusing the Kurds and their U.S. allies of committing crimes against the civilian population, the ITF failed in 2005 elections while the Kurdish-supported Turcoman appeared to have gathered more votes than the ITF itself. Barkey and Laipson claim that although the ITF does not represent the majority of the Turcoman and it failed in the elections it still remains as a factor due to Turkish military and logistical support. See Barkey and Laipson, pp.68 and 71

Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush assert that a confrontation between Kurds and Turkmen over the ownership of Kirkuk could provoke Turkish military intervention as Turkey insisted on its claim over Kirkuk due to the Ottoman legacy which led to strong historical interest in Kirkuk. Moreover, an inflow of some 350,000 Kurds to Kirkuk, many with no ties to the city, with encouragement and material assistance from the Kurdistan Regional Government, caused both the departure of the city's Arab and Turkmen population and resulted in Ankara's fear that this demographic transformation could threaten Turkey's interests as the referendum over the city's future set would take place before the end of 2007. According to Menon and Wimbush, Turkish concerns about Kirkuk have been heightened by the Kurdistan Regional Government's assertion that it can legitimately assign rights to develop the disputed territory's oil fields and its decision to sign agreements with foreign oil companies. See also Menon and Wimbush, pp.139-140

about Kurdish position in Northern Iraq due to its own Kurdish minority.⁵⁰¹ Moreover, Turkey was concerned about ambiguous attitude of the US towards a possible independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.⁵⁰² The United States and Kurds in Northern Iraq have been allies since 2003 due to Kurdish support for the US during the Iraq War and relative peace in KRG while the rest of Iraq was in chaos, and after the 2005 elections key political positions of Iraq was held by Kurds such as Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani who became president of Iraq and Hoshiyar Zebari who remained as Iraq's foreign minister by intensifying the relations between the US and Kurds.⁵⁰³ In addition to close relationship between Iraqi Kurds and the US which feared Turkey that her interest could be overlooked by the US, Turkey was concerned about PKK militants who use Northern Iraq as the main base to organize attacks to Turkey. Turkey had already suspected that the Iraq War would provide even more extensive safe havens to the PKK in addition to spreading turmoil to southeast Turkey by threatening the territorial integrity of Turkey; therefore, Turkey was not convinced that the invasion was necessary to defend the American people and it opposed to American operation campaign which would be launched without the legitimacy conferred by an enabling United Nations resolution.⁵⁰⁴ By this suspicion about the US plans for Northern Iraq, Turkey gave partial support to the US to open a northern front against Iraq in late March 2003 via a motion which permitted the US to use Turkey's airspace to cross into Iraq for airborne attacks, while it was also authorizing the Turkish government to send military troops to Northern Iraq.⁵⁰⁵ The motion led the US to be cautious about the possible Turkish military intervention to Northern Iraq as any fighting between Turkish troops and

⁵⁰¹ Aylin Güney underlines that Turkey was disturbed by the 'preferential' treatment given to the Iraqi Kurds by Washington, demanding a reversal of Kurdish gains. Güney says "Turkey expressed its doubts about US policy towards Kurdish groups in Iraq" by quoting "the US was giving excessive favors to Kurdish groups in Iraq, at the risk of encouraging civil war and Kurdish secession in the future ... Kurdish representation is far in excess of their real standing in the society". According to Güney, Turkey also complained that the demands and rights of Turcoman were not protected by the US like the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Moreover, despite Kurdish denial, Turkey was also concerned that the Kurds wanted to take control of the rich oilfields of Kirkuk. See Güney, p.353

⁵⁰² İşyar, p.47

⁵⁰³ According to Barkey and Laipson, another reason behind the close relationship between Northern Iraqi Kurds and the US was the rejection of Turkish parliament the U.S. request to open a second front in the north against Saddam. After TGNA's rejection Kurdish partnership became more crucial for the US. Barkey and Laipson also claimed that the Kurdish support for the US was caused by security concerns of the Kurds. See Barkey and Laipson, p.69

⁵⁰⁴ Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush, "The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance?", *Survival*, Vol:49, No:2, Summer 2007, pp. 137-138

⁵⁰⁵ Güney, p.351

Kurdish groups could seriously cripple the US military planning to overthrow Saddam Hussein and hinder the US aim of keeping Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups together.⁵⁰⁶

3.2.2.2. PKK and Northern Iraq after the Iraq War

After the Iraqi War, The PKK has found Northern Iraq as a suitable place to operate in order to organize military assaults to Turkey; therefore, there were about 3,000-4,500 PKK militants in Northern Iraq and while some of them were located right across the Turkish border, others encamped on the Iranian side.⁵⁰⁷ As the PKK gave up its unilateral ceasefire and started once more its assaults to Turkey in 2005, although the PKK was not as powerful as it was in the 1990s and not a critical threat as it was in the 1990s, the Turkish military started to consider the ways of intervening to Northern Iraq in order to stop the PKK military attacks from Northern Iraq which caused several Turkish soldiers' death.⁵⁰⁸ However, the US did not welcome any possible Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq which would endanger the peaceful situation in Northern Iraq while the rest of Iraq was still in chaos. Turkey had already 1,200-1,500 soldiers in Northern Iraq to watch out for the PKK cadres and provide support for the Turcoman people in Northern Iraq; however, Turkish military forces could not infiltrate into Northern Iraq to stop the PKK terrorist as Turkey refrained from a backlash in its relationship with the US, instead, Turkey tried to put pressure on the KRG directly and the US indirectly.⁵⁰⁹ Although both the KRG and the US backed Turkey in its fight against the PKK terrorism in principle, as Turkey did not see any commitment of the US in terms of taking action against the PKK, Turkey strongly criticized the US. In order to prevent the use of Qandil Mountains by PKK fighters for launching attacks, Turkey conducted special-forces operations in Northern Iraq in addition to its continued presence of its military contingent.⁵¹⁰ However, Turkey's counter-measures resulted in worsening of its relations with the

⁵⁰⁶ Güney, p.351

⁵⁰⁷ Barkey and Laipson p.71

See also Walker, p.99

⁵⁰⁸ Barkey and Laipson p.71

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

See also Walker, p.99

⁵¹⁰ Menon and Wimbush, p.138

US, especially when Turkish special forces commandos, and a number of Turkish and Turcoman civilians were arrested in Sulaimaniyah by the US forces on July 4, 2003 on the basis of intelligence reports that the Turks were engaged in ‘disturbing activities’.⁵¹¹ During the arrest of Turkish soldiers, the US forces treated Turkish soldiers as terrorists by taking them to interrogation with hoods on their heads and this event led to one of the biggest crisis in US-Turkish relations.⁵¹² The negative effects of the Sulaymaniyah incident were got over by two sides’ efforts to prevent the negative trend in bilateral relations to climb more, especially the US realized that in the long term it would need Turkish support; therefore the relations were recovered through the framework of the New Global Defense Strategy devised at the end of year 2003 by which the US authorities recognized the gravity of Turkey.⁵¹³

Turkish sensitivities about the PKK intensified after 2003 because Turkey’s dependence on the US troops and Kurdish *peshmerga* to confront the estimated 5,000 PKK separatists which have bases in the mountains of Northern Iraq and the US reluctance to end the PKK presence in Northern Iraq, although it agreed to do so on Ankara’s behalf in 2003, revealed that neither the US nor the KRG has will or

⁵¹¹ B. Park, p.26

Menon and Wimbush, p.138

İşyar, p.43

Walker, p.100

⁵¹² Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush expresses that the Sulaymaniyah event received considerable play in the Turkish media and political circles. According to Menon and Wimbush, the event was portrayed as ‘a humiliation, evidence of American ill-will, and payback for the Turkish parliament’s refusal to allow US forces to attack Saddam’s army from the north’. See Menon and Wimbush, pp.138-139

Bill Park reminds that the establishment of a US-Turkish commission to investigate the incident did not put an end to the crisis as the defining of General Hilmi Özkok, Chief of Turkey’s General Staff, the incident as ‘the biggest crisis of confidence between the two sides’ showed that Turkish side was still badly affected by the event. See B. Park, p.26

Joshua W. Walker argues that the July 2003 Sulaymaniyah incident was one of the diplomatic fiascos between the United States and Turkey that was caused by Turkish operations in Northern Iraq, but the most effective one. The US forces’ treatment of Turkish forces as al-Qaeda terrorists through the infamous hooding and humiliation of the Turkish soldiers was made into the top-selling Turkish movie *Valley of the Wolves*, which complements a trend of anti-American entertainment exemplified best by the novel *Metal Storm*, about a fictional war between the United States and Turkey over Iraq in 2007. See Walker, p.100

Ömer Göksel İşyar asserts that the distress in Turkish-American relations was caused by the voting for military permission of March 1 in Turkish Assembly. After that voting, some authorities in American side have begun to question the degree of friendship of Turkey. İşyar compared Sulaymaniyah incident with the atmosphere created by the famous ‘Johnson’s letter’ to Ankara in 1964. In that letter the United States had announced its opposite intention and that in turn had created a great indignation and negative reaction in Turkish public opinion like in the Sulaimaniyah incident.

⁵¹³ İşyar, p.44

capacity to invest in this PKK removal.⁵¹⁴ Although the US administration accepted that Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL), the brand new organization which had replaced the terrorist Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), as a terrorist organization and would be treated as such by US forces in Iraq⁵¹⁵, Turkish sensitivities regarding the PKK did not disappear; as a result, Turkish military was able to conduct cross-border military operations against the PKK thanks to a one-year Turkish parliamentary authorization given to the Turkish government in 2007, and in 2008 the authorization was extended for another year.⁵¹⁶ In the framework of the motion, in December 2007 the Turkish Air Force launched a series of air strikes which targeted presumed PKK positions in Northern Iraq and then air strikes followed by a week-long series of coordinated air and ground attacks under the name of ‘Operation Sun’ which involved several thousand troops, supported by aircraft and artillery in February 2008.⁵¹⁷ Turkish military strikes continued during 2008 such as series of air strikes on presumed PKK positions in Northern Iraq conducted by the Turkish Air Force in July 2008, and another series of air strikes into Northern Iraq which was conducted in October 2008 after the PKK attack which killed 17 Turkish soldiers.⁵¹⁸ By these military operations Turkey was able to convey its discomfort regarding the PKK attacks from Northern Iraq to the US; thus, in November 2008, the U.S., Iraqi and Turkish governments decided to initiate a trilateral forum to exchange information and coordinate activities regarding the PKK.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁴ Regarding the agreement between the US and Turkey, Bill Park reminds that in January 2004, Turkish General İlker Başbuğ, who had helped negotiate the agreement, declared that “the US’s fight against the PKK is not meeting our expectation.” Abdullah Gül repeated the complaint in May following the recent revival of the PKK violence. B. Park, p.26

⁵¹⁵ Güney, p.353

⁵¹⁶ Dale, p.58

⁵¹⁷ Tom Ruys, “Quo Vadit Jus Ad Bellum?: A Legal Analysis Of Turkey’s Military Operations Against the PKK in Northern Iraq, “Melbourne Journal of International Law”, 2008, p.2

See also Dale, p.58

⁵¹⁸ Dale, p.58

⁵¹⁹ Dale, p.58

Aylin Güney claims that the dynamics of the Turkish–US alliance have changed to a great extent especially in the post-9/11 period as Turkey started to pursue a more independent and assertive policy as well as seeking more balanced partnership in which her interests will be protected as much as the US’s. The establishment of tripartite forum can be considered as a product of this change in Turkish policy. See Güney, pp.355-356

3.2.3. Iran

Iran is one of the neighbor states of Turkey which has affected Turkey's Northern Iraq policy. Although Iran and Turkey had peaceful relations since both were established, the relations started to be problematic after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 as the revolution fundamentally changed the orientation of Iran's foreign policy and led to instability in the region.⁵²⁰ Islamic revolution resulted in the deterioration of Iran's relations with both the US and Turkey. After the revolution in November of that year, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was assaulted and its personnel taken hostage and in response to the hostage the US applied sanctions against Iran; thus, this event resulted in the cease of Iran's strategic alliance with the US.⁵²¹ Turkey-Iran relations were also deteriorated after the Islamic Revolution because of Turkey's long term foreign policy objective, which was being a status quo power in the region along with the protection of regional stability, contradicted with the militant rhetoric and the conduct of Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy that caused problems for Turkey at the international and regional levels.⁵²² While Iran had problematic relations with both Turkey and the US, and its military forces were weakened due to the US sanctions, military purges, and the summary executions of its leaders; Iran encountered Iraqi invasion starting the Iran-Iraqi war which lasted for eight years. The reason of the war was multiple including religious sects-Shiite and Sunni division in Islam-, border disputes, political differences, conflicts date back to centuries ago consisting religious and ethnic disputes, and a personal animosity as well competition between Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini.⁵²³ Moreover, Saddam Hussein wanted to benefit from the weak situation of Iran in order to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world, to prevent the exportation of Islamic Revolution to his country and to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state.⁵²⁴ During the war, Iran pursued the goal of both winning the war and exporting

⁵²⁰ Milani, p.2

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² John Calabrese, "Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:25, No:1, May, 1998, p. 77

⁵²³ Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm> (retrieved at 22 October 2009)

⁵²⁴ Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm> (retrieved at 22 October 2009)

See also Milani, p.2

its revolution which was driven by ideological and tactical motivations.⁵²⁵ The Iran-Iraqi war damaged Turkey-Iran relations because Turkey was dependent on Iraqi oil and foreign policy approach divergence between Turkey and Iran deepened as Iran had been already pursuing the objective of eradicating the state of Israel and took more radical stance towards Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵²⁶

Despite occasional diplomatic crises such as the 'car boot', 'turban', and 'Cape Maleas' incidents⁵²⁷, the tension never turned to be a military confrontation or a total breakdown of bilateral relations as both governments specifically avoided.⁵²⁸ Due to major developments in international regional and domestic arenas in the 1990s, Turkish-Iranian relations' content and context have changed and the relations possessed an ambiguous character and uncertain future.⁵²⁹ The main agenda of Turkish-Iranian relations during 1990s was "to solve their differences with regard to the Kurdish question in northern Iraq and not within either of their own country's borders" as after the First Gulf War Northern Iraq became a danger for states which have Kurdish minorities.⁵³⁰ After the First Gulf War, Iran had to accommodate to the massive influx of Kurds, including 700,000 to 1,000,000 Kurdish refugees as there was a humanitarian crisis due to Saddam Hussein's assault on Kurds.⁵³¹ However, Iran opposed to the establishment of 'safe havens' for the Kurds in north of the 36th parallel because Iran suspected that similar havens could also be established on the Iranian border and Iran was less tolerant than Turkey regarding the establishment of a de facto autonomous and/or independent zone in Northern Iraq due to its huge refugee accommodation.⁵³² The First Gulf War resulted in power vacuum in Northern Iraq; therefore, both Iran and Kurdish groups feared of permanent Turkish occupation of portions of Northern Iraq, especially the oil fields around Kirkuk while Turkey had also same fears.⁵³³ In addition, greater Turkish presence on its eastern border would increase Turkey's influence on Iran's Azeri population which was

⁵²⁵ Milani, p.2

⁵²⁶ Calabrese, p.77

⁵²⁷ For further information about these crises, See Calabrese, p.78

⁵²⁸ Calabrese, p.78

⁵²⁹ Ibid., p.79

⁵³⁰ Robert Olson, "Turkey– Iran relations, 1997 to 2000: the Kurdish and Islamist Questions", Third World Quarterly, Vol:21, No:5, 2000, p.875

⁵³¹ Olson, (1992), p.485

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Olson (1992), pp.489-490

estimated as 9 million; therefore, Iran could not tolerate any additional Turkish presence in Northern Iraq.⁵³⁴ After the collapse of the USSR led to Iran's competition with Turkey in Central Asia contributes further to its concerns apart from Turkish influence over Northern Iraq as well as Iran's Azeri population.⁵³⁵

When Syrian support for the PKK ended in October 1998 by the expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan, Turkey started to blame Iran for supporting the PKK more often.⁵³⁶ Iran tried to use the PKK as trump towards Turkey in order to prevent the Turkish control of Northern Iraq.⁵³⁷ The Iranian support to the PKK included the permission to hold its 6th Annual Congress in Urmiya in February 1999, recruiting local Kurds to conduct terrorist assaults against targets within Turkey, supply weapons and allowing weapons to be transferred via Armenia and Russia, and lastly allowing his territory to be used by the PKK.⁵³⁸ After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkish-Iranian relations started to be better off because Turkey's refusal to support to the US for the invasion worsened the US-Turkey relations while recovering Iranian-Turkey relations.⁵³⁹ Turkey and Iran had common objectives such as preventing the breakup of Iraq and establishment of an independent Kurdish state, and confronting Kurdish insurgents - Iran with the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PEJAK) while Turkey with the PKK.⁵⁴⁰ After violent clashes between PEJAK and Iranian forces during 2007-2009 which caused serious casualties of Iranian forces, as a result of common interest in defeating PKK and PEJAK, in February 2008 Iran and Turkey signed an agreement on 'security cooperation'; however, Iran's efforts to develop its own nuclear weapons created problems and in August 2004, the creation of new version of Shahab-3 missile,

⁵³⁴ Olson (1992), p.490

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Olson (2000), p.875

⁵³⁷ Ibid., p.877

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ William Hale, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era'", *Insight Turkey*, Vol:11, No:3, 2009, p. 154

⁵⁴⁰ P. Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush reminds that in Iran, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistané, PJAK) whose leader was Haji Ahmadi, has been battling Iranian security forces with greater intensity, while using Iraqi Kurdish territory as a sanctuary. Menon and Wimbush compare the PKK and PEJAK and conclude that PEJAK is in a different political line than the PKK as it is liberal rather than Marxist and seeking autonomy rather than independence. Despite differences between the PKK and PEJAK the result is the same, both are terrorist organizations for Ankara and Tehran. See Menon and Wimbush, p.140

See also Hale (2009), p.154

which had a range of 2,000 kilometers covering Turkey and Israel, caused new problems for the relations between Turkey and Iran.⁵⁴¹ Therefore; the current relationship between Turkey and Iran is marked by nuances, uncertainties, and contradiction, and the future of the relations is still uncertain.⁵⁴²

3.2.4. Syria

Syria is the last regional actor that affects Turkey's Northern Iraq policy. Turkey's relations with Syria started to normalize after the expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan and the cease of Syrian support to the PKK in 1999.⁵⁴³ Like Turkey and Iran, Syria was also affected by Iraqi War in 2003 due to its own Kurdish minority and its concerns about the future of Northern Iraq. Iraq War caused demonstrations of Syrian citizens of Kurdish origin especially in regions where Syrian Kurds live such as in Qamishli.⁵⁴⁴ Similar to Turkey, the rights of Kurds in Syria were denied for forty three years and Kurdish dissent and mobilization are particularly unwelcomed by the Bashar al-Asad regime; yet as the the Kurds in Syria achieved to be one of the best-mobilized groups within an otherwise disorganized opposition, they obtained the regime's offer of citizenship.⁵⁴⁵

Like Iran and Turkey, Syria has little sympathy for Kurdish separatist aspirations in Northern Iraq because Kurdish separatism could provoke separatism in the neighbors of Northern Iraq; thus, Turkey, Iran and Syria have tried to collaborate on limiting Kurdish progress towards independence.⁵⁴⁶ To prevent Kurdish progress towards independence both Iran and Turkey started to compete for the control Northern Iraq. Their preferences regarding the Kurdish presence in Northern Iraq differed as Turkey preferred a robust and secular Kurdish presence as an insurance policy against an Iraq which have had the potential to fall under the sway of Sunni or

⁵⁴¹ Barkey and Laipson argues that the increase in to the PKK affiliated group the PEJAK attacks caused by Tehran's increased cooperation with Turkish authorities. See Barkey and Laipson, p.71

See also Hale (2009), pp.154-155

⁵⁴² Calabrese, p.94

⁵⁴³ Robins (2007), p.295

⁵⁴⁴ Barkey and Laipson, p.72

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Menon and Wimbush, p.140

See also Barkey and Laipson, p.72

Shiite fundamentalist elements while Iran have an interest in maintaining good relations with the Kurds precisely because she refrained from allowing them to become Turkish clients.⁵⁴⁷ The Iraqi War changed the conditions in favor of Turkey because during the 1990s both Iran and Syria was supporting the PKK in order to use the PKK as a leverage on Turkey; yet, after the war the three states aligned against the PKK and have even attacked its positions in the mountainous Northern Iraq.⁵⁴⁸ As Turkish assessment of Syria and Iran changed by the end of their support to the PKK, the US and Turkish assessments of Iran and Syria have diverged following the Iraq War and Turkey started to hesitate about American tactics against either country due to the fact that such steps would weaken the regimes and strengthen Kurdish nationalism.⁵⁴⁹

Turkish-Syrian relations gained ground on the basis of two factors: Syria wanted to get rid of its wider international isolation while Turkey needed to be confident that Syria would never retreat regarding its stance towards terrorism.⁵⁵⁰ To consolidate relations, Turkey and Syria pursued various ways such as cross-border trade and high-level visits; including a first ever visit to Turkey by a Syrian president, combining with the multiple foreign policy strategy of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government which stipulated an active foreign policy understanding and peaceful relations with neighbor states. Currently, the relations between Turkey and Syria are continuing well under the JDP government's foreign policy strategy of peaceful relations. To strengthen relations, both countries agreed to open borders to enhance partnership in all areas.⁵⁵¹

After introducing the actors have involved in TFP policy making towards Northern Iraq, the approaches of Turkish governments towards Northern Iraq and

⁵⁴⁷ Barkey and Laipson, p.72

⁵⁴⁸ Menon and Wimbush, p.140

⁵⁴⁹ Philip Robins asserts that the US and Turkish approach to Syria differentiated after February 2005 by the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, which was generally perceived to have been ordered by the Syrian regime. While the US campaigned vigorously for the isolation of Syria, Turkey avoided jeopardizing its hard-won improvement in bilateral relations. See Robins (2007), p.296

See also Menon and Wimbush, p.140

⁵⁵⁰ Robins (2007), p.296

⁵⁵¹ Fulya Özerkan, "Turkey, Syria Ready To Look Up At Same Sky" Tuesday, October 13, 2009 (retrieved at 23 October 2009) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-syria-ready-to-look-up-same-sky-2009-10-13>

their role in foreign policy calculations and outcomes should be revealed. Next chapter will provide the analysis of TFP towards Northern Iraq periodically and on the theoretical FPA ground.

FOURTH CHAPTER
PERIODICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NORTHERN IRAQ POLICY OF TURKEY

4.1 PERIODICAL AND THEORETICAL TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq requires a comprehensive study of periodical transformation and continuity in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) along with the Turkish governments' attitudes in the conduct of foreign policy as well as their place in the political spectrum. To specify a part of TFP- in this case, the Northern Iraq policy- a general framework of TFP should be asserted with a historical background including a brief introduction of general traits and patterns evolved since the establishment of Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, the analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq should focus on the current situation of the relations which dates back to Gulf War. Therefore, this chapter aims to reveal the foreign policy formulations of Turkish governments starting with the Motherland Party government in 1983 until the Justice and Development Party government up to now within a theoretical perspective under the light of previous theoretical perspectives on foreign policy analysis. As the political events can be defined through different theoretical lenses, different conclusions can be obtained due to the fact that different level of analysis can lead to various deductions and implications because of focus area such as actors, groups, states, norms and organizations. Each foreign policy decisions and formulations can be assessed through many theoretical perspectives on foreign policy analysis; therefore, this chapter will attempt to approach foreign policy choices and decision making on this ground.

Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, TFP has had some general qualifications, constant patterns and repetitions.⁵⁵² The main trait has been avoidance

⁵⁵² Ahmet Sözen underlines that since the end of the 20th or the beginning of the 21st century, the traditional Turkish foreign policy attained certain characteristics or principles such as continuity

from interfering and involvement in domestic politics and international relations among the Middle Eastern states; nevertheless, developing close economic relations with the states in the region, while having a standing place among European powers through the establishment of close political and economic relationships in order to take place in Western Civilization has been the main objective of the TFP.⁵⁵³ The emergence of ideological Turkey's inclination towards secular regime and ideological differences between Turkey and Middle Eastern states, the inherited Ottoman Empire experience in Westernization and diplomatic tradition, and security culture created during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire can be regarded as the causes of the Western-oriented foreign policy and cautious TFP towards the Middle East based on non-interference and non-involvement principles.⁵⁵⁴ Among these reasons, the Ottoman legacy has been the most influential and determinative factor

conservatism, caution and status quo which are accepted as the fundamental principles of the traditional Turkish foreign policy.

See Ahmet Sözen, "Changing Fundamental Principles in Turkish Foreign Policy Making", Paper prepared for presentation at the 2006 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association in San Diego, USA, March 2006, p.1

⁵⁵³ Kemal Kirişçi draws attention especially to Cold War period when Turkey pursued the policy of non-involvement by remaining aloof from developments in the Middle East. While Turkey refrained from involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and tried to protect itself from the effects of Pan-Arabism, its interest in the region was economical until the end of the Cold War which resulted in major changes and challenges to Turkish foreign policy. See Kemal Kirişçi, "Between Europe And The Middle East: The Transformation Of Turkish Policy", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol:8, No:1, March 2004

For the constant aim of Turkish Republic which has been described as 'to bring Turkey to the level of contemporary civilisation', See Meliha B. Altunışık and Özlem Tür, "From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic", **Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change**, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, p.16

According to Ahmet Sözen since the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy pursued a policy of deliberate 'neutrality' in order to protect territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Turkey both internally and externally.

See Sözen, p.1

⁵⁵⁴ Since the 17th century when the Ottoman Empire entered into a period of gradual decline, Westernization was regarded as a way to prevent the collapse of the empire and Western diplomatic practices and processes became a must for the survival of the empire. Apart from attempts to develop close ties with Western states in order to penetrate European state system, the empire initiated a reform process intended to modernize the armed forces and the administration. This reform process continued after the establishment of Turkish Republic and became one of the Ottoman legacies. Another legacy of the Ottoman Empire has been the security culture in which the military became the main Westernization initiator and one of the dominant powers in the state.

See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol:54, No:1, Fall 2000, pp.204-207

Ideological difference between Turkey and Middle Eastern states caused by Atatürk's, the founder of the Turkish Republic, determination to shape Turkey as a Western state by cutting ties with Middle Eastern states and leaving the leadership of the world Islamic community by the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924.

For non-involvement strategy in TFP, See Hale, p.681

See also Kirişçi (2002), p.130

See also Özkan, p.158

Ahmet Sözen claims that both Turkish political elite and the public have mostly been affected by Sèvres syndrome, which was inherited from the Ottoman Empire, in the relations with the West, EU and the US, and the Middle East. See Sözen, p.13

that shaped the TFP because the Ottoman defensive *realpolitik* and ‘state-centric approach’ to foreign policy formulation was transmitted to Turkish Republic.⁵⁵⁵ Specifically, the consecration of the state and Sèvres syndrome, as mentioned in previous chapters, have had considerable impact on the foreign policy vision of Turkey.⁵⁵⁶ The main orientation of the TFP has been the protection of the state’s integrity of the current borders on the revised form of *Misak-ı Milli* (National Oath or National Pact) and for the realization of this aim, integrity of other states has been respected by the non-involvement policy especially towards the Middle Eastern states. However, this traditional TFP orientation has been challenged by the Özal government which pursued a new activism in TFP by establishing close political and economic relations with the Middle Eastern states.

After political disturbance in 1970s, on September 12th 1980, the military took over the ruling of the country by closing the parties established before 1980 and arresting and banning their leaders to restore order. To secure Turkish Republic, by ending the upsurge of left-wing and right-wing violence the military rule crushed leftist and rightist groups as it regarded them threat to the state.⁵⁵⁷ To prevent communist and leftist ideologies’ revival, the military rule pursued the strategy of depoliticizing the society and strengthening of political Islam in Turkey which resulted in a constant failure of transition to social democracy as well as crippling the

⁵⁵⁵ Ali Karaosmanoğlu introduces offensive and defensive *realpolitik* policies of the Ottoman Empire. Karaosmanoğlu asserts that until the end of 17th century, the Ottoman Empire pursued a foreign policy of offensive realism whose objective was to maximize power by conquering territory in order to obtain wealth. However, after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 the Ottoman Empire entered into a period of gradual decline and Ottoman *realpolitik* turned to have a defensive character which aimed to prevent the dissolution of the empire or at least slow down retreat to the East.

Ramazan Gözen argues that the dominant vision in TFP has been realist since the establishment of Turkish Republic. As the realism is a state-centric theory which is interested in power relations, national interest and offensive and defensive foreign policy formulations and calculations, TFP has been focusing on the preservation of the state and its maximization of power. Realist politics dates back to the 17th century when the Ottoman Empire started to pursue the balance of power diplomacy and defensive strategy in foreign policy formulations in order to survive in the Western power system. After the empire collapsed, the new state born from its ashes inherited its realist foreign policy formulations and perception of internal and external threats to territorial integrity as well as Westernization orientation.

See Ramazan Gözen, “Türk Dış Politikasında Vizyon ve Revizyon”, **Doğu’dan Batı’ya Dış Politika-AK Partili Yıllar**, Dr. Zeynep Dağı ed., Orion Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2006, pp.74-80

⁵⁵⁶ Gözen, p.75

See also Karaosmanoğlu, p.202

⁵⁵⁷ Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, “The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, **The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey**, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008, p.37

See also Ely Karmon, “Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol:1, No:4, December 1997.

social democrats.⁵⁵⁸ The main aim of the military rule in promoting political Islam was to benefit from Islam's unification force in Turkish society which would enable the justification of military rule and facilitate the establishment of order by the interim government in addition to keep the society in military control. To insert Islam as the cement of the society, the military rule initiated "a process of state controlled Islamization from above" which consisted state-controlled moral and religious education with a compulsory class in the education system in all schools and Quran courses all over the country.⁵⁵⁹ In addition to political Islam, the military rule resort to nationalism to bind social groups to each other in order to reach social cohesion. Nationalism was helping the military rule to create a more homogeneous society with less political Islam tendency besides alienating the society from left-wing ideologies. This combination of nationalism and political Islam was represented as the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' which was a new ideological concept developed by a group of right-wing intellectuals in Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) association and adopted by the military during the military rule between 1980-1983.⁵⁶⁰ This 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' enabled the justification of military junta and the hegemony of new ruling elite, the integration of Islamists and the nationalists, the reduce of leftist-communist and radical Islamist ideologies' appeals, and nationalization of Islam which would prevent the influences of non-Turkish

⁵⁵⁸ Rabasa and Larrabee state "The architects of this ideological program hoped to create a new form of depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture that would reunify society and provide the basis for a unified, strong, and stable state". See Rabasa and Larrabee, p.38

E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery: Paradoxes of the Turkish Experience", *Globalizations*, Vol:4, No2., 2007, p.8

See also M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", *Middle East Critique*, Vol:7, No:12, 1998, p.30

⁵⁵⁹ Muhittin Ataman says "In order to counter anti-regime ideologies such as communism and radical Islamic movements and states, the military government quickly became actively involved in traditional Islamic international organizations and began to search for closer cooperation with conservative Muslim countries."

See Muhittin Ataman, "Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol:1, No:1, Spring 2002, p.131

See also Rabasa and Larrabee, p.37

⁵⁶⁰ Rabasa and Larrabee underline that conservative scholars who belonged to Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals' Hearth) asserted a moral and philosophical rationale for the synthesis, building an ideology out of Ottoman, Islamic, and Turkish popular culture to legitimize the hegemony of the new ruling elite. Moreover, according to Rabasa and Larrabee, these scholars reinterpreted the nation and state as a family and community; besides, they selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideas to make the past relevant to the present and to unite differing interests together by emphasizing the danger to family, nation, and state posed by ideological fragmentation. The military junta represented the articulation of "the family, the mosque, and the barracks" concepts and benefited from the educational system and the media to diffuse a popularized version of the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' ideology to the masses. See Rabasa and Larrabee, pp.37-38

See also Karmon "Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey"

Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, Vol:6, No:2, 2005, p.179

strands of Islamic thinking from Pakistan and the Arab world in addition to counter to Islamic radicalism from Iran. One of the main goals of this ideology was to protect the territorial integrity of Turkish nation state against communist threat and Soviet expansion that the United States planned to prevent by surrounding the Soviet Union with a 'green belt' consisted of a coalition of the US-backed moderate Islamic states.⁵⁶¹ Turkey was one of the countries which were the part of the anti-socialist green belt strategy of the US which was applied to Egypt in 1970s. The military junta intended to use Islamists to eradicate the left and then stop them; however, after the Islamists completed their mission their influence over politics did not disappear.⁵⁶² As a result, the most important impact of the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was the Islamization of the Turkish society which led to influence and success of Islamic parties such as the Motherland Party, the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party.

4.1.1 The 1983 Elections and the Motherland Party Period

1983 general elections were held under these conditions created by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis strategy of the military rule. These elections were marked as the transition to multi-party democratic system from military rule; yet, as the military government allowed only a small number of parties to participate in the elections besides banning some politicians from taking part in the elections and

⁵⁶¹M. Hakan Yılmaz, "Democracy and Freedom: The Redefinition of the Ideology of the Turkish Regime in the Postwar Period", *Elites and Change in the Mediterranean*, Antonio Marquina ed., Madrid: FMES, 1997, p.11

See also Karmon "Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey"

Berdal Aral argues that Turkish-Islamic synthesis both in the military rule and later under the Özal's leadership was regarded as the result of the US global strategy to use 'neo conservatism' as a means to keep pro-Western regimes in power by many secularist Turkish intellectuals. However, despite being partly true, Aral opposes this supposition which portrays Turkish politics as a product of the US's global strategy.

See Berdal Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society During the Özal Decade, 1983-93", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:37, No:1, January 2001, p.75

⁵⁶² Although the 1982 constitution defined Turkish Republic as a secular state, the influence of nationalism and Islam synthesis did not vanish due to education system and Turkish popular culture. See Rabasa and Larrabee, p.38

Hakan Yılmaz notes that Bülent Ulusu government which lasted between 1980 and 1983 by modifying nationalism principle of Kemalism made nationalism and Islam compatible and embraced the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the new state ideology. Yılmaz also reminds that the textbook used in the religion classes planned to demonstrate a close connection between Sunni Islam and nationalism and between the Prophet Muhammed and Atatürk.

M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", *Middle East Critique*, Vol:7, No:12, 1998, p.30

See also Yılmaz (1997), p.11

politics.⁵⁶³ The military government hoped to establish two-party system and never return to the political disarray before the 1980 Coup after these elections were held under its strict control; however, the strict control of the military backfired and the elections were won by a party that the military did not support but at least allowed.⁵⁶⁴

The three parties that participated in the 1983 general elections were the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), the Motherland Party (MP), and the Populist Party (PP) which were approved by the military rule while 14 parties vetoed by the military government and left outside of the election process.⁵⁶⁵ The common feature of these parties was that they were all established in the post-September 12 period and the leaders of them all three parties came out of the military regime.⁵⁶⁶ Among them, the NDP, whose leader was a retired general (Turgut Sunalp) was the party supported by the military rule as its ideology supported the military rule and would enable the influence of the military over the politics. Meanwhile, Turgut Özal, who was a successful bureaucrat and adviser to the World Bank on special projects, was able to benefit from the lack of dominant political parties in the system and established the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) in 1982-1983 period.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶³ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu regards the 1983 general elections as a part of the transition process from military government to multi-party democracy. Kalaycıoğlu reminds that the military government of the time not only banned some politicians from participation in party politics, but also disapproved of all political parties except for the Motherland Party, and other populist, and national democratic parties. Moreover, Kalaycıoğlu underlines that the military government screened the candidates and vetoed those who they thought were not fit to run in the elections. Under the light of these information, Kalaycıoğlu concludes that the 1983 elections were neither free nor fair.

See Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party", **Political Parties in Turkey**, Metin Heper and Barry Rubin eds., Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., Great Britain, 2002, p.59

⁵⁶⁴ Ergun Özbudun asserts that the new military government attempted to change the party system into two or three party system by manipulating the electoral laws in order to perpetuate military control on politics. By this aim, in 1983, the military government introduced a new statute which stipulated a 10 percent national threshold and even higher constituency thresholds (from 14.2 percent to 50 percent, depending on the size of the constituency) which were designed to eliminate the more intensely ideological minor parties and leading to a more manageable system of two or three parties.

See Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: How Far From Consolidation?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol:7, No:3, 1996, p.127

See also Feroz Ahmad, "The Turkish Elections of 1983", Middle East Research and Information Project, MERIP Reports, Turkey under Military Rule, No:122, Mar. - Apr., 1984, p. 3

See also Ziya Öniş and E. Fuat Keyman, "Turkey at the Polls- A New Path Emerges", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol:14, No:2, April 2003, p.95

⁵⁶⁵ According to Kalaycıoğlu, "it was the determination of Özal and the tolerance of the military government, which enabled the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-- ANAP) to establish itself and to participate in the national elections of 1983." See Kalaycıoğlu, p.41

See also Ahmad (1984), p.3

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ Sedat Laçiner introduces Turgut Özal as "religious, nationalist, conservative, liberal politician, businessman, economist and bureaucrat" and reminds his former duties such as Deputy Prime Minister

Turgut Özal obtained a considerable success in the 1983 general elections by reaching 45 percent of the votes cast with 262 seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey while the Populist Party had 30% of the votes with 117 seats and Nationalist Democracy Party gained only 24% of the votes with 71 seats in the Parliament.⁵⁶⁸ The results of the elections demonstrated the reaction of Turkish citizens to the military rule because Turkish voters did not support the NDP which is backed by the military government.⁵⁶⁹ By the establishment of one party government of the MP (45th government), under which Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister, Turkey returned to parliamentary democracy.⁵⁷⁰

The success of the MP can be explained by various multilevel factors. On the actor level, the success of the MP can be attributed to Turgut Özal's himself.⁵⁷¹ The MP was a product of Turgut Özal's ambition; therefore, he established the party almost single-handedly and his influence over the party lasted after his leadership ended.⁵⁷² Özal's personal emphasis of conservative values and drive for the combination of modernism with traditional values enabled him to appeal Turkish

in charge of economic affairs after 1980. Laçiner emphasizes also Americanism feature of Özal which emanates from the US admiration created during his study in the US.

See Laçiner, p.162

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu also mentions Özal's professional experience before the Motherland Party leadership. Kalaycıoğlu states that "Özal had spent a lifetime in the highest echelons of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy, functioning as a technocrat working in electrification projects, in the directorship of the State Planning Organization (DPT), and finally as undersecretary of the prime minister's office in 1980". See Kalaycıoğlu, p.41

See also Ziya Öniş, "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:40, No:4, 2004, pp.115-116

⁵⁶⁸ Ahmad (1984), p.3

See also Özbudun, p.127

See also Laçiner, p.163

⁵⁶⁹ Feroz Ahmad argues that although the military rule was started to back NDP months before the elections, in the elections, Turkish voters refused to support the NDP as the voters regarded the election as a referendum on the regime of September 12. Moreover, according to Ahmad, the voters were more concerned to express their disapproval of the government, despite the fact that they were content about the restoration of public order, than to judge the character of the alternatives offered to them. Furthermore, Ahmad concludes that after the 1983 elections, the notion that the average Turkish voter has little interest in issues like freedom of speech and human rights and thinks exclusively in terms of law and order or economic stability was proven wrong.

See Ahmad (1984), p.3

⁵⁷⁰ Öniş (2004), "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", pp.116-117

⁵⁷¹ To demonstrate the effect of Özal's personality on the success of the MP, Sedat Laçiner quotes Erik Jan Zürcher who said "he had a foot in both camps: he had been a successful manager in the private industry in the 1970s and was very well connected in big business circles, which liked his liberalisation of the economy. Moreover, Laçiner also underlines Özal's connections with the Nakşibendi order which enabled him to become both a successful businessman and a religious person with good relations with religious groups.

See Laçiner, p.162

⁵⁷² Kalaycıoğlu, p.45

traditional society which is based upon moral-religious (Sunni) values of the past, as well as Turkish elite which aims to modernize the society to reach Western civilization level.⁵⁷³ Moreover, Turgut Özal was a charismatic leader who built the party according to his preferences and point of view. Özal was able to assert his power among different members of the MP which consisted politicians with liberal, religious conservative, nationalist, or social democratic ideas and interests, by his personal charm.⁵⁷⁴ Furthermore, Turgut Özal had necessary experience to find a way through the military regime to assert his power because he took part in the military government as a leading technocrat then he turned to be a civilian politician with a mass political appeal in short time period.⁵⁷⁵ Behind his successful transition his past and individual characteristics played an important role.⁵⁷⁶ During his technocratic position, Özal had worked out the famous "January 24 package" in 1980 which stipulated the liberalization of the Turkish economy under the leadership of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and he became famous for his economic success in fight against the inflation; therefore, Özal was able to gain the support of the people for his newly established party due to his reputation.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷³ Muhittin Ataman says "Özal synthesized his popular and religious tendencies shared by the majority of the population." See Ataman p.127

⁵⁷⁴ Kalaycıoğlu, pp.46-47

⁵⁷⁵ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu reminds that "The military coup of 1980 catapulted him to a position of political power. He was appointed as state minister in charge of the economy in the military government. His years in the public bureaucracy and at the helm of the state's economic affairs helped give him an image as an able technocrat."

See Kalaycıoğlu, p.41

Öniş (2004), , "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", p.8

⁵⁷⁶ Turgut Özal was able to claim the votes of Islamic groups because he was also a member of a well-known religious order (the Nakshibandi Order). Moreover, he could obtain votes of Islamic business class because he was a devoted economic functionalist.

See Gökhan Bacık and Bülent Aras, "Exile: A keyword in understanding Turkish politics", *The Muslim World*, Vol:92, No:3/4, 2002, p.390

Joel Beinin also states that Turgut Özal belonged to a conservative, religious family from the central Anatolian town of Malatya with ties to the Nakshibandi sufi order (tarikati), the largest of the Ottoman period.

See Joel Beinin, "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of Islamist Social Movements in Egypt and Turkey", prepared for the conference on French and US Approaches to Understanding Islam France-Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, September 12-14, 2004, p.28

For a detailed information about Nakshibandi Order and Islamic ties of Turgut Özal

See M. Hakan Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", Oxford University Press, 2003, p.141

See also Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity", *Middle East Report*, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State, No:199, Apr-Jun., 1996, p.11

⁵⁷⁷ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu says "His credentials as an economic wizard were soundly established in the eyes of the public when he launched his campaign in spring 1981 to establish a new political party."

See Kalaycıoğlu, p.41

See also Dani Rodrik, "Premature Liberalization, Incomplete Stabilization: The Özal Decade In Turkey", National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3300, Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, March 1990, p.4

On the party level, the success of the MP can be explained by the ideological stance of the party, supporting groups of the party, and the lack of alternative parties' participation in the elections. Firstly, the ideology of the party embraced the elements of "liberalism, conservatism with strong Islamist connotations, nationalism and welfarism".⁵⁷⁸ This hybrid ideology of MP enabled the party to appeal masses easily both in the center and periphery.⁵⁷⁹ Secondly, various groups supported the MP due to different elements of the party ideology. For example, while Islamic groups such as many Muslim-identified members of the business class supported the MP because of its conservative and business-oriented policies, nationalist groups espoused the MP due to nationalistic character.⁵⁸⁰ Moreover, the MP targeted to obtain votes of the middle class via its conservative and Islamic stance towards political issues.⁵⁸¹ Lack of political competition due to the limitation of the number of political parties by the military rule to participate in the elections resulted in the magnification of the MP's success which was unexpected.⁵⁸² In addition, the perception of the other parties as the representative of the military regime by the voters contributed to the success of

⁵⁷⁸ Ziya Öniş claims that until the 1987 elections, the MP was a truly cross-class coalition. Öniş underlines that the MP's programmatic appeal was based on a hybrid ideology which was combining a strong commitment to the market with communitarian elements of nationalism and Islam, although not to the extent of Nationalist Action and Welfare.

See Ziya Öniş, "Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox: The Turkish General Elections of 1999", *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, Vol:54, No: 1, p.300

See also Öniş (2004), "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", p.8

Laçiner reveals three more basic characteristics of the ideology of the MP: nationalism, conservatism and social justice. Laçiner, p.126

Berdal Aral states that the Motherland Party consisted of four different political wings which include liberals, conservatives, social democrats, and extreme nationalists. Aral claims that this is a proof of Turgut Özal's appetite for accommodation.

See Aral, p.73

⁵⁷⁹ Öniş (2004), "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", p.8

⁵⁸⁰ Beinin, pp.27-30

⁵⁸¹ Kalaycıoğlu reminds that Özal's emphasis on the MP's presentation of the interests of the Orta Direk (the "main pillar" of society, broadly speaking the middle classes of society) as a social category. Moreover, Özal argued that the MP hosted four different and seemingly irreconcilable ideological strands of conservatism (traditional Sunni) Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy within its ranks. Kalaycıoğlu quotes Nilüfer Göle who interpreted all that as a "combination of engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism" which can be named as the "Islamic social engineering". Moreover, Kalaycıoğlu claims that Özal's vision was reflected in the party program, orientation, ideology and, once in government, on government policy. Furthermore, according to Kalaycıoğlu, Özal's vision was welcomed as a fresh start by the business community, and was even labeled revolutionary by big business and some scholars alike. See Kalaycıoğlu, pp.45-46

⁵⁸² Kalaycıoğlu, p.41

See also Sözen, p.8

the MP.⁵⁸³ Besides, the economic program of the MP attracted the attention of both Muslim-identified and Kemalist business communities.⁵⁸⁴

The result of the 1983 elections determined both the domestic politics' direction and the foreign policy orientation for the next ten years as Turgut Özal remained as an influential leader until his death in 1993. The most effective MP's alteration of Turkish politics was on the economic realm which reflected in the foreign policy making. It was the economy policy of Özal which shaped the formulation of foreign policy because when the MP formed the government it continued the liberalization of Turkish economy which started by 24th January decisions.⁵⁸⁵ By the liberalization policy, the whole economic structure of Turkey was revised and turned from state-controlled and protectionist economy into free market economy system. Moreover, transition to export-oriented growth, the privatization of the state economic enterprises, and the liberalization of financial policies under the framework of the liberalization policy required change in the old policies of inward-oriented economy along with the globalization of economic system.⁵⁸⁶ To foster export-oriented growth, the MP government initiated export

⁵⁸³ Kalaycıoğlu, pp.41-42

⁵⁸⁴ Beinin, p.28

⁵⁸⁵ Dani Rodrik gives detailed information about 24th January package which included "a large devaluation (from TL 47.1 to TL 70 to the US\$), export subsidies, an increase in interest rates, and substantial price increases for state economic enterprise products and the promise of abolition of most government subsidies." Moreover, according to Rodrik, the most important of the measures taken was a new approach favoring exports, outward orientation, and liberalization. See Rodrik, p.4

Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan notes that the globalization and liberalization of Turkish economy started in January 1980 during the most severe economic crisis and accelerated by the military regime and then by Özal's leadership. Turkish economy rapidly turned from strictly controlled closed economic system into liberal economy with the export orientated foreign policy.

See Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan, "Turkey at a Crossroad", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol:54, No:1, Fall 2000, p.9

⁵⁸⁶ Sedat Laçiner says "Thanks to the Özalist economic measures of the early 1980s, by abandoning its inward-oriented economic policies, Turkey succeeded not only in diversifying its exports but also in becoming an important market for direct foreign investment." See Laçiner, pp.163-164 and 166

Ahmet Kuru reminds the economic system before the liberalization policy of Turgut Özal. Kuru states that before the liberalization process, there was a substantial state monopoly on economic and even socio-cultural life. In addition, the state was using import-substituting industrialization and controlling the market. Besides state monopoly on economy and social life, there was also a monopoly of the one-channel public television, the public radio station, and public universities. By the liberalization process, the state abandoned import substitution- based statist economy and transferred to the export-led liberal economy. Another change that the liberalization process brought was the abolish of state control over foreign currency and the change of Turkish currency to become convertible. Along the same lines, the other innovation was the establishment of Turkish stock exchange which was located in Istanbul. Accompanied by the economic liberalization, a privatization process started by changing state-owned enterprises into private firms and private education was initiated.

See Ahmet t. Kuru, "Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol:120, No:2, 2005, p.259

subsidies in the form of export tax rebates; however, although a lot of firms benefited from these subsidies, most of them violated the government support leading to serious corruption in Turkey through fictitious export.⁵⁸⁷ Despite attempts to liberalize trade and capital account regime and to transform the Turkish economy in order to integrate it to the world economy, serious problems remained such as chronic inflation, limited privatization and corruption.⁵⁸⁸ Nevertheless, economic liberalization resulted in economic growth which reached to high rates around 4-5 percent.⁵⁸⁹ Moreover, economic liberalization led to the creation of new social class consisted of newly emerging societal groups such as villagers, workers and traditional religious groups on the periphery.⁵⁹⁰ These groups benefited from the

⁵⁸⁷ Öniş (2004), "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", p.16

Ahmet Kuru signifies that Özal's liberalization policy spread over the development and the transfer of communications technologies by ending state monopoly on television and radio stations in early 1990s. As a result, a number of private radio stations and private national television channels were established. Apart from these, a considerable development in information technologies such as the use of cellular phones, fax machines, and computers along with the use of the Internet, was experienced by the society. Kuru claims that the reflection of economic liberalization to communications technologies enabled the emergence of heterogeneous identities and cultural diversity beyond the control of the state and Islamic identity was one of these identities which benefited economic liberalization to set up their own economic, media, and educational institutions.

⁵⁸⁸ According to Karaosmanoğlu, Turgut Özal was a firm believer in economic liberalism; therefore, to justify the globalization, he placed emphasis on international economic interdependence. See Karaosmanoğlu p.209

See also Öniş (2004), "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", p.16

⁵⁸⁹ Öniş (2000), "Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox", p.289

⁵⁹⁰ Ziya Öniş underlines that globalization of Turkish economy and comparatively high growth rate has led to the creation of a significant group of winners from the globalization process of Turkish economy which are not limited to large scale conglomerates, capitalizing on export markets and the opportunities provided by financial liberalization. Öniş expresses that in addition to these groups benefited from the globalization, new centers of industrial growth has emerged in inner Anatolia, such as Denizli, Çorum, Urfa, Gaziantep and Konya, which have challenged the industrial dominance of İstanbul and the Marmara region.

Öniş believes that the emergence of these new centers consisted of small and medium scale firms caused by small firm development success and their export production based development strategy. Öniş underlines that new centers of power created by these small and medium size firms in the inner of Anatolia, which is called as Anatolian Tigers, marked the transition period to neoliberal economy.

See Öniş (2000), "Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox", p.289

Ahmet Kuru also mentions 'Anatolian Tigers'. According to Kuru, the liberalization process of Turkish economy revealed a new pro-Islamic bourgeoisie which is called as the 'Anatolian Tigers'. This pro-Islamic bourgeoisie founded business associations such as 'The Association of Independent Businessman' known as 'Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği' (MÜSİAD) as alternatives to TÜSİAD, which represents the high bourgeoisie located mainly in İstanbul. Moreover, the Islamic movements have developed several media networks, including television channels, radio stations, and publications. The spread of communications technologies created new public arenas for formerly marginalized people such as Islamic movements the "best organized of the new publics". Therefore, globalization enabled Islamic movements to establish their own institutions.

See Kuru, pp.259-260

See also Yavuz (1998), "The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", p.30

See also Laçiner, p.164

See also Anwar Alam "Islam and Post-Modernism: Locating The Rise Of Islamism in Turkey", Introduction: Making Sense of Islamism, Centre for West Asian Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, Journal of Islamic Studies, 2009, p.16

globalization of Turkish economy which allowed them to integrate into the economy and replace bureaucracy and state-sponsored businessmen besides providing an opportunity to challenge the status and the autonomy of the core which consisted of the bureaucracy, the military and the state created industry.⁵⁹¹ Apart from economic liberalization, a liberalization process in politics was initiated by the MP government. As non-democratic rules were abolished by the restoration of democracy and high level of income facilitated the participation of the political and ethnic minorities to democratic system, ethnic groups and minorities were able to claim their rights through lobbying organizations, publishing houses and establishing links with political parties.⁵⁹²

The liberalization process dramatically affected the foreign policy orientation and formulation as well as the domestic politics. Economic considerations for economic growth through export-oriented economy policy forced policy makers to reach new markets to sell the products.⁵⁹³ The search for new markets resulted in the shift of the foreign policy orientation of the country causing a new activism in TFP. Turgut Özal initiated a new approach to foreign policy which aimed to “to depart from established policies, to take calculated risks, and to search for new alternatives and options”.⁵⁹⁴ As a result of Özal’s determination to change the orientation of TFP, Turkey started to pursue a “diversified, active, daring, and outward-oriented foreign policy” along with participation to multilateral organizations, close bilateral relationships and cooperation with the regional and Turkic states.⁵⁹⁵ The reflections

Muhittin Ataman states that under the leadership of Turgut Özal a new conservative elite class, which have had a close relationship with the common people, emerged. See Ataman, p.127

⁵⁹¹ Muhittin Ataman expresses that the traditional leadership of Turkey which based on strict nationalist, secularist and bureaucratic-authoritarian understanding, was challenged by Turgut Özal’s leadership between 1983-1993.

See Ataman, p.122

See also Laçiner, p.164

⁵⁹² Laçiner, pp.164-165

⁵⁹³ Ali Karaosmanoğlu asserts “the rising importance of economic considerations in external affairs” which enabled the entrepreneurial groups and managerial elites to play an important role in foreign policy formulation and the implementation. As a result, the concern for economic relations caused to transnationalism into the outlook of the traditional foreign and security policy elite. See Karaosmanoğlu, p.210

⁵⁹⁴ Ataman, p.131

⁵⁹⁵ Mahmut Bali Aykan argues that although Turgut Özal was an influential in the formulation of TFP, the TFP was not under complete control of him. Moreover, Özal’s influence over the TFP was caused by his constitutional powers as commander in chief of the Turkish Armed Forces and low profile of the prime minister. However, according to Aykan, Özal was still balanced by the influence of the army on TFP because he was unable to act along with his foreign policy decisions when the army opposed. For

and results of this active foreign policy were seen on the relations with Middle Eastern and Turkic states.⁵⁹⁶ Turkey under the leadership of Turgut Özal developed close bilateral relations with conservative Arab countries of Persian Gulf as well as radical Middle Eastern states such as Libya, Iraq and Iran. While these relations were on the economic realm mostly, relations with Turkic states were both economic and cultural based on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.⁵⁹⁷ Economic relations were boosted by Özal's support and enhanced by cooperation in other areas. This new activism in TFP was caused by personal initiative and influence of Turgut Özal's thinking and vision which stipulated an active role in the Middle East region besides being a valuable ally to Western states.⁵⁹⁸ Turgut Özal's vision did not stipulate a direct deviation from the traditional foreign policy such as cut off all ties with Western states and focus only Middle Eastern or Turkic states; instead, it aimed to establish a balanced relationship and enhanced alliance between Turkey and its neighbor states and Turkey and Western states. Nevertheless, Turgut Özal's foreign policy

example, during the Gulf War, Özal could not participate more actively in the international effort due to the army's opposition.

See Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:32, No:4, October 1996, pp. 344-345.

See also Özkan, p.166

See also Sayari (1997), p.45

Kemal Kirişçi also expresses Özal's activist and internationalist approach to TFP by saying "Turgut Özal left an important imprint on an increasingly activist and internationalist approach to Turkey's relations with the Middle East." See Kirişçi (2002), p.131

See also Ataman, pp.131-132

⁵⁹⁶ Ahmet Sözen remarks that as a result of Özal's active export strategy towards the Middle East, "between 1980 and 1985 Turkish exports to the Middle East increased fivefold, in 1985 sixty-four percent of total exports went to neighboring Iran and Iraq. Turkish exports to Iran rose from twelve million US dollars in 1979 to a peak of 1.1 billion in 1985." See Sözen, pp.8-9

⁵⁹⁷ According to Ataman, Turgut Özal destroyed many taboos and established a new system under his control which based on a synthesis of technological Westernization and cultural Turkism and Islamism called as the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". By combining the Islam and Turkish nationalism with economic and political liberalism, based on the Ottoman and Islamic culture, this ideology aimed to achieve a powerful position in the international arena. Moreover, Ataman reminds that Turgut Özal claimed that modernization could only be achieved through liberalization. In addition, he used economic liberalism to achieve political pluralism and visa versa. See Ataman p.125

Alexander Murinson underlines that Özal reintroduced into political discourse in Turkey the concept of the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' which Murinson describes as a school of thought emphasized Turkish nationalism and Islam as key contributors to the international standing of Turkey. Murinson expresses that Turkish-Islamic synthesis highlighted the historical legacy of the Ottoman past and flourishing Islamic culture as a source of the 'soft power' of the modern Turkish state.

See Alexander Murinson, "The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:42, No:6, 2006, p.950

⁵⁹⁸ Ahmet Sözen emphasized that as Turkey was experienced in the formulation of TFP towards the Middle Eastern states due to political issues in 1950s, Turkey avoided disturbing its Western alliance by its relations with the Middle Eastern states. Moreover, because of its experience, Turkey abstained from establishing multi-lateral relationships; instead, it established bilateral relationships with the major Middle Eastern states. Furthermore, Turkey managed bilateral relationships on the economic ground because Turkey wanted to stay away from the involvement in regional disputes in the Middle East. See Sözen, p.8

See also Sayari (1997), p.45

understanding showed departure from the traditional foreign policy formulation because Özal did not have merely Western oriented foreign policy understanding as he believed in ‘neo-Ottomanist’ foreign policy which asserts that Islam and progress is compatible but Turkish backwardness was caused by the lack of liberalism and scientific thinking.⁵⁹⁹ In order to strengthen the position of Turkey in world politics, Özal aimed to remind Turkish population the Turkish civilization to be proud of and revive the Ottoman past through establishing this “Özalist Foreign Policy understanding” in other words neo-Ottomanism.⁶⁰⁰ According to this understanding, by appealing Islamist or nationalist attributes to influence regional and Turkic states, Turkey could reach the strength, unity and stability that it had in the Ottoman Empire period.⁶⁰¹ Hakan Yavuz describes neo-Ottomanism as:

“Neo-Ottomanism is a world-view that is constructed on the basis of a selective reading of Ottoman administrative practices as pluralistic. It seeks to highlight those aspects that could be viewed by a modern observer as complementing a pluralist and pragmatic approach to issues of religious, cultural, and ethnic identity.”⁶⁰²

To realize establishing a new order similar to Ottoman Empire period, Turgut Özal challenged the traditional state-centric Turkish identity and the traditional foreign policy orientation as well as the traditional non-involvement principle.⁶⁰³ Moreover, to achieve this aim, Turgut Özal had to change historical ideology of Turkey which is described as “a blend of conservatism, which rejects

⁵⁹⁹ Sedat Laçiner notes that Turgut Özal represented Turkish Islamic understanding as an advantage in integration of Turkey with Western political and economic system because it is different from alike such as Iranian or Arab Islam. See Laçiner, p.168

⁶⁰⁰ Laçiner, p.167

⁶⁰¹ Ben Lombardi, “Turkey-The Return of the Reluctant Generals?”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol:112, No:2, Summer 1997, pp. 196-197

For Özal’s Ottoman past revival attempts, Berdal Aral says “As part of his project, Özal wanted to spark off a consciousness, among people and within the state alike, of the glorious Ottoman past. In his view, sooner or later, Turkey would have to come to terms with its Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman experience, to him, contained many lessons in tolerance and pluralism.” See, Aral, p.74

⁶⁰² Yavuz (1998), “The rise of Neo-Ottomanism”, p.24

Alexander Murinson asserts that the philosophy of neo-Ottomanism emerged as a response to the domestic challenge of ethno-national conflict with the Kurdish separatists led by the PKK; however, later it was spread over to the foreign policy thinking of contemporary Turkish policy makers. Moreover, Murinson reminds that the neo-Ottomanism term was introduced by one the leading Turkish scholars, Cengiz Çandar.

See Murinson, pp.945-946

Hakan Yavuz also names Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin as neo-Ottomanist. See Yavuz (1998), “The rise of Neo-Ottomanism”, p.37

⁶⁰³ Yavuz (1998), “The rise of Neo-Ottomanism”, p.24

political/systemic Islam, Western-oriented foreign policy, and xenophobic nationalism that mistrusts most of Turkey's immediate neighbors” with the neo-Ottomanism philosophy.⁶⁰⁴ Moreover, according to Yavuz, Özal and his followers (Neo-Ottomanists), have been determined to pursue an active and diversified foreign policy to be a leader of Muslim world in the Middle East region based on the Ottoman historical heritage and central power among Turkic states on the basis of Turkish nationalism which is not racial or linguistic but based on shared common history, common interest and religion.⁶⁰⁵ While some scholars explain new TFP activism via political and economic concerns such as Muslim world leadership or economic growth strategy through exporting, Sedat Laçiner argues that change in social and economic structures had an impact on foreign policy formulation. Laçiner claims that ethnic groups in Turkey, which immigrated from Muslim states in the region or Turkic states, caused the intensification of relations with those states as ethnic pressure groups forced Turkish policy makers to implement a more sensitive foreign policy towards these countries.⁶⁰⁶ Moreover, according to Laçiner, Turgut Özal realized these ethnic groups as an opportunity to change state’s orthodox foreign policy into a foreign policy covering all these sector demands.⁶⁰⁷ Apart from these reasons, Turkey’s interest in Middle East region and Turkic states can be regarded as the result of the European Community’s (EC) rejection of Turkish application for full membership in 1987.⁶⁰⁸ As the EC rejected Turkish membership,

⁶⁰⁴ Aral, p.73

⁶⁰⁵ Hakan Yavuz claims that neo-Ottomanism has a powerful ethnic Turkish dimension as it aimed to place Turkey at the center of a new imperial project which intended to "lead" the Muslim world. However, some neo-Ottomanists, such as Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin, who had very close ties to Özal, opposed this claim by arguing that "Turkishness" is not an ethnic category but rather a construct for and by Anatolian, Balkan, and Caucasian Muslim populations on the basis of their common Ottoman experience. Yavuz also asserts that for the realization neo-Ottomanist aims, in the 1980s, Özal used economic and cultural policies which planned to reconcile the Ottoman past with modern political and economic developmental needs. Yavuz opposes the claim that neo-Ottomanism was an imperialist ideology which stipulates an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy. To support this claim, Yavuz asserts that "neo-Ottomanism calls for (1) the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past; (2) the elimination of economic borders among the Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries; and (3) respect for the political borders of neighboring countries Neo-Ottomanism does not aim to eliminate state boundaries nor seek a resurrection of an unified Ottoman super-state but rather to create a new sense of a macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage."

See Yavuz (1998), "The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", pp.23-24 and 37, 39-40

See also Murinson, pp.946-947

⁶⁰⁶ See Laçiner, pp.164 and 166

⁶⁰⁷ See Laçiner, p.166

⁶⁰⁸ Yavuz (1998), "The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", p.35

Turkey had to find a new foreign policy orientation and gravitate towards a new direction in foreign policy making.

By the demise of the Cold War via the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), TFP activism found new influence areas to penetrate by the end of Soviet control over the Middle East region and Turkic states. After the elections held in 1987 in which the MP had considerable success although it could not obtain the same results of 1983, in 1989 Turgut Özal was elected as the president and despite limited competence of the presidency, he lasted his domination over politics.⁶⁰⁹ At the beginning of the 1990s, under the presidency of Turgut Özal, Turkey intensified its active involvement and close relationships with the newly emerging states in the Central Asia, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Middle East.⁶¹⁰ 1990s can be marked as the arise of new opportunities, new

⁶⁰⁹ Berdal Aral claims that although Özal aimed to transform Turkey's system into presidential system like the American political governance system, he failed to do so due to strong opposition. However, according to Aral, his failure of transforming the system did not prevent him to act as the president of a presidential system.

See Aral, p.74

Morton Abramowitz also argues that Turgut Özal attempted to change the parliamentary system into a presidential one.

See Morton Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Özal", Foreign Policy, No:91, Summer, 1993, p.171

Özbudun reminds that Motherland increased its parliamentary majority in the 1987 elections despite winning a diminished percentage of votes (36.3). According to Özbudun, these results were the proof of political fragmentation which was later clearly revealed by the local elections of 1989 and 1994, and the parliamentary elections of 1991 and 1995. See Özbudun, p.127

Ziya Öniş asserts that after the MP repeated its success in 1987 elections, Özal, as the leader of the MP, continued its influence over politics in prime minister position until November 1989 when he became the president of the Republic and occupied this position until his unexpected death in April 1993.

See Öniş (2004), "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy", p.7

Feroz Ahmad expresses that the MP won the 1987 elections by Islamic wing of the party because it was able to appeal Islamic votes. As the MP obtained Islamic votes, the Islamist Welfare Party failed to win even the 10 per cent of the vote necessary to enter the Assembly. Feroz states that although the MP won the election with only 36 percent of the ballot compared to 45 per cent in 1983, it could claim 66 percent of the Assembly seats, more than it had before the election due to an amendment in the electoral law.

Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion In Turkey", Third World Quarterly, Vol:10, No: 2, Islam & Politics, April, 1988, p.767

William Hale claims that from the beginning it was clear that new Prime Minister, Yıldırım Akbulut, would assume a secondary role in the politics under the shadow of Turgut Özal who would continue to exercise a predominant power over the government by taking advantage of the lack of experience of Akbulut in foreign affairs. See Hale, p.683

Cameron Brown also highlights the domination of Turkish politics by Turgut Özal. According to Brown, in order to continue his domination, Özal appointed Yıldırım Akbulut as prime minister and Akbulut was not more than a puppet of Turgut Özal. In addition to prime minister, Özal also diminished the influence of foreign ministry and its bureaucrats in foreign policy formulation and implementation. See Brown, pp.91-92

⁶¹⁰ Ahmet Sözen asserts that the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled Turkey to become and act like unofficial leader, in other words 'big brother' of newly emerged Turkic states in Central Asia and the

threats, new horizons and new ‘contours’ in the formulation of TFP; therefore, the end of Cold War can be accepted as the start of ‘pragmatic shift’ on the systemic level which affected TFP and changed its vision as well as providing place for maneuver along with new issues and tools for it.⁶¹¹ Turkey abandoned its isolationist foreign policy which was regarded as an obstacle to economic development by the Özal’s leadership. While enhancing the Western alliance, Turgut Özal continued active involvement in political events in the regions where Turkey started to seek new sphere of influence areas.

Northern Iraq was the region where Turgut Özal clearly demonstrated the change of traditional foreign policy making and new Turkish activism. As mentioned previously mentioned, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and initiated the Gulf crisis, contrary to traditional attitudes, Turkey directly involved in the crisis. As Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait, the UN Security Council adopted on 6 August 1990 the Resolution 661 which stipulated the imposition of economic sanctions (including large scale trade, economic and financial embargoes) against Iraq by all

Caucasus where Turkish influence was limited before. Sözen claims that in a couple of years Turkey realized that the original excitement about these regions falling under Turkish sphere of influence was proved unrealistic and then Turkey’s relations with this region came to sit on a more sober and realistic platform. See Sözen p.11

See also Karaosmanoğlu, p.210

Berdal Aral claims that “Özal’s ultimate objective was to install Turkey as the leader of a Turkic world stretching from the Adriatic to the great Chinese wall under the protective umbrella of *pax Americana*.” Moreover, according to Aral, after the end of Cold War, the US charged Turkey with three duties which Özal accepted voluntarily. The first of these duties was acting as a bulwark against Iranian (Islamic) influence in the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia by exporting its secular and liberal democratic model into these newly independent states as an alternative to the radical Islamic model promoted by Iran. The second was that Turkey would also back Western states, such as and particularly US, for their efforts to constrain and contain radical states and/or political movements in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq and Hamas, as part of a pro-Western bloc of status-quo oriented states. The last duty of Turkey was its commitment to the EC membership and the West would ensure that Turkey remained committed to European integration.

See Aral, pp.76-77

See also Gözen, p.81

⁶¹¹ Ahmet Sözen claims that the end of the Cold War caused to the change in the dominant paradigm which was ‘*Realpolitik*’ to be challenged and questioned by liberal perspectives – liberalist paradigm. According to Sözen, due to the fact that a spirit of optimism was becoming dominant across the world, the issues of *high politics* of the Cold War such as war, security/defense, military issues, and so forth were losing their priority and importance while the issues of *low politics* such as economy, democracy, human rights, environmental and social issues were filling in the vacuum created by the departure of the issues of *high politics*. In addition to these developments, Sözen underlines that after the end of Cold War, the axis of the world politics was moved from *geo-politics* to *geo-economics* and normative concepts were introduced such as democracy, human rights, market economy, and they became globally popular and even almost universally accepted in the 1990s. See Sözen, pp.2 and 10

member and non-member states to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.⁶¹² In order to follow the resolution, Turkey closed Kirkuk-Yumurtalık petroleum pipeline in addition to suspension of all economic relationship with Iraq and occupied Kuwait for supporting the economic embargo imposed on Iraq. Turkey's unexpected attitude towards Iraq can be explained by Özal's new active foreign policy. Özal saw the crisis as an opportunity to assert Turkey's influence and enhance Turkey's position in world politics by giving full support to the coalition powers. Özal desired to prove and demonstrate Turkey's strategic importance to coalition for having a direct involvement in the crisis and world politics. For this aim, Özal took the decision of cutting economic relations with Iraq and Kuwait without consulting to the cabinet and this event was one of the projections of Özal's domination over the politics.⁶¹³ When economic embargo was revealed to be ineffective to force Iraq out of Kuwait, the coalition forces decided to resort to military means. Meanwhile, Turkey was concerned about any possible Iraqi attack towards Turkey and discussing opening a northern front in the military intervention plan of the coalition forces. Turkey faced dilemma of both protecting itself and helping the coalition forces at the same time. Moreover, arming for purely defensive measures can lead to security dilemma by provoking Iraq to attack Turkey. However, as Turkey has been one of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with one of the leading advanced armies among NATO members, Turkey's military presence on the Iraqi border could act like a considerable deterrent for Iraq. Still, by the virtue of Özal's determination for playing an important role in the crisis, Turgut Özal wanted send troops to forthcoming military intervention of Allied forces; however, sending troops would mean declaring war against Iraq and this decision had to be authorized by the

⁶¹² When the crisis broke out Turkey was expected to preserve its traditional neutrality. According to William Hale, Turkey was not expected to issue anything apart from the condemnation of Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait and one day later the invasion, by arranging a meeting of national security council, Turkey attempted to keep itself away from the crisis and hoped that it would be settled by diplomacy; yet, its plans changed by the UN Security Council Resolution which initiated a comprehensive economic embargo against Iraq. See Hale, p.683

See also Özkan, p.166

⁶¹³ Mahmut Bali Aykan opposes to the representation of Turkish involvement in Gulf crisis as the product of single-handed leadership of Turkish president Turgut Özal. See Aykan, pp.343-344

See also Hale, p.684

See also Karaosmanoğlu, pp.210-211

See also Ataman, pp.133-134

See also Özkan, p.166

parliament.⁶¹⁴ Political groups in the parliament opposed Özal's intention to support coalition forces by sending troops and refused to give authorization to Özal.⁶¹⁵ Despite parliament's opposition, Turgut Özal did not give up supporting the coalition forces and Turkish support included, besides support for economic embargo, "the granting of permission for Turkish airbases to be used in mounting offensive operations against Iraq, the deployment of nearly 150,000 Turkish troops in the area bordering Iraq to tie down substantial numbers of Iraqi troops in the north and participation in NATO naval operations (patrolling and searching for mines) for the purpose of maintaining the Security of the Sea Lines of Communications security in the Mediterranean".⁶¹⁶ Moreover, Özal succeeded to persuade the coalition forces to initiate military operation to protect refugees massed on the Turkish border via creating safe haven in Northern Iraq and initiating the Operation Provide Comfort.⁶¹⁷ Therefore, although Özal was not able to send troops, he tried to play an important role in the crisis in order to show the geo-strategic significance of Turkey and prove that the security interests between Turkey and the West are converging, by allowing the US use of İncirlik airbase for strikes into Northern Iraq and applying economic embargo to Iraq.⁶¹⁸

Turgut Özal's determination to assert its active foreign policy towards the Middle East despite firm opposition from the various parts of the Turkish society, led to some consequences such as the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali

⁶¹⁴ Hale, p.685

⁶¹⁵ Turgut Özal wanted to send troops to take part in Desert Shield operation but due to the opposition from the parliament, he could not realize his plans. However, as a result of Özal's pressure and arrival of coalition forces fighter jets, the parliament agreed to enable the use of İncirlik airbase by the coalition forces. See Brown, pp.88-89

See also Kirişçi (2002), p.132

See also Hale, pp.685-686

⁶¹⁶ Karaosmanoğlu, p.211

See also Kirişçi (2002), p.132

⁶¹⁷ Aykan, p.345

See also Kirişçi (2002), p.132

See also Özkan, p.168

⁶¹⁸ Muhittin Ataman remarks that Özal's leadership aimed to improve and diversify relations with the US. Therefore, in addition to military cooperation, economic relations should be improved. Ataman claims that the reason behind Özal's desire for bandwagoning with the US through establishment of close relationship with the US was the aim of avoiding Kemalist threats. See Ataman, pp.145-146

See also Karaosmanoğlu, p.211

See also Sayari (1997), p.45

See also Özkan, p.167

See also Brown, p.95

See also Hale, p.687

Bozer, the Chief of General Staff (CGS) Necip Torumtay and Defense Minister Sefa Giray.⁶¹⁹ Among these resignations, the resignation of CGS was unprecedented because before this resignation, no CGS has resigned and it changed the context of civil-military relationship from that time.⁶²⁰ Speculations about the resignations were circulated such as Turkish press reports which claim that the resignation was a ‘warning’ to President Özal for his Gulf policy whereas politicians regarded the resignation as a ‘democratic act’.⁶²¹ Nevertheless, as it revealed by Torumtay’s written memoirs, the reason of his resignation was Özal’s domination over domestic and foreign politics by changing the traditional context of the government and bureaucratic procedures and by keeping the military out of decision-making process, besides his obsessed Gulf policy.⁶²² Similarly, Ali Bozer reacted to the Gulf policy of Özal with his resignation. Bozer opposed Özal’s desire of sending Turkish troops to help the coalition forces by reminding that when the war was over, Turkey would still be the neighbor of Iraq and would have to face Iraq alone after the coalition forces left.⁶²³ Both Bozer and Torumtay was disturbed by interventions and *faits accomplis* of Turgut Özal who continuously interfered in the duties of both Bozer

⁶¹⁹ Aylin Güney believes that Turkey’s policy during the Gulf War was under the direct control of President Turgut Özal who dedicated himself to assume an active role in the war. However, Güney reports that during the war, most of the Turkish population (up to 88 percent of the total population) opposed to Turkish participation to the war as opinion polls indicated. Despite this strong public opposition, Özal devoted to urge the US to reconsider the geostrategic importance of Turkey and its role as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East because Özal wanted to provide the US military aid to Turkey which would be used for an extensive army modernization program. See Güney, p.345

Sabri Sayari says that “Özal managed to maneuver his way through considerable domestic opposition to align Turkey firmly with the coalition”. See Sayari (1997), p.45

Cameron Brown underlines that the opponents of participation in the Gulf War claimed that neutrality should be preserved because involvement in the war on the side of the coalition forces could result in permanently damaged economic and political relationships with Iraq as well as other Muslim states. Moreover, when the war was over, Turkey would have to face Iraq alone as it would be still its neighbor. Furthermore, Turkey’s Islamic image could be damaged as it would side with non-Muslims against a Muslim state while the coalition forces intervention was perceived as an imperialist Western intervention. See Brown, p.88

For the resignations See Brown, p.92

See also Özkan, p.166

See also Karaosmanoğlu, p.211

See also Hale, p.686

See also Kirişçi (2002), p.132

See also Brown, p.95

⁶²⁰ Ali Karaosmanoğlu reminds that although in the past, there were fundamental disagreements between the military and the civilian governments and these disagreements resulted in coups three times; yet, not in the resignation of the chief of General Staff. See Karaosmanoğlu, p.211

Hale, p.686

⁶²¹ Karaosmanoğlu, p.211

⁶²² Hale, p.686

See also Karaosmanoğlu, pp.211-212

⁶²³ Brown, p.92

and Torumtay.⁶²⁴ As a result of these disagreements, Ali Bozer, Foreign Minister, resigned on October 11, 1990 while Necip Torumtay resigned on December 3, 1990.⁶²⁵

Despite its costs, Özal's Gulf policy enabled Turkey to attain an advantageous position during the war. However, after the war, Turkey realized that it was heavily damaged by the costs of the war such as military expenses, loss of economic ties with Iraq and war reparations in the region. Moreover, Turkey was disappointed by the US reluctance to keep its promises to accommodate Turkey's damages emanated from the war.⁶²⁶ Furthermore, Turkey had to deal with the humanitarian crisis of Kurdish refugees created as a result of Iraqi army's suppression over Kurds in a response to Kurdish rebellion attempted to topple down Saddam Hussein. The solution of Kurdish refugee problem through the creation of safe haven for Kurdish refugees above the 36th parallel by the Operation Provide Comfort, eased Turkey; however, the creation of a *de facto* Kurdish state in Northern Iraq led Turkish concerns arise. Turgut Özal as the Turkish President with Kurdish origin, stepped ahead to keep Iraqi Kurds under the control. In fact, one of the prominent causes of Özal's desire for sending Turkish troops to help the coalition forces was have a say in the region in any post-war situation besides preventing Kurds to establish an independent state if Iraq breaks apart.⁶²⁷

At this point, Özal's new activist foreign policy orientation including novel ways to control Northern Iraq such as Özal's meeting with Jalal Talabani and Masood Barzani in March 1991, resulted in start of new era for Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq. In other words, Özal's attitude towards Northern Iraq initiated a new phase which witnessed Turkey's active involvement in Northern Iraq and change in the Turkish government attitude towards the Kurdish problem. While diminishing the influence of the military over the Kurdish policy of Turkey both

⁶²⁴ Brown, p.92

⁶²⁵ Ibid., pp.92-93

⁶²⁶ Sabri Sayari expresses that the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq caused Turkey to lose \$20 billion between 1990 and 1994. See Sayari, p.46

According to Cameron Brown, although the economic losses of Turkey were never authoritatively settled, they were estimated from \$2 to \$60 billion for the entire and post-war period. However, Brown claims that \$30 billion was the most accurate. See Brown, p.96

⁶²⁷ Brown, p.95

internally and externally, with a single-handed influence over the politics, Turgut Özal initiated a new approach to the Kurdish problem through amending the Turkish law severely restricting the use of the Kurdish language and attempting to grant ethnic, cultural and social rights to Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin.⁶²⁸ To sum, Turgut Özal opened a new path in Turkey's relations with Northern Iraq by introducing politics on the identity, economic and cultural ground; and the MP's successors respectively the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party followed this path and set their policies under this context. Parallel to this argument, Mahmut Bali Aykan says "... his (Özal's) policies of contact with the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders and of military cooperation with the Western states to maintain stability in northern Iraq have been perpetuated up to present- more than a year after his death".⁶²⁹

4.1.1.1 The Theoretical Assessment of the Northern Iraq Policy of Turkey During the Özal Period

The Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during the Özal period can be assessed by applying various theoretical perspectives. However, the theoretical perspectives applied give only a general implication regarding the policy, instead of a detailed account of each foreign policy calculation and application towards Northern Iraq. When analyzing the foreign policy formulation during the Özal period, three main research strands of the FPA which are "Foreign Policy Decision Making",

⁶²⁸ To demonstrate Özal's attempts to diminish the role of the military in Turkish domestic and foreign politics, Mahmut Bali Aykan states that besides controlling the Turkish foreign policy single-handedly; Turgut Özal did not adequately consult or inform the military during the Gulf crisis. Moreover, the military was briefed on talks held with the Kurdish leaders. See Aykan, p.347

Turgut Özal introduced a new approach to Kurdish issue especially during his presidency from 1990 until his death in 1993 by "shifting the 'terms of the debate' about the Kurdish question with his 'imaginative if modest' approach". According to Louise Fawcett, Özal changed the perception and the representation of Kurds as 'mountain Turks' by recognizing the existence of the Kurdish problem and abandoning old policies which denied the existence of Kurds. As a result, concerning the Kurdish problem, Özal harmonized Turkish politics for dialogue and the granting of certain basic (mainly cultural) rights, though alongside a policy of repression and assimilation as Fawcett argued. See Louise Fawcett, "Down but not out? The Kurds in international politics", *Review of International Studies*, Vol:27, 2001, p.115

⁶²⁹ Although Özal's domination declined when the elections held in 20 October 1991 because after the elections, the parliamentary seats of the MP reduced to 112 in 450 seats and Süleyman Demirel became the prime minister with Erdal İnönü his deputy. The new government granted cultural rights for the Kurdish minority including freedom to issue books and newspapers in Kurdish as well as the establishment of a Kurdish cultural institute. See Hale, p.689
See also Aykan, pp.347-348

“Comparative Foreign Policy” and “Foreign Policy Context” can be three main theoretical frameworks to apply. All of the three strands of FPA analyze foreign policy decision making on the individual level by centralizing the actor-specific approach to FPA. Foreign Policy Decision Making strand with the representatives Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (SBS) is the strand of FPA which focused on decision making process with specific attribution to actors involved in foreign policy decision making. As SBS regards foreign policy decision making as organizational behavior because it is determined by foreign policy actors, statecraft; foreign policy decisions during Özal period can be regarded as the product of Özal’s leadership as Muhittin Ataman asserted. Ataman assumes leadership group as more than a certain leader in power by claiming that it may be collective as well as individual.⁶³⁰ Moreover, according to Ataman, the regime or the leadership group is a broader concept which includes more than the current government. In the light of Ataman’s leadership concept, the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during the Özal period can be accepted as the product of Özal’s leadership because Turgut Özal formed statecraft to control foreign policy formulation with the staff which has similar political stance and cultural values with him.⁶³¹ The works of Charles Hermann, and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, especially the second cut which concentrates on organizational structure and its effects on decision-making, can be revealing for the deeper analysis of Özal’s leadership.⁶³² In particular, Allison and Zelikow’s assertion that existing programs and routines of organizations, and organizational culture which shape the behavior of individuals in the organization have a constraining effect on the decision making behavior; can be applicable to the Özal period. Concerning the organizational culture, the military junta had changed organizational structure and

⁶³⁰ Ataman, p.120

⁶³¹ Turgut Özal constituted state institutions with the staff which has similar values with him, mainly neo-Ottomanism and neo-liberalism. Therefore, Özal formed its leadership composed of his colleagues with similar features.

⁶³² In his works, Charles Hermann analyzes groups by categorizing them according to their size, role of leader, rules for decision, the autonomy of group participants in order to obtain general predictions about “the likely outcome of deliberations in each type of group.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow introduced the second cut of Cuban missile crisis by applying the organizational behavior model which focused on intra-organizational factors. Moreover, they tried to apply the governmental politics model which aimed to analyze inter-organizational in order to reveal organizational dynamics such as psychological, even cognitive variables for the analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. These two models are both applicable for Özal period foreign policy decision making and foreign policy formulation; yet, these models are too specific that they can be applied to each foreign policy decision making event and this transcends the scope of this thesis.

See Allison and Zelikow, pp.13-407

culture of Turkey into a more centralized the organizational structure and culture in order to keep the country under the military control. For example, the military rule introduced 10 percent threshold for the general elections and increased the competency of the president. As a result, Özal could enjoy the high level of threshold which enabled the MP to obtain considerable success in the elections, and then during his presidency, advanced presidency power and control over the politics.

Some theoretical perspectives which enable the explanations of international events on the individual level can be applied to the Özal period foreign policy formulations. The third model of Allison and Zelikow, the governmental politics model, has more individualistic approach to foreign policy decision making; thus, it is suitable for the analysis of the Özal period because it provides the explanations of foreign policy events through the knowledge of the leader's interaction with many other individuals in the organization by centralizing the leader. In this case, Turgut Özal can be assumed as the final decision maker; yet, his preferences, experiences, and values are affected by his interaction with the staff. According to the third model, each individual in the organization is in intra-national political system and they compete and bargain for affecting and shaping foreign policy formulation; therefore, the foreign policy formation during the Özal period can be explained through interest groups, influence groups, bureaucrats as well as the ministry of foreign affairs staff. However, Steve Smith, criticizes 'Essence of Decision' and so the third model for the underestimation of the capacity of the president by reflecting it as one of the player among many although the president, in this case the President Turgut Özal, constitutes bureaucratic structure through the choice of staff. Regarding the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey, during the Özal presidency period, Turgut Özal sometimes bypassed the ministry of foreign affairs in the calculation and formulation of the foreign policy decisions; therefore, the third model can be misleading for this case. Smith argues that Allison and Zelikow fail to take none-electoral bureaucratic elements in governmental arena into consideration. Moreover, Smith criticizes the Essence of Decision generally by claiming that Allison and Zelikow only concentrated on only on bureaucratic and organizational factors by ignoring values of participants in the foreign policy process. In addition, Smith highlights that two

alternative models cannot be applied to the foreign policy behavior of developing states such as Turkey, and as Smith argued, both models are inappropriate for the Turkish case.

When analyzing the foreign policy events on the individual level, the social context of the leader along with leader's the psychological and operational environments, as the Sprouts and Christopher Farrands introduced, should be taken into consideration. For the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during the Özal period, the psychological and operational environments of Turgut Özal can be guiding for explaining and analyzing foreign policy events. Özal's perception of the international politics, his neo-liberalist approach, besides his social structure and culture, which have conservative and religious roots, can provide the framework of values that Turgut Özal has as well as providing guidance for the analysis of foreign policy choice and behavior of Turkey especially during the Gulf War. Moreover, as Farrands argued ideologies and values have implications for foreign policy because they can generate demands for actions as well as constrains on the kinds of strategies that policy makers can pursue; Turgut Özal, under the influence of his values and ideology, searched for the ways of helping the coalition forces and backing the US foreign policy towards Iraq during the Gulf War, as he shared same values with them. In addition, apart from the psycho-milieu of Turgut Özal, his individual characteristics such as his educational experiences in the US and his admiration for the US might affect the foreign policy orientation of Özal during the Gulf War.⁶³³ Besides, as social context scholars argued decision makers' core political beliefs, their personal ability to change events and pursue goals, motivations, and decisional styles can shape foreign policy, Turgut Özal's personal ability to control the foreign policy decision making by bypassing the foreign affairs ministry in foreign policy formulation towards Northern Iraq.

In addition to individual level, on the society level, social context scholars examine the role of elites in foreign policy decision making. Historically, Turkish foreign policy was controlled by Kemalist elites who promoted cautious and non-

⁶³³ Laçiner, p.162

involvement oriented foreign policy. However, by the liberalization of Turkish economy, a new elite class emerged. This new class was conservative and had a religious base; therefore, it was challenging both the Kemalist principles and Kemalist foreign policy formulation through neo-Ottomanist domestic politics structure and foreign policy formulation which stipulate new activism in Turkish foreign policy towards the Black Sea, the Central Asia and the Middle East regions, including Northern Iraq. As the public and elite opinion can constrain the foreign policy options and decision making by setting the parameters for what government officials view as permissible actions to undertake in the foreign policy domain; if newly emerged counter-elite did not balance the Kemalist elite, Turgut Özal could not implement his activist foreign policy because Kemalist elite would limit the influence of Turgut Özal over the foreign policy formulations.

On the state level, another aspect of social context, apart from the leader's characteristics and political elites, is the national attributes of a country that include size, wealth, social structure, culture, political accountability, and economic system. As Christopher Farrands specified; Turkey, despite its weak economy due to transition to the liberal economic system, played an important role in the international politics during the Gulf War because of its strategic position and being supported by a major power, the US. Among these national attributes, the most important is the economic environment of foreign policy because domestic economic structure has a direct impact on foreign policy as economic resources and relations can constrain foreign policy choices and behavior. Structuralist theories such as Neo-realism or Marxism attribute the economic or political structure a determining force on both international and state level. According to them either international power structure or international economic structure determines the nature and the process of international politics. As Arthur Stein underlined domestic characteristics, such as political or economic structure, of a state can constrain and shape its behavior as well as foreign policy choice; therefore, the analysis of domestic factors is required for a precise prediction about state behavior in addition to foreign policy choice.⁶³⁴ International Political Economy (IPE) theoretical perspective approach to FPA

⁶³⁴ Stein, pp.190-192

analyzes the economic constraints on foreign policies and how economy determines the foreign policy decision making of states. IPE theorists oppose the neo-realist arguments that states pursue national interest on the ground of power and structural forces; rather, according to IPE theorists, states' main concern is about their legitimacy and capital accumulation.⁶³⁵ Moreover, IPE theoretical approaches are intended to predict state behavior by centering the structure of the economy as a significant predictor of behavior.⁶³⁶ Furthermore, when conducting the foreign policy analysis, IPE approaches classify states into three categories which are periphery, semi-periphery and core.⁶³⁷ While core states are developed, highly industrialized, wealthy and democratic states; periphery states are underdeveloped, poor and authoritarian states. Semi-periphery states are in the transition process from periphery to core. Turkey can be regarded as the semi-periphery state with its transition to liberal economic system in 1980s. In the light of IPE approach to FPA, Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq during the Özal period can be seen as a result of Turgut Özal's economic concerns due to need for capital accumulation in order to complete the transition to liberal economy. Indeed, Turkey was promised a huge amount of financial aid by the US in return for Turkey's support for the coalition forces during the Gulf War.

The other important national attribute is the national culture which has direct effect on the organizational structure and the foreign policy formulation as certain values in particular cultures would prevail, so individuals who control foreign policy making would be constrained by these values.⁶³⁸ Like in the French culture, in which top decision maker- generally the president- dominates the foreign policy arena, Turkish culture with its conservative values, such as respect for the old and higher rank in the professional life, enabled Turgut Özal to dominate foreign policy formulation by centralizing his power in domestic politics. Therefore, Özal could lead the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during the Gulf War.

⁶³⁵ Moon (1987), p.38

Moon (1985), pp. 188-191

⁶³⁶ Moon (1987), pp.43 and 47

⁶³⁷ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein introduced the world systems theory and core-periphery model of states. See Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, "**World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction**", Duke University Press, 2005, pp.1-105

⁶³⁸ Sampson, pp.384-404

Lastly, the political system of a country plays an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. Joe Hagan analyzes the effects of regime change over foreign policy by conceptualizing political fragmentation and vulnerability. Among the five basic levels of political fragmentation that Hagan introduced, the Turkish political system under the domination of the MP and Turgut Özal suits to “Regimes dominated by a single, individual leader”, or “Regimes dominated by a single, cohesive party/group in which there exist established, autonomous bureaucracies and institutions”. Moreover, Hagan claims that democracies are more open to regime fragmentation, which is the division of central government’s power because of political groups, and regime vulnerability, which is the likelihood that the current leadership will be removed from political office because various political actors able to form the opposition.⁶³⁹ However, Hagan opposes the claim that closed regimes are immune from domestic constraints; rather, Hagan argues that closed regimes have domestic constraints to a considerable extent and opposition can occur in any type of regime.⁶⁴⁰ As Hagan asserted, Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq under the leadership of Turgut Özal was criticized by various political groups but mainly Kemalist elites including the military, the foreign affairs ministry and prominent businessmen.⁶⁴¹ Among these opposition groups, the military and the foreign affairs ministry witnessed the domination of Turgut Özal and resignation of Foreign Minister Ali Bozer, the Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay and Defense Minister Sefa Giray. Therefore; Turkish democratic regime during the Özal period, despite opposition attempts, did not allow any regime fragmentation or regime vulnerability.

4.1.2 The Welfare Party Period

After the death of Turgut Özal on April 17, 1993, Turkey returned to its isolationist foreign policy with Western-oriented relationship base by abandoning the balanced foreign policy which stipulated an active involvement in the Middle East,

⁶³⁹ Hagan, p.339

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., pp.342-344

⁶⁴¹ Ataman, pp.123 and 148

the Black Sea and the Central Asia regions.⁶⁴² After Özal, weak coalition governments were established and the foreign policy formulation was controlled by the Kemalist elite again. However, the elections of 24 December 1995 changed both the domestic and foreign policy context. In the elections, the “growing domestic strength of the political Islam” was revealed.⁶⁴³ The elections marked the success of the Welfare Party (WP) which began in the 1984 municipal elections with 4.4 percent of the votes, following the establishment of the party in 1983.⁶⁴⁴ The votes of the WP was in increasing trend and the WP managed to obtain 7.2 percent in 1987 and the 19 percent of national votes in the municipal elections of 1994 besides mayor seats in both Istanbul and Ankara.⁶⁴⁵ The votes of the WP reached its peak in the general elections of 1995 by obtaining the 21.4 percent of the national vote.⁶⁴⁶ As a result of this high vote rate, after the 1995 general elections, the WP held 158 seats among 550 seats in the parliament.⁶⁴⁷ The 1995 general elections had significant consequences and indicators of change in Turkish politics. The most important consequence of the elections was the entry of about 36 Kurdish deputies to the

⁶⁴² Abramowitz, p.164

See also Ataman, p.149

⁶⁴³ Sayari(1997), p.51

See also Özkan, p.171

⁶⁴⁴ Haldun Gülalp, “Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party”, *International Journal, Middle East Studies*, No:33, 2001, p.433

See also İhsan D. Dağı, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol:6, No:1, 2005 (Forthcoming), p.5

⁶⁴⁵ Burhanettin Duran, “Approaching the Kurdish Question via Adil Düzen: An Islamist Formula of the Welfare Party For Ethnic Coexistence”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol:18, No:1, 1998, p.111

Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists versus Reactionary Secularists”, *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:16, No:3, Fall 2007, p.291

See also Gülalp, p.434

See also Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol:18, No:4, 1997, p.743

See also Ergun Özbudun “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey”, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol:11, No:3, 2006, pp.544-545

⁶⁴⁶ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol:30, No:1, Oct., 1997, p. 63

See also Duran, p.111

See also Gülalp, p.434

See also Henri Barkey, “Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question”, *World Policy Journal*, Vol:13, No:1, Spring, 1996, p.43

See also Beinin, p.37

See also Dağı (2005), “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p.6

See also Nilüfer Narlı, “The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol:3, No:3, September 1999, p.39

⁶⁴⁷ Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, pp.3 and 219

See also Duran, p.111

See also Yavuz (1997), *Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey*, p.63

See also Sabri Sayari, “Turkey’s Islamist Challenge”, *The Middle East Quarterly*, Vol:3, No:3, September 1996

parliament under the framework of the WP as well as the support of Kurdish populated areas to the WP.⁶⁴⁸ Another consequence was the shocking of Kemalist elite by the elections won by a religious base party for the first time in Turkey's history and revelation of 'the spread of fundamentalism' and Islamic resurgence.⁶⁴⁹

The success of the WP can be assessed by various aspects. The most remarkable cause of the WP's success was its strategy for the creation of support base. The WP benefited from both the conditions created by the military rule which promoted Islam as a cement of the society in addition to a tool for controlling the society. Moreover, with the complaisance of the military rule in the framework of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the WP started to develop an educated counter-elite class by strengthening the Islamic stream in the educational system in order to obtain a base of support and to enhance and spread the Islamic Movement.⁶⁵⁰ Furthermore, the WP took advantage of globalization of Turkish economy and the creation of a conservative, religious based middle class which is open for the spread of Islamist Movement, with the re-Islamization of Turkish society by the military rule in 1980s.⁶⁵¹ The support base of the WP consisted of three class segments which are

⁶⁴⁸ Eric Rouleau, "Turkey: Beyond Atatürk", Foreign Policy, No:103, Summer 1996, pp.76-77

See also Duran, p.111

⁶⁴⁹ Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", Survival, Vol:39, No:2, Summer 1997, p.82

Sabri Sayari argues that Welfare Party posed a significant challenge to the country's secular form of government and highlighted the problem of Turkey's identity. See Sayari, p.51

See also Özkan, p.171

⁶⁵⁰ Nilüfer Narlı highlights that following the military coup, Islamic education in the schools was regarded as a *panacea* (healing) against extremist ideologies. See Narlı, p.40

See also Öniş(1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey", p.750

⁶⁵¹ Haldun Gülalp asserts that WP's support consisted of the votes of newly emerging but still peripheral and industrialist class because the WP was more pro-private-enterprise party. This newly emerged class included entrepreneurs who were export-oriented, highly dynamic and successful but unprotected by the state. It trusted the WP because it kept itself away from corruption scandals. Gülalp explains how the WP won the working class by saying "In the context of the collapsed welfare state, a worsening distribution of income, a continually high rate of inflation, and constant rumors of government corruption, the discourse that identified the exploiters as those who rely on the state and its Kemalist ideology won significant support from the working class". According to Gülalp, the WP attracted working class through populist appeal of political Islam as the social democrats lost their credibility in terms of their approach to the problems of the state. See Gülalp, pp.438, 440, 441

Ziya Öniş emphasizes the devastating effects of the globalization on both social democrats and welfare state. According to Öniş, globalization has caused the rising unemployment, inequality and a corresponding erosion in social rights in terms of social services such as education, health and social security. As a result, social democratic parties have found little room to manoeuvre at the economic realm and this lead to vacuum in political space which filled by the Political Islam and the WP. See Öniş(1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey", pp.746 and 748

Mehmet Özkan claims that one of the main reasons of dramatic increase in the support base of the WP was the perceived failure of mainstream parties to deal with political and economic problems of the state. See Özkan, p.172

See also Narlı, p.40

capitalist small and medium-scale business class, the professional middle class and the working class emerged out of the migration from the east to the west.⁶⁵² In fact, the effect of migration from towns and villages to urban over the success of WP was remarkable because immigrant people participated in the networks of solidarity organizations and “community-based form of cooperation” and the WP utilized this situation via door-to-door activism in order to reach the vote of a large segment of the Turkish society.⁶⁵³ In addition, the WP took advantage of support for Islamic movement by different strands of the Islamic Movement such as Fethullah Gülen Movement which has roots in the Nurcu Movement of Said Nursi, and Nakşibendi Movement.⁶⁵⁴ However, despite benefiting from the revival of Islamic Movement in the society, the National Outlook Movement of Necmettin Erbakan had to compete with the Fethullah Gülen’s Nurcu Movement for the support of the society.⁶⁵⁵

See also Rouleau, p.77

⁶⁵² Güllalp, pp.444 and 445

⁶⁵³ Marie-Elisabeth Maigre, “The Influence of the Gülen Movement in the Emergence of a Turkish Cultural Third Way”, **Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement**, İhsan Yılmaz et al. eds., London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007, p.35

See also Narlı, p.40

See also Öniş(1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey”, p.755

See also Güllalp, pp.441 and 442

⁶⁵⁴ Hakan Yavuz categorizes the four leading contemporary Turkish Islamic political and social movement, emerged in 1970s, which are the neo Nakshibandi Sufi order of Süleymançı and other orders; the new Islamist intellectuals; the Nurcu movement of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, with its offshoot led by the charismatic Fethullah Gülen; and the National Outlook Movement of Necmettin Erbakan. See Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p.11

Moreover, Yavuz specifies the features of Nur Movement and Nakşibendi Order which have enhanced its support base through educational activities such as establishing new high schools (İmam Hatip liseleri) and Qur’anic schools for children. Yavuz argues that the struggle between state and society intensified over the control of the education system and this conflict resulted in the 28 February process which led to the eradication of Islamic politicians. See Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p.121

Marie-Elisabeth Maigre underlines that in 1980s, Sufi brotherhoods established new media channels such as the daily newspaper Zaman, the television channel STV (Samanyolu or “Milky Way”), the radio station Burç, and an advertising agency, IŞIK; holdings; Islamic banks, Asya Finans, and business associations like MÜSİAD or İŞHAD which was linked to Fethullah Gülen, in order to have a bridge between modernity and the traditional Anatolian society. See Maigre, pp.35-37

See also İhsan Yılmaz “Beyond Post-Islamism A Critical Analysis of the Turkish Islamism’s Transformation toward Fethullah Gülen’s Stateless Cosmopolitan Islam”, Islam in the Age of Global Challenges Conference Proceedings, p.907

See also Beinin, p.28

See also Rabasa and Larrabee, p.15

For detailed information about Nur Movement see Feroz Ahmad, “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:27, No:1, January 1991, pp.11-12

⁶⁵⁵ Among the Islamist movements, Marie-Elisabeth Maigre attributes special importance to Gülen Movement because Gülen community posed an alternative elitist culture. See Maigre, p.36

See Rabasa and Larrabee, p.15

Hakan Yavuz reminds the competition between Gülen Movement and Erbakan’s WP which led to Gülen’s support for all of the center-right parties in order to balance the votes of the WP in the general elections in 1991, 1995, and 1999. Moreover, Yavuz highlights the close relationship between Gülen and Özal and Gülen’s support for the neo-liberalist policies of Turgut Özal. See Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, pp.198-199

Moreover, the National Outlook Movement of Erbakan contrasted with the Gülen Movement about the role Islam in politics and the content of Islamic politics.⁶⁵⁶

As a result of the globalization of Turkish economy and the revival of Islamic Movement, the WP could win the elections and found a chance to establish 'Refahyol' coalition government with the True Path party in 28th June, 1996 and as a result of the agreement between two parties for periodical prime ministry, Necmettin Erbakan became the prime minister of Turkey and for the first time in Turkish political history a Turkish prime minister had a religious philosophy.⁶⁵⁷

The process of emergence of Islamic politics in Turkey dates back to 1970s when the 'National Order Party' was officially established by Necmettin Erbakan on 26th January, 1970 under the framework of his National Outlook Movement.⁶⁵⁸ Following the 1971 Coup, the National Order Party was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court decision and its members gathered under a different party name but the same party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, the National Salvation Party (NSP) on October 11, 1972.⁶⁵⁹ The NSP was much more conservative and radical Islamist party

⁶⁵⁶ Marie-Elisabeth Maigre asserts that the Gülen movement was entirely based on the personality and teachings of Fethullah Gülen who is called as the Hocaefendi (beloved master). According to Maigre, Gülen underlined the importance of creating a Turkish culture which would be neither Kemalism nor Islamism but include a mix of 'Turkishness', 'Islamic Sufi thought', and 'the appropriation of the Americanized globalization'. Gülen emphasized the need for an inter-religious dialogue. See Maigre, p.36

⁶⁵⁷ Öniş (1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey", p.743

See also Yavuz (1997), "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey", p.63

See also Narlı, p.42

See also Özkan, p.171

See also Maigre, p.39

See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.3

See also Yılmaz, p.878

See also Karen L. Cox, "Turkish Islamism: The Refah Party", A Research Paper Presented To The Research Department Air Command and Staff College In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC, March 1997, p.10

See also Özbudun (2006), "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy", p.545

⁶⁵⁸ Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.4

See also Öniş(1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey", pp.743-744

See also Gülalp, p.435

See also Ahmad (1991), "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", p.13

See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", pp.34 and 209

⁶⁵⁹ Narlı, p.39

See also Beinin, p.28

See also Gülalp,p.435

See also Öniş (1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey", pp.743-744

See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", pp.34 and 209

See also Özkan, p.172

See also Ahmad (1991), "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", p.13

and its existence was used as a reason for the military coup in 1980 by claiming that the NSP was threatening the secular establishment of Turkish Republic. After the coup, the NSP was banned besides all other parties and Necmettin Erbakan had to spend three years in military custody like other politicians. The Welfare Party was established on July 19, 1983 under the leadership of Ali Turkmen as Necmettin Erbakan was banned from politics; however, later on Erbakan by the referendum held in 1987 for the return of banned politicians into the politics, assumed the leadership of the WP and took place in Turkish politics.⁶⁶⁰

The importance of the WP was that it continued the legacy of Turgut Özal in terms of foreign policy activism apart from his approach to the Kurdish problem. Moreover, the WP attempted to change the identity of Turkey by introducing and highlighting the Muslim identity which was regarded as a way to peaceful coexistence in international politics. Furthermore, the Muslim identity was regarded as a basis of foreign policy formulation in addition to a binding force on the identity ground. The main foreign policy activism areas of the WP were Bosnia, Cyprus, the Middle East, and Azerbaijan before the WP came to power; however, during the Refahyol government period, the foreign policy orientation of Turkey was directed to Middle Eastern states such as Syria, Iran and Iraq; and Muslim countries in Northern Africa.⁶⁶¹ Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's trips to Iran and Libya concerned the Kemalist elite that Turkey's traditional Western foreign policy orientation would be changed by the WP.⁶⁶² Moreover, the Kemalist elite worried about the approach of the WP towards Kurdish problem and Northern Iraq. The WP's policy of dealing with the Kurdish problem was shaped in the framework of 'Just Economic Order' social and economic perspective. Just Economic Order can be defined as the project

⁶⁶⁰ Narlı, p.39

See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p. 218

See also Öniş(1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey", p.751

⁶⁶¹ Hasret Dikici Bilgin emphasizes that as the WP's ignorance towards other regions and the party's diplomatic visits and policies towards the Middle East demonstrate, it is possible to argue that the Islamic perspective dominated the National Outlook Movement's nationalism and so the WP's. Moreover, Bilgin assessed the proposal of Erbakan to make Arabic compulsory for the Turkish diplomats as a sign of the Middle East and Eastern orientation of the WP foreign policy understanding. See Hasret Dikici Bilgin, "Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah", Turkish Studies, Vol:9, No:3, 2008, pp.411-412

See also Özkan, p.172

⁶⁶² Sayari 1996), "Turkey's Islamist Challenge"

See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p. 236

See also Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", pp.88-89

of the WP which would replace the capitalist system with a utopian scenario of Islamist civilization which would include egalitarian petit-bourgeois society composed of individual entrepreneurs.⁶⁶³ This economic model based on the charter prepared by professors and introduced to the party in 1985.⁶⁶⁴ The charter projected “the creation of a pluralistic, democratic and free market-based civil society”. Moreover, the charter intended to create a free-market base civil society on the ground of individual entrepreneurship along with the Islamic principles.⁶⁶⁵ The main aim of the charter was proving that Islamic beliefs and liberal ideals are not contrasting; rather, it claimed that Islam is compatible with modernity and it did not oppose secularism in the West.⁶⁶⁶ The charter was adopted to the WP’s program for the 1991 parliamentary election and used in a booklet with the title of ‘Just Economic Order’ under the name of Erbakan.⁶⁶⁷

In the beginning of 1990s, the WP started to conceive and represent the Kurdish problem with its two aspects: an identity problem and an economic issue.

⁶⁶³ Güllalp, p.440

See also Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 221

See also Öniş (1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey”, p.753

See also Duran, p.112

See also Toprak, p.181

See also Beinin, pp.36-37

See also Cox, p.19

See also Özbudun (2006), “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy”, p.545

⁶⁶⁴ Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 221

⁶⁶⁵ According to Yavuz, the charter “marked one of the first times a group of Muslim professionals used Islamic precepts to justify notions usually associated with liberal ideologies, namely pluralism, democracy, the free market, and individual responsibility”. See Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 221

Joel Beinin underlines that the Just Economic Order was not a neo-liberal program because it abolished the interest and restricted the amount of money in circulation to the value of production. However, it had some liberal features such as permission for the investment of foreign capital or the continuing privatization of the state’s economic enterprises, despite preferring the purchase of state enterprises by the medium-sized Turkish businessmen like the Anatolian Tigers rather than by the highest bidder. See Beinin, pp.36-37

See also Barkey(1996), “Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question”, p.46

⁶⁶⁶ Ziya Öniş emphasized that “the basic message of the program was that the private enterprise, commercial activity and the profit motive are perfectly consistent with the basic principles of Islam, as long as the gains generated are a product of legitimate and truly productive economic activity.” Moreover, according to Öniş, the content of the program has no difference from a program of a typical social-democratic party on the left. However, it was represented as “a mixed economy structure lying somewhere between the free market capitalism of the West and the state controlled socialism of the former Eastern Bloc.”

See Öniş(1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey”, pp.753-754

Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 221

⁶⁶⁷ Hakan Yavuz claims that the ‘Just Economic Order failed to address economic problems adequately due to its confused economic ideas and contradictions emerged out of its promises of social justice and equity along with rapid export-oriented capitalist development.

See Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 221

According to the WP, the Kurdish identity problem can be overcome by “the idea of fatherland as a basis of national identity”.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, the WP emphasized the conciliatory effect of the Islam over the Turkish society. The WP argued that national identity should not include ethnic substance such as reference to Turkish or Kurdish origins and Muslim brotherhood can provide social cohesion and peace by reviving the spirit of the War of Independence at the national level and by establishing an Islamic Union on the international level.⁶⁶⁹ To realize national integrity, the policies of the WP towards the Kurdish problem were presented in the 4th General Congress of the WP on 10 December, 1993.⁶⁷⁰ Erbakan declared that the WP was different from other political parties in Turkey which imitated the West and concerned only about the ‘power’ rather than ‘justice’.⁶⁷¹ Moreover, the WP represented the Kurdish problem as the result of policies of Western imitator parties of Turkey and the Kemalist project of identity formation which led to the suppression of both Islamic and Kurdish identity for the creation of homogenized Turkish society.⁶⁷² Furthermore, in the General Congress, the WP claimed that the Kurdish problem was caused by “the materialist and racist character of Turkish nationalism; economic underdevelopment of the region; the lack of democracy in the southeast; the destruction of Islamic Brotherhood by Republican policies of modernization without providing a substitute in its place; external forces and their activities such as the Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) which was the US-led peace-keeping operation in Northern Iraq; the policies of Israel; and the state of Emergency Rule (OHAL) in the region”.⁶⁷³ To solve the Kurdish problem on the national level, the WP proposed the ‘Just Economic Order’ program that would enable the establishment of Islamist order which would be peaceful and just for the citizens with Kurdish origin as it would provide equal social and economic rights under the

⁶⁶⁸ Hakan Yavuz argues that Erbakan represented the WP as “a base for a supra-identity within which other ethnic, religious, and regional identities would be subsumed”. See Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p.225

See also Duran, p.112

⁶⁶⁹ Duran, pp.112-114

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid., pp.113 and 116

See also Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 227

⁶⁷¹ Duran, p.113

⁶⁷² Yavuz (1997) , “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”, p.64

⁶⁷³ Duran, pp.113-114

framework and by the bonds of the Islamist order.⁶⁷⁴ The WP affirmed its political stance towards the Kurdish problem with its election manifesto booklet in December 1995 elections in which Kurdish problem took place under the title of “The Southeast, Terror and Solution”.⁶⁷⁵ As this time the WP introduced more concrete measures to deal with the Kurdish problem and Erbakan succeeded to resort to identity politics although he did not define the identity clearly by referring the ethnic substance of it. However, Erbakan took some brave steps concerning the Kurdish problem such as the promise of permission for speaking, broadcasting and education in Kurdish language in the booklet.⁶⁷⁶ Nevertheless, these promises could not be realized during the leadership of the WP.⁶⁷⁷

On the international level, the policy of the WP towards the Kurdish problem affected the foreign policy and especially shaped the foreign policy decision making towards the Northern Iraq. Similar to Özal’s period, the WP attempted to conduct an active foreign policy; however, unlike Özal’s diversified foreign policy orientation including the Western alliance, the WP concentrated on developing close relationships with Muslim states including the Middle Eastern states, the post-Soviet emerging states, Southeast Asian states with predominantly Islamic populations such as Malaysia and Indonesia and Muslim North African states.⁶⁷⁸ Though these close relationships, the WP hoped to attain the leadership of the Islamic world.⁶⁷⁹ Under the framework of the activist foreign policy for the establishment of the Islamic Union, Necmettin Erbakan firstly visited Iran officially and signed an economic agreement which consisted of a \$23 billion gas and oil deal, and then Libya where he was humiliated by Muammar al-Gaddafi who accused Turkey to suppress Kurdish

⁶⁷⁴ Burhanettin Duran highlights the WP’s attempt to solve the Kurdish problem on the Islamic identity ground instead of creating a new Kurdish nation-state or a federal state. See Duran, p.114

Hakan Yavuz states that unlike the concept of legal pluralism which stipulated the autonomy of separate communities rather than individual freedoms, the WP was concerned with individualism rather than pluralism. See also Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p. 227

⁶⁷⁵ Duran, p.116

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid., p.120

⁶⁷⁸ Öniş (1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey”, p.754

See also Özkan, p.184

⁶⁷⁹ For the Islamic Union aim of the WP see Bilgin, p.409

See also Öniş(1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey”, p.754

citizens and to be too pro-Western.⁶⁸⁰ Although the approach of the WP towards the Middle East focused on the Muslim identity, the Northern Iraq policy of the WP concentrated on two issues generally: the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline and the issues of the Operation Provide Comfort and the Poised Hammer. As the WP regarded Northern Iraq crucial for the economic relations, it tried to reopen the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline and achieved to reactivate the pipeline in 1996.⁶⁸¹ Related to the OPC and Poised Hammer, the WP changed its previous hostile attitude towards these initiatives after it came to power.⁶⁸² Moreover, the WP had to approve the 5 months extension of its mandate on 30 July 1996 during its leadership; however, the task of the OPC was changed into only patrolling the 36th parallel zone to deter Iraq by air forces by abandoning the land forces.⁶⁸³ The WP's foreign policy orientation towards Northern Iraq during its leadership concentrated mainly on the finding solution to the Kurdish problem on the regional level by establishing an Islamic Union which would include Northern Iraq but would exclude great powers and prevent their influence over the region.⁶⁸⁴

⁶⁸⁰ George Gruen, "Turkey's Political Earthquake: Significance for the United States and the Region", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol:25, No:2, 2003, p.91
See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p. 243
See also Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", pp.89-93
See also Cox, p.24

See also Sayari (1997), p.51
See also Bilgin, pp.410 and 417

⁶⁸¹ Kemal Kirişçi, "Post Cold-War Turkish Security and the Middle East", *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol:1, No:2, July 1997

⁶⁸² Burhanettin Duran reminds that while the WP was in opposition, it was arguing that the OPC's intention was creating a Christian Kurdish state in Northern Iraq alongside the borders of Turkey besides supporting the terrorists in Northern Iraq in order to divide Turkey by reviving the Sèvres Treaty. See Duran, p.121

See also Barkey(1996), "Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question", p.49

Philip Robins reminds that when the WP was in opposition, the WP deputies opposed the extension of the OPC mandate; yet, when they came to power they had to follow the predecessors. See Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", p.85

See also Özkan, p.174

⁶⁸³ According to Philip Robins, during the WP government, the name of the Operation Provide Comfort was changed into 'the Operation Northern Watch' in order to depoliticize the nature of the operation. As a result of this change the WP was able to vote for the extension of the mandate. See Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", p.85

See also Duran, pp.121-122

See also Cox, p.23

See also Bilgin, p.410

⁶⁸⁴ For the creation of an Islamic Union, the WP initiated an economic cooperation pact among "Developing Eight Muslim states". For detailed information see Yılmaz, p.878

Robins states that the Developing Eight (D-8) consisted of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan apart from Turkey. These states forming the D-8 are middle powers from the predominantly Muslim world. See Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", pp.93-94

See also Bilgin, p.410

See also Duran, p.122

See also Özkan, p.175

The domestic and foreign policies of the WP and its approach to the education were perceived as threat to ideological basis and worldview of the Kemalist republic by the military.⁶⁸⁵ The military was disturbed by the initiatives of the Refahiyol government such as the trips to Iran and Libya, Iranian-like Jerusalem night in the Sincan district of Ankara controlled by the WP which led to the intimidation of the military via tanks pass through the district, attempts to remove the headscarf ban in universities and public administrations, and dispute over building a mosque in the Taksim square in Istanbul.⁶⁸⁶ As a result, on 28 February 1997, the military forced Erbakan to accept the demands of the National Security Council which included the reforms which would hinder religious private schools, associations and Qur'anic seminaries as well as closing the public İmam Hatip middle schools because of the extension of the compulsory education until the high school.⁶⁸⁷ Due to the 28 February process, Necmettin Erbakan had to resign on June 18, 1997 and this political event was called as the 'Soft Coup' or the 'Post-modern Coup' because it did not involved the direct intervention of the military as happened in 1960, 1971 and 1980, instead indirectly, the military forced the government to resign by itself.⁶⁸⁸ Following the soft coup d'état, all people involved in Islamic oriented activities and organizations such as politicians, intellectuals and

See also Yavuz(1998), "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", p.40

⁶⁸⁵ Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p. 242

⁶⁸⁶ Hakan Yavuz argues that the education is central for the shaping the future of the country, thus, Kemalists perceived the spread of religious schools, İmam Hatip Schools, as a threat to the secular Turkish Republic as they diffuse Islamism in society. As a result, they intervened to the Refahiyol government. See Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", pp. 121, 127-128 and 243

Concerning the history of İmam Hatip schools, Morton Abramowitz underlines that the number of these religious schools dramatically increased during the Özal's leadership. Moreover, about 20% of the graduates became the graduates of these religious schools. See Abramowitz, p.176

See also Maigre, p.40

See also Narlı, p.42

See also Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p. 242

Philip Robins reminds that in the Sincan Incident "Turkish army sent 30 tanks and armored vehicles through Sincan to warn the dangers of such a challenge". See Robins "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan", p.97

See also Duran, p.122

⁶⁸⁷ Hakan Yavuz claims that the expansion of the compulsory education from five to eight years decreased the opportunity of İmam Hatip graduates to attend a regular university program. See Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", pp. 127-128, 244

See also Duran, pp.122-123

See also Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.7

⁶⁸⁸ Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey on the Brink", Washington Quarterly, Vol:29, No:3, p.60

See also Maigre, p.40

See also Yılmaz, p.878

See also Rabasa and Larrabee, p.44

businessmen faced the suppression from the military.⁶⁸⁹ This post-modern coup resulted in new era in both Turkish politics and political Islam because in the post-coup period the WP members questioned themselves and the future agenda of the Islamic Movement. Consequently, the WP divided into two along with the generations consisted of traditionalists under the leadership of Erbakan and modernists or reformists led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.⁶⁹⁰ The importance of the division of the WP was that reformists would be successful in 2002 general elections and would rule the country up until now.

4.1.2.1 The Theoretical Assessment of the Northern Iraq Policy of Turkey During the Welfare Party Period

Unlike the Özal period, the TFP and the Northern Iraq Policy of Turkey during the WP period can be assessed via limited theoretical perspectives because the Refahiyol government continued for a limited time period, only one year. Moreover, the WP's room for maneuver in the foreign policy formulation was limited because its political views were under the close scrutiny by the Kemalist elite. As previously mentioned, as Christopher Farrands underlined, ideologies and values affect and constrain the foreign policy decision making; therefore, the political Islam ideology of the WP shaped the foreign policy decision making of the WP and led to change in the foreign policy orientation. The foreign policy orientation of Turkey during the WP leadership, along with the political Islam ideology, focused on the relationships with Muslim states rather than Western alliance.

⁶⁸⁹ Yılmaz, p.913

See also Maigre, p.40

⁶⁹⁰ Rabasa and Larrabee, p.45

Hakan Yavuz asserts that the reformist generation of the WP was younger than the members of the traditionalist generation. The modernists' political views were more prone to liberal approach than Erbakan and his generation. The reformists wanted to change the WP into a party which would be a representative of Islamic groups and views within the political domain but it would not be a purely religious party. Yavuz reminds that the leading political figures in the younger generation are Abdüllatif Şener, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Abdullah Gül who support democratic political system rather than subordinating democracy to an interpretation of Islam. The supported democratic political system would enable Islamic identity to assert itself among other competing identities and visions. See Yavuz, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.226

See also Aylin Güney and Filiz Başkan, "Party Dissolutions and Democratic Consolidation: The Turkish Case", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol:13, No:3, 2008, p.267

On the society level, the foreign policy formulation during the WP period can be examined by the analysis of the role of elites in foreign policy decision making. The historical conflict between the Kemalist elite and Islamic groups reflected in the foreign policy formulation also. While the Kemalist elite insisted on the Western oriented TFP, Islamic elite and the WP like in the Özal period searched for the diverse foreign policy orientation; yet, this activist foreign policy was limited to Muslim states. Similar to the Özal period, the Kemalist elite set the parameters for the government officials to conduct foreign policy.

The foreign policy towards Northern Iraq during the WP period was mainly shaped by both economic and identity politics; therefore, the International Political Economy (IPE) theoretical perspective can reveal the dynamics behind foreign policy formulation during the WP period. As the IPE theorists argued that the main concern of the WP was its legitimacy and capital accumulation.⁶⁹¹ The WP attempted to attain the legitimacy by depending on the Islamic bourgeois and capital accumulation obtained by Islamic business class. Moreover, the legitimacy would be achieved by the 'Just Economic Order' which would create a more equivalent society on the Islamic basis. The WP attempted to solve the Kurdish problem which intensified by the increasing terrorist attacks during the 1990s, on the economic base; thus the foreign policy concern of the WP towards Northern Iraq was shaped by the economic concern and the conciliation of identity problem. According to the WP, the Muslim identity can surpass the Kurdish identity and can solve the identity crisis emerged out of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Nevertheless, this solution should be backed by the economic gains; therefore, the Yumurtalık-Kirkuk pipeline was crucial for the realization of the WP's plans for finding solution to the Kurdish problem. In addition, the reopening of the Yumurtalık-Kirkuk pipeline would both improve economic ties with the Northern Iraq and also would help the Islamic business class to enhance its wealth. As the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during Özal period could be seen as a result of Turgut Özal's economic concerns due to need for capital

⁶⁹¹ Moon (1987), p.38
Moon (1985), pp. 188-191

accumulation in order to complete the transition to liberal economy, the WP also took foreign policy decisions concerning Northern Iraq on the economic ground.

The effect of Islamic culture on the foreign policy formulation can be analyzed by the theoretical perspective introduced by the social context scholars. As the national culture has direct effect on the organizational structure and the foreign policy formulation as certain values in particular cultures would prevail, so individuals who control foreign policy making would be constrained by these values, Islamic culture can be an asset in the evaluation of foreign policy decision making process.⁶⁹² Moreover, in Islamic culture, leading charismatic figures are respected; thus, Necmettin Erbakan could be the top decision maker who dominated the foreign policy arena as he was respected as an Islamic leader. To sum up, the Islamic culture might facilitated the foreign policy the conduct of the WP in the Refahiyol government because Islamic society with conservative values could enable the assertion of the WP's influence over the foreign policy conduct as well as the centralization of Erbakan's power. However, both domestic politics and the foreign policy orientation of the WP was heavily criticized by the Kemalist elite as Turgut Özal was also criticized. These criticisms led to the 28 February process and unlike Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan was banned from politics for five years while Turgut Özal put the Kemalist elite out of the decision making until his death in 1993. Therefore, while Turkish democratic regime during the Özal period, despite strong opposition from the Kemalist elite, did not allow any regime fragmentation or regime vulnerability, the Turkish democratic regime witnessed a post-modern coup during the WP leadership which led to change in the content and context of Turkish politics and opened a new era in both Turkish and Islamic politics.

⁶⁹² Sampson, pp.384-404

4.2.1. The Justice and Development Party Period

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) was born out of the WP's ashes. The reformist group within the WP formed the core of the party yet the modernist group had joined to the Virtue Party (VP) which was established by the successors of the WP under the leadership of Recai Kutan on December 17, 1997 following the resignation of Erbakan in 1997, the ban of the WP by the Constitutional Court in 1998.⁶⁹³ The VP was established by the experience of 28 February process; therefore, its preeminent aim was distancing itself from the Islamic discourse and focus on liberal and conservative values by separating the state and Islam.⁶⁹⁴ The VP tried to distance itself from the WP and the National Outlook movement by introducing democratic and liberal values and embracing the Western political values as well as the EU membership.⁶⁹⁵ The VP was able to obtain 15.41% of the national votes in April 18, 1999 general elections.⁶⁹⁶ Due to conflict between the traditionalists and reformists and the closure case opened in the Constitutional Court following the general elections by the claim of anti-secularist activities of the VP, the modernist wing of the VP had to resign on July 26, 1999 and decided to establish a new party.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹³ Narlı, p.43

See also Yılmaz, p.878

See also Kuru, p.270

⁶⁹⁴ Nilüfer Narlı expresses that the attitudes of the VP towards the human rights revealed itself in the VP's stance that the state should be in the service of the people instead of the WP's view of a holy state that stands far above the people. Moreover, the VP assumed the duty of creating a humanitarian state that meets its citizens' needs without totally dominating it, a more democratic rather than more authoritarian state. See also Narlı, p.44

See also Metin Heper, "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol:8, No:1, 2003, p.130

See also Yılmaz, p.900

See also Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.8

⁶⁹⁵ Ahmet Kuru reminds that unlike the WP, the VP was pro-EU party and favored the EU membership. According to Kuru, the VP represented religious rights as part of a broader agenda on democratization and, individual and human rights. Moreover, the VP policies emphasized the importance of decentralization and local governments, as well as the market economy and privatization. See Kuru, p.271

See also Yılmaz, p.900

See also Ziya Öniş, "Globalization and Party Transformation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", **Globalizing Democracy: Party Politics In Emerging Democracies**, Peter Burnell ed., UK Routledge, Warwick Studies on Globalization, September 2006 (draft version), p.8

See also Toprak, p.183

⁶⁹⁶ Heper(2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", p.129

See also Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.9

⁶⁹⁷ Sencer Ayata, "Changes in Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy Orientation of the AK Party", in **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy**, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis eds., 2004, p.247

See also Narlı, p.43

As expected, although the VP distanced itself from both the WP and the National Outlook Movement, the Constitutional Court decided to shut down the VP in June 2001.⁶⁹⁸

Following the closure of the VP, the divergence between the traditionalists and modernists deepened and revealed. While the traditionalists established the Felicity Party (FP), the reformists founded a new moderate successor, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) on 14 August 2001.⁶⁹⁹ As a more moderate strand of the Islamic movement, the JDP had stronger pro-system features and a much more flexible and cooperative political approach than its predecessors which enabled the JDP to reach compromise with the secularist Kemalist elite, at least, at the beginning.⁷⁰⁰ These features of the JDP resulted in a great success in 3 November 2002 elections in which the JDP achieved to obtain 34.4% of the votes and 364 of the 550 seats in unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey.⁷⁰¹ This landslide

See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.8

See also Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.10

⁶⁹⁸ According to Metin Heper, both the WP and VP were closed down by the Constitutional Court "not because of a clash between their programs and the relevant provisions in the Constitution but because of provocative yet isolated statements made by marginal members of these parties."

See Heper(2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", p.130

See also Yılmaz, p.878

See also Kuru, p.271

⁶⁹⁹ Sencer Ayata asserts that the closure of the VP was regarded as an opportunity to establish a new party by the reformists. As a result, the Islamic movement was divided into two rival fractions consisted of Erbakan controlled Felicity Party and under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan JDP. See Ayata, p.247

See also Gunter and Yavuz (2007), pp.289 and 292

See also Özbudun (2006), "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy", p.546

See also Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.11

See also Güney and Başkan, p.270

⁷⁰⁰ Ali Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory for the 'Pro-Islamists' or the 'New Centre-Right'?-The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey", South European Society and Politics, Vol:12, No:4, December 2007, p.505

See also Heper (2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", p.131

⁷⁰¹ Soner Çağaptay, "The November 2002 Elections And Turkey's New Political Era", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol:6, No:4, December 2002, p.42

See Heper (2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", p.127

See also Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey", South European Society and Politics, Vol:7, No:3, 2002, pp.131-132

See also Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The New Face Of Turkey: The Domestic And Foreign Policy Implications of November 2002 Elections", East European Quarterly, ProQuest Social Science Journals, Vol:37, No:4, Winter 2003, p.425

See also Ayata, p.247

See also Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.95

See also Gruen, p.87

See also Toprak, p.178

See also Özbudun (2006), "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy", pp.543 and 546

victory of the JDP left all small and big, strong and weak political parties of 1990s such as True Path Party, Nationalist Action Party, and Democratic Left Party; except the Republican People's Party (RPP) out of the parliament as they all failed to pass the 10% national threshold.⁷⁰² Moreover, due to this high threshold both the JDP and the RPP could claim high proportions of the seats allocated; 363 and 178 respectively.

The success of the JDP in 2002 general elections can be explained by various reasons. Firstly, Turkey experienced its two deepest and worst economic crises in November 2000 and February 2001 in its history during the Democratic Left Party, the Motherland Party and the Nationalist Action Party coalition government while Bülent Ecevit was the Prime Minister and these economic crises decreased credibility of the parties in power.⁷⁰³ Although the RPP achieved to enter into the parliament, in

⁷⁰² Metin Heper remarks that the True Path Party (TPP) failed because of Tansu Çiller, the TPP's leader, due to her past in the Refahiyol government. Similarly, according to Heper, the Democratic Left Party (DLP) failed because of its leader, Bülent Ecevit. As Ecevit dominated the party, his absence due to his health problems would lead to curbing the capability of the party to handle political issues. Failure of these parties resulted in their leaders to quit from politics. The leader of the Motherland Party, Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the DLP, Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the TPP and the leader of the Nationalist Action Party, Devlet Bahçeli had to exit from the political scene, except Devlet Bahçeli who kept low profile soon after the 2002 elections but returned to the party leadership then.

See Heper (2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", pp.127-129

See also Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.95

See also Gruen, pp.88-89

Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar explain the landslide victory of the JDP on the ground of the WP experience of the JDP founders and taking lessons from 28 February process. See Gordon and Taşpınar, p.61

⁷⁰³ Ali Çarkoğlu highlights the political impact of the financial crises of November 2000 and February 2001 which was caused by the political manipulation of fiscal policies led to an unsustainable public debt, high urban unemployment rates and a record depreciation of the Turkish lira against all foreign currencies. The peak of the economic crisis was witnessed on 21 February 2001 with an overnight devaluation of the Turkish lira by about 50 per cent. The devastating effect of the crises was so strong that it caused about 2.3 million people to lose their jobs by the end of 2001 and it resulted in the economy contraction in real terms as much as 8.5 per cent. According to Çarkoğlu, the economic crises following the August 1999 earthquake spread over the political arena and made masses alienate from the current political parties. See Çarkoğlu(2002), "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey", p.131

See also Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", p.13

See also Çarkoğlu (2007), "A New Electoral Victory for the 'Pro-Islamists' or the 'New Centre-Right'?", p.505

Heper (2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", p.127

Meltem Müftüler-Baç argues that Bülent Ecevit was regarded as the responsible of the 2001 economic crisis as he initiated the crisis by revealing the argument with the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.

See Müftüler-Baç, "The New Face Of Turkey", p.427

Ziya Öniş says "Center-left parties were penalized for failing to protect the interests of the poor and the underprivileged and center right parties suffered, in addition, from their association with widespread corruption."

See Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", pp.13-14

the absence of these parties, its success was limited. Besides, while the JDP was inexperienced and new party, the RPP was old party established by Atatürk who was regarded as the founder of the Turkish Republic; therefore, it had a well founded image and reputation. However, the RPP missed the opportunity of a landslide victory in the elections because it failed to adopt its policies in the changing domestic and international contexts by becoming more and more state-centric and nationalist party.⁷⁰⁴ The inability of the RPP to transform itself along with the needs of the society such as liberalism and democracy and becoming a European style social democratic party instead of constructing causality between secularism and democracy, promoting the military's role of guardian of the state, and spreading the fear of division as a way to consolidate its power, resulted in the exaggeration of the JDP's success.⁷⁰⁵ Moreover, the centralization of Deniz Baykal's power and his domination in the party structure damaged the image of the party and immovable status of the party leader, Deniz Baykal, led voters to question the credibility and ability of the party to provide social justice and economic welfare.⁷⁰⁶ Furthermore, the JDP was much more successful than the RPP to form its party program in accordance with social justice and economic development; besides, the JDP seemed more serious than the RPP in its fight against the endemic problems of Turkey such

⁷⁰⁴ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş diagnosed the causes of the RPP's failure in the elections. According to Keyman and Öniş, the RPP failed because it could not persuade people that it had the ways of dealing with the economic hardships and disparities. Moreover, RPP elites could not create a cross-electoral base like the JDP elite did, besides the RPP did not have the municipal experience and support like the JDP had. Furthermore, the RPP failed to appeal to small and medium-size enterprises while the JDP obtained the support of Islamic bourgeoisie created since 1980s. Lastly, the RPP could not wipe out the negative image of past RPP experiences due to statism, centralization, and top-down decision making.

See Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", pp.97 and 102

See also Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", p.4

⁷⁰⁵ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş claims that the strict interpretation of secularism by the RPP limits the RPP's ability to realize a democratic opening for extending the realm of politics for religious freedoms. See Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", pp.4 and 24-25

See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.14

⁷⁰⁶ Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman underline that the JDP's economic program consisted of three basic principles which were "an effective and post-developmental state", "a properly regulated market economy" and "social justice". These principles stipulated the transformation of the existing state and economic structure. Social justice principle of the JDP envisioned the equal distribution of wealth and welfare systems within the limits of a market-oriented economy which would not discriminate among social segments with different cultures and beliefs.

See Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", pp.19-20

Heper (2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", p.129

as high inflation, corruption and unemployment.⁷⁰⁷ In addition, the past experiences of the RPP in the government resulted in negative attitude of the voters towards the RPP.

Secondly, the JDP's attempts to distance itself from the other political Islam Movement parties such as the WP, the NOP and the VP played an important role in the persuasion of the voters. The JDP represented itself as a center-right party by abandoning the political Islam discourse and shifting to secularist political stance.⁷⁰⁸ The moderation of the JDP has been explained by the 28 February process which forced Islamic political parties to move to the center in the political spectrum in order to live beside the Kemalist elite.⁷⁰⁹ In order to express the difference of the JDP from its predecessors, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the JDP compared the JDP with the Christian Democratic parties which are committed to modern democracy but conservative about religious and political issues.⁷¹⁰ To sum up, the JDP's synthesis of

⁷⁰⁷ Ziya Öniş and Keyman assert that Turkish voters demanded social justice and they voted for the promise of a mixed economy which would provide an intermediate way between the extremes of freedom and regulation. As the JDP promised to provide an effective state which would enable free but regulated market economy similar to 'the Third Way' of Tony Blair's New Labour government in Britain. See Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.97

See also Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", p.17

See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.14

⁷⁰⁸ İhsan Dağı asserts that the JDP distanced itself from political Islam and National Outlook Movement by claiming that its ideology is 'democratic conservatism', See Dağı (2005), "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", p.11

See also Ayata, p.247

⁷⁰⁹ Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman remark that by distancing the party from the Islamist label and representing the party as a center-right formation, the JDP widened the electoral base and appealed to more voters. See Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.99

See also Ayata, p.248

See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.24

⁷¹⁰ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş specify that since its establishment, the JDP strongly emphasized democracy and the protection of individual rights and freedoms along with the party's support for the EU membership. However, due to its religious conservatism and hierarchical vision of society in addition to conservatism concerning the family and gender relations, Keyman and Öniş argues that the JDP cannot be regarded as a European style social democratic party. Nevertheless, according to Keyman and Öniş, the JDP has tried to "project itself as a "conservative democratic" or "Muslim democratic" party with obvious parallels to the Christian democratic tradition in Europe". Moreover, when the JDP came to power, it has tried to develop close and organic links with the Christian Democrats in Europe to demonstrate its parallel features with them. Although the JDP has not been a European style party, with its "emphases on cosmopolitanism, multi-culturalism, democracy redistributive justice, and the recognition of the need to construct a broad-based cross-class coalition of which small and medium sized business an integral component", it looks more similar to a European style social democratic party than the RPP, Keyman and Öniş argues. See Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", pp.16-17

See also Gunter and Yavuz (2007), p.292

modernism and conservatism as well as its shift to center in the political spectrum, which led the JDP to occupy both the center-right and center-left later on, broaden its electoral base and contributed its electoral success.⁷¹¹

Thirdly, the JDP's discourse on democracy which was represented as a cure for all of the illness in Turkish politics and economy was very effective in convincing the voters.⁷¹² The democracy discourse and support for the human rights and freedoms of the JDP was the main difference from its predecessors because these features of the JDP enabled the establishment and the consolidation of ties with the society.⁷¹³ Moreover, democracy discourse attracted the attention of Kurdish voters as the JDP approached the Kurdish problem in the framework of democracy by claiming that the Kurdish problem can only be solved through the consolidation of democracy.

Lastly, the election strategies of the JDP became effective in the JDP's success. The JDP achieved to construct a cross-class electoral alliance which includes both winners and losers of the globalization process such as business class consisting medium and small-scale industrialists, proletariat and religious groups in

See also Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol:28, No:7, October 2007, p.1271

Sencer Ayata underlines that although the Islamic discourse was abandoned at the public level, the party's conservatism perpetuated in the small scale through closed and informal meetings arranged by the party members with the more conservative and radical Islamic groups. See Ayata, p.250

Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş remind that the conservatism of the JDP reveals in women's rights and gender equality issues.

See E. Fuat Keyman & Yusuf Ziya Öniş, "Modernization, Democratization and Challenges to the new Europe", **Turkish Politics in a Changing World – Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations**, İstanbul Bilgi University Press, İstanbul, 2007, p.69

See also also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.15

See also Gruen, p.88

See also Özbudun (2006), "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy", p.549

⁷¹¹ Sencer Ayata points out that the success of the JDP came from the new constituencies which include conservative center-right and nationalist-right voters. See Ayata, p.250

See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.17

See also Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Modernization, Democratization and Challenges to the new Europe", p.70

See also Gruen, p.88

For election strategies and center-right position of the JDP see Özbudun (2006), "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy", p.554

⁷¹² Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman remind that the JDP repeatedly stated that "democracy constituted the fundamental and effective basis for the long-term solution to Turkey's problems". See Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.99

⁷¹³ Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.99

the Islamic Movement network.⁷¹⁴ Moreover, the JDP was successful at mobilizing at the municipal level with its advanced party local branch network and the JDP benefited from the past local administration performance of Islamist parties.⁷¹⁵

The importance of the JDP's success was that the JDP formed a single-party government which dominated Turkish politics for a decade and is a rare achievement as the Turkish political history had generally witnessed coalition governments.⁷¹⁶ Moreover, when the JDP came to power, the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey began to be directed by the JDP; therefore, the general assessment of the JDP's characteristics, values, and approach to domestic and international politics are needed in order to reveal the current dynamics behind the Northern Iraq policy formulation and application. Following the victory in the 2002 elections, the JDP formed the single-party government under the leadership of Abdullah Gül due to Recep Erdoğan's punishment and imprisonment in December 12, 1997 because of a poem by Ziya Gökalp which was perceived as an act to "incitement to religious hatred".⁷¹⁷

The foreign policy formulation of the JDP differed the Islamist foreign policy understanding of the WP; yet, the active foreign policy approach was common. The JDP abandoned Islamist discourse on the foreign policy domain, instead it focused mainly on a Western-oriented and multidimensional approach which would not exclude the Middle East region in foreign policy activism, but the Islamist

⁷¹⁴ Ergun Özbudun specifies that the electoral base of the JDP consisted of "rural population, artisans and small traders in the cities, urban slum-dwellers, and the rapidly rising Islamist bourgeoisie" which form the middle class of Turkish society. See Özbudun (2006), "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy", p.547

Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", p.19
See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.12

⁷¹⁵ Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery", p.19
See also Öniş (2006), "Globalization and Party Formation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective", p.12

⁷¹⁶ Özkan, p.176

See also Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.105

⁷¹⁷ The poem of Ziya Gökalp, as followed: "Turkey's mosques will be our barracks, the minarets our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the faithful our soldiers", caused Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to be banned from politics and sentenced to 10 months in prison, 4 of which he actually served. Because of this punishment, Erdoğan could not assume the Prime Minister position following the victory of his AKP on November 3, 2002.

See Gunter and Yavuz (2007), "Turkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists versus Reactionary Secularists", p.291

See also Gruen, p.90

See also Toprak, p.177

discourse.⁷¹⁸ Moreover, by representing itself as a conservative democratic party, the JDP conducted the foreign policy on the ground of identity politics and distanced itself from the National Outlook line.⁷¹⁹

The foreign policy formulation of the JDP has been conducted by a small group of advisors consisted of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Cüneyt Zapsu, Ömer Çelik, Mücahit Aslan and Egemen Bağış who became the chief negotiator in accession negotiations with the EU.⁷²⁰ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has still kept central power in decision making. Nevertheless; the foreign policy formulation, the Middle East policy in particular, of the JDP was heavily influenced by “the Strategic Depth Doctrine” introduced by Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu.⁷²¹ According to this doctrine, as Turkey ignored its organic ties with the Ottoman Empire and regarded Turkey as a bridge state between the Asia and the Europe, Turkish policy makers have been unable to assess the strategic depth of Turkey’s potential to be a central power in the Middle East region.⁷²² To realize the potential of Turkey to become a leader in the region and global actor, which will assume an active role in international norm

⁷¹⁸ Hasret Dikici Bilgin asserts that although both parties attempted to establish good relations with Muslim states, while the WP excluded the West, the JDP pursued a multi-dimensional foreign policy which stipulated the establishment of good relations with both the Western and Eastern states. Moreover, while Erdoğan visited only Muslim states, Erdoğan visited countries located in both the West and the East. See Bilgin, pp.414-416

⁷¹⁹ Keyman and Öniş highlight the ambiguity in JDP’s approach to democratization as it only concerned about religious liberties.

See Keyman and Öniş (2007), “Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery”, p.29 Bilgin states that unlike the WP, the JDP constrained religious identity to the individual and cultural levels.

See Bilgin, pp.414-415

See also Keyman and Öniş (2007), “Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery”, p.28

⁷²⁰ Bilgin, p.416

⁷²¹ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz describe ‘Strategic Depth’ doctrine as a perspective which stipulates “foreign policy as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes instead of a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves”. See Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era”, Turkish Studies, Vol:10, No:1, March 2009, p.8

Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğlu, “AKP Döneminde Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası”, **AKP Kitabı- Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu**, Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzgel (eds.), Phoenix Yayınevi, Şubat 2009, p.381

⁷²² According to Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğlu states that due to Davutoğlu’s desire to vision Turkey as a successor of the Ottoman Empire, his approach has been called as ‘the Neo-Ottomanism’ Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, p.382

Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz explain Strategic Depth doctrine further by stating that Ahmet Davutoğlu aimed to create a long-lasting strategic perspective which requires historical depth since this provides links between the past, present and the future. According to Davutoğlu, in addition to historical depth, geographical depth should be taken into consideration since it is needed to explain relations between domestic, regional and global factors. See Öniş and Yılmaz, pp.8-9

See also Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran, “AKP Dış Politikası: Teori ve Uygulama”, Doğu’dan Batı’ya Dış Politika- AK Partili Yıllar, Zeynep Dağı ed., Orion Press, Kavaklıdere/Ankara, 2006, p.26

making, Turkey should pursue a multi-dimensional active foreign policy that would provide security and stability in the region via peaceful coexistence with its neighbors besides making Turkey a global and central power.⁷²³ Moreover, to be a central power, according to Davutoğlu, “vision based” strategies with multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding in foreign policy making instead of “line based” or “crisis based” strategies, which produce only reactive or defensive policies on the mono-dimensional level, should be pursued.⁷²⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu formulated the Turkish foreign policy on the basis of five fundamentals which are “balance between freedom and security”, “zero problems with the neighbors”, “multi-dimensional and multi-track policies”, “a new diplomatic discourse based on firm-flexibility”, and “rhythmic diplomacy”.⁷²⁵ All these fundamentals unfolded that Turkish foreign policy would stipulate active involvement in international events and as predicted Turkey intensified its relations with all countries including the neighbor states in the Middle East region.⁷²⁶

When the JDP came into power, it faced problematic issues that should be handled carefully in order to achieve democratic consolidation and material development. Firstly, the JDP had to deal with the economic crisis through financial planning and aid from the IMF.⁷²⁷ Secondly, the JDP had to solve Cyprus issue and conduct harmonization process to become an EU member.⁷²⁸ While dealing with these challenges, the JDP had to compromise or at least should not contrast with the

⁷²³ As Hasret Dikici Bilgin noted, the party program of the JDP had also reflected JDP’s intention for active participation to international politics in order to obtain the leadership role in conflict and crisis resolution, as well as in regional initiatives. See Bilgin, p.412

See also Özbudun (2006), “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy”, p.548

See also Öniş and Yılmaz, p.9

⁷²⁴ İlhan Uzgel underlines that when describing the Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu has used the concepts such as ‘central state’, ‘strategic depth’, and ‘multi track-multi dimensional foreign policy’ and thus these concepts can be revealing for the understanding of the JDP’s foreign policy formulation. See İlhan Uzgel, “Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, **AKP Kitabı- Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu**, pp.358 and 362

See also Sözen, p.2

⁷²⁵ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz describe ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ as “pro-activism in the field of diplomacy and trying to achieve a more active role in international organizations and opening up to new areas where Turkish contacts have been limited in the past”. See Öniş and Yılmaz, p.11

Sözen, p.3

⁷²⁶ Bilgin, p.412

See also Öniş and Yılmaz, p.9

⁷²⁷ Bilgin, p.413

See also Öniş ve Keyman (2003), “A New Path Emerges”, p.103

⁷²⁸ Dağı (2005), “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey”, p.12

See also Bilgin, p.413

secular elite. The most striking development that the JDP encountered as soon as assuming the power was war preparations of the US in order to topple down the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and this was another challenge apart from economic crisis, the EU membership, Kemalist elite and Cyprus issue.⁷²⁹ The US expected the JDP to perpetuate the traditional strategic alliance between the US and Turkey and support the US efforts for the democratization of the Middle East region starting with the invasion of Iraq.⁷³⁰ However, the problematic nature of the US-Turkey strategic partnership was revealed during and after the discussions over the war preparations focusing on Turkey's role in the war and its logistical and military support for the war.⁷³¹ While the US insisted on Turkey's compliance with its policies towards the Middle East, Turkey underlined the need for equal relations on the ground of interdependence and reciprocity.⁷³² Moreover, Turkey demanded the United Nations approval for a possible military campaign against Iraq. There were various concerns of Turkey about the US military intervention to Iraq. Firstly, Turkey was concerned about a possible independent Kurdish state which would be established by the US approval following the intervention.⁷³³ Secondly, Turkey was sensitive about Kirkuk's future status after the military intervention because Kirkuk had been declared as the capital of the independent Kurdish state and Turkey wanted to protect Turcoman minority living in Kirkuk.⁷³⁴ During the bargaining period which started in 2002 and intensified in January 2003, Turkey attempted to notify the US about Turkish concerns for the Northern Iraq, Kirkuk and the integrity of Iraq.⁷³⁵ Nevertheless, when the US obtained the right of modernizing Turkish ports and

⁷²⁹ Özkan, p.179

⁷³⁰ Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran states that the multi-dimensional foreign policy pursuit of Turkey disturbed the US because the US expected Turkey to act within the framework of strategic partnership. See İnat and Duran, p.47

⁷³¹ Gruen, p.95

⁷³² İnat and Duran, pp.48-49 and 59

⁷³³ Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran assert that Turkey has been still concerned about the results of the OPC which was suspected to create an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. See İnat and Duran, p.50

⁷³⁴ Altunışık (2006) "Turkey's Iraq Policy", p.192

⁷³⁵ Mehmet Şahin defines Turkish concerns about the Iraqi war as Iraq's territorial integrity, Iraq's regime after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the status of Turcoman minority in the Northern Iraq, and economic damage created by the military operation. Apart from allaying Turkish concerns, the US should provide the justification of the military intervention.

See Mehmet Şahin, "İrak Bağlamında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri", **Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye**, Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), Siyasal Yayıncılık, 2006, Ankara, p.206

Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar underline Turkey's fear about Kurdish separatism problem provoked by the Iraqi War by stating that "Turkey's long-standing fear that independence-minded Kurdish nationalists would dominate Northern Iraq become reality". See Gordon and Taşpınar, p.57

See also Robins (2007), "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002", p.294

military bases by the first bill, the US assumed that it could get the second bill accepted without paying attention to Turkish demands.⁷³⁶ However, when the second bill which would allow the transit passage of about 40,000 US troops from Turkish border to Iraq and enable the deployment of around 20,000 US troops in southeastern Turkey, was conveyed for the approval on 1st March, it failed by 264 votes for the bill while 250 against the bill and 19 abstained.⁷³⁷ The rejection of the motion was explained by various reasons but the leading cause was the strong public opinion against the war (about 90% of the public was against the war) alongside the strong opposition from the RPP, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer besides 71 members of the JDP government.⁷³⁸ The cause of this strong rejection was that Iraq was a Muslim country and a military intervention without United Nations Security Council decision would breach the international law.⁷³⁹ Moreover, during the bargaining period, in other words during negotiations over the Turkey's role and the extent of its support for the war, the US offered a financial aid in return for Turkey's support and this offer provoked nationalism and reaction against the war by the claim that the US was trying buy Turkish support.⁷⁴⁰ The objection to the war of the Turkish public was consolidated by the opposition of most nation states, such as Russia, France and China, to the US military intervention to Iraq.⁷⁴¹ To sum up, as a result of the rejection of the 1st March motion, the US-Turkey relations were damaged as the US was disappointed by Turkey's reluctance and Turkey was disturbed by the US' negligence of Turkish demands and the strategic alliance between two countries was

⁷³⁶ Şahin, pp.207-208

For the content of the second bill see Şahin, p.209

⁷³⁷ Heper(2003), "The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", pp.131-132

See also Şahin, p.210

See also Bilgin, p.413

⁷³⁸ Philip Robins underlines that "the majority of elite and mass opinion was deeply unenthusiastic about the increasingly proximate invasion." Moreover, Robins reminds that although the bill was voted nominally in favor, it lacked three votes to pass. Robins assesses the voting as a maneuver made by the military and the JDP government. As a result of this voting, according to Robins, the JDP both relieved and embarrassed at the same time. See Robins (2007), "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002", p.294

See also İnat and Duran, p.52

⁷³⁹ George Gruen expresses that Turkey expected for a second approval by the UN Security Council as happened at the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 before allowing the US forces to use its soil and sending about 80,000 Turkish troops to the Northern Iraq to prevent a possible influx of refugees emerged out of any move for an independent Kurdish state. See Gruen, p.95

See also İnat and Duran, pp.51-52

See also Öniş ve Keyman (2003), "A New Path Emerges", p.104

⁷⁴⁰ Şahin, p.208

See also İnat and Duran, pp.52-53

⁷⁴¹ İnat and Duran, p.53

questioned along with the increasing anti-Americanism in Turkish public.⁷⁴² Although Turkey passed a new bill which allowed the US usage of Turkish airspace and deployment of Turkish troops later on to restore relations, the bill could not recover the relations.⁷⁴³ In addition, the Sulaymaniyah incident in which Turkish soldiers were humiliated by the US forces in Sulaymaniyah in the Northern Iraq deteriorated relations further besides increasing anti-Americanism in public opinion.⁷⁴⁴

The friction of the US and Turkey over Northern Iraq during and after the Iraq War constituted the core of Turkey's Northern Iraq policy during the JDP period. Incompatibility of interest toward Northern Iraq led conflicts between two states because while Turkish policy towards Northern Iraq historically stipulated the prevention of an independent Kurdish state, dissolution of Iraq along with ethnic lines, and the Kurdification of Kirkuk to make it the capital of independent Kurdish state; the US aimed to keep Iraq under control and perpetuate relatively peaceful conditions in the KRG. As a result, Turkey had to abandon some of these historic 'red lines' of its approach to Northern Iraq after the Iraq war because of changed conditions.⁷⁴⁵ Moreover, along with the different political context, Turkey had to change its traditional security based foreign policy understanding towards Northern Iraq after frustrated by its relations with the US. As the US warned Turkey not to take any action unilaterally in Northern Iraq, and addressed the Kurdish Regional Government and Kurdish leaders as the authority control Northern Iraq; Turkey

⁷⁴² Yavuz and Özcan identified two causes of increasing anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion which were the US support for Kurdish self determination and disregard the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. See Yavuz and Özcan, pp.110-111

See also Şahin, p.210

See also Gordon and Taşpınar, p.66

⁷⁴³ Uzgel, p.371

⁷⁴⁴ Bilgin, p.413

See also Uzgel, pp.370-371 and 373

See also İnat and Duran, p.53

See also Gordon and Taşpınar, p.65

⁷⁴⁵ Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan remind that by 2001 Turkey's foreign policy towards Northern Iraq consisted of four main components which were "maintain Turkish military forces along Turkey's border with Northern Iraq, with occasional incursions into Iraqi territory against the PKK activities, prevent the emergences of a federated Kurdish region, protect the rights of ethnic Turcoman people and maintain close economic ties with the Iraqi Kurds." However, the JDP had to change or abandon some of these components as these policies failed after the Iraqi War. See Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party", Middle East Policy, Vol:13, No:1, Spring 2006, p.106

See also Uzgel, p.374

See also Şahin, pp.216-217

realized that it lost its political influence and military control by hot pursuits against the PKK militants in Northern Iraq obtained during Saddam regime in 1980s.⁷⁴⁶ In addition, as the US attempted to impose its control over Northern Iraq via Kurdish authority instead of asserting its own authority by the aim of not disturbing relatively peaceful part of Iraq; the JDP reformulated and harmonized the TFP towards Northern Iraq with the changing conditions and by 2005, it started to pursue an constructive, active, economy based and balanced foreign policy approach towards Northern Iraq.⁷⁴⁷ However, the increasing PKK attacks from Northern Iraq revived Turkish security concerns and limited the room for decision and the conduct of the JDP's identity politics besides pragmatist foreign policy⁷⁴⁸. Moreover, the reluctance of the US to fight against the PKK and to cooperate with Turkey in its fight against terrorism, further constrained JDP's pragmatist foreign policy choices as the Kemalist elite insisted on security based foreign policy calculations and

⁷⁴⁶ Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar argue that a unilateral intervention of Turkey to Northern Iraq could lead a potential confrontation with the United States and Turkey since it would be perceived as invading a sovereign country which would result in the prevention of Turkey's EU membership. See Gordon and Taşpınar, pp.65-66

See also Uzgel, p.374

Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran note that Turkey perceived the US addressing of Kurdish authority as retaliation for the 1st March motion. See İnat and Duran, pp.54-55

After 2003, Turkey had to take the permission of the US in order to militarily intervene to Northern Iraq and this was perceived as a humiliation by Turkish public and led to increasing anti-Americanism and reaction to the KRG. See Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, p.399

⁷⁴⁷ Mehmet Şahin asserts that as Kurdish groups fully supported the US during the Iraqi War while Turkey refused to aid, they became the closest ally of the US after the war. See Şahin, p.215

Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş underline that after taking important steps in terms of economic recovery and democratization, the JDP turned the foreign policy from hard-line nationalistic stance into a more balanced and pragmatic approach. Moreover, Öniş and Keyman claim that along with the process of democratization at home, Turkey consolidated its regional influence and transformed into a regional power by establishing cooperation with neighbor states in the framework of Strategic Depth doctrine and zero problems with neighbor states policy.

See Keyman and Öniş (2007), "Modernization, Democratization and Challenges to the new Europe", pp.70-71

See also Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, p.399

See also Özkan, p.185

Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğlu assert that since 2005 Turkey pursued a pragmatist and positive policy. According to Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, Turkish support for the Iraqi constitution, economic investment in Northern Iraq region and contribution to the development of Northern Iraq symbolized Turkish de facto recognition of the Kurdish authority, the KRG. See Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, p.399

⁷⁴⁸The PKK attacks resumed in 2 September 2004 when the PKK/Kongra-Gel ended unilateral ceasefire declared in February 2000. See Altunışık, p.192

Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan emphasize that only after May 2005 PKK attacks, the JDP changed its policy of ignorance towards the Kurdish problem and started to concern about the PKK attacks. Before that time, the JDP had inherited and perpetuated the WP approach to Kurdish problem which perceived Kurdish issue as a product of the Kemalist elite and exaggeration of the military. See Yavuz and Özcan, p.110

Mehmet Şahin argues that before the Iraqi war, Turkey had been concerned about economic losses which would be caused by the military intervention; yet, after the war, Turkish concerns intensified on security matters due to increasing PKK incursions into Turkish territory. See Şahin, p.213

See also Öniş and Yılmaz, p.12

application.⁷⁴⁹ Despite close economic ties and investments of Turkish businessmen, the JDP realized that good relations between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government can be achieved only through fostering cooperation on various areas by emphasizing mutual interests, common values and norms such as democracy, respect for human and minority rights and free trade and asserting Turkish soft power. Since the JDP has regarded democracy as the solution of economic and political problems, cooperation with the KRG can be facilitated by the consolidation of democracy and the respect for minority rights by recognizing Kurdish identity and solving the historical Kurdish problem via extending Kurdish cultural rights.⁷⁵⁰

By the acceleration of PKK attacks from Northern Iraq in 2007, the search for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem ascended. Meanwhile, the JDP was stranded because of a debate over the possible wide-scale cross border military operation to Northern Iraq to prevent rising PKK attacks, the election of the new Turkish President and the upcoming general elections which was resorted to settle down the president election crisis emerged out of the Kemalist elite's insist on a president who will preserve secular state while opposing the candidate of the JDP, Abdullah Gül.⁷⁵¹ Only after November 2007, Washington and White House visit of Erdoğan, Turkey could conduct limited military operations to Northern Iraq such as Sun Operation in 2008 which could not remove the PKK from Northern Iraq but destroyed its strategic bases.⁷⁵² The permission of the cross border military operations was caused by the US change of its attitude towards Turkey and representation of it

⁷⁴⁹ Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar express that Turkey was disappointed by the US intentions about Northern Iraq and felt betrayed as the US did not keep its promises about prevention of Kurdish domination of Northern Iraq. In addition, Turkey realized that the US was maintaining a double standard about fighting terrorism because while it was reluctant to confront PKK attacking from Northern Iraq, it was eager to confront terrorist might attack to the US. See Gordon and Taşpınar, p.65 See also İnat and Duran, p.55

⁷⁵⁰ In order to both increase electoral base by appealing the votes of citizen with the Kurdish origin and maintaining good relations with the KRG since Turkey lost its control over Northern Iraq after its relations with the US deteriorated following the rejection of 1st March motion, the JDP attempted to recognize Kurdish identity by 2005. To reveal this policy change, Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan emphasize the speech of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara in August 2005 by which Erdoğan accepted the existence of Kurdish question and offered citizenship rather than 'Turkish identity' as a supra-identity for both Kurds and Turks. See Yavuz and Özcan, p.111

Meliha Benli Altunışık emphasizes that instead of realist cost-benefit approach to TFP, although identity politics are not only the main source of the foreign policy, they played an important role in constructing and constraining policy options in terms of Turkey's relations with the US over Iraq including the Northern Iraq issue. See Altunışık, p.194

⁷⁵¹ Uzgel, p.375

See also Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, pp.399-400

⁷⁵² See also Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, pp.399-400

as a model country for the states in the Middle East region.⁷⁵³ The JDP's capacity to further perpetuate the pragmatist and activist foreign policy formulation and application towards Northern Iraq was again constrained in 2008 by a JDP closure case initiated by the Chief Prosecutor who applied to the Constitutional Court on 14 March 2008⁷⁵⁴. After that time, the JDP had to demonstrate its legitimacy for the power it holds against the Kemalist elite. Despite the fact that the JDP was not shut down by the Constitutional Court, since the predecessors of the JDP were closed down and the closure of the JDP was attempted; yet, failed. Nevertheless, this act was marked as a traumatic experience in the JDP leadership which led to current debates about the revision package of the Constitution which concentrated on the changes in the structure of the Constitutional Court.

Although the JDP was able to claim about 47 percent of the votes and consolidate its power and legitimacy; following the 2009 municipal elections, the JDP was disappointed by decreased vote rate especially in the regions where Kurdish origin citizens live. By these results the JDP realized the need for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and how it became more crucial and imminent issue to be solved. As a result, on 29 July 2009, by the speech of Beşir Atalay, minister of internal affairs, the process of 'Kurdish Opening' called as 'Democratic Opening' was initiated.⁷⁵⁵ By this process, the JDP hoped to solve the Kurdish issue in a long time period by taking small steps such as recognizing and granting cultural rights to Kurdish people; for example, a TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish, Kurdish language courses and replacing the names of places with formerly Kurdish names. The Kurdish Opening would enable social cohesion between Turks and Kurds;

⁷⁵³ Although not the same of the old days, the strategic alliance between Turkey and the US was partly revived in 2007 because the US realized that Turkey is a model for compromise between Islam and Western democracy and hence it can facilitate the spread of Western values in the Middle East. Moreover, as Turkey could very well "opt for closer strategic relations with countries such as Russia, Iran, China and India", the US wanted to keep Turkey within the strategic alliance. See Gordon and Taşpınar, pp.67-69

Hasret Dikici Bilgin asserts that Turkey's approachment with Arab countries, its increasing dependence on Russia disturbed the US. However; later on as the US stipulated, Turkey intensified its influence over the Middle East by increasing official visits to the Middle Eastern states. See Bilgin, p.414

⁷⁵⁴ Güney and Başkan, p.271

⁷⁵⁵ Yavuz and Özcan express that although the JDP attempted to solve the Kurdish issue in the framework of the EU as the membership does not seem feasible soon, the JDP has have to solve it by itself. However, according to Yavuz and Özcan the JDP is not able to propose a comprehensive plan to address the Kurdish question since its decision making is constrained by the Kemalist elite who also attempted to close the JDP, and Kurdish political actors who provoke nationalism by representing the cause of the Kurdish Opening along with their views. See Yavuz and Özcan, pp.115-116

hence, the cooperation with the Kurdish authority would be facilitated. However, the direction of domestic politics changed and Kurdish Opening has currently lost its eminence in Turkish politics. However, frequent PKK attacks from the Northern Iraq although do not change the pragmatist foreign policy of the JDP and the president of the KRG, Massoud Barzani has visited Turkey soon, disturbed Turkish public and limited the decision making capacity of the JDP since the PKK attacks provoke nationalism. It seems that the Northern Iraq policy of the JDP will rhythmically be affected by the PKK attacks and continually limited by the rising nationalism. Moreover, the National Movement Party can benefit from this rising nationalism and can claim some of the JDP votes to the extent that it can be regarded as an alternative for the government or at least a coalition government partner.⁷⁵⁶ In order to keep the power in its hands, the JDP should consolidate its moderate political stance and has to refrain from or prevent conflict with the Kemalist elite. Another challenge that the JDP faces can be emanated from its own Islamist electoral base which force the JDP to take steps for their demands, such as head scarf issue, which can further deepen the conflict with the Kemalist elite and raise concerns and suspicions for the JDP.⁷⁵⁷ In addition, the transformation of the RPP can pose another challenge for the JDP as it can decrease the votes of the JDP and public support.⁷⁵⁸

4.2.1.1. The Theoretical Assessment of the Northern Iraq Policy of Turkey during the Justice and Development Party Period

Turkish foreign policy during the JDP period was more pragmatic than its predecessors. This pragmatism can be assessed by various theoretical perspectives on individual level, on group level and on party level by applying foreign policy

⁷⁵⁶ As Gordon and Taşpınar argued, “No political leader is immune to populism”; hence, the main competition between the National Movement Party and the JDP will be over the votes obtained by populist approach. See Gordon and Taşpınar, p.70

⁷⁵⁷ Ergun Özbudun claims that the JDP can face the risk of division of its electoral base as it consisted of different segments of the society such as “moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists, secular but socially conservative centre-right voters and a sizable number of liberal intellectuals”. Özbudun (2006), “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy”, p.555

Keyman and Öniş (2007), “Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery”, p.28

⁷⁵⁸ Keyman and Öniş stress that after 2004 elections, the RPP realized the need for transformation. However, despite the RPP’s suitable position to be initiator of the Europeanization, up until now, the RPP failed to transform itself and continued its nationalistic and state-centric political stance. Nevertheless, in order to obtain the majority of the votes, it has to reconstruct itself as a European style social democratic party. See Keyman and Öniş (2007), “Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery”, p.29

decision making, comparative foreign policy and social context approaches. Firstly, according to foreign policy decision making strand of the FPA, the foreign policy choices are determined by the actors take place in decision making. Moreover, the foreign policy decision making scholars are interested in the decision making group's shape, organization, size, rules for decision, the role of leader, and the autonomy of group participants.⁷⁵⁹ Therefore, when analyzing the Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq, the group structure of the JDP should be assessed in the light of foreign policy decision making scholars' findings.

On the individual level, the centrality of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in decision making shapes foreign policy decision making process. By his charisma, Erdoğan not only determines the direction of foreign policy orientation, but also represents overall approach of the JDP towards the foreign policy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the leader who says the last word on decision taken in terms of all policies including the foreign policy decision making; therefore, decisions Erdoğan opposes cannot be taken. For the analysis of the JDP's decision making on the individual level, the third model of the Essence of Decision by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow can be helpful because they are interested in explanations of international events on the individual level by assuming that all individuals are a player in the intra-national political system compete and bargain for affecting and shaping foreign policy formulation. When conducting the foreign policy analysis on the individual level, the psychological (which consists the perceptions, images, assumptions and expectations of policy makers about the world) and operational environments (which includes social structure, culture, physical and economic environments and the structure of the international system) of the decision-maker introduced by the social context scholars such as the Sprouts and Christopher Farrands should be taken into consideration because decision makers interpret and decide on the ground of their perception of their circumstances and international political events.⁷⁶⁰ Moreover, social context scholars highlighted individual characteristics as well as situations that affect the leaders' decisions such as high stress, high uncertainty, and the position of the leader

⁷⁵⁹ See Charles Hermann in "New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy"

See also Hudson and Vore, p.216

⁷⁶⁰ See Farrands, pp.87-89

in foreign policy decision making.⁷⁶¹ Furthermore, they emphasized that decision makers' core political beliefs, their personal ability to change events and pursue goals, motivations, and decisional styles could shape foreign policy. Under the light of these insights, it can be concluded that political experiences of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the Welfare Party period and his dominant political style emanates from his native region and his personal features, his aggressiveness, impressiveness, and charisma, might have lead the control of Northern Iraq policy during the JDP period by Erdoğan. In addition, Islamic politics past of Erdoğan can constrain foreign policy choice of him as happened in 1st March Motion rejection since it stipulated a military invasion of a Muslim state. As Farrands argued, the ideology and values of Erdoğan can constrain the strategies that Erdoğan can pursue because they generate demands for actions from Erdoğan.

On the group level, intra-party cooperation in foreign policy shapes the foreign policy decision making. The actors involved in the JDP's foreign policy decision making consist of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Cüneyt Zapsu, Ömer Çelik, Mücahit Aslan and Egemen Bağış, as mentioned earlier. Among these actors, Ahmet Davutoğlu takes center stage by his 'Strategic Depth doctrine'; besides, later on he became the minister of foreign affairs and his influence over the foreign policy crystallized. Although Erdoğan says the last word on the foreign policy decision making, he shapes his decisions in the framework of his advisors; hence, the foreign policy decisions of the JDP reflect ideas of this small decision making group. Therefore, the JDP's Northern Iraq policy can be seen as an outcome of foreign policy views, calculations and formulations of this decision making group. To analyze group organization and its effect on the foreign policy decision making process, the insights of Sapin, Bruck and Snyder (SBS) can be revealing because they regard the foreign policy decision making as an organizational behavior on which actors involved in decision making have a determining effect by their spheres of competence, their flow of communication and information which contain

⁷⁶¹ See Hudson and Vore, p.218

diplomacy, and their motivations.⁷⁶² Graham Allison's invaluable work on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 can provide a framework pattern for the analysis of JDP's decision making group by asserting "the organizational behavior model", which focused on intra-organizational factors, and "the governmental politics model" concentrating on inter-organizational factors attempted to reveal organizational dynamics such as psychological, even cognitive variables for further analysis of the JDP group structure.⁷⁶³ Especially the model three, although it mainly focuses on the individuals, it underlines that "the proposition that knowledge of the leader's initial preferences is, by itself, rarely a sufficient guide for explanation or prediction"; therefore, besides leaders' preferences, experiences, and values, their interaction with other individuals in the organization should be considered when conducting an analysis of foreign policy decision making. In this case, JDP's decision making group can be assumed as the center of Northern Iraq policy decision making since they are continuously interact with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

On the party level, the JDP's identity politics take the stage in foreign policy decision making. The JDP's efforts for the representation of the JDP's identity as a social democratic party can be assessed through the work of Martin Sampson who analyzed the direct or indirect effects of culture on foreign policy decision making process and outcomes.⁷⁶⁴ In this case, as Sampson stipulated, the Islamic culture and politics has prevailed in the foreign policy formulation and implementation of the JDP. However, unlike the WP period, the JDP's foreign policy decision making was not determined by Islamic politics and concerns. In addition, foreign policy activism of the JDP was not limited to Muslim states. Nevertheless, organizational behavior and structure, centralization of the power of the party leader, respect for and concern about traditional and religious values can be interpreted as the marks of Islamic culture's influence on the JDP. This cultural influence has been caused by the

⁷⁶² See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "The Decision-making Approach to the Study of International Politics," **International Politics and Foreign Policy**, Michael Brecher in James N. Rosenau ed., p.189

See also Rynning and Guzzini, p.2

See also Hudson and Vore, p.213

⁷⁶³ See Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, "**Essence Of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis**"

⁷⁶⁴ See Martin W. Sampson, "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy", **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, pp.384-404

electoral base of the JDP as well as the WP past of the founders of the JDP. As voters generate demands and hence constrain and shape the policies of the government; religious elite, which emerged out of the globalization and favor further globalization of the Turkish economy, demands further liberalization of the trade and peaceful relations with the neighbor states in order to perpetuate trade relations. As a result, the JDP has to keep good relations with Northern Iraq and avoid military intervention as much as it can.

The JDP's need for good relations with the KRG can also be explained by IPE theoretical perspective which emphasizes structural constraints on foreign policies of states with the special emphasis on economic relations. As Turkey experienced one of the worst economic crises ever in 2001, in order to realize economic recovery, peaceful economic and political relations with neighbor states have been required. Therefore, the foreign policy orientation of the JDP was shaped under this economic environment and constrained by economic drives. As IPE scholars asserted, the JDP is concerned about their legitimacy and capital accumulation⁷⁶⁵. Moreover, as IPE approaches predict state behavior on the ground of the structure of the economy, the continuation of JDP efforts to provide peaceful relations with neighbor states can be predicted.⁷⁶⁶

Lastly, the political regime during JDP government suits the category of "Regimes dominated by a single, cohesive party/group in which there exist established, autonomous bureaucracies and institutions" of Hagan's analysis. However, the existence of the Kemalist elite would limit this domination through autonomous bureaucracies and institutions like the Constitutional Court. Besides, the Northern Iraq policy of the JDP can be constrained by security concerns and opposition of this Kemalist elite and it seems that the political struggle over the foreign policy control between the Kemalist elite and the JDP will endure.

⁷⁶⁵ See Bruce E. Moon, "Political Economy Approaches to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", **New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy**, p.38

See Bruce Moon, "The State in Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy", **Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change In Its Second Generation**, pp.188-191

⁷⁶⁶ Moon, pp.43 and 47

To conclude, the Northern Iraq policy of the JDP can be evaluated by different theoretical perspectives. Since there is no grand-unified theory which can explain all foreign policy events, each of foreign policy decision making of the JDP can be assessed through a different theoretical perspective, as well as multiple theoretical approaches at the same time. Therefore, there is no standard theoretical approach for all foreign policy events and each theoretical perspective application to foreign policy events will result in different conclusions and explanations.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has been designed to describe the historical background and current status of relations between Turkey and Northern Iraq. This study has attempted to reply the general research questions that guided the thesis which were “What are the causes of Turkish foreign policy concerns towards the Northern Iraq?” and “How the Turkish foreign policy towards Northern Iraq was shaped for the last thirty years?”. As a result of the analysis, some implications were obtained. The main finding was that while TFP was security dominated, neutral and ignorant towards the Middle East (and Northern Iraq, as a part of); with Özal leadership and its successors, the WP and the JDP; this traditional policy was replaced with an active, pragmatist, conciliatory and Islamic identity-based foreign policy with the introduction of Muslim and peaceful identity which seeks not only establishing cooperation with not only the Western states, but also with Turkey’s neighbors, Turkic countries and the Middle Eastern countries. As a part of the Middle East, Northern Iraq was influenced from this change which was reflected as cooperation in economic and security matters through the MP, the WP and the JDP periods.

When assessing the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during the MP, the WP and the JDP periods, throughout the research, it was realized that there is no complete analysis, research or study focused on the explanations of foreign policy events; rather, there are various studies attempted to describe relations between Iraq and Turkey by partly mentioning the place of Northern Iraq in TFP calculations and decisions towards Iraq but mostly focusing on the PKK factor. Moreover, these narrow scope works ignore or neglect the status of Northern Iraq which is regarded an autonomous part of Iraq but acts like a *de facto* state with its national attributes such as flag, representation, and national anthem. As this *de facto* Kurdish state emerged during Özal leadership, this analysis started with the examination of Özal period and revealed that Özal’s attitude towards Northern Iraq was peaceful due to his economic concerns. Another reason of his attitude was his approach towards the Kurdish problem which regarded the ethnic identity and economic backwardness as the causes of the problem. Therefore, Özal strived for solving the problem through

granting cultural rights. Turgut Özal's positive approach can be regarded as a product of his view, as mentioned in detail in previous chapters, called as "Neo-Ottomanism" which stipulates the creation of a Turkish power center that would control the Middle East and Turkic states. To realize this aim, Özal developed organic links with Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in order to assert Turkey's influence over Northern Iraq via enhancing cooperation. Özal's peaceful attempts and foreign policy understanding continued by the WP but as not effective as the MP period. However, the JDP has intensified the efforts for finding solution to the Kurdish problem and peaceful relations with Northern Iraq.

While desire for strong relations with Muslim countries including Northern Iraq was common for all of them, their orientations for the direction of the relations were diverged. While Turgut Özal had put emphasis on the economic domain of the TFP towards Northern Iraq, in the WP period, the focus was on the Islamic identity which was regarded as a unifying framework that would prevail and suppress ethnic identities; in this case the Kurdish identity. However, the JDP combined both identity and economic domains of the TFP towards Northern Iraq of these periods. The combination of the identity and economy can be a result of the JDP's pragmatism and the experiences the JPD officials had in WP era.

Both in the MP period and the WP period, TFP towards Northern Iraq was far away to create a successful foreign policy approach which balances identity and economic drives; yet, the JDP could realize the need for a pragmatist and balanced foreign policy approach to sustain a successful and consistent foreign policy implementation. The peaceful identity domain reflected in JDP's means to conduct relations between Turkey and the Northern Iraq. During the JDP period, especially in 2007, Turkey formed the relations via diplomacy and establishing dialogue instead of emphasizing the security concerns of Turkey. Even cross border operations crisis in 2007 was attempted to be solved through diplomacy instead of resorting to the unilateral power. Moreover, although Turkey does not regard the KRG as a *de facto* state but as an autonomous part of Iraq; through increasing economic ties, relations between Turkey and the Northern Iraq well improved despite the problems between

Turkey and the KRG emerged from terrorist incursions from the Northern Iraq and Turkish military operations to prevent these terrorist attacks. As a result, it can be concluded that while TFP was much more nationalist or Islamic identity-based and emotionally charged during the 1990s, its orientation was shifted to pragmatism by the JDP in 2000s. The WP's Muslim country-oriented foreign policy approach was abandoned by the JDP and was replaced with a broader perspective "Strategic Depth" doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu which stipulated peaceful existence and relations with the rest of the world. This shift in the TFP can be a product of JDP's democratization attempts of both TFP and Turkish political system. The involvement of new actors by the democratization of TFP changed the social context of foreign policy decision making and eliminated many taboos in foreign policy areas such as Cyprus, relations with Armenia, and relations with Kurds in Northern Iraq.

The dynamics of relations between Turkey and Northern Iraq were revealed via the assessment of foreign policy events of Turkey within the theoretical perspectives' framework. Starting with the explanation of the causes of the MP's success in its transition from state controlled economy to liberal economy and achievement in 1983 elections, the whole MP period was explained by different theoretical perspectives. The Northern Iraq policy under Turgut Özal attempted to be explained by mainly the International Political approach since it emphasized the economic concerns and calculations. Besides, Özal's leadership and his dominance in foreign policy formulations and calculations were analyzed within the framework of "Foreign Policy Decision Making", and "Foreign Policy Context" branches of FPA and the effect of Özal's personality, charisma and past experiences in the formation of foreign policy decision making and activism were highlighted. Moreover, the effect of the organizational behavior in foreign policy decision making was apparent in Özal leadership since Özal formed his leadership with constituents who have the same values, vision and political stance, Neo-Ottomanism in other words. Furthermore, on the individual level, both the effects of culture, social context, and both operational and psychological environments of Turgut Özal were attempted to be analyzed in order to reveal the causes of Özal's centralization in foreign policy decision making besides his strong influence in domestic politics. As a

result, this study indicated that the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey during the MP period was under the control of President Turgut Özal, especially during the Gulf War and later until his sudden death in 1993. In addition, his domination in TFP formulation towards Northern Iraq was explained by various theoretical perspectives.

The WP period was examined on the general scope which intended to show the social transformation of Turkish society with Islamization. As Islamic identity was the base of both social transformation in domestic politics and foreign policy, its impact on the foreign policy decision making and understanding during the WP period was analyzed. Similar to the MP period, the WP approached both the Kurdish problem and Northern Iraq via peaceful means; however, the WP's emphasis was on the Islamic identity which was regarded as the solution to the Kurdish problem and problems with Northern Iraq as it would suppress the Kurdish identity and unify people on one cause, Islam. On this line, the WP's foreign policy was oriented to Muslim states by abandoning traditional Western-oriented TFP. The WP's foreign policy understanding and formulation towards Northern Iraq was evaluated in the framework of the WP's efforts to form an Islamic Union and finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem via Islamic identity.

The JDP also followed the MP's and the WP's peaceful foreign policy approach towards Northern Iraq; however, the JDP took one step ahead of both by appealing Islamic identity originated from the WP and economic aspect of the relations which was emphasized by Turgut Özal. Therefore, the JDP with its pragmatist attitude combined the approaches of the MP and the WP, and its foreign policy understanding and approach have become more successful and consistent compared to the predecessors. For the future of relations, it can be argued that the JDP's ability to balance the identity-pragmatism and security-economy aspects of the relations and foreign policy decision making will determine the context of the relations.

The main contribution of this thesis is that it represents the relations between Turkey and Northern Iraq in both broader and narrow aspects by providing both the

general scope and necessary details. Moreover, this study provides a comprehensive literature review that can facilitate the reproduction for further studies. Besides this literature review, this study's authenticity emanates from the representation of theoretical perspectives which enable the assessment of foreign policy decision making on different grounds. These theoretical perspectives and their implementation can illuminate other studies and can be a sample for the foreign policy analysis.

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