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THE EASTERN AND WESTERN DIMENSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Daniya USMANOVA

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ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

The Eastern and Western Dimensions of the Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period

Daniya USMANOVA

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
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Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından ve Soğuk Savaşın bitmesinden sonra Rusya Federasyonu yeni dünya düzeni içinde dış politikasını çizerken bir takım vazifelerle karşı karşıya kaldı. Bu tez Boris Yeltsin ve Vladimir Putin'in bu vazifeleri nasıl yerine getirebildiklerini, ayrıca Yeltsin ve Putin yönetimlerinin dış siyaset dalındaki davranışlarında ne tür belirleyici faktörlerin yer aldığını analiz etmeye çalısacak. İki Cumhurbaşkanının dış siyaseti, bireysel açıdan ve ilgili dönemin kurumsal çerçevesi açısından değerlendirilecek. Rusya'nın dış politika oluşturma sürecinde bir takım yeni eğilimler belirleniyordu; bunların arasında en belirgini, 19. yüzyıldan bu yana Rus siyaset adamları ve felsefeciler arasında devam eden 'Avrasyacılığa karşı Batıcılık' ideolojik fikir mücadelesi idi. Bu mücadele, Rus dış politikasının dünyanın Batı ve Doğu bölümlerindeki tercihlerinde yansıtılmıştı. Yeltsin ve Putin dönemlerinde Rusya'nın dış siyasetinde Avrasyacılığın mı, yoksa Batıcılığın mı hakim olduğunu veya bu ideolojilerin dengeli biçimde yada bir araç olarak kullanıldıklarını ortaya çıkarmak önemlidir.

Bu çalışma, Yeltsin ve Putin yönetimlerinin, dünyanın Batı ve Doğu bölgelerinde bulunan, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD), Avrupa Birliği (AB), NATO, ve diğer taraftan Asya (Doğu, Güneydoğu Asya, Kuzeydoğu Asya ve Asya-Pasifik bölgesi) ve Orta Doğu ülkeleri ile ilişkilerinde ne tür etkenlerin (örgütler, kuruluşlar, aktörler, geopolitik, güvenlik veya iktisadi düşünceler, yada ideolojiler) yer aldığını ortaya çıkarmaya çalışacak.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rus Dış Politikası, Yeltsin, Putin, Değişim, Devamlılık, Avrasyacılık, Batıcılık, ABD, NATO, Avrupa Birliği, Asya, Orta Doğu

ABSTRACT

Post Graduate Thesis

The Eastern and Western Dimensions of the Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period

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After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War the Russian Federation faced a number of tasks in drawing its new foreign policy agenda in the new world order. The thesis will analyze how Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin managed to handle this task and which factors did play decisive role in Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations' behavior considering foreign affairs. The foreign policy of two Russian presidents will be evaluated in the individual perspective and in the institutional framework of Russia in the respective period. Emerging trends in Russian foreign policy-making were numerous; the most prominent of them was Eurasianism versus Westernism ideological debate which persisted among Russian policy-makers and philosophers since the nineteenth century until nowadays. This debate was reflected in Russian foreign policy preferences when dealing with the Western and the Eastern parts of the world. It is important to find out whether Eurasianism or Westernism prevailed in Russian foreign policy agenda during Yeltsin's and Putin's periods or whether these ideologies were balanced or used instrumentally.

This work will try to explore which factors (organizations, institutions, actors, geopolitical, security or economic considerations, as well as ideologies) stood behind one or another choice of both Yeltsin and Putin's administrations when dealing with the Western part of the world, namely the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the Eastern part in face of Asia (East, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific) and the Middle East.

Key Words: Russian Foreign Policy, Yeltsin, Putin, Changes, Continuities, Eurasianism, Atlantism, Westernism, the United States, NATO, the EU, Asia, Middle East

THE EASTERN AND WESTERN DIMENSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

CHAPTER VI
CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING YELTSIN'S AND PUTIN'S ADMINISTRATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
BEF	Baikal Economic Forum
BRIC	Brazil Russia India China Alliance
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CE	The Council of Europe
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEES	Common European Economic Space
CFE	The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	The Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EEC	Eurasian Economic Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	The European Security and Defence Policy
EU	The European Union
EURATOM	The European Atomic Energy Community
FSB	Federal Security Service (Russia)
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G7	The Group of Seven
G8	The Group of Eight
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
ISAF	The International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDPR	The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
MD	Missile Defence
MFN	Most-Favored-Nation
MINATOM	The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles
NACC	The North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEACD	Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NMD	National Missile Defense
NPCSD	North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
NPT	Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PPC	Permanent Partnership Council
PSC	Political and Security Committee
P8	Political Eight
RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces
R&D	Research and Development
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SORT	Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty

START	The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WEU	West European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization
XUAR	Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

INTRODUCTION

This thesis represents a comprehensive analysis aimed at exploring how the Russian foreign policy was shaped during President Boris Yeltsin's and President Vladimir Putin's administrations within the context of Eastern and Western dimensions of Russian foreign affairs. The main format of the work will be the diplomatic history, based on main events and developments in Russia's foreign policy agenda since the end of the Cold War. The vertical level of analysis will be leader-oriented (rather than period-based); hence I shall focus on the two periods of Russian foreign policy due to administrations of the two presidents: Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. It is important to follow down decisions and stances of the two Russian leaders in various situations. The time-frame of the 1990s corresponds to 'Yeltsin's era', and 2000s – to 'Putin's era'. I also used the comparative method in order to reveal the changes and continuities in Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations.

I shall use Eurasianism vs. Atlantism (pro-Westernism) debate among Russian thinkers and policy-makers as an ideological prism of analyzing Russia's choices in foreign affairs and to what degree these concepts were practiced by Yeltsin and his administration, as well as by Putin. While exploring Western and Eastern dimensions of Russian foreign policy separately, I shall also describe how Russia and the Western states or communities, organizations and alliances interacted in European, Asian or Middle Eastern regions and how Russian foreign policy intersected with that of Eastern states in relation to the West.

There will be discovered which factors (organizations, institutions, actors, geopolitical or economic considerations or ideologies) stood behind one or another choice of both Yeltsin and Putin when dealing with the Western part of the world, namely the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the Eastern part in face of Asia (East, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific) and the Middle East. This work will try to examine whether domestic factors, outside actors, economic reasons, security needs or other strategic aspects were decisive in transformation of Russia's foreign policy during the post-Cold War period.

One of the main prospects of this work is to answer such questions as: what were the main factors determining the evolution of the Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period?; during which periods and considering which issues Russian foreign policy stand was pro-Western or anti-Western?; with which states did Russia cooperate in the long-term perspective?; which states Russia preferred to treat pragmatically?; was Russia pursuing bilateral or multilateral policy in the world and how these policies were used in constructing relations with various states in the Eastern and the Western part of the world?; what was the theoretical framework of Russian diplomacy during Yeltsin and Putin?; what were continuities and changes in Yeltsin's and Putin's periods?

The thesis is comprised of six chapters. I made a chronological (vertical) division to Yeltsin's and Putin's periods, placing geographical division and thematic issues at the horizontal level of analysis.

The first part will give a general outlook on the international relations arena after the end of the Cold War, covering the change in international system, new concepts in international relations agenda and positions of the two superpower successors of the Cold War: the Russian Federation and the United States. Further this chapter will give a glance at the fundamentals of the Russian foreign policy in the post-cold war era: Russian stance in the new world order; new trends in Russian foreign policy after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) such as liberal and moderate Westernism, fundamental nationalism, pragmatic nationalism, moderate conservatism, democratic Statism, etc.; and rise of assertiveness and geopolitics in Russian foreign affairs agenda. The chapter will also widely explain the Eurasianism versus Atlantism debate in Russian foreign policy-making and take a general look on the institutional and personal aspects of the Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin and Putin's presidencies.

The second chapter will explore Western dimension of Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's administration. I will analyze the tasks Yeltsin met in shaping Russia's external interests, beginning with the US and continuing with EU. Russia's relations with the US and EU in the perspective of security and democratic transformation will be handled. It is important to find out which reasons lied in change of Russian foreign policy from pro-Western in the early 1990s to more

assertive and Eurasianist since 1993. Here I shall also touch such international organizations and institutions as NATO, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Council of Europe (CE). Russian-American security relations will be analyzed considering such fields as strategic disarmament and nuclear security, NATO activism and the issue of NATO expansion from the Russian point of view. Wars in the Balkans also had a great impact on Russian-American security relations during Yeltsin's administration, having in mind that afterwards the conflicts Russia became openly resisting American dominance in world security-making. Security relations of Russia and the EU will be analyzed within the perspective of the role of NATO and the OSCE in the construction and development of European security architecture. The chapter will conclude with Russian-EU relations in the field of democracy.

The third chapter will reveal Eastern dimension of Russia's foreign policy during Yeltsin's presidency – that is Russia's relations with Asian states and Middle Eastern states. Russian relations with China will broadly explain the Sino-Russian alignment against the United States and their multipolar policies in the world in general and in Asia in particular. I shall also explain Russo-Indian relations which were mainly focused on arms trade. Russian policy in Asia-Pacific region will touch such topics as building relations with Japan, particularly developments on the territorial issue between Moscow and Tokyo and importance of maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula. When analyzing Russian foreign policy in the Middle East it is important to handle security issues, the Arab-Israeli peace process and the factor of Islamic Fundamentalism in the region's political affairs. Besides Russia's relations with particular countries, I shall also take into consideration such important regional organizations as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

At the fourth part of the thesis I shall continue by analyzing Western dimension of Russian foreign policy during Putin's administration. There will be explored Putin's decisions to cooperate with the United States on fight against

international terrorism and development of Russia's policy towards the USA in general. Security issues in Russian-American relations will be handled within the context of such developments as 9/11 attacks in the USA, Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, the US war in Iraq and Russia's invasion in Georgia, US missile defence plans in Europe, and NATO enlargement. Russian relations with the EU will be handled in the field of security and democracy which will particularly stress Putin's policy of 'sovereignty democracy' and EU's perception of this policy, as well as Russian-EU cooperation on democratic issues as human rights, freedom, justice and the rule of law.

The fifth chapter will follow by examining the fundamentals of Russia's foreign policy in Asia and in the Middle East. Russian policy in Asia will be evaluated in face of new rising power – China; Russia's relations with Japan and other states in Asia-Pacific; as well as relations with India, the Koreas and regional organizations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Middle Eastern policy will underline geopolitical considerations on developments in security and energy fields and balancing of great powers like Russia and the United States and international community in the region.

The sixth is a generalizing chapter on comparing development of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations. It will gather the conclusions on whether changes emerged or continuities prevailed in foreign policy-making under the government of the two Russian leaders. The conclusion will summarize the findings of this thesis and provide answers to the questions I raised in the beginning.

CHAPTER I

A GLANCE AT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

In the first part of the study I shall give a basic outlook on the situation in international arena in general and Russia in particular after the end of the Cold War. It is important in order to reveal the preconditions for the transformation of Russia's foreign policy vectors in the post-Soviet stage. These preconditions undoubtedly depend on fundamental changes in international relations system in the 1990s that changed from bipolarity to multipolarity, on emergence of new concepts and common principles in the world policy and international law, spread of democracy and other factors. Of equal importance are developments in Russian domestic scene: new trends in internal policy-making (and implications on foreign policy-making); rise of assertiveness and geopolitics in Russian foreign policy agenda and intensification of the Atlantism-Eurasianism debate. The role of the United States as the main player of the Western world and the new Russia's emerging relations with the United States will be discussed in this chapter.

1.1. General Situation in the World Stage after the End of the Cold War

Dissolution of USSR, collapse of communism and the following end of the Cold War marked new era in international relations history. International system met important changes: world was no more bipolar, superpower rivalry ended and the threat of global nuclear war disappeared. Retrenchment policies adapted by USSR and USA presupposed also the end of confrontation between world powers and their further cooperation diminishing regional conflicts. However, as the history shows, such expectations disproved and the new world order brought serious uncertainty into the international arena.

At that period, new concepts such as North-South cooperation, polarity of international system, regional crises, economics, nuclear disarmament and human rights took the first place in international agenda. Besides principle of non-violation

of state sovereignty, which is the heritage of the Westphalian system, the principle of national self-determination also came onto the international agenda, bringing independence to the post-Soviet states, but also causing ethnic and national conflicts in unstable regions as Yugoslavia, Transcaucasus, Africa, Middle East and so forth.[1]

According to Gaddis, national self-determination, leading to the breakup and reunification of states (such as Yugoslavia on one hand, and Germany on the other), could signal abrupt shifts in the balance of power with a destabilizing effect. On the other hand, integrated markets, especially energy markets, became a security liability for the world economic system, as events affecting energy security in one part of the globe could threaten countries far removed from potential conflicts.[2]

To Fukuyama, globalization and capitalism were main leverages to de-ideologize relations between states and enforce cooperation.[3] He argues that the only legitimate ideology after the collapse of communism was liberal democracy.[4] Nevertheless, in practice globalization caused enormous increase in international trade and rise of new economic powers as China and India, as well as the EU. Thus, competition between states sometimes overbalanced cooperation, and as a result, the globalization caused increase in the gap between poor and wealthy countries.

1.1.1. Russia in a New World Order

At the end of the Cold War Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush defined the present international setting as "New World Order".[5] This meant a drastic change in "balance of power" and world politics in general. Gorbachev characterized the new world order by end of confrontation and need for peaceful coexistence. He also advocated strengthening the central role of the United Nations, and the active involvement of all members. Main ideas given at his speech at UN meeting in 1988

[1] "The New World Disorder", Britannica Book of the Year, 1994, 2009, **Encyclopædia Britannica Online**, 19 March 2009, available online at http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9111295
[2] *See* John L. Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World", **Foreign Affairs**, 1991, Spring
[3] *See* Francis Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man?**, New York: Macmillan Inc. , 1992.
[4] Fukuyama, p. 37
[5] Cambridge University Dictionary gives following definition of "the New World Order": "a political situation in which the countries of the world are no longer divided because of their support for either the United States or the Soviet Union and instead work together to solve international problems: The new world order was expected to come into existence after the collapse of Communism in eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War." available online at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=53532&dict=CALD

were to build a new world order based on interdependence, pluralism, tolerance, freedom of choice, equal cooperation, "co-authorship" and "co-development".[6] As for the US' stand, Miller and Yetiv concluded that Bush characterized new world order by three features: "the aggressive use of force was unacceptable, it would be rejected through collective security, and to meet that goal, great power cooperation was necessary".[7]

However, although the US was expected by some observers to yield significant influence to the UN, argue the authors, in reality USA's conceptualizing of new world order was less idealistic. US administration preferred multilateralism, however not rejecting unilateralism withal.[8] Hence, by 1992, some documents from Pentagon advised the United States "to play a selective, unilateral role in world affairs, essentially rejecting multilateralism and focusing solely on preserving American dominance".[9]

Thus, US proved to be the only great power left at the world stage, celebrating the victory of the Cold War, while the new created Russian Federation had no choice but to withdraw on the back front, focusing on domestic reformation, economic problems and reorganization of the new state structure. Changes in international system and especially in Europe were unacceptable for Moscow, but at the same time Moscow could not prevent these changes. That is the very reason why Gorbachev decided "to drastically reduce the international commitments of the Soviet Union and to retrench".[10]

Splidsboel-Hansen argued that in "the mid-1980s Moscow represented the losing side of the Cold War and its economic system had been proven inferior to that of its adversaries." As a consequence, he noted, Russia "had to accept a fundamental restructuring of the international order and to redirect its attention towards internal reform efforts".[11] Meanwhile, such developments as withdrawal of Soviet troops, the unification of Germany, cut in Soviet support to the Third World states, and Soviet

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[6] "Our Common Aim", Gorbachev's speech at UN Meeting 07/12/1988, **Politizdat,** available online at http://www.gorby.ru/rubrs.asp?art_id=21943&rubr_id=243&page=1
[7] Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, "The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition", **Presidential Studies Quarterly**, March 2001, p. 61
[8] Miller and Yetiv, p. 60
[9] **Ibid**, p. 67
[10] Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 54(3), 2002, p. 385
[11] **Ibid**, p. 385

dependence on Western economic aid for democratic reformation cemented the U.S. superiority over the Soviets.[12]

Robert Gilpin stated that "when major power shifts like these take place … it is determined who will govern the international system and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order".[13] Russia in this case felt in full all the effects of such a sudden power shift and found itself in a "marked imbalance between ambitions and resources".[14] Some scholars admitted that the post-Cold War international order was likely to go against Russia, which did not expect such a turn. Thus, it made sense for Russia to oppose the status quo.[15]

Referring to the situation in Russia after the Cold war, Gorbachev's New Political Thinking (interdependence theory) became outmoded. In 1991 Russian people realized that "perestroika" went smash. As Nikitin argues, the 1990s was a period of "post-Soviet transformation of Russian foreign policy".[16] Actually, there prevailed national weakness caused by the collapse of communist ideology as a motivating power. Leszek Buszynski characterized Russian foreign policy of the early 1990s as 'disoriented', since Russia lost vast territories, old domestic borders became international and the country was living economic and social decline.[17]

The revision of identity for new Russia was at the agenda; there was a need for new national mission to build foreign policy. There was no more a Soviet Union; Russia lost its satellite republics. After the end of the Cold War Russia had to rethink its position in the world stage: whether it would be a great power, a global power, a regional power or just a normal power. According to Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "state's new identity depends on acceptance by other states", thus Russian elites seek for West's approval of Russia's new identity in order to become an equal player.[18]

Change of political regime, domestic reforms – resulted in change in foreign policy, too. For a certain period, focused on domestic transformation, Russia was

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[12] "With Moscow Crippled, U.S. Emerges as Top Power", **LA Times**, 12 September 1990
[13] Gilpin in Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, p. 385
[14] Brzezinski in Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, p. 385
[15] Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, p. 385
[16] Alexander Nikitin, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post Soviet Space", **International Journal on World Peace**, XXV(2), June 2008, p. 9
[17] Leszek Buszynski, **Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War**, Westport, CT and New York: Praeger, 1996.
[18] Splidsboel-Hansen in Valentina Feklyunina, "Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West", **Europe-Asia Studies,** 60(4), 2008, p. 608

reluctant to take assertive role in international relations. The identity issue was delayed for the better times. Main priority of Russian foreign affairs at that period was keeping summitry with the United States in order to prove that Russia was still a great power and nuclear power, argues Curtis.[19] Hence, in September 1992 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev claimed that the argument that Russia had lost its status after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not match "realities" and identified characteristics that proved Russia's great power status: "human and intellectual resources, natural wealth, geographic location, and size".[20] New issues arose on international agenda of Russia, such as newly emerged ex Soviet states; a danger of further disintegration of Russia; military conflicts in the Post-Soviet space, in Balkans and inside Russia; hostile reaction to considerable Russian minority living in ex-Soviet states; and the NATO expansion.[21]

1.1.2. New Trends in Russian Foreign Policy after the Break of USSR

Meanwhile, serious debates on what course should Russia take after the dissolution of USSR took place among policymakers in Kremlin. There were several alternatives. Various scholars mentioned different alternative courses for new Russian foreign policy. One of them, Margot Light, divided these alternatives into three: Liberal Westernist, Pragmatic Nationalist and Fundamentalist Nationalist.[22]

Liberal Westernists were aiming at creating a democratic environment and flourishing economy, based on good relations with democratic states in Europe and with the US. This trend implied abandoning ambitions to achieve a great power status and was suspicious on the leading role of Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Some scholars, Dugin for instance, supposed that this scenario would also diminish Russian status as a regional power.[23] This school is close to what Tsygankov calls '*integrationists*'; Andrei Kozyrev introduced them in

[19] Glenn E. Curtis, ed., **Russia: A Country Study**, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996, p. 17
[20] Buszynski, p. 5
[21] *See* Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives", **East European Quarterly**, 32, 1998.
[22] Margot Light, "In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology", **Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics**, 19(3), September 2003, p. 44
[23] Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Dugin Eurasianism: a Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an Intellectual Ploy?", **Stud East Eur Thought**, 59, 2007, p. 227

the post-Soviet stage, who prioritized individual and free market over society and moved towards developing 'natural partnership' with Western states.[24]

Fundamentalist Nationalists strongly opposed Liberal Westernists, holding antipathy to market economy and dreaming of reviving Soviet foreign policy. It was "a group of unreformed communists and ardent nationalists", as Light described.[25] The main feature of this trend was the desire to return Russia's decisiveness and assertiveness in foreign affairs policy, as well as to bring the old "Great Russia" on the world stage as a counter-balance to the United States and international institutions it controls.[26] This group is also called *neo-imperialists*, because they dream of restoration of the former Great Russian Empire and propose expansionism; Russia in their view should "remain an independent, socialist civilization that is autarchic, has a self-sufficient economy, and is generally isolated from 'alien' Western influence".[27] The leader of Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadiy Zyuganov, falls in this category.

Pragmatic Nationalists, in turn, did not completely reject Liberal Westernist ideas, but draw a special path for Russia based on pragmatic realism in foreign policy. This group of politicians proposed "a more independent policy vis-à-vis the West, based on rational analysis of Russia's national interest".[28] Admitting inevitableness of confrontation between developed countries, Pragmatic Nationalists pointed to the need for diversification of relations with non-Western states, such as China, India, Middle East countries and especially the CIS states. Similar to this is school called by Tsygankov as *Balancers* (for balancing the West's power). Balancers also proposed vision of Russia as "a geopolitically and culturally distinct entity" and called for independent stance of Russia in the multipolar world.[29] Such a perspective was supported by the second foreign minister of Russia, Yevgeniy Primakov.

Arbatov presumes that with declining power of Liberal Westernists, two main groups came to the stage of policy-making in Russia: *moderate liberals* and

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[24] Andrei P. Tsygankov, "New Challenges for Putin's Foreign Policy", **Orbis**, Winter 2006, p. 154
[25] Light, p.44
[26] This is view of Russian Eurasianist scholar, Dugin, in Shlapentokh, p. 224
[27] Tsygankov (New Challenges), p. 155
[28] Light, p.45
[29] Tsygankov(New Challenges), p. 154

moderate conservatives.[30] The former can be equaled to *pragmatists* who advised Russia to follow her rational national interest in foreign affairs. On the other side, the moderate conservatives defended the position that Russia was still possessing great power status, and proposed for Russia to develop her influence in near abroad and avoid dependence on the West.

Graham Smith wrote about *Democratic Statists* (*gosudarstvenniki*), who saw Russia different from the West in cultural and geopolitical sense, and promoted the idea of a "strong state with a commitment to Western-style democracy".[31] They proposed a combination of Western liberalism and neo-nationalism. Although Democratic Statism is opposed to Atlantism, Smith argued that it is pragmatic enough to understand that Russia needs to cooperate with the West, instead of staying in isolation or falling into confrontation with the West.

Bobo Lo has observed ideologizing trends in Russian foreign policy. Hence, the liberal agenda was full of thought on integration with the West and the 'economization' of foreign policy; the imperial 'syndrome' emphasized importance of the CIS region; great power ideology was focused on sustaining Russia's status as a geopolitical world power; proponents of independent foreign policy called for 'diversification'; and adherents of foreign policy retrenchment "advocated 'concentration' on a narrow set of priorities".[32] Other scholars mention different trends in Russian foreign policy. Neumann, for instance, divides between *Romantic Nationalists* and *Europe-Oriented Liberals*.[33]

In a comprehensive work Karen Dawish and Bruce Parrot singled out the four schools of thought in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy.[34] Proponents of the first school envisioned Russia as democratic, market-oriented, multi-ethnic, secular, pluralist and cosmopolitan state, but with strong, if need be authoritarian, government, holding assertive 'great power' foreign policy, above all in Near Abroad. Main members of this school are: State Counselor Sergei Stankevich, St.

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[30] Arbatov in David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 47(6), September 1995, p. 1
[31] Graham Smith, "The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism", **Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers**, New Series, 24(4), 1999, p. 487
[32] Bobo Lo, **Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p. 7
[33] Neumann in Lo
[34] *See* Dawish and Parrot in Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a "Great Power" in World Affairs: Image and Reality", **International Affairs**, 71(1), 1995, pp. 50-51

Petersburg's former mayor Anatoly Sobchak, Duma deputy Yevgeny Ambartsumov, head of the Duma foreign affairs committee Vladimir Lukin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia Nikolai Travkin, deputy head of the Institute on Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences Sergei Karaganov, and members of Yabloko bloc [35] such as Grigory Yavlinsky and Yury Boldyrev.

The second school of thought similarly regards Russia as a great power, however it is based on more ethnically defined 'Great Russia' with emphasis on protecting the rights of more than 25 millions Russians and several million Russophones living outside the Russian Federation. Members of this school, such politicians as former parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and ex Vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoy, did not see Russia's territories of that time as final and even advocated reconstruction of empire. The school also entailed such institutions as the Russian armed forces, internal security services, collective farms and 'military-industrial complex'; [36] as well as political parties Civic Union and Russian All-National Union.

The third group, which can be called Slavophiles or isolationists, evaluated Russia to be "in the midst of a spiritual rebirth and religious revival".[37] They argued that economic and moral values of Russia were squandered during the Soviet stage and now Russians should concentrate on domestic reconstruction. Main figures of this school are writers Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Vasily Belov and Valentin Rasputin; the mathematician Igor Shafarevich and members of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Proponents of the fourth school of thought, while blaming outside conspiracy for the dissolution of the USSR, laid responsibility of post-Soviet Russia's predicament on Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Jews, Freemasons and foreigners. Dawish and Parrot evaluated supporters of this school as persons not sure enough of their methods of establishing 'law and order' in Russia or restoring the Soviet Union. The authors named several members of this schools, that is majority of the Russian Communist Party, right-wing and pro-fascist groups, ex-KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov with his National Salvation Assembly, some activists of October 1993

[35] *See* http://eng.yabloko.ru/
[36] Adomeit, p. 50
[37] **Ibid**, p. 51

insurrection as General Makashov or Viktor Anpilov, the Agrarian Union, the Party of National Union and The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).

1.1.3. A General Look on the Institutional and Personal Aspects of the Russian Foreign Policy

The successors of Gorbachev faced a hard task of domestic reformation and transformation of Russia from authoritarian entity with state planned economy, to a democratic government with free market economy. The new regime faced hard obstacles, such as lack of political, economic and social institutions; lack of cadres or citizens familiar with capitalistic and democratic system. Nevertheless, since Yeltsin the new generation of leaders in Russia more or less settled on market economy, democracy and freedom, albeit with poor record of success.

1.1.3.1. The Yeltsin Period

According to Felkay, Yeltsin realized that in order to escape the isolation imposed by Communism and to join Western civilization, Russia had to get rid of its traditional image of acting as undemocratic country.[38] Ironically, Yeltsin pushed Russia to this path by forceful means: "the conspiratorial dissolution of the Soviet Union"[39]; forcible dissolution of the parliament and adoption of new constitution in 1993. These steps were anti-democratic in fact, defined by some Western commentators as 'market Bolshevism regime'.[40] Main factor here was the peculiarity of the stormy 1990s reflected in political and economic corruption in Russia. The 1990s had "distributed wealth and power with chaotic unfairness, but nobody had full control of either".[41] Main control of domestic resources and economic power was in the hands of "oligarchs".[42]

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[38] Andrew Felkay, **Yeltsin's Russia and the West**, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 2002, p. 69

[39] Reddaway and Glinski in Peter J. S. Duncan, "Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West", **The Historical Journal**, 48(1), 2005, p. 279

[40] **Ibid**

[41] Edward Lucas, **The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 7

[42] Oligarchy is "a form of government in which only a small group of people hold all the power"; Oligarch is "a member of an oligarchy", Oxford University Press Dictionary, 2005, available online at http://www.oup.com/oald-bin/web_getald7index1a.pl

Russian foreign policy was also overcoming transition in the post-Soviet period. First aim of new Russian president Boris Yeltsin was to gain recognition from the West for Russia as the successor state from the Soviet Union and for his own authority.[43] He stressed that Russia would be no more "the centre of an 'enormous communist empire' but a state that wanted good relations with its former adversaries".[44] Eventually, owing to Soviet Union's former power, Russian Federation took over the permanent seat in the UN and managed to preserve diplomatic properties worldwide. Yeltsin stressed importance of multipolarity and multilateralism during his second term, declaring commitment to international law and primacy of the UN in international issue settlement.

Nevertheless, Yeltsin had not managed to get rid of such traditions as illusion and mythmaking in foreign policy, which were actively used by the Soviet Union propaganda policy and earlier by Catherine the Great, expressed in 'Potemkinization' policy.[45] Hence, Yeltsin's administration tried to portray a vision of wellness and coherence by creating such documents as the Foreign Policy Concept, the Military Doctrine, or the National Security Concept, which were only the framework for particular policy actions, while in reality Russian foreign policy stayed 'fragmented and opportunistic'.[46] Hence, Yeltsin's administration often put on the foreground such trends in Russian foreign policy as: "the primacy of the CIS issues, the conflation of multipolarity and multilateralism, and the notion of a 'diversified' or geographically 'balanced' foreign policy".[47] Coming to above-mentioned primacy of the UN and multipolarity declared by Yeltsin, this was also only a semblance, while in reality Russian policy-makers still preferred to think in terms of 'big issues for big players', a continuation of nineteen-century idea of the Concert of great powers.[48]

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[43] Felkay, p. 85
[44] S. White et al, "A European or a Slavic Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post- Soviet Europe", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 54(2), March 2002, p. 184
[45] One of Catherine the Great's particular favourites, Prince Potemkin, was in the habit of putting up façades of prosperous villages (complete with freshly dressed peasants) along the Empress's carriage route in order to hide from her the reality of extreme rural degradation and poverty. Since that time, the term pokazukha ('fake show') has come to denote government attempts, particularly during the Soviet period, to promote the fiction of wealth and happiness where little of either existed.
Lo, pp. 66, 181
[46] Lo, pp. 66, 67
[47] **Ibid**, p. 7
[48] **Ibid**, p. 67

Yeltsin's administration acted in most cases reactively considering foreign affairs, often puzzling international society. Lo evaluates the total approach of Russian foreign policy during the Yeltsin period as "reactive and ad hoc".[49] This can be explained by the lack of trust on benign intentions of the United States, as well as the lack of uniform foreign policy course for Russia. In evidence of this, Zimmerman confirms that imminent after the Cold War sizable amount of Russian public did not perceive Western intentions to be benign. On the other hand, survey works on mass and elites in Russia show that in regard to security, United States were not seen as a threat at that period.[50] In general, Yeltsin lacked coherence and clear approach to dealing with domestic and external issues; his policy was characterized by "personal idiosyncrasies, "narrow egotistical interests" and erratic political decisions."[51]

Russian foreign affairs administration acted resting on pragmatism and avoidance of risk, thus lacking consensus and causing further decline of Russian position worldwide. The heterogeneity of elites in post-Soviet Russia and absence of coordination at the highest level of government explains this shortage. As Russian political system of that period was not stable enough and had ill-defined decision-making mechanisms, the impact of individuals on general foreign policy course and particular issues was considerable.[52] Lo argues that there was no consensus on foreign policy between Russian elites until Primakov succeeded Kozyrev as a Foreign Minister in 1996.[53] As foreign affairs ministers, Kozyrev and Primakov left their own impact on development of Russia's foreign policy: if Kozyrev hold pro-Western policy, oriented towards democracy, economic reforms and internationally promoted moral values such as human rights or multipolarity; then Primakov promoted more nationalistic foreign policy, based on pragmatism, instrumentalism and balance of power notion.

During Yeltsin's presidency Russia's foreign affairs lacked continuity and unity on such events as conflict in Kosovo, National Missile Defense (NMD), NATO

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[49] **Ibid**, p. 8
[50] W. Zimmerman, **The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
[51] B.M. Jain, "India and Russia: Reassessing the Time-Tested Ties", **Pacific Affairs**, 76(3), Fall 2003, p. 379
[52] Buszynski, p. 28
[53] Lo, p. 4

enlargement, [54] territorial disputes with Japan and other issues. Curtis added that another contradiction between the Yeltsin administration and military actions was indicated during Abkhazian crisis in Georgia in 1993, when Russian military supported Abkhazian rebels, whereas Yeltsin promoted a cease-fire in the region.[55] The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II was also a deadlock between Yeltsin and Duma which refused to ratify the treaty. Generally, the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Apparatus was pursuing pro-Western stand, whereas the Supreme Soviet, Military and Security instances promoted more nationalist policy, oriented towards the near abroad, Middle East and Asian states.

Russian foreign policy is being treated as unpredictable by Western policy-makers; moreover, they can not be sure of whether domestic factors or international developments determine Russian foreign policy. Most scholars, such as Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, admitted that because of undetermined, changing and complicated institutional setting in Russia, "there were no clear divisions of competencies in the formulation and implementation of policy."[56] Zimmerman supposes that domestic political economy had great impact on Russia's Western policy, however less impact on near abroad policy.[57] Dobriansky, while giving key factors influencing Russian foreign policy, stresses insufficient institutional arrangement for dealing with international affairs, vulnerability of the Russian executive branch, as well as weak Russian nationalism and importance of elite in international agenda, which actually has less interest in this specter. Main issues Russian people are interested in considering foreign affairs are developments in near abroad or policies towards Russian minorities in newly independent states, argues the author.[58]

The impact of domestic factors on Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's ruling was fairly considerable; hence some scholars pointed out politicization of foreign affairs in Russia.[59] For instance, Dobriansky argues that, while Soviet foreign

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[54] **Ibid**, pp. 5-6
[55] Curtis, p. 12
[56] Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, **Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
[57] Zimmerman, p. 216
[58] Paula J. Dobriansky, "Russian Foreign Policy: Promise or Peril?", **The Washington Quarterly**, 23(1), Winter 2000, p. 138
[59] *See* Lo, pp. 12-13

policy was driven mostly by communist ideology and actually unaffected by domestic opinion and personalities, "Russia's developing democracy, [on the contrary], provided context for domestic conditions to influence Russian foreign policy".[60] According to Robert Putnam's 'two-level games', "the Russian foreign policy elite needs to balance the representation of domestic interests and pressures whilst minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments."[61] Hence, Yeltsin's foreign policy option towards the West was strongly affected by domestic interests that had been sharply critical of US, NATO, and IMF policies and actions.[62]

Dobriansky asserts that political and economic crisis in Russia in the early 1990s made Russia to suspect that the United States has intentionally undermined the Russian economy.[63] Thus, political and economic factors, concludes Dobriansky, led the course of Russian foreign policy towards anti-Western side. So it can be supposed that would Russia be more economically strong and independent from USA, its foreign affairs in such regions as Middle East, Balkans and near abroad probably would be quite different at that period. Paul Kubicek, on the contrary, argues that Russian foreign policy was shaped rather "as a result of opportunities and constraints in the international environment", than by position of domestic elites on foreign affairs.[64] There is also a theory that some personal actions of Yeltsin, such as war in Chechnya, forceful dissolution of the Parliament in 1993, often firing prime ministers and corruption caused moral decline among Russian society, which in turn awakened assertive sense of nationalism in Russia in order to avoid chaos and cement the state together.[65]

1.1.3.2. The Putin Period

Vladimir Putin inherited a Russia which lost respect and great power status both at home and abroad, yet in a decade had overcome "trauma of rapid market

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[60] Dobriansky, p.136
[61] Putnam in P. Shearman, "The sources of Russian conduct: understanding Russian foreign policy", **Review of International Studies**, 27, 2001, p. 258
[62] Shearman, p. 258
[63] Dobriansky, p. 136
[64] Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West", **Political Science Quarterly**, 114(4), Winter99/2000, p. 22
[65] Shearman, p. 260

development." [66] When Putin came to power, the country was still suffering the shock of the 1998 financial crisis: unemployment increased, Russia's external debts were enormous, and business was damaged by a devaluation of ruble. It was hard time to be in business, nor was it a good time to be the head of the government.[67] Nevertheless, new President of the Russian Federation proceeded to business with great eagerness and professionalism.

Political circles at that period came to a broad consensus that Russia should become a 'capitalist democracy integrated with the West.'[68] Putin envisioned strong and democratic Russia as well, on the other hand insisting that it would not imitate the United States or the United Kingdom, in such way giving to understand that Russia would not follow Western liberalization model.[69] Sakwa defines this way to modernization as 'modernisation without modernity', that is Westernization "without the critical spirit, pluralism and political diversity." [70]

During his first Millennium speech in December 1999 Putin stated that his task was to build a bridge between contemporary Russia and its past, let it be the Soviet period or period of Great Russia, in order to at last construct the continuous identity of Russia, which was so missed in the 1990s. Putin stressed the need for *gosudarstvennost*, or the strong state, which was the main dib that the opposition (communists and nationalists) struggled for. He evaluated the concern of a strong state as something necessary for survival and as a guarantee of order, herewith stressing that for the Russian society this never means a totalitarian government.[71]

Putin implemented this project of strong government, consolidating the state power, diminishing authority of the Parliament, regional leaders, armed forces, business community and mass media, on the other hand expanding authority of FSB (Federal Security Service of Russia). Incidentally, 25% of Russian ruling elite consists of FSB cadres.[72] In fact he broke Yeltsin's taboo against suppression of

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[66] Richard Sakwa, **Putin: Russia's choice**, Second edition, Routledge, Oxon, 2008, p. x
[67] Marshall I. Goldman, **Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia**, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, p. 94
[68] Sakwa (Putin: Russia's choice**)**, p. ix
[69] Abraham Ascher, **Russia: A Short History**, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2002, p. 240
[70] Sakwa (Putin: Russia's choice**)**, p. viii
[71] Jakob Hedenskog et al, eds., **Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of security under Putin**, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 15
[72] Freedom House Report on Russia, available online at www.freedomhouse.org

independent media and oligarchs.[73] Putin also believed that mineral natural resources, as well as all the private enterprises, especially the monopolies and manufacturers, must be under the tight control of the government and function in concordance with Russia's national interest.[74] Terrorist attacks in the central Russia and worsening of situation in Chechnya served as motive for further tightening of state control. In 2008, at the end of Putin's second term, Shevtsova summed up that by focusing on establishing stability through 'political crackdown' Putin in fact put administrative, military and other reforms on the back burner and cut the way of modernization for Russia.[75]

Shevtsova described Putin's democracy as "phony" and his government as a "half-baked autocratic regime" in a sort of democratic clothing.[76] From this point of view, the pseudo democracy (that is when the state has democratic institutions and other features but they are not functioning) is even more dangerous than autocracy, because authoritarianism and totalitarianism at least create some endeavor for freedom, while imitation of democracy in reality discredits liberal democratic institutions and values, pushing society towards the 'iron hand'.[77] On the other hand, Sakwa asserts, that although Putin can not be called the greatest democrat in the history, he nevertheless is not a killer of democracy: he created sustained economic growth and "pluralistic social development", leaving behind potential for development of democracy.[78]

Since 2000, Russia became strengthening its foreign policy position and its international weight in general owing to such developments as positive changes in Russian economy, growing importance of security in international agenda, increased dependence on energy, destabilization of international relations, as well as personal diplomacy of Putin.[79] Russia gained leading status in international organizations, including The Group of Eight (G8). During the same period, the problem of Russia's image abroad became the direct issue of foreign policy-making: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2000 also stressed importance of promoting a

[73] Shevtsova in Duncan, p. 281
[74] Goldman, pp. 97-98
[75] Lilia Shevtsova, "Vladimir Putin", **Foreign Policy**, January-February 2008, p. 38
[76] **Ibid**, p. 34
[77] **Ibid**, p. 34
[78] Sakwa (Putin: Russia's choice), p. xi
[79] S. Karaganov, "Russia and the International Order", **Military Technology**, 1, 2006, p. 223

favourable image of the state.[80] On the other hand, it was realized that isolationist policy of the Soviet period was not suitable for new Russia anymore; hence Putin envisioned successful integration of Russia into the world economy by the means of energy and intelligence.[81]

Unlike Yeltsin, who was at odds with the Duma, Putin managed to establish good ties with the parliament: he came to power with an operative majority in the Duma. The electoral association, "Unity", created by Putin was an effective instrument of gaining elections and dealing with the opposition.[82] Not different from Yeltsin's period, governmental structures lacked coherency during Putin too. Inter-bureaucratic rivalry continued; financial support was insufficient in some sectors, especially concerning military sector. Institutions during Putin's period became even more bureaucratic and oligarchic than in the 1990s. Having built a hyper centralized and closed state administration, Putin in fact paralyzed state structures within the bureaucracy: authorities could do little without Putin's approval, so the decision-making was highly dependent on the President. Also, unlike Yeltsin, Putin did not antagonize communists, but his attention was mainly directed towards Russian nationalists, the Orthodox Church and economic liberals. According to Tsygankov, Putin realized the transformation of foreign policy by reshaping domestic interest groups and their identities, thus totally altering the context of foreign policy-making.[83]

Economic elites became highly disloyal to government during Putin's administration: many of oligarchs moved to Europe, namely London; Russian investors preferred to invest their cash abroad because of highly complicated bureaucracy of business-making in Russian governmental structures and other reasons. Policy-makers under Putin became no longer focused on nuclear might, as energy politics became more effective. At the beginning of his ruling, Putin stated that he would eliminate the class of oligarchs who merged power with capital;

[80] Feklyunina, p. 605
[81] Putin in Feklyunina, p. 616
[82] Martin Nicholson, "Putin's Russia: Slowing the Pendulum without Stopping the Clock", **International Affairs**, 77(3), 2001, p. 873
[83] Tsygankov (New Challenges), p. 157

indeed, he reduced the influence of Yeltsin's 'family' and oligarchs, increasing that of security services.[84]

Shevtsova evaluates Russian elite during Putin as the hardest barrier on the way towards democracy and integration with the West, since political and economic elites were not yet ready to deal with competitive society: they assured that Russia was not mature enough to become truly free. The West, in turn, had no choice but to support this stand of elites, as the West did not want to worsen relations with Putin's administration.[85] Russian elites instrumentally used anti-American propaganda, manufacturing an "imaged enemy",[86] in order to concentrate power. This propaganda, however, was never used in practice, as Putin's administration refrained from provoking a real friction with the US – this may isolate or marginalize Russia.

Russia gained political stability during Putin's administration, mainly due to the steady growth of Russian economy. Russia's GDP rose from $200 billion in 1999 to $920 billion in 2006;[87] unemployment fell; Russians' standard of living rose. Putin managed this by establishing private enterprise, liberal tax system and cautious macroeconomic system (the lesson of 1998 crisis).[88] Aslund notes that Russia's intellectual establishment, impacted by general economic development of Eurasia, was also focused on economic growth together with the President.[89]

A number of critics noted that this economic growth largely owed to high oil prices and Putin's protectionism policy.[90] In this perspective, the more dependent economy was on natural resources, the more the Kremlin sought centralizing its power, bullied the West and pressed on Belarus, Ukraine and other former periphery states.[91] Under Putin's administration Russia in fact restored its status of 'natural resource superpower'[92] or a 'petrostate'[93], which helped to reorganize the economy of the state. Such a state, which produced "growth without development" could not

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[84] Duncan, p. 281
[85] Shevtsova, p. 34
[86] **Ibid**, p. 36
[87] **Ibid**, p. 34
[88] Anders Aslund, "Putin's Lurch toward Tsarism and Neoimperialism: Why the United States Should Care", **Demokratizatsiya**, 16(4), Winter 2008, p. 20
[89] **Ibid**, p. 20
[90] Shevtsova, p. 35; Aslund, p. 20; Rosefielde S. and Hedlund S., **Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 218-219
[91] Shevtsova, p. 35
[92] Rosefielde S. and Hedlund S., pp. 218-219
[93] Shevtsova, p. 35

modernize or use geopolitics in a healthy way, argues Shevtsova.[94] The deputy Grigory Yavlinsky was sure that oil and gas were "awful things"[95], whereas Shevtsova warned that "overreliance on oil exports" was a fatal mistake of USSR which led to economic disaster when oil prices fell in 1980.

Russian foreign policy under Putin became more pragmatic according to external developments and balance of power; more responsive to problems and opportunities; and gained relatively high level of continuity. This was not pragmatism by default, but in accordance with Russia's national interests, which the state used deliberately to avoid international isolation and to exert pressure. Tsygankov evaluates Russia's foreign policy during the first term of Putin's ruling as fitting the framework of 'great-power normalization' or 'great-power pragmatism'.[96] According to Casier, the 'leitmotiv' of foreign policy during Putin became economic concerns and multilateralism.[97] Hedenskog asserts that Russia's security policy was closely interrelated with the country's economic capacity.[98] For Lo, the most outstanding feature of Russia foreign policy under Putin was its 'securitization' in institutional framework and in dealing with priorities. He added that although Putin never committed himself to any political philosophy, his approach could be characterized as "more unified, coordinated and above all activist approach to external relations."[99]

Sakwa states that Putin's choices regarding policy were characterized by a "combination of strategic purpose and tactical flexibility."[100] For Dmitri Trenin, contemporary foreign policy of Russia is characterized by not strategic, but rather a 'tactic', at best operational approach, cheerily recommended as 'pragmatism'. Within this framework, Russia tries to play a role of partner-competitor of America, Europe and China, a role of Eurasian integration centre, mediator between East and West,

[94] **Ibid**
[95] Yavlinsky in Feklyunina, p. 618
[96] Tsygankov (New Challenges), p. 156
[97] Tom Casier, "Putin's Policy Towards the West: Reflections on The Nature of Russian Foreign Policy", **International Politics**, 43(3), July 2006, pp. 384-401
[98] Hedenskog, p. 7
[99] Lo, p. 8
[100] Sakwa (Putin: Russia's choice), p. xi

North and South.[101] Withal Trenin stresses that Russian foreign policy is still reactive to outside developments and unable to set its own masterful daily agenda.

On the other hand, growing lack of check and balances in domestic policy hardened integration of Russia with the West and gave greater freedom to Vladimir Putin in asserting Russia's growing great power abroad.[102] Hence, while keeping drawing the line of cooperative security vis-à-vis the West, Russia showed neo-imperialist aspirations towards its neighbours in the CIS. Hence Putin was actively criticized by commentators for establishing 'neo-imperialism' and even 'tsarism' in Russia. Aslund argues that although Putin persistently advocated democracy, he had actually built authoritarian government, albeit his authoritarianism was more reminiscent of tsarism, rather than Soviet dictatorship.[103]

1.2. Rise of Assertiveness in Russian Foreign Policy

Debates on new foreign policy perspective for Russia reached the hot point in 1993, when political and economic reforms proved to be inefficient, and the conflict between the president and the legislature resulted in dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and issuing a new constitution. Despite polarization in domestic affairs, foreign policy became more cooperative after these events.[104] Light noted that Liberal Westernists turned to more nationalistic policies, in some way accepting the need for pragmatic foreign policy. Adomeit argues that the response of the ruling elite to conservative and reactionary forces was reflected, in domestic affairs, in a "slowing down of the processes of democratization, federalization and market-oriented reforms", and in international affairs, in "a return to military and geostrategic frameworks of analysis".[105]

[101] Dmitri Trenin, "Vneshnaya Politika Rossiyi: Samoutverjdenie ili Modernizacionniy Resurs", 13 May 2008 (in Russian) available online at http://www.polit.ru/institutes/2008/05/13/vneshpol.html
[102] Hedenskog
[103] Aslund, p. 17
[104] Margot Light, p. 45
[105] Adomeit, p. 37

1.2.1. 1993 Elections and Its Aftermath

Anti-Western moods prevailed in Russian public since 1993; Russia's national interest was opposed to that of democratic Western states, and more attention was paid to the near abroad foreign policy. There was an idea that Russia should regain her great power status and take responsibility in the post-Soviet space. Hence, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev made some statements on the need for Russian military presence in near abroad region, especially in the Baltic States in order "to prevent forces hostile to Russia from filling the 'security vacuum'".[106] He also claimed that "the territory of the former Soviet Union cannot be considered a zone in which CSCE norms are wholly applicable."[107]

Heikka admitted the fact that Russian foreign policy changed from pro-Western in 1991-1992 to "a more assertive post-imperialism in the following years".[108] Proponents of this neo-imperial policy, politicians calling themselves "derzhavniki", argued that Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's Western-prone policies were nothing but an illusion or a naïve romanticism.[109] The most short and clear description was given by Bazhanov and Bazhanov, who noticed that since 1993 Russian foreign policy became "less ideological and more realistic and pragmatic, less humanistic and more nationalistic, less political and more professional."[110]

Another attribute of post-1993 elections period was that after a brief space in foreign affairs under Shevardnadze and Kozyrev, the old nomenklatura now regained influence over foreign policy-making.[111] Kozyrev's successor, Primakov, had a more traditional and pragmatic position on Russian foreign affairs. He saw Russia as a still "great power" and argued that its foreign policy must be formulated appropriate to

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[106] Felkay, p. 101
[107] Adomeit, p. 45
[108] Henrikki Heikka in Ted Hopf, ed., **Understanding of Russian Foreign Policy**, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999 (Reviewed by Yury Polsky, West Chester University)
[109] Adomeit, p. 36
[110] Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, "Russia and Asia in 1993", **Asian Survey**, 34(1), January 1994, p. 87
[111] Ingmar Oldberg et al., **At a Loss. Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990-s**, Stockholm: Defence Research Establishment, 1999, p. 169

this status.[112] Primakov also emphasized relations with Post-Soviet republics, China, India and other states who would "resist American 'hegemonism'".[113]

Assertiveness in Russian foreign policy was reflected by such concepts as "Russian nationalism", "unilateralism" and "neo-imperialism". Adomeit also stressed that Russian neo-imperialism since 1993 was "supplemented by a quasi-ideological mélange of nationalism, pan-Slavism, 'Eurasianism' and Western-style neo-realism".[114] Some scholars consider the return to assertive policies in Russia quite predictable and rational, because in their opinion, the proponents of democracy and cooperation with West in Russia "had always occupied an extreme position within the Moscow elite."[115]

1.2.2. Rise of Geopolitics in Russian Foreign Affairs

These new developments in Russian foreign affairs were also accompanied by rise of geopolitics in the mindsets of Russian policy-makers. The discipline seemed to propose answers to the new challenges in international relations after the dissolution of USSR and failure of 'perestroika'. Such problems as ethnic separatism, smuggling, instable borders, authoritarian regimes in some CIS states, insecurity, energy competition in the Caspian, etc. required rethinking of geopolitical priorities for Russian Federation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were debates in Russia and the West that geopolitics was going outmoded, yet economic objectives were becoming important.[116] However, according to Lo, geopolitics remained dominant in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy anyway. He affirms this in the following words:

> "The recentness of the Soviet past meant that elite thinking continued to be conditioned by zero-sum equations, balance-of-power notions and 'spheres of interests'... The post-Soviet version of geopolitics may have been less harsh and confrontational than its Cold War predecessor, but the geopolitical mindset became stronger if anything." [117]

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[112] White, p. 184
[113] **Ibid**
[114] Adomeit, p. 45
[115] Judith S. Kullberg in Adomeit, p. 36
[116] Lo, p. 7
[117] **Ibid**, p. 8

Solovyev, on the other hand, explains expansion of geopolitics in post-Soviet Russia as a result of endeavor to substitute Marxist-Leninist ideology of communism with new political ideology in order to draw a course for "the new challenges in international relations presented by the changes of the 1980-1990s."[118] He argues that geopolitics in Russia "became the mirror image of Mikhail Gorbachev's political idealism and Yeltsin-Kozyrev's political subservience and frequent concessions to the West."[119]

Kolosov points out that debates on geopolitics got prominence in Russia when a number of political leaders began to use geopolitical arguments in order to explain their choices of political allies in international stage.[120] Kolosov also adds that radical geopolitical debates such as 'Neo-Eurasianism', Russian nationalism and Westernism were challenged by new stream of more moderate consensual geopolitics, which proposed Russia to isolate herself from expansionist geopolitical debates and apply "a strategy of balancing between the largest geopolitical centres of the world (USA, Western Europe, China) without pretending for the role of a superpower."[121] In parallel, he underlines that various institutes and journals on strategic and geopolitical studies was proliferating in the post-Soviet Russia like mushrooms.[122]

Russian geopoliticians emphasized geopolitical predicament above all other concerns when drawing Russian foreign policy course. They criticized pro-Western colleagues "for pursuing unrealizable aims without necessarily denigrating the value of those aims."[123] Among geopoliticians there were conservatives, moderate nationalists, pragmatists and even democrats, but all of them advocated vision of foreign policy "as a realistic and pragmatic adjustment to existing conditions" and first of all to geographic conditions.[124]

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[118] E. G. Solovyev, "Geopolitics in Russia – science or vocation?", **Communist and Post-Communist Studies**, 37(1), March 2004, pp. 85-96
[119] **Ibid**, p. 90
[120] V.A. Kolosov (ed.), **Geopoliticheskoe polozhenie Rossii: Predstavlenija i Real'nost' (The geopolitics of Russia: Ideas and Reality)**, Art-Courier, Moscow, 2000 (in Russian) (reviewed by O. van der Wusten-Gritsai in **GeoJournal**, 53, 2001, pp. 199-210)
[121] **Ibid**
[122] A. P. Tsygankov, "Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up", **Communist and Post-Communist Studies**, 36(1), March 2003, p. 105
[123] Buszynski, p. 7
[124] **Ibid**

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the post-Cold War era ended, Russian globalism was reborn with Putin coming to the ruling of the Russian Federation. According to Nikitin, it was easier to move on the way towards new international globalism, since the "*semi-isolationism* and *self-restrictions* of the 1990s" were liquidated by the Kremlin.[125] Putin declared the concept of "sovereign democracy" in 2006, thereby further increasing assertiveness of Russian actions in the world stage. As Nikitin noticed, during 2000-2008 Russia has modified its foreign policy from 'regional power' notion to identification itself as a 'global energy power'.[126]

1.2.3. Eurasianism versus Atlantism Debate in Russian Foreign Policy Agenda

Needles to say, that geopolitics in Russia was directly associated with Eurasianism in the 1990s. While geopolitics and foreign policy options in common has ousted the agenda of Russian policy-making during the mid-1990s, two of main streams in Russian foreign policy debates are worth accentuating, that is Eurasianism (Slavophilism) and Atlantism (Westernism).

Russia's ties with the West and particularly with Europe, as well as significance of these ties in political, economic and strategic sense, were continuously emphasized by Russian Westernizers since the eighteenth century until nowadays. This Westernizers-Slavophiles debate invokes a drastic challenge over the vital question as to whether Russia should rely on the West in order to become a strong and civilized state, or keep traditional Russian or Slavic virtues, such as "autocracy (samoderzhavie), Orthodoxy (pravoslavie) and nation-mindedness (narodnost)".[127]

Duncan states that from the Westernizers' point of view, 'West' is characterized by "progress, freedom, democracy, civil society, normality, and a nation-state."[128] On the other hand, Slavophiles saw the West as embodiment of

[125] Nikitin, p. 7
[126] **Ibid**, p. 8
[127] Neumann in Lo, p. 15
[128] Duncan, p. 277

"capitalist exploitation, moral decadence, and American dominance".[129] Duncan continues by arguing that "Westernizers saw the 'East' as linked with autocracy, despotism, and empire", while their opponents saw these features as symbolizing a powerful state, unity and order.[130]

The father of Westernism in Russia is considered to be Peter the Great who emphasized Russia's close cultural ties with the West and made first Western modernizing reforms at home. In the nineteenth century Russian philosophers, such as Belinskiy, Stankevich and others, developed Westernism being inspired by German philosophy and Hegelianism.[131] Meanwhile other Russian Westernizers took example from French utopian socialists and "the anthropological materialism of Feuerbach".[132]

During the 20th century Westernism in Russia was interrupted by socialist system, up to the last decade, when in 1990-1993 Atlanticist policy became the first preference in Russian foreign affairs. According to Graham Smith, this new foreign policy trend was a sine qua non of Russia's transition to the market economy and of the assurance of vital Western assistance for Russian domestic reconstruction.[133]

After the collapse of communism, Russia sought to become an equal partner of the West, 'returning to the civilization' and again becoming 'an apprentice of Europe';[134] and this idea was stated in main official documents of the period. Yeltsin's adviser, Sergey Stankevich stated in 1992 that Atlanticism emphasized such aims as: becoming a part of Europe and the eighth member of The Group of Seven (G7), to strike a prompt and well-organized entry into the world economy, and to focus on Germany and USA as "two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance".[135] Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was a votary of Russia's Westernization: in the early 1990s he defended Western liberal values and called for democracy. Kozyrev opposed Eurasianism idea, believing that Russia should get rid

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[129] **Ibid**
[130] **Ibid**
[131] *See* Andrzej Walicki, "Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Russia", **Russian Review**, 36(1), January 1977, pp. 1-45
[132] Walicki, pp. 13-14
[133] **Ibid**
[134] G. Smith (1999), p. 482
[135] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 March 1992, in Iver B. Neumann, **Russia and the Idea of Europe: A study in identity and international relations**, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 181

of its 'distinctiveness' and of illusions to serve as a bridge between Europe and Asia.[136]

Russian Westernizers, or Atlanticists, assert that future of Russia lies in its integration with western (including Japanese) institutions; they believe that without Western integration Russia would stay "at the periphery of the world economy and remain undemocratic"[137] and that Russia might and should follow the way of 'European progress'.[138] Tsygankov admitted that Russian Westernizers warned against only Eurasian orientation of Russian foreign policy and argued "for the country's pro-Western, rather than merely regional, orientation".[139] This means that if Russia has to play any special role in Eurasia and respond to economic and political challenges in the region, this must be realized only in the framework of Western institutions and standards of liberal democracy. In the early years of Russian Federation, such idea was supported by politicians Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev.

Eurasianism is the continuation of the Slavophile movement of the nineteenth century, which started with the consciousness of Russia's special position between Europe and Asia, as well as political, cultural, and geopolitical implications of this uniqueness. Slavophilism was transformed into Pan Slavism and political liberalism during the reign of Alexander II, thus changing from philosophical movement into socio-political stream.[140] It is remarkable that in contrast to Slavophilism, which called for the unification of Slav people, "Eurasianism is orientated southwards and eastwards and envisages the merger of the Orthodox and Muslim populations".[141]

As a geopolitical movement, Eurasianism was developed by Russian émigrés in the 1920s. According to this group, "Eurasianism was a special form or type of culture, thinking and state policy ingrained from time immemorial in the space of the greatest Eurasian state – Russia".[142] Even Lenin, bewared of special place of Eurasia

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[136] Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L.Nogee, **The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests**, ME Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1998, p. 113
[137] George E. Hudson, "Russia's Search for Identity in the Post-Cold War World", **Mershon International Studies Review**, 38(2), October 1994, p. 237
[138] Walicki, p. 16
[139] Tsygankov (Mastering Space), p. 108
[140] Walicki, p. 10
[141] O. Koulieri, "Russian "Eurasianism" & the Geopolitics of the Black Sea", **UK National Defence Minister's Staff,** October 2000, p. 28, available online at http://www.da.mod.uk
[142] Kerr, p. 3

in the minds of Russian people, proposed idea to rename the USSR into "the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia".[143] According to Zagorskii, Eurasianists claimed that Russia was never part of Europe in cultural aspect, since "Enlightenment never penetrated the nation". Thus, there was no problem of "returning to Europe"; accordingly, Russia had no choice but another stand, a stand between East and West.[144]

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Westernist-Slavophile debate continued in terms of struggle between leftist Western liberals and rightist Russian nationalists. Communists also took place in the rightist camp. During the 1990s, Eurasianism emerged as a new intellectual movement which was looking for a geopolitical rethinking of post-Cold War international relations and Russia's place in this new era.[145] For instance, Afanasyev, placing Russia between Europe and Asia, proposed the term "Dom Evrazii" (Eurasian Home) instead of "Common European Home" (the credo of Westernism).[146] Most scholars approve the fact that Eurasianism gained influence among Russian thinkers parallel to assertiveness followed 1993 parliamentary elections, acquiring new name "neo-Eurasianism" or "New Eurasianism."[147] Kerr concluded that "new Eurasianism" of the 1990s had given greater emphasis to such factors as economic growth and integration due to "simultaneous, and often contradictory, process of globalisation and regionalisation of the international economy."[148]

Eurasianism came to the stage as a new geopolitical context in the early years of Yeltsin's administration, as a result of growing criticisms against the Atlanticism policies.[149] Accordingly, some Russian commentators insisted on alliance with Asian states in order to achieve internal balance in Russia. For instance, Sergei Goncharov from the Institute of the Far East argued that in geopolitical terms Russia must change direction from the West towards Islam and China.[150] Yeltsin's advisor, Sergei Stankevich, was a proponent of Eurasianism, which he evaluated as not rejection of

[143] Neumann, p. 169
[144] Zagorskii in Hudson, p. 237
[145] Tsygankov (1998)
[146] Yuriy Afanas'ev, "Chto pozhinaem" ("What Do We Reap"), **Vek XX i Mir (Century and World)**, 33(5), 1990, p. 13
[147] *See* G. Smith (1999), pp. 481-494
[148] Kerr, p. 14
[149] **Ibid**, p. 6
[150] Goncharov in Kerr, p. 7

the West, but rather a balanced policy, although the balance was outweighing to the East, were Russia had more opportunities to display its great power.[151]

According to Solovyev, Eurasianism saw Russia as a unique world, aligning "the elements of both Europe and Asia", with Asia predominating. Eurasian thinkers envisioned Russia as a "middle continent" – Eurasia – rather than as a state divided between Europe and Asia.[152] By Asia it was meant China, India, Iran and other Asian states, while Europe was considered to include territories from "its western boundaries to the eastern border of Poland and Romania."[153]

Nikitin draws interesting parallel between Russian Eurasianism and "American exceptionalism", stressing their common characteristic; e.g., their uniqueness.[154] According to Nikitin, for America this concept means "unique geographic, geopolitical, ethnic and religious composition of the American society". As for Russia, its 'Eurasian exceptionalism' which had been based on geopolitical, religious and cultural basis in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was adjusted into "the Soviet ideology of the exceptionalism of the *Soviet Union* in the twentieth century. This uniqueness was derived from its super power status, its socialist model of society, its global ideological influence of communism and lastly its projection of power (nuclear, military and ideological)".[155]

Surely, Eurasianism as a stream was divided in itself into different branches. Tsygankov noted at least four groups supporting neo-Eurasianism: Expansionists, Civilizationists, Stabilizers, and Geoeconomists.[156] For example, Aleksandr Prokhanov, one of promoters of neo-Eurasianism, sought to replace the Communist ideology of "international class struggle" with new "national and civilizational struggle against the West".[157] To justify imperial ambitions of Russia, Prokhanov strongly advocated the idea that "the West was encouraging Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia in order to weaken the USSR and then Russia".[158]

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[151] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 114
[152] Solovyev, p. 88
[153] **Ibid**
[154] Nikitin, pp. 8-9
[155] **Ibid**, p. 9
[156] Tsygankov (Mastering Space), p. 107
[157] Duncan, p. 288
[158] **Ibid**

Another Eurasianist proponent, Aleksandr Dugin, who was also a representative of the Eurasianist New Right, claimed that it was mistake to evaluate the Cold War only as ideological struggle between communism and Western liberalism; rather there was much deeper difference between Russia and the West in face of "the geopolitical struggle between two civilizations."[159] Hence, it can be said that in geopolitical sense, Eurasianism for Russia means a stabilizing role within the whole Eurasian continent and integrating "function in relation to a united and well-established Europe and what is still a poor and disunited Asia".[160]

According to Bobo Lo, Eurasianism is an amalgamation of several identities, covering uniqueness (ability to consolidate vast amount of communities and territory), Russian geographical position and inclusive Slavic identity.[161] It is worth noting, that Pan-Slavism was often used as a factor of the Russian assertive foreign policy in the former Soviet areas, namely diaspora issues.[162] In a broader sense, Slavic identity was used in Russian foreign policy during the Kosovo crisis, once, as Felkay put it, "there had been longstanding historical and emotional ties between the Russians and the Orthodox Serbs".[163]

Eurasianism was also used by Russia to elevate its international position in various conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans and Korean peninsula. Lo stated that, according to its proponents, Eurasianism was used as a justification for Russian involvement in international issues.[164] Finally, Eurasianist policies of Russia manifest the desire to "reintegrate former Soviet republics into some form of economic and political interdependence with Moscow through such mechanisms as a ruble zone or the continued stationing of Russian troops in the new nations."[165]

If to sum up on Atlanticism-Eurasianism debate, Eurasian notion of it is weighty: both Romantic nationalists and liberals/Westernizers in Russia used the term 'Eurasian', giving different meanings to it. If nationalists used Eurasianism "to forge a non-European identity for Russia", then liberals used the idea "to add a

[159] Dugin in G. Smith (1999), p. 483
[160] Kerr, p. 7
[161] *See* Lo, p. 18
[162] **Ibid**, p. 16
[163] Felkay, p. 187
[164] Lo, p. 19
[165] Hudson, p. 237

complementary, separate identity for Russia on top of the European identity they so desired for it."[166] Moreover, Eurasianism of liberals valued Europe as "being morally equal to Russia", while nationalists saw Europe as "being morally inferior to Russia."[167] Neumann believes that "the Russian debate about Europe is also a debate about what Russia is and should be", in other words this never-ending debate on Russia's identity (whether European, Asian or uniting Eurasian) is important for projecting the foreign policy now and in the future.[168]

Having looked through the general situation in the Russian foreign policy-making in the post-Cold War period, arising new trends in Russian policy-making process, growing assertiveness in Russia's external relations, as well as institutional and personal aspects of Yeltsin's and Putin's foreign policy stands, let us pass to the detailed analysis of Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin and Putin's administrations in the time and geographical framework.

[166] Neumann, p. 178
[167] **Ibid**, p. 184
[168] **Ibid**, p. ix

CHAPTER II

WESTERN DIMENSION OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE YELTSIN ADMINISTRATION

In this part of my work the Russian foreign policy towards West during the Yeltsin administration is to be analyzed. From the Western side, it is important to understand how Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union evaluated in security and democracy fields after the end of the Cold War. The work will discuss relations between the Yeltsin and Clinton administration within the new conditions in the international arena since the end of bipolar confrontation. Further there will be explained the process of the return of old-style politics toward the West in Russian policy-making and which factors were decisive in this process. Security relations are mainly concerned with the issue of NATO expansion and Russian-EU, Russian-American relations in this perspective. From the US perspective, strategic disarmament developments between Russia and the United States and the impact of wars in Kosovo and in Bosnia on Russian-American security relations will be analyzed.

When examining Russian-EU relations I shall try to understand how they developed in the paradigm of Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's policies, particularly Yeltsin's 'Our Europe' choice. Security relations with the EU will consider the European security architecture in relation to NATO and the OSCE. Finally, the chapter will explain Russian-EU relations in the perspective of democracy and other European (Western) normative values.

2.1. Western Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy during Yeltsin's Administration

The place of the West in Russia's foreign relations is undoubtedly important. But more important is what the West means for Russia: is it primarily Western European states or the United States?[169] Should Russia be more oriented towards Europe, its continental and historical neighbor, or the United States, its former Cold

[169] *See* Hudson, p. 236

War adversary and present global power, influencing the whole world? Graham Smith argues that most of Russian statists "have increasingly embraced the rhetoric of the neo-nationalists by representing the United States as 'the reborn Cold War Other'". Europe, on the other hand, is defined as "'the good West' because of its perceived sensitivity towards Russia's regional security concerns." However, Russian administration prefers not to seek rapprochement with Europe on account of harming America, adds Smith.[170] Light gives well-heeled analysis of how Russia perceives Europe and USA. According to Light, Europe for Russia is "other", which is being admired as an example for imitation; but at the same time Europe is resented, because of lasting attempts by Europe to exclude Russia. On the other hand, the United States, while being also the "other" for Russia and admired for its economic and technologic power, is not the community Russia wants to be the part of.[171]

As we shall see in the following sections, most scholars during the 1990s admitted that if during the 1980s Russian government took the course towards integration with the West, then since 1993 Russian foreign policy turned to anti-Western dimension, pushing Russia into unilateralist trend. At the same time, there were some scholars, such as Surovell, who argued that Russian foreign policy has been largely pro-Western in its core, despite anti-Western rhetoric, claimed by Russian leaders.[172] He explains such a course by the argument that Yeltsin and his inner cycle became dependent on Western support in order to enrich themselves and always served Western interests in order to get financial backing and domestic influence. Seemingly, Lynch argued that Russian foreign policy was far from anti-Western in the 1990s, and adds that Moscow generally pursued pro-Western stance, at the same time protecting its own interests, and challenged the West by "establishing 'diplomatic and security hegemony throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union'."[173] In fact, Russia was living identity crisis regarding its position towards the West, because its main problem was "to get out of the no-man's

[170] G. Smith (1999), p. 491
[171] Light, p. 55
[172] Jeffrey Surovell, **Capitalist Russia and the West**, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, Vt., 2000.
[173] Lynch in Jeffrey Surovell, "Yevgenii Primakov: 'Hard-Liner' or Casualty of the Conventional Wisdom?", **Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics**, 21(2), June 2005, p. 224

land it found itself in after the Cold War as a semi-partner semi-enemy of the West".[174]

2.1.1. Russian-American Relations during Yeltsin

After collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary question in Russian-American relations was the depth and breadth of Russia's cooperation with the North-Atlantic world. The focal point of Russian-American relations was economic and political transformation of new Russia, which was welcomed by Russian elite who evaluated American assistance to Russia's transformation and integration process as a 'mutually reinforcing dynamic'.[175]

At the first years of newly formed Russian Federation, Yeltsin made serious steps to build good relations with the West. Addressing the extraordinary meeting of the Security Council, Yeltsin stated that "Russia considers the United States and the West not as mere partners, but rather allies."[176] In 1993 Yeltsin admitted that Russia's independent foreign policy started with the West, more exactly with the United States and added that Russia must move towards global elimination of nuclear weapons, inasmuch on this basis it would be easy to set "relations with any country, be it from the West or East, Europe, or Asia".[177] As well, Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, stated that "ideological confrontation" was over and "developed countries of the West" were "natural allies" of Russia.[178]

Russian interests were not incompatible with American vital interests. After won in 1992 elections, Clinton proposed new foreign policy strategy towards Russia. He criticized Bush's policy for being too much loyal to Gorbachev, "concern with order rather than the promotion of democracy", and "failing to provide economic assistance to facilitate transition to the capitalist market". Main goal of Clinton was to create a 'strategic alliance', or new 'democratic partnership' with Russia,[179] as

[174] Hedenskog, p. 13
[175] Allen C. Lynch, "The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s", **Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics**, 18(1), 2002, p. 161
[176] M. Nemeth and H. Macenzie in Felkay, p. 90
[177] Neumann, p. 182
[178] Kozyrev in Lo, p. 40
[179] Shearman, p. 259

well as ensuring security and stability in Russia concerned with danger of nuclear arsenal.

Main expectation of Russia from the United States was to be treated as an ally in political sense and to be worth of financial aid from the West in economic sense. Russian orientation to the West in the early 1990s was based on economic and social reforms, led by Yeltsin and his reformers team, including Yegor Gaidar and Anatoliy Chubais, the young ministers. According to Felkay, generally "Yeltsin's mission to the West was successful". "His statesman-like behavior" during meetings with Western leaders and his openness in intentions to make Russia strong democratic state helped to strengthen Yeltsin's image abroad.[180] On the other hand, Yeltsin never covered the fact that Russia depended on Western financial support to realize its economic and political reforms.

Meanwhile, since the middle 1990s, Russian foreign policy turned from cooperation with the West to direct confrontation on such issues as Bosnian conflict, NATO's eastward expansion and Russia's efforts to assert influence in the post-Soviet sphere.[181] On the one hand, Russia was discomposed by dual message of the US's foreign policy.[182] One of such examples was the fact, that Clinton, while supporting Yeltsin's policy, at the same time promoted NATO enlargement policy. On the other hand, Western critics pointed out to inappropriate policy of Russia in Chechnya, Russian military's actions in Georgia, and Russia's desire to sell nuclear reactor technology to Iran. Besides, the US administration was not sure of the stability of Yeltsin's reforms. In 1994 arrest of Aldrich Ames in the United States also caused cooling in relations.[183]

Most scholars agree that Russian foreign policy was mainly Western-centric in the first decade after the Cold War.[184] For instance, Lo asserts that despite all myths among some Russian policy-makers on Russia's Eurasianist unique role and the priority of CIS in foreign affairs, "the West retained its dominant position in

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[180] Felkay, p. 91
[181] Kubicek
[182] Felkay, p. 107
[183] Aldrich Hazen Ames was arrested by the FBI in Arlington, Virginia on espionage charges on February 24, 1994. He was a veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who had been spying for the Russians since 1985. Ames was sentenced to incarceration for life without the possibility of parole. For more information *See* http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/ames/ames.htm
[184] *See* Lo; Malcolm, pp. 87-88; Kubicek, pp. 550-54

Moscow's world-view".[185] Similarly, Kubicek has remarked that the core trend of Russian foreign policy of the 'pragmatic nationalists' envisioned a 'realistic partnership' with the West, and was not necessarily anti-Western.[186] Indeed, the United States represented the main point of reference for Russia at that period, whether by IMF policies, strategic disarmament plan, in shaping Russia's interests in regional and global international issues or in effecting Russian elite's perceptions of national identity.[187]

However, the same scholars add that this Westerncentrism did not mean a totally pro-Western foreign policy of Russia. According to Lo, the Westerncentrism of Moscow's foreign affairs was reflected in pragmatism. While for Russian liberalists Westerncentrism was a full adherence to cooperation with the West, then for other political groups relations with the West were "highly conditional", based on "objective facts" and pragmatism.[188] Kerr also stated that criticism of pro-Western policy in Russia did not mean that Russia was opposing the Western economic and political model; it was rather the realization that Russia had its own national interest, as other countries did, not necessarily oriented to the Western interests and even clashing with them sometimes.[189]

Even though Russia began to feel itself insulated, there were some contending voices like that of Dmitri Trenin, Russian political commentator who suggested Russia to relieve itself the pattern of thought that had prevailed along the Cold War. Trenin pointed out to business-like position of Russian leaders towards international community. He argued that values were outmoded and ideology no more mattered for Russia, while interest, especially economic interest was topside.[190] Trenin asserted that from the Russian perspective, Russian-Western relations were competitive, but not hostile. He was certain that Russia was not seeking for world domination; moreover its leaders did not dream of restoring USSR: they sought to "rebuild Russia as a great power with a global reach, organized as a

[185] Lo, p. 8
[186] Kubicek, pp. 550-54
[187] Lo, p. 8
[188] **Ibid**, p. 22
[189] Kerr, p. 2
[190] *See* Dmitri Trenin, "Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West", **The Washington Quarterly**, 30(2), Spring 2007, pp. 95-105

supercorporation".[191] However, in its essence, Trenin was recommending the Russian authorities to ignore Western moral authority and build relations with the West on the basis of pragmatic interest, accounting only "terms of engagement".[192]

Another interesting remark is assertion made by Andrei Tsygankov, who believed that deterioration in Russian-American relations since the 1990s might be caused by the writings of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington about "the end of history" and "clash of civilizations". As he states on this: "to the extent that the 'end of history' and 'clash of civilizations' theses were involved in Russia's domestic intellectual developments, their authors are responsible for the rise of Russian discourses of isolation and anti-Western hostility".[193]

2.1.1.1. Return of Russia and Old Style of Politics with the West

In 1993 there was a parliamentary crisis in Russia, caused by discontents of communists and nationalists with Yeltsin's administration, which was criticized for giving too many concessions to the US and paying less attention to the Near Abroad region. As Shearman noticed, "initial dominance in policy circles of the 'liberal westernizers' soon gave way to a more 'conservative' and 'pragmatic nationalist' approach to foreign policy".[194] Oldberg notes that despite its hardening rhetoric, Russian foreign policy since 1993 was limited from being assertive, because of military and economic realities. Analyzing ambiguities of Russian foreign policy in the past, Oldberg concludes that "romanticism" in the Russian-Western relations was replaced by Russia's desire to reassert its position in international arena and especially in its neighborhood. The author argues that this, in turn, triggered rise of pragmatic realism in Russian foreign policy, characterized by need in good relations with the West because of financial dependence.[195] Smith supposes that, for Western commentators, significant shift in Russia's foreign policy in 1993 reflected a

[191] Trenin (2007), p. 96
[192] **Ibid**
[193] Andrei P. Tsygankov, **Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas After the Cold War**, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004 (Reviewed by William Zimmerman in Perspectives on Politics, March 2005, 3(1), pp. 208-209)
[194] Shearman, p. 256
[195] Ingmar Oldberg et al., **At a Loss. Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990-s**, Stockholm: Defence Research Establishment, 1999 (Reviewed by Roger E. Kanet)

"systemic crisis of national identity", or "what it means to be Russian following the demise of the Soviet homeland (*Sovetskaya rodina*) and of the difficulty that many Russians face in readjusting to the loss of global superpower status".[196]

Russia's new national interests in near abroad and Eastern states as China, India or Iran which were likely to conflict with Western interests were enounced by various Russian political groups at that period: radical democrats and pro-Westerners warned that such interests should be constructed in the context of the Western alliance; geopoliticians claimed that Russia could pursue its interests in near abroad and Asia "in a way that would not undermine the pro-Western policy"; while Russian nationalists insisted that Russia's urgent strategic interest in near abroad were of first priority and Russia must pursue these interests "with or without Western endorsement".[197]

Washington reacted passively to this sudden shift in Russian foreign affairs agenda: it neither engaged in the dissolution of the conflicts in the post-Soviet territory, used neither 'carrots' to support Russian liberal's policy nor 'sticks' to weaken Russian nationalists.[198] Having seen that the US was not compelling to choose ultimately between pro-Western orientation and predominance of the CIS, Russian government decided to acquire more assertive foreign policy and more independent stance towards the West, prioritizing relations with post-Soviet states, Asian and Middle Eastern states.

In 1995 New York Times wrote, that a "honeymoon" of the Russian-American relations, which started after the end of the Cold War, was over. Both Russian foreign minister Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that relations between the two states were overcoming serious changes and were far from being mature.[199] After 1995 elections Yeltsin criticized the West for challenging Russia interests in the CIS, marginalizing Russia's role in the settlement of Bosnian crisis and undermining the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.[200] The bitterest disappointment with the United States came when it began to treat Russia as

[196] G. Smith (1999), p. 481
[197] Buszynski, p. 38
[198] Lynch, p. 166
[199] "U.S. and Russia Put Upbeat Front on Summit Talks Rehearsal", **The New York Times**, 27April 1995.
[200] Felkay, p. 133

a non-equal player. This resulted in great frustration and further in fury for Russians. From the Russian point of view, "the US government ... [treated] Russia as the vanquished in the War, rather than as the side that simply ceased to play the Cold War game".[201] In 1997 interview to *Izvestiya*, Primakov also remarked upon this:

> Initially, Russia's policy was one of 'strategic partnership' with the United States ... a structure in which one country (the US) led the others was gradually created... This is not what Russia wants. We want equitable co-operation even though we realize that we are now weaker than the United States.[202]

Primakov, Kozyrev's successor as Russian Foreign Minister, hold more pragmatic and nationalist stand, which affected further route of Russian foreign policy. From Primakov's point of view, growing US hegemony was so overwhelming that such states as Russia, China, France and India which generally shared different interests might create a common anti-US front if necessary.[203] Primakov was proponent of multilateralist policy, based on constraining the US domination in the world by common regional security and economic structures. However, this policy failed to constrain the US regarding the NATO expansion and the US-led bombing campaign of Yugoslavia.[204] Actually, after Primakov's appointment as a Foreign Minister, many US commentators and journalists made references to Russia's Cold War policy, arguing that Primakov drove Russia back to the days of Brezhnev and Gromyko.[205]

One of the most important documents that signified the erosion of trust in the Russian side was Russia's National Security Concept of 1997. This document stated that international system was multipolar, but warned against "attempts to create a structure of international relations based on unilateral solutions of the key problems of world politics".[206] Light asserts that it was evident that these words referred to the US unilateral ambitions; however the name of the country was not mentioned openly.

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[201] Light, p. 55
[202] *Izvestiya*, 23 December 1997, in G. Smith (1999), p. 491
[203] Dobriansky, p. 140
[204] Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin", **International Relations of the Asia-Pacific**, 9, 2009, p. 214
[205] Alain Gresh, "Russia's Return to the Middle East", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, 28(1), Autumn 1998, p. 68; also *See* the **International Herald Tribune** leaders on 15 and 16 February 1998
[206] Light, p. 49

Thus, she argues, as the result of discords between Russia and USA on such issues as missile defence, arm sales and Iraq policy, criticism of USA increased among Russian policy-makers, however, they were reluctant to speak openly.

Despite the negative signals indicating deterioration of the relations between the two states, relations with the United States during Yeltsin's administration never escalated into a level of crisis as long as the Clinton administration remained concerned with the political system in Russia and always gave open support to Yeltsin during presidential elections against the communists. For instance, before 1996 elections Russia was promised to take part in G7+1 (with Russia); and in 1997 former G7 officially became G8, including Russia as a high-developed industrial state. Moreover, the United States did not use pressure on Russia regarding compliance to international legal and political norms; while examples of non-compliance were numerous: from Russian military intervention to Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, to reckless statements of Yeltsin and his officials and Russia's sale of $800 million worth nuclear reactor to Iran.[207]

2.1.1.2. Security Dimension of Russian-American Relations

One of the milestones of Russian-American relations after the end of the Cold-War was global and regional security. Both Yeltsin and Clinton emphasized geostrategic considerations in drawing foreign policy, especially considering new conditions where there was serious potential for emergence of regional conflicts within the unstable post-Soviet space. The United States admitted Russia's capability in generating stability within the Former Soviet Union: hence, during the bilateral summit in January 1994 Clinton administration did not dispute "Russia's interpretation of its 'peacekeeping' mission in the 'near abroad'".[208] Clinton even phrased on this issue that Russian military was acting "instrumental in stabilizing"

[207] Lynch, p. 169
[208] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Premature Partnership", **Foreign Affairs**, 74(1), January-February 1994, p. 70

crisis in Georgia, adding that Russia was likely to involve in some areas near it, just like the United States had been involved in Panama or Grenada.[209]

Russian military had great impact on foreign policy issues, especially considering NATO expansion which the Defense Ministry and the General Staff evaluated as a main threat of the period.[210] The argument that the United States was not interested in strong Russia was widespread among the military: so, Russia's Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov considered Western policy towards Russia as 'contradictory', on the one hand providing aid to Russia, and on the other "encouraging internal disintegration".[211]

According to Lo, Russian security agenda during Yeltsin's period prioritized such security concerns as: strategic disarmament and non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD); 'geopolitical disadvantage' and the problem of 'inclusiveness'; conventional security threats and non-traditional security; and crisis and conflict management.[212] To these, the problem relating to the future expansion of NATO so as to create a chain of allies surrounding Russia should be added. Below, the issues pertaining the dialogue for disarmament and NATO activism in the post-Cold War era, the major headaches for the Russian state elite, are to be handled in detail.

2.1.1.2.1. Strategic Disarmament and the Russian-US Relations

New security concern of strategic disarmament was not only mutual arms reduction of Russia and the US, but first of all nuclear security guarantees for former Soviet republics: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia was willing to play a role of constructive and strong player in the post-Cold War global affairs, therefore reduction of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was a good chance to show this. According to Buszynski, negotiations over nuclear disarmament gave Russia opportunity to disengage from the nuclear arms race, as well as "consultative rights and a claim to equality with the world's remaining superpower".[213] Another important factor which

[209] Brzezinski, p. 70
[210] Buszynski, p. 22
[211] Kolesnikov in Buszynski, p. 22
[212] Lo, p. 128
[213] Buszynski, pp. 6, 38

pushed Russia for disarmament was a moral side of the issue, since it was important for Moscow to give a positive example to such 'nuclear threshold states'[214] as India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and the CIS states. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin often stressed the special relationship between Russia and the US as two great powers responsible for global security and sustaining peace.[215]

Maintaining and modernizing nuclear weapons was extremely expensive business,[216] then Yeltsin began nuclear arms reduction, claiming in January 1992 that this would save a large amount of money which can be channeled towards civilian needs and implementation of reform.[217] Yeltsin set disarmament agenda as a prerequisite for normal foreign policy development and a "quid pro quo for Western trade, aid and investment".[218] In 1994 State of the Nation address Yeltsin stressed the need for strengthening non-proliferation regime as the most important priority of Russia's foreign policy.[219] Yeltsin also declared that "Russian controlled missiles would no longer be targeted on the U.S. cities."[220]

Boris Yeltsin's stand on security issue went parallel with that of Bill Clinton's administration, actually the two presidents managed to establish effective relationship based on cooperation efforts. As Thompson stated, "the cooperative effort to reduce and control nuclear weapons marked a major success in Russian-American relations after 1991".[221] The most important of these efforts was START II agreement on reducing nuclear armament, which was continuation of START I initiated by Gorbachev. The START II Treaty was signed in January 1993 and complemented with agreement on denuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan by February 1994. Negotiations of the Treaty included reducing number of nuclear warheads to between 3000 and 3500 and destruction of delivery systems. On September 26, 1997 Russian Foreign Minister and US State Secretary signed

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[214] Lo, p. 130
[215] Buszynski, p. 6
[216] Lo, p. 129
[217] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 191
[218] Lo, p. 129
[219] **Ibid**, p. 127
[220] Felkay, p. 90
[221] John M. Thompson, **Russia And The Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction From The Kievan State To The Present**, Westview Press, 2009, p. 360

additional Protocol to START II which extended accomplishment of the treaty until the end of 2007.

However, disarmament negotiations went slowly and faced various impediments. According to Western commentators, problems were on the Russian side. Lynch asserted that the fragility of Russian-American relations was threatened not by the fear of resurgence of cold-war antagonism or Russian imperialism; it lied rather in "greater difficulty and higher costs of obtaining Russian co-operation in areas where such co-operation [was] essential to maintaining international security", [222] namely the START II nuclear disarmament treaty, which was refused to be ratified by Russian Parliament for eight years since 1992. Although Yeltsin assured Clinton that the treaty would be ratified, the process of ratification was delayed by various security pretexts, such as NATO expansion, the Kosovo operation or the ABM Treaty. Moreover, for almost three years the Treaty ratification had been stalled because of Ukraine's refusal to give up its 'nuclear card'.[223] Evidently, the US Congress ratified START II in 1996, while Russian Duma in 2000.

There was also division inside of the Russian military itself on the issue of nuclear arms control: some military officials criticized the START II for making Russia vulnerable in international stage; while others in the General Staff and the Defense Ministry assured that "Russia could not afford the cost of nuclear rivalry with the United States".[224] In fact, Moscow indeed made serious concessions by signing the START II agreement: for instance, the treaty eliminated all Russian land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads, while the United States was permitted to retain such warheads on its submarines.[225] Russian military pressed Yeltsin mainly on two issues: revision of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and arms sales abroad. Yeltsin pressed the West for accommodation on both issues. Arms sales issue was one of contentious stones in Russian-US relations: Yeltsin's arms export policy balanced between cooperation and competition with the West. In order to avoid confrontation with Washington, Yeltsin cooperated with UN sanctions against Iraq, Libya and

[222] Lynch, p. 177
[223] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 193
[224] Buszynski, p. 23
[225] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 192

Yugoslavia, facing strict nationalist criticism for this at home. On the other hand, he emphasized need for hard currency, thus expanding export markets for Russian arms sales in Middle East and Asia, were the West was main supplier for decades.[226]

On the other hand, Washington doubted about success of Moscow's commitment to strategic disarmament. Hence, in the framework of US national interest Russia, as a nuclear power, was not assumed to be a stable state, since Russia's commercial interest might conflict with its obligations under the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[227] Lo also stressed that Russia's stance towards non-proliferation regime was softer than that of the United States. This was evident in such examples as when Moscow did few to restrict the flow of nuclear technology to Iran; reacted dispassionately to nuclear test of India and Pakistan in 1998; called for lifting the UN sanctions on Iraq; and disclaimed that North Korean missile programme posed a threat to global security.[228] Main reasons of such a Moscow's behavior were as well economic interests of Russian corporations such as The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (MINATOM) and military institutions.

2.1.1.2.2. NATO Activism and Russia

After the break of the Warsaw Pact, NATO faced crisis concerning its necessity in international arena, for the main security threat was absent, and raison d'être of the Alliance came under the question. However, NATO managed to redefine its mission and draw new strategies. In 1991 the Alliance identified a new Strategic Concept where new global security threats were determined, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. Also new type of dialog between NATO and non-members was drawn, reflected in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In reality, after the actual collapse of the USSR, NATO acted cautiously, and its main expressions according new international order were as following: praise

[226] **Ibid**, pp. 196-197
[227] Lynch, p.178
[228] Lo, p. 131

economic and political reforms in the post-Soviet countries; seek for stability and security in "free and undivided Europe"; "seek neither unilateral advantage from the changed situation in Europe nor threaten the legitimate interest of any state"; support democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, based on rule of law, human rights and market economy.[229] Despite, the guarantees from the organization, Russian-NATO relations after the end of the Cold War began in an atmosphere of uncertainty. In the early 1990s Yeltsin sent a letter requesting membership in NATO for Russian Federation, aiming at consolidating pro-Western stance of Russia. However, being unsure of the viability of democratic reforms in Russia and full of suspicion towards Yeltsin's intention, the West couldn't give any answer to such a proposal and, as Felkay states, "missed an excellent opportunity to strengthen Russia's nascent democracy".[230]

Meanwhile, the first step to Russian-NATO cooperation was made in 1992 when Russia together with Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other CIS members joined the NACC. Moscow was also interested in joining the alliance within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, however Russian nationalists declared that this would be humiliating for the great power status of Russia and believed that it was only a gambit in order to move NATO's power closer to Russia. In December 1994, at NATO meeting in Brussels supposed to sign a PfP treaty, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, being affected by nationalist pressure, refused to sign the treaty and condemned NATO for discussions about plans for former Warsaw Pact states to join the alliance by the end of 1995. He said Russia would not join PfP until it gets more clarifications on this issue.

Nevertheless, in 1995 PfP between NATO and Russia was signed, mainly as a result of more soft conversation between Yeltsin and Clinton in Moscow during the summit at 9 May Victory celebrations. As Felkay admitted, The West was reluctant to take a risk of acting unilaterally in armed conflicts, which may evoke Russia's aggression, thus Clinton decided to initiate between NATO and former Soviet states.[231] By the end of 1995 twenty seven states, consisting of former Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet republics, joined the PfP. At that time Andrei Kozyrev

[229] Felkay, p. 88
[230] **Ibid**
[231] **Ibid**, p. 104

stated that PfP was a better alternative than the immediate expansion of the Alliance, [232] adding that "it should, however, be clear that a genuine partnership is an equal partnership… There can be no vetoes on others' actions nor surprises undermining mutual trust" .[233]

Initially, Russia was not concerned with possibility of NATO expansion towards Eastern Europe, because it was sure that NATO would not expand. Pushkov stressed the fact that NATO gave promise to Russia in 1990 not to expand to the East: James Baker, then US secretary of state, assured Gorbachev with the following words, "NATO would not move an inch eastward outside of its present zone of action".[234] Cohen also stated that a commitment was given that NATO would never expand to the East,[235] but according to Robert B. Zoellick, then a State Department official involved in the Two Plus Four negotiating process, this appears to be a misperception, since no formal commitment of the sort was made.[236]

Later, when in reality expansion of the alliance took place, Moscow claimed that NATO expansion, which began with Poland membership into the alliance and later the other two former Warsaw Pact states, was illegal. Gorbachev will confirm this fact to The Daily Telegraph on May 6, 2008, saying that "Americans promised that NATO wouldn't move beyond the boundaries of Germany after the Cold War but now half of central and eastern Europe are members, so what happened to their promises? It shows they cannot be trusted".[237] Again, as Karaganov stated, Russia had no written guarantees on non-expansion, "because in the euphoric atmosphere of the time it would have seemed indecent – like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other's husband". [238]

Russian leadership adopted more assertive stance on NATO expansion issue after 1993 elections, being pressed by nationalists who won the most of the votes in the parliament. In 1993 Yeltsin wrote a letter to Clinton and European leaders, in which he opposed NATO enlargement towards Eastern Europe. Moreover, he added

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[232] Buszynski, p. 38
[233] Kozyrev in Luis J. R. Leitão Tomé, "Russia and NATO's Enlargement", **NATO Research Fellowship Programme 1998-2000**, Final Report, June 2000, p. 17
[234] Alexey K. Pushkov, "Missed Connections", **The National Interest**, May-June 2007, p. 55
[235] Stephen F. Cohen, "Gorbachev's Lost Legacy", **The Nation**, 24 February 2005.
[236] Robert B. Zoellick, "The Lessons of German Unification", **The National Interest**, September 22, 2000.
[237] "Gorbachev: US Could Start New Cold War", **Telegraph**, May 6, 2008.
[238] Karaganov in Tomé, p. 15

that Russia's relations with the alliance should be much closer than those between NATO and Eastern European states. This meant that Russia was against integration of Eastern European states with NATO, since this would impede Russia's interest in this region and prevent these states to be under Russian influence.[239] Tomé argued that "the will and positions of Eastern European states were simply ignored in the letter".[240] According to Lo, Russia's position towards Eastern Europe was as following: although Eastern Europe was lost for Russia, it would not be completely handed over to the West.[241] As Trenin names this, Moscow sought the "Finlandization"[242] of Eastern Europe, which meant striving to ensure the neutral status of the states in this region in order to use them as a buffer.[243] NATO was representing a big obstacle to Russia in this sense.

Despite open opposition to NATO expansion, expressed by Yeltsin, there were some contradictory facts, observed by Surovell. For instance, Yeltsin, in his speech on 25 August 1993 in Warsaw, himself gave government approval of East European states' (Poland and Czechoslovakia) membership of NATO, thus giving motion to further NATO enlargement.[244] As stated earlier, Surovell promotes the idea that Yeltsin's administration was exposing anti-Western rhetoric only for an outward show; similarly in NATO case, Surovell found out that in reality the Kremlin did nothing to stop NATO expansion, likewise failing to support Serbs during Yugoslavian conflicts, since Moscow either voted in favor or abstained from voting on the UN resolutions against Serbs.[245] However, at summit meeting of OSCE in Budapest in December, 1994, Yeltsin, already bolstered by NATO eastward enlargement, Western position towards Serbs and crisis in Chechnya, condemned NATO for trying "to divide Europe again" and USA for intention to dominate the world. This speech of Yeltsin also was the first warning of oncoming "cold peace" in Europe.[246]

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[239] Tomé, p. 15
[240] **Ibid**
[241] Lo, pp.117-118
[242] The term 'Finlandization' referred originally to the international position of Finland after the Second World War. Although it was not a Soviet satellite or client state, it kept its distance from Western security and economic structures such as NATO and the EU. (*See* Lo)
[243] Trenin in Lo, p. 118
[244] Surovell (2005), p. 227
[245] Surovell (2000)
[246] "The World; Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe", **New York Times**, December 11, 1994.

In another attempt of such a balancing, in 1994, during the meeting of CSCE leaders, Russia proposed the idea of CSCE to become the major security organization in Europe with its own Security Council like in the UN. According to Kubicek, Moscow wanted NATO, the EU and the West European Union (WEU) to be subordinated to CSCE in order to maintain security in Europe. More than that, Russians proposed that NATO itself should be transformed from a military alliance into a "more open, politically-oriented organization".[247] This meant the condition that NATO members would not position NATO troops or weapons on their territories. In 1995 Russian policy-makers strictly criticized publication of the "Study on NATO Enlargement" for being provocative, preconditioning NATO expansion only by full-membership and putting condition of allowing foreign troops and nuclear equipment stationed on the territory of applicants.[248] For Russian side, NATO expansion presented a threat to arms-control agreements as START II and CFE Treaty.[249]

In 1996 OSCE Parliament adopted Stockholm declaration on NATO expansion, rejecting Russia's proposal on creation of OSCE Security Council. Later the US Congress adopted resolution on Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to join NATO and invited Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic States to join the Alliance. NATO held what is officially called a 'distinctive partnership' with Ukraine since 1997.[250] Kubicek argues that Clinton, "emboldened by NATO's success in Bosnia, more confident of his Russia policy after Yeltsin's reelection, and mindful of his own domestic audience", made NATO expansion idea his primary aim.[251]

Russian reaction to these developments was instant. So, main Russian reformist deputy Anatoly Chubais claimed that NATO enlargement was "one of the worst ideas to be advanced by the West in recent years."[252] Grigory Yavlinsky protested by adding that "NATO expansion would only undermine the position of pro-Western reformers by constituting a psychological "rejection" of Russia from the

[247] Kubicek, p.8
[248] Tomé, p. 19
[249] **Ibid**, p. 21
[250] M. A. Smith, **Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?**, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 29
[251] Kubicek, p. 9
[252] Chubais in Kubicek, p. 9

Western community"[253]; whereas Yeltsin blamed NATO for intention to push Russia out of Europe.[254] Indeed, as Lynch noticed, the prospect of the entry of former Soviet satellite states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO showed that classical geopolitical criteria overtopped liberal criteria in post-Cold War international relations arena.[255]

Since Russia realized that NATO enlargement was inevitable, it sought compromises: Moscow tried to make NATO-Russian relations to be bind with formal agreement, where limitations on NATO and interests of Russia would be included. However, the Allies preferred "commitments to be political, not legally binding".[256] Nonetheless, Russia's protest against NATO expansion, while failing to obtain primary objectives considering the issue, resulted in several compensations from the West, such as delay in timing of expansion, commitments not to station conventional and nuclear forces to East and Central Europe, as well as Russia's membership in a permanent joint Russia–NATO Council (organization that allowed Russia a voice in internal discussions of the Alliance).

As a result of 1997 Russia-US summit in Helsinki, Russia accepted a policy of consolidating the political system while demanding "economic benefits" as compensation for its approval of NATO's eastward expansion.[257] Tomes states that this proved the fact that domestic economic problems and social unrest in Russia was of more importance than foreign military threats.[258] Besides the economic aid, Russia and the US also agreed on the ABM Treaty, START III and ban on chemical weapons as a result of Helsinki summit. These were "gestures of ongoing cooperation between the two nations, despite their disagreement on NATO", argues Felkay.[259]

Russian communists criticized this decision of Yeltsin to be the analogue of the Versailles treaty and "a treaty on complete capitulation"[260] and claimed that this step in some sense implied Russia's partial defeat to NATO expansion activity. The

[253] Yavlinsky in Kubicek, p. 9
[254] Kubicek, p. 9
[255] Lynch, p. 167
[256] Tomé, p. 27
[257] **Ibid**, p. 28
[258] **Ibid**
[259] Felkay, p. 166
[260] **Ibid**

aim of Russia was a special partnership with the alliance, "one that would allow them to influence and even veto key decisions such as expansion".[261] In fact, Russian authorities still did not recognize Russia's retreat in its contest against expansion of the Alliance.

The NATO enlargement resulted in important changes in Russia's military and security doctrines, as well as in Russia's acquiring antagonistic position towards the West. Russia's National Security Concept of 1997 stated that NATO's eastward expansion posed a threat to Russia and was seen unacceptable.[262] Such policy-makers as deputy minister of defence Andrei Kokoshin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov saw NATO expansion as "a move aimed against Russia as a civilization" and "a new division of the [European] continent".[263] On February 1997 Russian Foreign Minister Primakov also warned that "the planned expansion of NATO would seriously damage Russia's relations with the West" .[264]

2.1.1.2.3. Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo: Russia Becomes a Counterweighing Force

Bosnian crisis was important factor in the rise of Russian nationalism. In the early years of crisis Russia totally supported decisions of the United States, UN and European powers on dividing Yugoslavia. However, as the war escalated in 1992-1993 and NATO involved in operations, this policy gained strict criticism from Russian nationalists, who argued that Russia must support Orthodox Serbs, historical allies of Russians. Moreover, according to nationalists, Russian stance in this conflict could affect Moscow's policy of ethnic Russians in the CIS region.[265] According to Arbatov, NATO's actions during the Bosnian conflict showed that using force was still the major instrument in solving conflicts and that "the myth of the exclusively defensive nature of NATO was exploded" in the eyes of most Russians.[266]

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[261] Kubicek, p. 8
[262] Light, p. 50
[263] Kokoshin and Ivanov in Light, p. 50
[264] Felkay, p. 163
[265] *See* Kubicek
[266] Arbatov in Tomé, pp. 20-21

Russia strongly opposed NATO's air strikes against Serb positions in August 1995, warning that "if the air strikes continued Russia would have to reconsider its relationship with NATO".[267] Considering Bosnian crisis, Yeltsin declared that "NATO was overshadowing the UN Security Council in dealing with European security problems",[268] adding that Russia would participate in Bosnian conflict settlement only "under a clear-cut mandate of the UN Security Council".[269] Felkay has stated on this, that although Russia showed its acquiescence on cooperation with the West, it was uncompromising on the issues of NATO expansion and new peace-keeping role of the Alliance.[270] Russian authorities argued that international conflicts must be taken by the UN or CSCE, which it was a member of.

Nevertheless, afraid of being isolated from global affairs, Moscow decided to cooperate with the West in Bosnia and sent peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia. After 5 February 1994 mortar attack in Sarajevo, Yeltsin, giving a right to Western reaction, appealed to the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Sarajevo. This step calmed down the crisis and gave Yeltsin prestige both at home and all over the world. In summer 1993 Russia vetoed the US proposal to the UN for lifting the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia in respect of Bosnia and succeeded to become a member of the Contact Group of major powers under Security Council on Bosnia. By means of this membership Russia managed to balance pro-Serbian position with its functional relations with the United States, that is to pursue aims of both asserting great power influence in strategic regions and sustaining close ties with the United States and other Western states.[271] On the other hand, as Zimmerman mentioned, Russia's antagonistic position towards NATO expansion can be explained by desire to balance a threat from the West, but not by Russia's world power ambitions.[272]

In 1999 NATO operation in Kosovo sharpened Russian-NATO relations, as Russia together with China again opposed bombing of Serbian positions and refused to participate in Permanent Joint Council (PJC) – the platform in NATO enabling Russia with direct contact with the NATO officials. As Pushkov stated, NATO's

[267] Tomé, p. 20
[268] Felkay, p. 129
[269] Vanden in Felkay, p. 129
[270] Felkay, p.103
[271] Lynch, p. 168
[272] Zimmerman, p. 199

actions were "in clear breach of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, signed on May 28, 1997, in Paris."[273] Naturally, NATO's war against Serbia awaked the most uproarious and sustained Russian protest against the West since the disintegration of the USSR. Igor Ivanov often used such terms as 'aggression', 'barbaric', 'diktat', 'genocide' and 'Natocolonialism' when speaking of NATO actions in Kosovo, also making comparison with the destruction of Yugoslavia during the Second World War.[274]

As soon as NATO bombings began, Russia suspended its participation in the Founding Act, PfP, and joint Russia-NATO Council. Nevertheless, Russia did not refuse to participate as a mediator between NATO and Milosevic, sending Victor Chernomyrdin as a special envoy to Kosovo in June 1999. Moreover, the same month the General Staff of the Russian Federation sent 200 troops to Priština airport. Russia also decided to send Kosovo Forces (KFOR) to Kosovo in order to have a deal in peacekeeping operation. Moscow's aim was "to prevent NATO from unilaterally setting up a permanent military presence in the region", to determine Russia interest in the region and protect Serb population against Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).[275]

NATO's operation in Kosovo happened just weeks after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO. This was a traumatic event for Russian government, since NATO intervention had much broader sense for Russians than the future of Kosovo. According to Lynch, this was the question of how NATO states, led by the United States, without compliance to the UN Security Council and to the NATO Charter itself applied force in pursuing political interests, "perhaps extending to the border regions of Russia itself".[276] So, NATO's decision to held operation in Kosovo showed that Russian-NATO Council had a symbolic, not substantive,

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[273] Pushkov, p. 54
Note: NATO-Russia founding act was one of the key documents defining the security and strategic perceptions of the two parties. Section II of the act states: "The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern." Among other things, the act pledged that both NATO and Russia would refrain "from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act."
[274] Lynch, p. 174
[275] Tomé, p. 36
[276] **Ibid**

significance. Aftermath the Kosovo crisis, Russia decided to revise its military and security doctrines, thus in October 1999 the New Military Doctrine educed new threats deriving from international and local conflicts, and posing military aggression against Russia and its allies. As Tome argues, first since the end of the Cold War, Russia had a chance to imagine a projection of direct NATO involvement into its territory.[277]

2.1.2. Russian-EU Relations during Yeltsin

Russian-EU relations were shaped by the means of numerous factors in the 1990s: main developments which affected Russian-EU relations were NATO enlargement, wars in the Balkans and the new agenda of the European Union (EU). European integration gained totally new quality and speed after the end of the Cold War. As "iron curtains" no longer existed, there emerged new opportunities for Eastern and Western Europe to reunite. Eastern Europe was seen as a sort of abeyant, thus it attracted activities of international organizations such as NATO, EU and OSCE. Integration of Eastern European countries began with the Baltic States, and continued with the Balkans. European Community (EC) reconsidered its vision and mission in the region, renaming itself into the EU in 1993. What is more, Common European market was created in 1993 to control trade in Europe. EU had accepted candidate applications of thirteen states during period from 1987 to 1996: Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey and Southern Republic of Cyprus. In December 1997 the Luxembourg European Council launched EU enlargement process.

All these developments had produced deep debates among Russian policy-makers. For them, the alternatives of European integration for Russia raised following questions: to what extent Russia may hold herself a European state and to what extent her interests coincided with those of normal European states? The main question was "how Russia may build its sovereignty, society, and state as it proceeds on the road to political and economic modernization".[278] As far as Russian-EU relations during Yeltsin's administration were only at initial stage, no systematic

[277] **Ibid**, p. 37
[278] Hudson, p. 236

relationship and concrete policy vision existed at the moment. Thus, many Russian and European scholars proposed possible scenarios for future Russian-EU cooperation.

2.1.2.1. Fundamentals of the Russian-European Relations

According to Likhachev, cooperation between Russia and the EU must be guaranteed in four vectors. First two of these are obligations of each partner. For instance, Russia must held effective domestic reforms in order to answer the EU requirements, define its national interest considering European integration, and so forth. Secondly, EU, on its side, must draw the type of future expansion which would avoid divisions inside the organization, develop an effective system of joint foreign and security policy, solve expansion-related issues by democratic means, calculating EU interest towards Russia, and so forth. The third vector relates to Russia's and EU's bilateral relationship. And the fourth vector, according to Likhachev, is reflected in both "sides' effort to make a qualitative change in the external environment, in which Russia and the EU operate both on their own and as partners" .[279]

Mitropolsky and Smirnov believed that the most effective path to Russia's integration with Europe was to build a "platform of an economically and politically well-developed and integrated zone – 'some sort of a independent pole in the East of the continent'" which would cover Eastern European and Central Asian middle developed countries. The authors assure that such a perspective "would have nothing in common with the rebirth of the old imperial structures" .[280] Some Russian scholars promoted an idea of integration with the European Union without American domination.[281] They envisioned to exclude the United States from integrated Europe in future and promoted a "policy whereby Russia could retain its uniqueness and still interact with a Europe that has been de-Americanized".[282]

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[279] V. Likhachev, "Russia and the European Union", **International Affairs**, 2, 2000, pp. 60-61
[280] Mitropolsky and Smirnov in Hudson, p. 239
[281] *See* A.B. Mitropolsky and P.E. Smirnov, "Rossiya i Evropeiskaya Integratsiya" ("Russia and European Integration"), **Russian Science Fund**, 1993.
[282] Mitropolsky and Smirnov in Hudson, p. 238

Light and the others believed that EU enlargement signified that the "process began of separating Europe into 'insiders' and 'outsiders'".[283] The authors asserted that no matter how decisive EU and NATO authorities declared that they did not intend to divide Europe, their acts as including some members and offering partnership and actually excluding the other states, traced selective character of the West. Such scholars as Kissinger and Brzezinski were also pessimistic on Russian-EU cooperation, arguing that Russia was not a democratic country and was not likely to become so in future, because Russian and European civilizations were very different.[284] They believed that the US should assure EU states to held a policy of 'cautious cooperation' towards Russia, giving priority to relations with Russia's neighbours, Ukraine to be the key state regarding geopolitics and containing Russia's imperial ambitions.[285]

Webber in his book "Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?" examines Russian-EU relations through the prism of realism vs. liberal institutionalism.[286] Main argument is that Russia's European diplomacy has two faces: "growing anti-Western rhetoric and geostrategic assertiveness, on the one hand, and routinization of cooperation across an expanding range of political, economic, and security issues, on the other."[287] From the realism perspective, Russia has conflict-prone relationship with Europe, where cooperation is at the margins of relations. The second view, on the contrary, is pretty optimistic on cooperation between Russia and Europe and stresses historical and institutional ties of the two sides, despite Russia's nondemocratic past and Eurasian entity.

For Webber, the level of European integration, rules and institutions mitigate "the transaction costs of cooperation" and builds the base for common Russian and European interests.[288] Similarly, Bowler argues that it is the only realistic choice for Russian elites to choose constructive cooperation with Europe, as country is weak at

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[283] Light in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., **Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century,** Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 56
[284] Henry Kissinger, "Russia's Unformed Foreign Policy", **The Washington Post**, 7 December 2000; Zbigniew Brzezinski, **The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives**, New York: Basic Books, 1997.
[285] Vitaly Merkushev, "Relations between Russia and the EU: The view from across the Atlantic", **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, 6 (2), 2005, p. 363
[286] Mark Webber, ed., **Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?**, New York: St Martin's, 2000.
[287] Webber (Reviewed by Adam N. Stulberg in **American Political Science Review**, 95(3), September 2001)
[288] **Ibid**

home and abroad.[289] By and large, Webber concludes that Russia's commitment to Europe is ad hoc and cannot be explained by correlation between European institutional changes and domestic developments in Russia.[290] Indeed, Russia's stance towards Europe is still a topic of incomplete and most fascinating debates: new European logic of treating Russia in a way that allows preventing Russia from becoming disengaged and on the other hand not actually letting it in is puzzling Russian thinkers yet more.[291] Zagorskii argues that actually, Russia's position towards the EU is not determined by external environment, but rather it is formulated in Russian inner cycles. Hence, the key question Russian people must ask themselves is "not whether Russia will be able to remain a European nation, but whether it will want to".[292]

2.1.2.1.1. Russia-Europe Relations from Gorbachev to Yeltsin

After the end of the Cold War, Russia began its journey in international scene with a strong pro-Western (ipso facto pro-European) orientation. Gorbachev had prepared substantial base for improvement of Russian-European relations by his policy of Common European Home, Glasnost and 'mezhdunarodnik thinking'.[293] As Neumann observed, "Europe returned as a priority in the Soviet debate about the capitalist West" and in foreign policy agenda as well.[294] In notion of 'Common European Home' the main accent then was made on the CSCE/OSCE as an organization for security in Europe. Herewith, Gorbachev's notion of common Europe did not mean shared values, principles or economic rules; he rather referred to peaceful co-existence of various people living on the continent.[295] Later

[289] Bowler in Webber (Reviewed by Adam N. Stulberg in **American Political Science Review**, 95(3), September 2001)
[290] Webber
[291] Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?", **International Affairs**, 76 (3), July 2000, p. 446
See also Tuomas Forsberg, "The EU-Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, 9, 2004, p. 251 (Forsberg argued that the EU aimed at binding Russia with European values and norms without, however, offering any membership)
[292] Zagorskii in Hudson, pp. 236-237
[293] *See* Oded Eran, **Mezhdunarodniki: An Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy**, Ramat Gan: Turtledove, 1979.
[294] Neumann, p. 158
[295] R. Rose and N. Munro, "Do Russians See Their Future in Europe or the CIS?", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 60(1), January 2008, p.51

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would be blamed by many Russian analysts (not only traditionalist communists, but those not associated with particular ideology) for unnecessary and humiliating concessions given by Moscow to Europe and the West in general, such as retreatment of Soviet forces; these analysts claim that Russia's rapprochement with the West was poorly compensated and "could have been traded for significant compensations for Moscow, but instead were simply given away".[296]

Boris Yeltsin developed the project of integration with Europe further, moving Russia towards the liberal path. He pursued much closer relations with Western Europe and made big success in bringing the level of integration with Europe to the higher point than Gorbachev did. In the early 1990s Yeltsin and Kozyrev pursued every opportunity to set cooperative relations with Western states either bilaterally or by means of international organizations as EU, the G-7, the London and Paris Clubs, the IMF, World Trade Organization (WTO) and Council of Europe. The PCA agreement, signed between Russia and the EU in 1994 during the G7 summit in Corfu, drew the guide-line for Russia's European integration. It was clear that Russia will take its path on the way towards integration with Europe like other Eastern European states (as Poland), gradually inheriting norms and the rules of the EU. Meanwhile, Russia's main expectations from Europe were to gain economic aid and access to European markets, gain recognition of Russia's interests in the CIS and Central Europe, as well as regional cooperation on such security issues such as organized crime, smuggling and nuclear non-proliferation.

2.1.2.1.2. Yeltsin's "Our Europe"

As in Russian-US relations, the situation changed since the '1993 shift' in Russian foreign policy strategy towards the East. The urgency of joining the Euro-Atlantic system and necessity to bind itself by European norms and rules began to be questioned. War in Chechnya further soured Russia's relations with the EU and slowed process of Russia's membership in the Council of Europe. By the end of 1997, Yeltsin began to claim openly in European capitals that there was the need to

[296] Baranovsky, p. 448

reduce the US influence in "our Europe".[297] At summit meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1997 Yeltsin stressed the extent to which Russia regarded itself as a part of Europe (especially Germany and France) resisting to the US domination manifested in NATO enlargement, US refusal to Russia's most-favored-nation (MFN) status, US Congress's threats to cut financial aid, and Washington's position against Russia and France cooperating on development of gas fields in Iran.[298]

Baranovsky explains this decline in Russian-European relations by the fact that post-Cold war euphoria was over. Russia was different player in international arena than its predecessor: if it was sufficient for the Soviet Union simply to declare its 'Europeanness' to gain apprehension from Europe, then this was not the case for post-Soviet Russia, which was playing role of 'normal' member of international society, so was subject to more strict requirements such as human rights, democracy and market economy.[299]

In July 1997 Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin proposed that Russia could become a member of EU; this idea was greeted by Brussels with 'diplomatic pleasantness' but such a scenario was likely to be the area of interest of "none but the youngest Eurocrats".[300] Some US policy-makers, mostly democrats, also supported the idea that Russia's integration with and even possible membership in the European Union would suit the US interest considering European and Transatlantic security.[301] Bill Clinton and his advisors, on the other hand, insisted that Russia should be kept out of the EU, though there must be friendly relations between Russia and the EU, especially in trade and investments realms.[302]

Soon it became clear that Russia cannot become the part of European civilization: hence, even though the framework of development was the same in the minds of Russian liberals, in reality there were plenty of impediments, including Russian nationalist (Eurasian) opposition and traditional foreign policy stand relied on great power notion, which was contradicting collectivist (liberal institutionalist)

[297] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 219
[298] **Ibid**, p. 232
[299] Baranovsky, pp. 447-448
[300] Paul Flenley, "Russia and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship", **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, 6(3), 2005, p. 438
[301] Merkushev, p. 360
[302] **Ibid**, p. 362

approach of the EU.[303] Many Russian liberals opted for more Eurasian course, as well as state authorities who promoted the idea that "the relationship with Europe should not be allowed to marginalise relations with other parts of the world".[304]

Flenley argues that Russian-EU relations were low staged during the 1990s, because Russian policy-makers saw the EU rather as economic agency and tended to handle international relations in the level of individual states.[305] Many Russian observers also admitted that Moscow tended to see the EU on a par with other international organizations as the Council of Europe, NATO and the UN, in which individual states played a deciding role.[306] Russian position towards Europe was best characterized by Likhachev's words: "our political interaction is dominated by considerations of pragmatism, mutual benefit and the sides' aspiration to honor their obligations arising from international treaties".[307]

On the other hand, the EU itself was too busy with internal transformations to set relationship with Russia on a systematic basis. EU treated post-Soviet states with caution at that period, reluctant to import regional conflicts to its own borders. Hence, in 1993 Copenhagen summit EU made it clear that membership for former Soviet states is 'out of question'.[308] At that time Europe called CIS states, namely Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 'the outsiders' which constituted "a borderland between full members of the European family and the rest of the Eurasian landmass".[309] In fact, during the 1990s the EU was mostly preoccupied with security in the Balkans and integration with Eastern Europe, as well as internal EU developments, thus paying less attention to the integration with the CIS states.

Russian-EU relations are institutionalized in two pillars. The first pillar is the European Community, institutionalized in Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) for controlling economic, political and trade relations. The second pillar is Common Foreign and Security Policy to deal with foreign affairs and security between Russia and the EU. However, considering the second pillar, Russia is more

[303] Timofei Bordachev, "Russia's European Problem: Eastward Enlargement of the EU and Moscow's Policy, 1993-2003", in Oksana Antonenko and Kathryn Pinnick, eds., **Russia and the European Union: Prospects for a New Relationship**, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 41
[304] Neumann, p. 183
[305] Flenley, p. 436
[306] Bordachev in Antonenko and Pinnick, p. 40
[307] Likhachev, pp. 116-126
[308] White, p. 181
[309] **Ibid**

limited here, as it is involved in the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) only in consultative role.[310] From the EU's perspective, Europe's interests in Russia are characterized in four components: consolidation of democracy, rule of law and public institutions; integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space; security; and common challenges such as environment, organized crime, nuclear security, and environmental hazards.[311] Although Russian-European relations are very complicated and multidimensional, in the course of this study, the most outstanding aspects of the bilateral relations; i.e., the issues of security and democratization, is to be brought to the fore.

2.1.2.2. Security Dimension of Russian-EU Relations

With the end of bipolar division in Europe, Russia had lost most of its territories in Europe. Consequently, the security status and military might of Russia deteriorated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which meant loss of sea access and availability to critical resources and redeployment of armed forces 1000 miles westward from Central Europe. Hence, Europeans no longer perceived Russia as a military threat: in a survey of top EU decision-makers made in 1996 Russia's military might was considered the least important threat, whereas US economic power and emergence of China as a world power were most alarming concerns.[312]

Relations between the European Union and Russia developed in the 1990s in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since 1999 the EU launched its own security and defence policy (ESDP). Russia did not figure in this policy as a threat, but neither was it mentioned as a valuable security cooperation partner.[313] The main point of reference for Europeans when drawing ESDP strategy was the USA, not Russia's military experiences or technology; hence the main focus

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[310] Jessica Leigh Riester, "Russian Public Opinion and its Role in the Security Policy between Russia, the European Union, and NATO", A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006, p. 6

[311] **Official Journal of the European Commission**, Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia, available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:157:0001:0009:EN:PDF

[312] Jacqueline Spence**, The European Union: "A View from the Top": Top Decision-Makers and the European Union**, EOS Gallup, Brussels, 1996, available online at europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/top/top.pdf

[313] Forsberg, p. 247

in Russian-EU security relations was made on "practical crisis-management cooperation".[314] On the other hand, the EU's "Common Strategy" addressed to individual countries emphasized role of Russia in European security by the following objective of the strategy: "maintaining European stability, promoting global security and responding to the common challenges of the continent through intensified co-operation with Russia".[315] Russia's response to the EU Common Strategy was its Medium-term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union that was adopted in October 1999. This 'raw' document, as Gowan stated, showed how the conflict in Kosovo had affected Russian perception of the EU.[316]

Level of security cooperation between Russia and the EU was low in the 1990s. One of the reasons was the fact that both Russian and European policy-makers emphasized the primacy of the USA in security realm. Most Europeans saw the ESDP as an opportunity to add power to the transatlantic security. Another reason was the lack of knowledge among Russians about basic aims and structure of the EU. Indeed, Russians usually have focused on traditional power and nation-states system in international politics, relying more on European capitals in dealing with security issues (as Kosovo, Iraq, etc.) than on the EU.[317]

One of main developments in security realm was ratification by then Soviet Union of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in 1990. However, the CFE Treaty, signed in 1990 by the former Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact states and NATO members, sometimes served as a reason to discontent on issues of compliance, especially regarding Russian troops and military equipment in Georgia, Moldova and North Caucasus region. Russia was also an 'enthusiastic participant'[318] in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (later OSCE), an organization including 53 member states from North America to Central Asia. Russia expected

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[314] **Ibid**, p. 251

[315] David Gowan, "How the EU can help Russia", **Centre for European Reform**, London, 2000, p. 10, available online at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p203_russia.pdf

[316] **Ibid**, p. 11

The Strategy gave a message that Russia did not want to be an 'object' or a 'petitioner' on the EU strategy; also that Russia was a 'world power' and had no interest in accession to the EU. In the Mid-term strategy Russia also attempted to drive a wedge between Europe and the USA by giving emphasis to the OSCE as "a key basis of European security" in order to "counterbalance NATO-centrism in Europe".

[317] Forsberg, pp. 256-259

[318] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 218

that new security framework in Europe would be realized through the OSCE as an all-European institution able to deal with tasks of conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

For Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, OSCE was the vehicle to achieve security in European space, while "placing the North Atlantic Alliance at the centre of the collective security system in Europe is, in essence, counter-productive".[319] Smith noticed that in conflict resolution Russian policy-makers preferred to trust international institutions or organizations where Russian Federation had a 'prominent status' (such as OSCE and UN), rather than trust 'foreign' institutions such as NATO.[320] Similarly, Macfarlane stated that for Russia, task-sharing with European and international organizations in resolving regional conflicts, was "a means of reasserting control while benefiting from the legitimising effects of involvement of international organizations".[321]

The West estimated this move of Russia as a new strategy to "gain influence over NATO and other Western organizations".[322] The CSCE rejected Russia's proposal, but agreed to change its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in order to underline the permanent status of the organization. Western states were reluctant to accept OSCE as an alternative to NATO, claiming that it was not a defensive alliance but only a supplementary organization to deal with issues where NATO was not able to enter.[323] When Russia realized that primary role in European security continued to be played by NATO, Russian policy-makers began to express their position on the issue more assertively. Russian Prime Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in 1994:

> The creation of a unified, non-bloc Europe can best be pursued by upgrading the CSCE into a broader and more universal organization. After all, it was the democratic principles of the 53-member CSCE that won the cold war – not the NATO military machine.[324]

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[319] Ivanov in Light, p. 55
[320] M. A. Smith, (2006), p. 11
[321] "Vozroditsya li Soyuz? Tezisy Soveta po Vneshney i Oboronnoy Politike' (Will the Union be Reborn? Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy), **Nezavisimaya Gazeta**, 23 May 1996, in S.N. Macfarlane, "On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars", **Third World Quarterly**, 18(3),1997, p. 523
[322] *See* http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11501.html
[323] Felkay, pp. 112-113
[324] Mary M. McKenzie and Peter H. Loedel, eds., **The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests, and Institutions**, Westport: Praeger, 1998, p. 128

During 1994 OSCE Summit in Budapest Yeltsin warned that Europe was in danger to be plunged into "cold peace", pointing to NATO's expansion plans.[325] Yeltsin also demanded the OSCE to grant 'special security responsibilities' for Russia in the former Soviet space in order to get leverage over Russian minority issues.[326]

It is also worth noting that EU and NATO had been differently perceived by Russians in the 1990s: Riester noticed that Russian public perceived the EU as a "friendly economic entity, whereas NATO [was] perceived as a threatening military entity".[327] Herewith Russia ignored the fact that 11 of 15 EU states were at the same time NATO members and kept solidarity to transatlantic security and policy system: so, almost all NATO actions (evaluated as not legitimate by Russian authorities) were seen by Russians as performed by the United States, as if Europe did not participated in military operations in Yugoslavia.[328] As Kolosov explained this, Russians made distinction between 'good' Western Europe on the one hand and United States, which 'was not always good', on the other.[329]

Similarly, in the 1990s Russia was less concerned with EU enlargement, considering it a "harmless surrogate for the Central European and Baltic States";[330] while expansion of NATO posed more serious threat to Moscow at that time.[331] Entry of Central and East European (CEE) states into NATO in the early 1990s was considered by the Russian Foreign Ministry as "unambiguously negative and therefore categorically opposed by Russia", while their entry into the EU was seen as "almost a benefit, another brick in the foundation of the "common European process".[332]

Nevertheless, the West preferred to rely on NATO in dealing with security issues, accounting this for inefficiency of OSCE in reacting to instabilities resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Indeed, a number of scholars argue that Europe

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[325] **Ibid**
[326] P. Baev and P. Kolsto, "Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Union", **Conflicts in the OSCE Area**, Oslo: IPRI, 1997, p. 90, available online at www.PRIO.no
[327] Riester
[328] Baranovsky, p. 455
[329] Kolosov in Rose and Munro, p. 53
[330] Gowan, p.1
[331] Dmitri Trenin, "Russia, the EU and the Common Neighbourhood", **Centre for European Reform**, September 2005, p. 1, available online at www.cer.org.uk; Baranovsky, p. 453
[332] Gowan, p. 15

and the US preferred relying on NATO in security issues rather than on Russia and other third party states.[333] While the US government rejected any propositions of Moscow considering restructuring of the OSCE, Russia factually demonstrated its commitment to the OSCE norms by permitting peacekeeping missions by this organization to CIS states and Russia itself. So, Russia supported CSCE decisions on conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh.

At the 1992 CSCE Helsinki summit Yeltsin supported CSCE peacekeeping initiations and creation of post of High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Kozyrev stated that this post bore a serious diplomatic role in the cases of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia.[334] Russia also agreed to accept OSCE Assistance Group into Chechnya in 1995, when situation in the secessionist region deteriorated, and Yeltsin got a lot of critique from the world press relating violation of human rights. Smith suggests that Russia accepted OSCE engagement in its internal conflict so easy, because, first, being against NATO enlargement, Russia nonetheless sought to have a seat in the table of European security making in face of OSCE, of which Russia is a prominent member since Soviet period. Secondly, Russian leaders saw the Chechen problem as a quid pro quo for future scenarios considering issue of Russian-speaking minorities in the CIS and the Baltic States.[335] Nevertheless, there were some bitter points in the Chechen issue. At OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 19, 1999, when European states called for political settlement in Chechnya, Russian authorities on their part criticized OSCE for turning "from an organization that expressed Europe's collective will, to an organization that serves as a Western tool for 'forced democratization' ".[336]

When dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia and OSCE tried to settle the issue each by their own means. In June 1993 OSCE organized peace conference on the issue called "Minsk Group", pursuing opportunity to prove itself "as an effective regional conflict prevention/settlement organization".[337] If OSCE desired to lift its status from monitoring to peacekeeping with arms and means to

[333] Kuzmicheva in Riester, p. 8
[334] M. A. Smith (2006), p. 11
[335] **Ibid**, p. 15
[336] I. Ivanov, **The New Russian Diplomacy**, Washington, DC: Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2002, pp. 97-98.
[337] M. Mooradian and D. Druckman, "Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95", **Journal of Peace Research**, 36(6), 1999, p. 710

control, then Moscow wanted Russian and CIS force to be the only army deployed in the region. Unlike Europe, Russia managed to achieve real results in Karabakh and brokered a new cease-fire in May 12, 1994 which lasted five years instead of foreseen three months.[338] Uhlig believes that the main winner of this conflict was the Kremlin, since it reasserted its influence in the region by extending military support to Azerbaijan and pushing it to join the CIS.[339]

In Transnistrian issue there was also a contradiction: OSCE called for respect of territorial integrity of Moldova and withdrawal of Russian troops.[340] Having failed to undertake serious actions to the resolution of the conflict in early stage, it opened a 'long-term Mission to Moldova'[341] in April 1993. OSCE also engaged in Dayton-like conferences as in Meshcherino, workshops and regional conferences held in Moldova, Russia and Europe during 1994-1999 and sent OSCE missions to Kiev (1996), Tiraspol (1999), Kiev and Budapest in 2000. Russia in its turn acted operatively and sent the 14th Army to secure the status of Transnistria which is still frozen until nowadays. During Istanbul Summit of 1999 Russia promised OSCE to withdraw armed forces from Transnistria.

In some cases European society in face of EU (OSCE) preferred to entrust the burden of conflict resolution in the former Soviet space on Russia. Russia actually managed to build a dialogue between conflicting parties and to hold a peacekeeping mission in Georgia, Moldova or Tajikistan. However, some western critics warned that it was risky to rely much on regional organizations, as this may "further the hegemonic aspirations of dominant powers within that organization".[342] Considering Russia's actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States evaluated it as "a rogue operation and a serious impediment to a multilateral solution".[343] Eventually Russia failed to get acceptance of its initiatives considering security in Europe and the CIS region.

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[338] D. D. Laitin and R. G. Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh", **Middle East Policy**, VII(1), October 1999, p. 161
[339] Mark A. Uhlig, "The Karabakh War", **World Policy Journal**, 10(4), Winter 1993-1994, p. 52
Also see: Laitin and Suny, p.162
[340] *See* C. Neukirch, "Transdniestria and Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr", **Helsinki Monitor**, 2, 2001, pp. 126-127
[341] **Ibid**, p. 126
[342] Macfarlane, p. 521
[343] Laitin and Suny, p. 160

2.1.2.3. Russian-EU Relations and Democracy

EU's strategy towards Russia relies first of all on promotion and acceptance by Russia of common European values as democracy, human rights and rule of law. Yet, during the whole decade after the end of the Cold War, the EU did not recognize that Russia fully committed to these values, evaluating the normative and cultural gap between Russia and the EU as too wide.

Russia's admission to the Council of Europe, "an organization of democratic nations focusing on social and political issues",[344] was a long process. Russian officials were discontented with the list of obstacles put by the Council of Europe on the way to the membership, stressing easy and considerably fast admission of Baltic states. The Council was underlining continuing presence of Russian troops in the Baltic states, absence of free parliamentary elections and democratic constitution. On the other hand, Kozyrev protested admission of Estonia to the Council of European action despite Moscow's strong complaints over Estonia's treatment to Russian minorities. Hence, Kozyrev cancelled his attendance at the council meeting in 1993.

By 1994, virtually having completed all conditions, having held elections and adopting a new constitution, Moscow faced new requirement in face of human rights legislation. The Council froze Russia's application after Russia military's invasion in Chechnya. Only in January 1996 Council's parliamentary voted for Russia's admission despite reports from its commission on Russia's flaws in legal system and human rights. Again, it put conditions to Russia such as: to sign the European Convention on Human Rights which would give Russian citizens legal standing before European human rights court; to complete adaptation of Russian legislative to European standards; abolishing death penalty; constrain the power of the Federal Security Service and even to cease calling its neighbors as the "near abroad".[345]

The Council of Europe granted full membership to Russia in January 1996. According to European authorities, including Russia into the Council of Europe

[344] Donaldson and Nogee, p. 225
[345] **Ibid**, p. 226
Note: The term "Near Abroad" (*blizhneye zarubezhye*) has been used by Russians to refer former Soviet countries, including the CIS and the Baltic States. It is worth noting that Russians use the term "near abroad" quite widely both in usual life and in official statements and media, while Western commentators use this term only within quotation marks, because as they deem, Russia employs this term to show its imperial ambitions.

would develop democracy in Russia in more effective way than the isolation of Russia.[346] Webber also stated that Russia's membership in the Council of Europe and costs of exclusion in some extent guaranteed Russia's commitments to European democratic norms.[347] On the other hand, some authors proposed that failure to satisfy the Council's strict conditions regarding human rights and democracy might leave Russia under criticism and harmed its international image: strict condemnation of Russia's actions in Chechnya by the Council of Europe pushed some Russian analysts to propose for withdrawal from the Council.[348]

The EU's "Common Strategy" drawn in 1999 signaled a sense of frustration on the part of the EU with the state of relationship with Russia. One of the main goals of the strategy was "a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy benefiting alike the people of Russia and of the European Union".[349] The EU was about to return Russia to the "European family", however at the same time presenting a confusing list of requirements Russia must overcome for the full transition in a condescending tone expressed in following words:

> The Union and its member-states offer to share with Russia their various experiences in building modern political, economic, social and administrative structures, fully recognizing that the main responsibility for Russia's future lies with Russia itself.[350]

Lynch noted that by this new Common Strategy the EU recognized that Russia would not become a candidate for membership, yet it expressed "heavily conditional and interventionist" approach which it as usual had been developing for the accession countries.[351] By introducing the Common Strategy towards Russia, the EU aimed at changing domestic situation in Russia, emphasizing democracy and human rights. On the other hand, Moscow called for cooperation with the EU "on

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[346] Curtis, p. 23
[347] Mark Webber, ed., **Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?**, New York: St Martin's, 2000 (Reviewed by Adam N. Stulberg in **American Political Science Review**, 95(3, September 2001)
[348] Baranovsky, p. 453
[349] Gowan, p.10
[350] **Ibid**
[351] Dov Lynch, "From 'Frontier' Politics to 'Border' Policies Between the EU and Russia", in Antonenko and Pinnick, p. 16

equal terms in a broader international context".[352] Russia had different view on human rights: it emphasized the international law on state sovereignty rather than human rights that, according to Russians, undermined state sovereignty.[353]

So, this division between the EU and Russia on the level of values was predominant obstacle in Russian-EU integration during Yeltsin's administration. Many scholars turned to Samuel Huntington's theory of a clash of civilizations in attempts to understand this value-divergence, which might lay in Russian vs. European cultural traditions, as well as a civilizational division due to different "geopolitical imperatives".[354] As Pushkov stated, Russia, as a Eurasian power, had "distinct strategic and economic interests, which [did] not always coincide with those of the US or the EU".[355]

To conclude on the second chapter, there can be stressed several points: Yeltsin's foreign policy towards the West in general was oriented to the integration and cooperation due to the fact that Russia needed Western help to hold economic and democratic reforms during the transition period after the Perestroika, as well as due to the need to sustain common security in the new world order. Although after the 1993 parliamentary crisis Russian nationalists highly affected Yeltsin's foreign policy-making, this did not lead to total isolation from the West: Yeltsin's Russia was still pro-Western in its core, yet starting to draw its own, independent policy in the CIS region and in the Eastern part of the world.

[352] Bordachev in Antonenko and Pinnick, p. 42
[353] Forsberg, p. 262
[354] Clelia Rontoyanni , "So Far, so Good? Russia and the ESDP", **International Affairs** (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 78(4), October 2002, p. 828
[355] Pushkov in Rontoyanni, p. 828

CHAPTER III

EASTERN DIMENSION OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE YELTSIN ADMINISTRATION

The following chapter will reveal Eastern dimension of Russia's foreign policy during Yeltsin's presidency, namely in Asian and Middle Eastern regions. The Asian vector of Russian policy includes constructive relations with China, Japan, North and South Koreas and India. It is important to investigate whether Russia pursued great power interests or multilateral policies when projecting its foreign policy in Asia. The role of Japan and China as great power players in the region is significant here, as well as the role of the United States in the perspective of balancing. Analysis of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East will include security issues, the Arab-Israeli peace process and the factor of religious radicalism in the region's political affairs. Besides Russia's relations with particular countries, I shall also take into consideration such important regional organizations as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

3.1. Eastern Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy during Yeltsin

Feeling disappointment according Russia's expectations from the West, a number of Russian politicians proposed to generate new, 'eastern options'[356] for Russian foreign policy in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. This proposal was probably associated with recent shift in the global scene towards the Eastern hemisphere. Together with positive developments in economic, political and military arenas in the East, such as Russia's growing trade and military relations with China, India, and other Asian and Middle Eastern states; there appeared also negative trends, such as religious and ethnic radicalism in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, which evidently affected Russian policy perceptions in the East as well as its domestic affairs.

[356] Dmitri Trenin, "Russian-Chinese Relations: A Study in Contemporary Geopolitics", **OEBH,** available online at http://www.oebh.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb00_46.pdf

Yeltsin and his team had to deal with all these developments, for a moment turning away from the US and looking eastward. Russian leaders realized the decline in Russia's influence in the East after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and had to take measures. Hence, since 1994 Russia turned to new foreign policy options such as alliances and partnership with Eastern states, from India, Iran and Iraq, to China, Korea, and close cooperation with the CIS states. 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of Russia "called for enhanced ties with Asian Pacific countries to balance relations with the West".[357] According to Kuhrt, this new concept aimed at "establishing Russia's 'Eurasian status' and exerting a direct influence on the situation in the CIS by virtue of their geopolitical position".[358] Kolosov suggested that this new development in Russian foreign policy was "seen as a 'third way', making it possible to avoid the extremes of the Westernism and isolationism as a part of the nationalistic doctrines".[359]

Development of Russian foreign policy towards the East in the post-Cold War period has its roots in ideology of Eurasianism. Eurasianism was employed by authorities to assert Russia's role as a Great Power in East and South Asia, as well as to ensure guarantee of Russian dominance in the CIS area. According to Rangsimaporn, Russia's foreign policy in East Asia is based on three main interpretations of Eurasianism, such as: 'Pragmatic Eurasianism', 'Neo-Eurasianism', and 'Intercivilisational Eurasianism'.[360] Pragmatic Eurasianism promotes Russia's right to play dominating role in East Asia due to Russia's geographical location in the Far Eastern landmass.[361] Smith asserts that "Moscow has long seen its presence in Asia as synonymous with its status as a world power".[362] Thus, Asian vector is important for Russian foreign policy in rather material sense, than cultural.

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[357] Curtis, p. 4
[358] Natasha Kuhrt, **Russian Policy towards China and Japan: The El'tsin and Putin periods**, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 2
[359] V.A. Kolosov (ed.), **Geopoliticheskoe polozhenie Rossii: predstavlenija I real'nost' (The geopolitics of Russia: ideas and reality)**, Moscow: Art-Courier, 2000 (in Russian), reviewed by O. van der Wusten-Gritsai, in **GeoJournal,** 53, 2001, pp. 199-210
[360] Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia's Role in East Asia", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 58(3), May 2006, pp. 371-389
[361] **Ibid**, p. 372
[362] G. Smith (1999), p. 491

During Yeltsin's period, many academicians and politicians promoted idea of Eurasianism in Russia's foreign policy agenda. Besides scholars as Dugin and Prokhanov, core politicians such as LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Communist Party's leader Gennady Zyuganov, and Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov developed Eastern vector of Russian foreign policy in their proceedings. Russia's Right and Far Right political parties promoted notion that Russia needs to interfere more into the East and South. Such Eurasianist thinkers as Dugin and Prokhanov advocated Moscow's intervention to Afghanistan in the 1990s, as well as need to promote Russia's interests in Central Asia, Transcaucasus and the Middle East. NATO's eastward expansion was also a pivotal factor in Russia's turn to the East: as Defence Minister Grachev claimed in 1997: "if NATO goes East, we will go East too".[363]

Leader of the LDPR Vladimir Zhirinovsky, being impressed by Eurasianist idea, emphasized Russia's interests to move towards Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf in his famous words: "I dream of Russian soldiers washing their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean".[364] Russian Communist leader Zyuganov, on the other hand, suggested that Russia must form a coalition with Islamic East and East Asia (China in particular) in order to challenge the "hegemony of the western civilization".[365] Both of them were supposed to represent Neo-Eurasianism stream in Russian foreign policy, based on geopolitics, instrumentalism and "dichotomous worldview of a Eurasian Russia against the West".[366] Rangsimaporn argues that Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov's Neo-Eurasianism was far from original Eurasianism of 1920 in its ideas, since contemporary leaders did not emphasize enough the influence of Eastern culture and civilization on Russia as original Eurasianism did; on the contrary, they antagonized the West, thereby isolating East and West from each other, instead of connecting them.[367]

Despite his wide-known pro-Western orientation, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev gave great place to Eurasianist policies in his speeches and deeds. In his

[363] Grachev in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 377
[364] Vladimir Zhirinovsky, **Posledniy Brosok na Yug (The Last Throw to the South),** Moscow: TOO "Pisatel'", 1993, p. 66
[365] Zyuganov in Koulieri, p. 29
[366] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 380
[367] **Ibid**

draft of the Foreign Policy Concept Kozyrev stressed the importance of improving relations with countries of Asia-Pacific, Southern and Western Asia "for establishing our Eurasian status and in terms of achieving a balance in relations with the West and for diversifying foreign economic activity, and also as countries that, due to their geopolitical position, have a direct influence on the situation in the CIS".[368] Eurasianism in the retrospect of Kozyrev's policy was not openly anti-Western; rather it was used as an alternative in dealing both with Europe and Asia, according to the symbolic double-headed eagle – the emblem of the Russian Federation.[369] Such a double-sided policy emphasized close relations first of all with China (also accompanied by restoration of ties with Cuba) in order to "correct the asymmetry in relations with the US and the West."[370]

Russian Prime Minister and later Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov was one of supporters of Pragmatic Eurasianism as an instrument for balanced foreign policy, using the East as a counterbalance towards the West. Primakov emphasized need to strengthen Russia's relations with China, Japan and ASEAN states. Representing nationalist (anti-Western) policy circles, he was nevertheless pragmatic enough to accept importance of cooperation with the West.[371] In 1998 Primakov suggested an idea of a "strategic triangle" of Moscow-Beijing-Delhi in order to strengthen the Eastern powers to challenge the dominance of the United States.[372] This was the first Eastern alliance aimed at counterbalancing the US and the West. However, at time of its implementation, this idea was not met enthusiastically by China and India.[373] Trenin noticed that never before in New Russia's history "had a senior Russian leader been so explicit about the idea of counterbalancing the global domination of the West, led by the United States, by means of a Eurasian alliance".[374]

Besides Eurasianists, some Russian geopoliticians also emphasized Russia's turn towards the East, China and Islamic world. Vasilyev believed that Russia could

[368] Kozyrev in Kuhrt, p. 11
[369] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 375
[370] Surovell (2005), p. 233
[371] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 376
[372] *See* H. V. Pant, "The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi 'Strategic Triangle': An Idea Whose Time May Never Come", **Security Dialogue**, 35(3), 2004, pp. 311-328
[373] **Ibid**, p. 312
[374] Trenin (Russian-Chinese Relations)

not identify with the West without detriment to the relations with Islamic World, since too close association with the West might induce rise of anti-Russian Islamic extremism or Turkic nationalism.[375] Similarly, Sergei Goncharov of the Far Eastern Institute argued that "from a purely geopolitical perspective", Russian diplomacy should focus on Islamic World and China and not ignore these neighbours when pursuing its relations with the West. Goncharov believed that Russian-Western alliance of the kind Kozyrev promoted could "result in a countervailing Islamic alliance that may even involve China".[376] Myasnikov also stressed that Russia was "too removed from the West to be a part of it", and its 'geostrategic position' required attention on relations with China, which was main partner of Russia, he believed, since Russia's relations with the Islamic World would be affected by fundamentalism.[377]

On the other hand, many Western commentators were concerned with Russia's turn to the East. Brzezinski, for instance, noted that Russia sought for becoming Eurasian superpower and stressed the danger for the West of potential "Russian-Chinese convergence".[378] There was concern among western observers that rise of Eurasianism in Russian foreign policy brought in "new form of the old 'Eastern Question'", or the competition between Russia and Western states for influence in the Black Sea region.[379] Although a number of scholars supposed that new assertiveness of Russian foreign policy in the East was a sort of tactic or an instrument to counterbalance the Western influence (namely NATO expansion), nevertheless, Russia's Eastern policy had a "value in itself" and was a 'genuine strategy'.[380]

3.1.1. Fundamentals of the Russian Foreign Policy in Asia during Yeltsin

Despite periodical changes in calculations, Russia's policy towards Asia showed significant continuity under Gorbachev's, Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations, based on such factors as: the extent of the US and European

[375] Aleksei Vasilyev, "Rossiya i Musul'manskiy Mir: Partnery ili Protivniki," (Russia and the Islamic World: Partners or Rivals), **Izvestiya**, 10 March 1992.
[376] Goncharov in Buszynski, p. 7
[377] Myasnikov in Buszynski, p. 7
[378] Brzezinski in Koulieri, p. 29
[379] Koulieri, p. 29
[380] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 377

involvement in Asia; development of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and its implication on other Asian states' security position; reaction of Asian states to "distant appendage" of the Russian Far East; and, lastly, the level of opportunity for Russia to engage in great power relations dynamics of the Northeast Asia.[381]

If in the early 1990s Russia focused on restoring its relations with China, then since the mid 1990s Yeltsin's diplomatic efforts resulted in Russia's gaining respect in the 'Asian club', and since then Russia began to diversify it contacts with Asian states. Such a new balanced policy owed to growing power of domestic business circles aspiring Yeltsin's administration to take more active steps in economic cooperation, trade and investment.[382]

Since the 1993 turn in Russian diplomacy towards the East, Asia-Pacific region took the major place in the minds of Russian policy-makers, especially in security concerns. The fact that Russia bordered the Pacific Ocean and China and had territorial disputes with Japan was a good reason that Russia had legitimate interest in the Asian security. China dropped from the list of potential threats, while Korean peninsula represented the most serious threat in Asia. Russia's 1993 Foreign Policy Doctrine stated that Russia must gain solid positions in Asia Pacific, in this way achieving influence in global political and economic processes. It also emphasized the need for independent role in regional politics and for military potential as an instrument of foreign policy and stability in the region.

Rozman and others evaluated Yeltsin's policy in Asia as low marked, arguing that in his early administration Yeltsin "brought Russian indifference to Asia to its extreme", allowing ideology to overwhelm realism. Even if he tried to rebuild relations in various directions during his second term, these attempts lacked coordination and long-term strategy, or were not pursued vigorously.[383] Yeltsin's political agenda revived during his 1996 election campaign, when he appointed more 'Eastern-leaning'[384] Primakov as a foreign minister. In November 1996 Primakov visited various Asian capitals in an attempt to improve relations and establish an

[381] Gilbert Rozman et al, eds., **Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.2
[382] James Clay Moltz, "Russia in Asia in 1997: Moving beyond the "Strategic Partnership", **Asian Survey**, 38(1), A Survey of Asia in 1997: Part I (January 1998), p. 91
[383] Rozman, pp. 4, 9
[384] James Clay Moltz, "Russia in Asia in 1996: Renewed Engagement", **Asian Survey**, 37(1), A Survey of Asia in 1996: Part I (January 1997), p. 89

image of strong leadership in the outside world. Primakov and Deputy Foreign Minister for East Asia Grigoriy Karasin turned from one summit to another in Asia ushering in active policy of shuttle diplomacy.[385] National security concept of the Russian Federation in 1997 was pessimistic on Russia's future position in international stage, referring to the fact that Russia's international influence had diminished and that Russia stood apart from the integration processes in Asia-Pacific region.[386] Light states that this was unacceptable, since Russia was supposed to be a Eurasian power and had strategic position on the whole Eurasian continent.

During his administration Yeltsin supported security arrangements of international character in Asian region, including participation in peacekeeping operations. Thus, in order to limit growing military budgets of Asian states, Russia proposed to "toughen nuclear proliferation and missile technology transfers regimes",[387] on the other hand cutting its own military equipment and troops in the Far East. While reducing military presence in Asia, Russia also annulled old Soviet security alliance with North Korea, Vietnam and India, giving place to new friendship and cooperation agreements which did not place any security obligations on Russia.[388] Most Russian foreign policy actors, Defense Minister Rodionov and his successor Sergeev, Foreign Minister Primakov and other officials advocated the idea that security issues in Northeast and East Asia should be based on the Concert of Powers approach, where such powers as Russia, China, Japan and the United States should cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally on major security concerns in the region.[389]

In 1992 Russia gained a status of dialogue partner of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) together with the EU, the US, Canada and other states. Russia was also included as a member to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1994. At the 25th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting Kozyrev proposed security

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[385] Moltz (Russia in Asia in 1997), p. 91
Shuttle diplomacy: discussions between two or more countries, in which someone travels between the different countries, talking to the governments involved, carrying messages and suggesting ways of dealing with problems (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary)
[386] Light, pp. 50-51
[387] Bazhanov and Bazhanov, p. 88
[388] Frank Umbach, "The Wounded Bear and the Rising Dragon. The Sino-Russian Relationship at the Beginning of the 21st Century: A View From Europe", **Asia Europe Journal**, 2(1), January, 2004, p. 44
[389] Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 231

cooperation with ASEAN states, some items to be confidence building measures (CBMs) and measures to limit naval exercises within designated "zones of peace".[390] ASEAN states allowed Russia's access to Asia-Pacific security area, because they were seeking for Moscow's affirmation of the post-Cold War security equilibrium. However, Russia was not able at that moment to play the role of major actor in support of regional security, thus it limited itself to promoting the policy of security multilateralism in the region, trying to minimize impact of the US. Moscow tried to attract ASEAN states by its raw materials, military industrial technology and "cheap yet qualified" labour force; flow of Russian capital to ASEAN banks increased, however no large-scale economic commitments were made.[391] Russia also participated in North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), as well as non-governmental forums such as the Trilateral Forum on North-Pacific Security Problems.[392]

Asian region had also economic weight in the minds of Russian policy-makers, who stressed the importance of Asia-Pacific investments, technology and capital for development of Russian East and Siberia. In this framework Russia participated in such regional organizations as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and APEC. APEC was founded in 1989 by the initiative of Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia, and included 12 Asia-Pacific states (6 developing states of South-Eastern Asia and 6 developed states of Pacific), including Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong and the United States. Since 1998 APEC began to cooperate with non-APEC members and the WTO. Russia applied for APEC membership in March 1995 and joined APEC in 1998, together with Peru and Vietnam. In November 1998 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated formation of "APEC Business Club" in order to gather representatives of Russian business circles oriented towards trade in Asia-Pacific region. This club entails more than 50 Russian companies and banks.[393] By enmeshing regional powers and the US in the rules and norms of such organizations

[390] Buszynski, p. 170
[391] Bazhanov and Bazhanov, p. 97
[392] *See* Akiko Fukushima, "Japan's Emerging View of Security Multilateralism in Asia", UC Berkeley, Policy Papers, **Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation**, 6 January 1999, pp. 23-41 available online at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8cj4p21s
[393] *See* The official website of APEC in Russia http://apec2012.ru/content/?a=325&s=168&p=1

as ASEAN or APEC, Russia tried to constrain these powers with the notion of multilateralism.[394] Yet some scholars argue that Russia tried to catch the place in Asia-Pacific regional organizations in order to become a legitimate player in regional affairs and strengthen its great power status, while Russia's belief in efficiency of multilateralism was secondary.[395]

According to Natasha Kuhrt, Russian perspective in Asia during Yeltsin's period was two-faced: first, there were those who emphasized "the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific, with Japan as the main player". Second, more nationalist thinkers stressed position of Russia as a Eurasian power and the need to cooperate mainly with China in order to gain control of both Asia-Pacific and Eurasia.[396] Lukin also identified Russia's foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific in terms of maintaining balance of power between two major actors: Japan and China.[397] This balance of power notion and Gorbachev's multilateralism policy towards Asia-Pacific often clashed in Russian foreign policy-making in this region. In fact, Yeltsin's Russia acted in Asia according to two inter-related concepts: Russia's self-perception of being a great power, and perceptions of multipolar Asia, which was important for Moscow in sense that unlike the global level where, the most influential power was the United States, in regional level East Asia was influenced by two powers as China and Japan, besides the United States.[398]

Some Russian politicians, as LDPR's deputy leader and foreign policy expert Aleksei Mitrofanov, argued that Russia should consolidate its position by creating a 'Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo' axis and a 'Russia-China-India' axis and improve its relations with China by selling arms to it.[399] On the other hand, there were apprehensions on China's growing demographic expansion and Russia's loosing its Far Eastern territories. Domestic political forces and 'revived nationalism' also had great impact on Moscow's policy, which was greatly dependent on Russian local Far

[394] Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 209
[395] **Ibid**, pp. 228-229; A. Shkuropat, "Russia in Asia and the Pacific: an initial assessment of Russia's Membership in APEC", **Centre for Trade Policy and Law Occasional Papers**, 51, June 1999, p. 4
[396] Kuhrt
[397] Vladimir Lukin, "Rossiya i ee Interesy," (Russia and its Interests), **Nezavisimaya Gazeta**, 20 October 1992.
[398] Rangsimaporn (2009), pp. 208-209
[399] Mitrofanov in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 381

Eastern interests.[400] Conservative Russian regional leaders were reluctant to open to the East, fearing to fell under foreign control and lose economic subsidies from the center.[401]

Rangsimaporn argued that by the mid 1990s Eurasianism became an official political ideology used to justify Russia's relations with East Asian states.[402] Russian policy-makers emphasized the role of Russia as a 'bridge between the Atlantic and the Pacific' and importance of drawing a balanced policy between the West and the East.[403] In geopolitical sense, Eurasianism was welcomed by Russian military, who were interested in representing NATO as a threat and kept countries who treated the US with suspicion, such as China, Iran or India, as 'customers'.[404] Rangsimaporn stressed that besides original Eurasianism, there was another stream in Russian foreign policy called "Asianism", emerged in 1920s and used to contrast Russia with other European powers.[405] He noticed that Asianism was used by Russian authorities whenever Russia felt isolated or marginalized by the West, as in the period after the Crimean War, or in the early 1990s, after the Cold War, when Russia looked towards Asia in search of salvation. Hence, as Sarkisyanz discovered, Russia's relations with the East in fact emanated from its relations with the West, and was "conditioned by a turning away from Europe more than by positive attractions to Asia as such".[406] Similarly, Bazhanov and Bazhanov suppose that by strengthening positions with Eastern states Russia in fact tried to regain respect in the West.[407]

Director of Russia's Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Mikhail Titarenko, advocated idea of Intercivilisational Eurasianism in Russia's role in East Asia, namely China, where he stressed Russia's 'unique geographical position' linking Europe with the Asia-Pacific.[408] This view was parallel to official Russian foreign policy, balanced between the East and West and based on equal inter-civilizational dialogue. Rangsimaporn suggests that 'civilisational Eurasianism' was used instrumentally by Russian diplomats in order to justify Russia's participation in East

[400] Buszynski, p. 169
[401] Moltz (Russia in Asia in 1996), pp. 88, 89-90
[402] Rangsimaporn (2006), pp. 208-209, 375
[403] **Ibid**
[404] **Ibid**, pp. 377-378
[405] **Ibid**, pp. 371-389
[406] Sarkisyanz in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 374
[407] Bazhanov and Bazhanov, p. 89
[408] Rangsimaporn (2006), pp. 372-373

Asian region affairs, and sometimes as a counterweight to American influence in the region.[409]

Despite Eurasianists' assertions on Russia's Asian identity and that Moscow attached as much importance to Asia as it attached to the West, geographic proximity appeared to be insufficient base to involve in Asia-Pacific region for Russia. On the one hand, cultural differences between Russian and Sino-Confucian cultures and economic and administrative chaos in Russia made it unattractive partner to region states. On the other hand, Asia-Pacific states treated Russia as an outsider, not part of their Asia, evaluating it as a more European country.[410] Indeed, many scholars admitted the fact that Russia had more historical and cultural affinity with Europe and the West in general, than with Asian states.[411] One possible problem of Russia's unsuccessfulness was that Russian officials still tried to act in Asia as a superpower; they did not realize the fact that it was not a Gorbachev's Russia when every new proposition was applauded outside. Moreover, Moscow again played bilateral game with Asia-Pacific states, which was not relevant to the proclaimed multilateralism policy: say its hostility with Japan over territorial disputes and, on the contrary, too close economic and military cooperation with China – these policies were evoking concerns among Asian states and impeding Russia from pursuing coherent foreign policy in the region. Rangsimaporn argues that Russian elites used Russia's Eurasianist identity for primarily instrumental aims in order to justify Russia's 'perceived special right' to play a Great Power role in Asia-Pacific affairs and to prove Russia's attractiveness as a partner to East Asian states "by virtue of its territorial presence in the region and also from its 'Asiatic' traits, self-proclaimed when the need arises".[412]Rozman et al added that Asia was at the margins of Russian Eurasianism.[413]

3.1.1.1. Russian Relations with China

Russia's relations with China developed in positive trend after the end of the Cold War, namely due to Gorbachev's achievements in resolving the border dispute

[409] **Ibid**, p. 373
[410] Buszynski, p. 172
[411] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 386; Rozman, p. 4
[412] Rangsimaporn (2006), pp. 385-386
[413] Rozman, p. 9

between Russia and China and his "policy of creating a stable external environment conducive for domestic reforms".[414] Sino-Russian Border agreement was signed in 1991 and contributed to development of trade between the two states. Main reason of rapprochement was realization by Russia that China was becoming a strong economic power and cannot be neglected as a trade partner, especially in raw material sector.

Russia and China of the post-Cold War period had a number of common points. Both of them tried to self-fulfill in the international arena and especially in Asia, so both Russia and China tried to exploit each other's potentials for strategic cooperation. For instance, China esteemed such factors as Russia's military and technical power, its raw material and natural resources, 'independent foreign policy' and 'power projection capability'.[415] Russia made significant assistance to China in international and geopolitical fields, helping in communication with the UN Security Council and resolution of global and regional issues in China's territorial space. On its turn, Russia was interested in China's military and security modernization which had problems of external access, China's investments to Russian market, technology investment and labour resources.

Of course, not everything was ideal in Sino-Russian relations in the early 1990s. Initially China treated post-Soviet Russia with suspicion because of Russia's Western-oriented policy; moreover, China still saw Russia as 'the gravedigger of communism' in the early 1990s.[416] Moscow on its part was displeased by human rights violation in China, especially events at Tiananmen Square in 1990, Chinese sympathy for the August 1991 coup, the borders issues, inflow of cheap Chinese labour force into Siberia, and perceived demographic threat by China. However, Russia's orientation towards the West did not last long, largely because of NATO expansion issue and due to change in Russian foreign policy towards pursuing national interest and Eurasianist course. So, Yeltsin turned to China as a balancing force, so that since the mid 1990s Sino-Russian relationship became even more cordial than that of Russian-US.

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[414] Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 222

[415] Alexei D. Voskressenski, "Variants of Russia's Policy towards the Rise of China", in "The Rise of China: Policies of the EU, Russia and the US", ESF Working Paper No. 30, **European Security Forum**, February 2008, p. 12, available online at http://www.ceps.eu/node/1615

[416] G. Smith (1999), p. 492

According to Curtis, Russia's strategic interest towards China had two main goals: "to preserve a counterweight against United States influence in the Pacific and to prevent Chinese regional hegemony and a Sino-Japanese alliance that could exclude Russia".[417] Ferdinand also supported this standpoint, calling Sino-Russian rapprochement "'a new strategic partnership' forming an 'alternative pole' to Atlanticism in global geopolitics".[418] So, Moscow preferred to establish close and substantive relations with China while eliminating possibility of third states, as the US or Japan, using China against Russia.[419]

First visit of Russian Federation's President Boris Yeltsin to China was paid in 1992. Russia and China signed a series of joint agreements within the multipolarity framework since the mid 1990-s, in a period when American hegemony was at its highest point. Hence, during 1992-1999 seven summits were held between the two sides on border trade, military exchanges and providing security in Asia. In December 1992 Yeltsin's visit to China resulted in signing a nonaggression declaration, which, according to Curtis, "theoretically ended what each called the other's search for regional hegemony in Asia".[420] In relation to the Taiwan question, Russia preferred to act pragmatically, thus Yeltsin stated: "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Russian Federation does not maintain official interstate relations with China".[421] Kozyrev proposed to develop nongovernmental ties with Taiwan at the same level as with other states without damaging political relations with China.[422] At the same time, Russia did not hesitate to develop trade with Taiwan which reached $3 billion in 1995.[423]

Trade was one of the main milestones in Sino-Russian relations during Yeltsin's administration. Russia sold mainly raw materials, metals and machinery to China. China less suffered from the world economic crisis, since it focused on domestic demand, "unfettered by world market limitations".[424] Accordingly, Chinese economy grew in high rates and still is continuing growing. China's development of

[417] Curtis, p. 28
[418] Ferdinand in G. Smith (1999), p. 492
[419] Curtis, p. 28
[420] **Ibid**
[421] Yeltsin in Kuhrt, p. 14
[422] Kuhrt, p. 10
[423] Curtis, p. 28
[424] Yeltsin in Kuhrt, p. 13

production and export potential in the north-east and north-west in the 1990s coincided with Russia's 'economic opening'[425] in the Far East, Transbaikalia and Siberia, which earlier were special restricted military zones of Russia, closed to foreign trade and functioned for only domestic needs.[426] Taking all these in mind, China was a serious supporter of developing Russian economy in the post-Cold War period.[427] Some scholars as Titarenko even proposed China as a model Russia should follow in its economic development.[428] Similarly, Migranyan proposed Russia to follow China as a model, a "country that pursues an independent foreign policy and yet continues to receive economic and trade benefits from the West".[429] On the other hand, conservative thinkers warned that relations with China should not threaten Russia with "the fate of a raw materials appendage to somebody's industrial machine".[430]

As a result of active trade between Russia and China, Russian Far East and Siberia became populated by Chinese workers, merchants and peasants establishing "Chinatowns" in cities and villages. Chinese officials called for establishment of free economic zone in the border area and opening of the whole border from Vladivostok to Mongolia. Consequently, when Chinese population in Russia increased to one million, Russian people became demanding that the Chinese were not allowed "to conquer the eastern part of the country by peaceful colonization".[431] Growing Chinese commercial presence in the Far East also incited Russian officials to tighten border control, concluding agreements with Beijing on control of illegal migration of foreign citizens, trafficking of arms, drugs and poisonous and radioactive metals. Far Eastern authorities claimed that trade with China was not benefiting local economies and worried about Russia becoming 'a raw materials appendage' of China.[432] On the

[425] Kuhrt, pp. 12-13
[426] Umbach, p. 54
[427] Russo-Chinese bilateral trade increased year by year, with around 40% annual rate of increase: such as $5.5 billion in 1995, to almost $7 billion in 1996. The largest part of this trade was Russian exports of energy and industrial products. So, at 1997 Yeltsin-Jiang summit in Beijing, the two sides initiated an estimated $12 billion gas-pipeline project to supply Russian gas to the growing Chinese energy market. Looking ahead, Yeltsin intended to reach $20 billion bilateral trade turnover by the 2000. (Moltz (Russia in Asia in 1996), pp. 90, 91; Moltz (Russia in Asia in 1997), p. 94)
[428] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 383
[429] Migranyan in Buszynski, p. 8
[430] Muradian in Kuhrt, p. 11
[431] Bazhanov and Bazhanov, p. 90; Sergei Zhikharev, "Russia and China Will Make Friends by Borders", **Commersant Daily**, Moscow, August 26, 1995.
[432] Kuhrt, p. 16

other hand, there were problems in mutual trade, such as records on low-quality and fakeness of Chinese products, rise of smuggling and cooperation between both states' underworlds due to easy border regimes, and pirating issues.

3.1.1.1.1. Sino-Russian Alignment against US

Sino-Russian cooperation in the post-Cold War period was based on notion of multipolarity and opposition to the US domination of the world. Russia became concerned with the US growing unilateral behavior in the international arena since the mid 1990s, when even pro-Western policy-maker as Kozyrev became to talk about a multipolar world, including multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific.[433] Russia's stance on multipolarity in Asia-Pacific was aimed at 'democratization' of international affairs; hence Yeltsin claimed that Russia's and China's attempt to create a multipolar world was "the 'most democratic model of the world system', in which nobody would have claims on exclusive rights".[434] For many Russian elite and scholars multipolarity was effective in Asia, because this region had been multipolar during the Cold War and after, thus Russian multipolarity was not a reactive one – "it addressed objective realities" of Asia-Pacific.[435] On the other hand, Turner asserts that China and Russia used diverging strategies to achieve multipolarity and had no distinct definition for their vision of this term in practice.[436] This divergence was reflected in "advocating multipolarity" on the one hand, and "denouncing unipolarity and hegemonism" on the other.[437]

China was highly disappointed by the US domination in the world, including suspension of China's MFN status, Bush's "constructive engagement policy toward China"[438] in the early 1990s and other issues. Even before Deng Xiaoping's formal declare of multipolarity vision, his successor, Jiang Zemin, incorporated the concept of "duoji shijie (multipolar world)" into China's foreign policy in 1992.[439] China's

[433] A. Kozyrev, "A Strategy for Partnership", **International Affairs (Moscow)**, 8, 1994, p. 7
[434] Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 228
[435] **Ibid**, p. 216
[436] Susan Turner, "Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order: the Danger in the Undefined", **Asian Perspective**, 33(1), 2009, pp. 159-184
[437] **Ibid**, p. 170
[438] **Ibid**, p. 161
[439] **Ibid**, p. 168

foreign minister, Qian Qichen, declared in 1992: "the USA's hegemonic stance and its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states pose the greatest danger to socialist China," and proposed to develop relations with Russia, Japan, Korea and other neighbouring states to resist US pressure.[440]

Thus, since 1994 China engaged in close cooperation with the Russian Federation, establishing a 'constructive partnership' in September 1994. In 1996 Yevgeniy Primakov replaced pro-Western Andrey Kozyrev as a foreign minister and the Sino-Russian partnership was renamed as 'strategic', moving this relationship further away from the West and from mutual historical mistrust. 'Primakov's Doctrine' called for multipolarity on the ground that it best reflected reality of international system and took into account interests of major states, including Russia, thus providing greater stability.[441] Lo evaluated such a policy of Primakov as 'revised bipolarity' when Russia acts in concert with other powers (such as China, India or Japan in East Asia) in order to balance the US domination considering specific issues.[442] Some Russian commentators criticized Moscow's policy of balancing the US by the means of China as too ambitious and not responding to Russia's resources. For instance, Karaganov argued that Russia should follow more moderate policy, first consolidate domestic strength and establish favourable economic relations with leading Western states, and only then try to challenge the West. He also added that multipolarity best suited China's interest than Russia's, because China was economically strong enough to counter the US.[443]

During high-level delegations to Beijing in November 1996 there was signed bilateral defense cooperation pact which laid base for military cooperation and sale of Russian military equipment to China. In 1997 Russia and China signed Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration of a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order, voicing "their resentment over Washington's efforts to be the sole global superpower".[444] Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji stated during his visit to Russia in 1997 that China and Russia had common stands on several issues,

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[440] **Ibid**, p. 168
[441] Primakov in Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 212
[442] Lo, p. 108
[443] Karaganov in Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 214
[444] John Cherian, "Getting Closer to Russia", **Frontline**, 15(26), 1998-1999, available online at http://hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1526/15260480.htm

including the Balkans, the Gulf region, the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia.[445] This Declaration, while not aiming at third parties, including the US, nevertheless included criticism on the West's interference in both countries' internal affairs (Chechnya in Russia and Tibet and Taiwan in China) and an attack on NATO enlargement.[446]

China also supported Russian intervention in Chechnya: in 1999 Chinese Foreign Minister, Zhang Qiyue, stated that China supports Russia's military action in Northern Caucasus "as an effort to maintain national unity and territorial integrity" .[447] Motivation of China to support Russia in this issue laid in its own internal questions such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. China was also standing by Russian side, opposing NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999. The Kosovo crisis made Russia and China realize that their militaries were "on the receiving end of American-led international interventionism",[448] argues Trenin. This instigated intensification of military and political contacts between Moscow and Beijing. In December 1999 Moscow and Beijing signed the joint commitment which stressed the 'negative momentum' that had been developing in international arena lately, namely "the intrusive U.S. actions in Kosovo, its consideration of a NMD system, and its refusal to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty".[449] During the 'West99' military exercise hold by Russia and designed against NATO as an enemy, China was given unprecedented access to Russian nuclear bases.[450] Russia and China also had common stand on the issue of theater missiles (they opposed it); moreover Russia relaxed some restrictions it imposed on the quality of arms to sale especially for China.[451]

3.1.1.1.2. The Shanghai Forum

In 1996 Russia and China initiated a Shanghai Forum to resolve border issues and demilitarization, other members to be Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

[445] **Ibid**
[446] Rangsimaporn (2009), p. 213
[447] Felkay, p. 228
[448] Trenin (Russian-Chinese Relations), p. 6
[449] Turner, p. 163
[450] Trenin (Russian-Chinese Relations)
[451] **Ibid**

Together these five states presented the "Shanghai Five". At the first meeting of the forum the state leaders decided to establish a security mechanism and reached an accord to inform each other of military exercises undertaken within 100 kilometers of China's border with the other four countries. Although issue of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the secessionist Uighur movement in China, did not figure in 1996 Shanghai meeting, it was nevertheless the central issue China was concerned with. In fact, by offering to improve relations with Russia and the Central Asian states, Beijing hoped to win their active support over the XUAR issue.[452] This support maintained repression by Central Asian regimes of their Uighur minorities, estimating over 500,000 in the whole region.[453]

During the second meeting in April 1997 new agreement was signed limiting deployment of troops in the border territory. In July 1998, at the Almaty summit, the Shanghai Forum was expanded to cover broader regional security questions, such as ethnic separatism, religious fundamentalism, international terrorism, smuggling and other cross-border crimes, and improve regional economic co-operation. This was important development, since 1998 was a year when the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime consolidated positions in Afghanistan. Further, at Bishkek summit in 1999 the Shanghai Five decided to create an anti-terrorist centre in Tashkent to deal with increasing radical Islamic movements and criminal organizations.[454] The Bishkek Declaration signed after such developments as NATO expansion and the U.S.-led invasion of Serbia in 1999 emphasized "a regional commitment to continued political and military cooperation in the context of a "general trend" of the world toward multipolarity".[455] As Turner admitted, the Shanghai Five, similarly to Sino-Russian position, stood against the global tendency to unipolarity and aimed at "balancing the U.S. presence in Central Asia".[456]

Russia sought for support from the Shanghai Forum members on its opposition to NATO enlargement: even verbal support was welcomed with pleasure

[452] Flemming S. Hansen, "The Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation", **Asian Affairs**, 39(2), July 2008, p. 218
[453] C.-P. Chung, "The Defense of Xinjiang: Politics, Economics, and Security in Central Asia", **Harvard International Review**, 25(2), 2003.
[454] Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, eds., **The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy**, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 187
[455] Turner, p. 173
[456] **Ibid**

by Moscow. Russia was also satisfied that China favored greater political influence of the Shanghai Forum in Central Asia.[457] Although Russia and China were close on the issue of the US domination in the world and supported each other considering NATO expansion issue on the one had, and "One China" policy on the other, the two states repeatedly claimed that the Shanghai Five "did not represent a new alliance and that the co-operation was not directed at any third country".[458] In fact, during the 1990s the Shanghai Five was mainly "an inward-looking" organization, focused on issues within the group, as border disputes, demilitarization and economic development.

3.1.1.2. Russia and Asia-Pacific Region

Russian strategic thinking towards Japan from the Soviet era till nowadays has been relied on two major factors: geopolitical interest in the Asia-Pacific and Japan's importance in contributing to Russia's economic development.[459] On the other hand, such scholars as Kuhrt stressed that "geographical contiguity and economic complementarity" did not guarantee investment by Japanese business.[460] While China and Russia promoted multilateralism in Asia, Japan preferred a strategy of building 'minilaterals' ('trilaterals' and 'quadrilaterals'), focusing on improving relations with leading players in Asia, as China, Russia and the United States. Fukushima estimates this strategy as a "way to resist some attempts to drive a wedge between the two countries".[461]

Kuhrt asserts that Russian-Japanese relations were difficult after the dissolution of the USSR, first because Japanese leaders still viewed Russia as a military threat, and second, because of Japan's close ties with the West, namely the US.[462] Nevertheless, Japan, which was "a West in Asia", took the highest place in Russia's foreign policy towards Asia during the euphoria of the Atlanticism policy in the early 1990s. After Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo in 1991, Russia's stance towards

[457] Rozman, p. 22
[458] Hansen, p. 218
[459] Rozman, p. 23
[460] Kuhrt, p. 2
[461] Fukushima, p. 36
[462] Kuhrt, p. 2

US-Japanese alliance appeared to be mitigated, as well, Japan's foreign policy towards Russia shifted "from disengagement to engagement".[463]

After the dissolution of the USSR, there emerged an opportunity to resolve the territorial issue between Japan and Russia which alienated the two states for nearly half a century. Kurile Islands were annexed by the USSR in the result of 1945 Yalta Conference, and since then, Russia claims that Japan has no basis for disputing Russian sovereignty over the islands. Japan, on the other hand, claims that even if in 1951 they ceded the islands according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the four islands – Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai – "are an extension of nearby Hokkaido and hence part of Japan" and must be returned to Japan.[464] Yeltsin made significant yet failed attempts to resolve this territorial issue. In May 1992 Yeltsin reached an agreement with Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe that forces would be reduced in the disputed territory over 1–2 years.[465] Yet, no progress was recorded by the involved deadline. According to Miller, the Kuriles dispute was aggravated by "mutual dislike and distrust between Russians and Japanese", which originated from "the troubled historical relationship" between the two states.[466] If the issue was settled, continues Miller, this would have brought advantages for the both sides: Japan would be able to access energy and natural resources of Russia's Siberia and Far East; while Russia would have opportunity of attracting Japan investments and technology to Russian East and consequently integrate with dynamic economy of East Asia.[467] On geopolitical scene, Russo-Japanese rapprochement would strengthen Moscow's and Tokyo's positions regarding the rising China.

According to Miller, Japan did not envisage this issue as the most important question in Asia, and never tried to use force against Russia in this view.[468] Tokyo even tried not to concentrate serious forces at that period in order to demonstrate a policy of construction of 'principally new relations' with democratic Russia.[469] However, Tokyo always kept Kurile issue on the front of its bilateral relations with

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[463] Fukushima, p. 28
[464] John H. Miller, "Russia-Japan Relations: Prisoners of History?", **Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**, Special Assessment, October 2004, p. 7-2, available online at www.apcss.org
[465] Buszynski, p. 23
[466] J. H. Miller, p. 7-1
[467] **Ibid**, p. 7-2
[468] **Ibid**
[469] Alexander Panov, "The Policy of Russia toward Japan 1992-2005" in Gilbert Rozman et al, eds., **Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 171

Moscow and as a "sine qua non of a peace treaty and improved relations".[470] Hence, at Munich G-7 summit in July 1992 Japan insisted on inclusion in the declaration of the clause that the full normalization of Japanese-Russian relations is based on resolution of the territorial problem.[471] Such a behavior made Russia suspicious of seriousness of Japan's intentions, and Russian public widely became thinking that Japan tried to use Russia's weakness to get the islands to itself, and was not really interested in developing of Japanese-Russian relations.

Since 1997 Russia became more actively involving in Asia-Pacific region affairs, attending ASEAN meetings and applying to the APEC. Russia, which participated in G-7 meetings, realized that its ties with Japan, one of the most developed members of the G-7 club, were least developed, and this was unnatural. In Japan, on its turn, elites grew more convinced that democratization and transition to market economy in Russia were irreversibly developing and it was worth developing relations with Russia in various specters. Japan's Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto opened new window of opportunity in 1997-1998 period by his speeches on Eurasian thinking, economic cooperation and common geopolitical interests. So, during 16 February 1998 speeches, both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan claimed that peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region depends on cooperation and 'mutual ties based on confidence' between the four states: Japan, the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Russian Federation.[472]

In response, in November 1997 Yeltsin proposed to conclude a new peace treaty by 2000. The same month Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto came to visit Yeltsin in Krasnoyarsk. As a result of the meeting, Russia and Japan signed an agreement on the plan of gradual development of Russo-Japanese economic relations, called the 'Yeltsin-Hashimoto plan', which entailed joint fishing agreement to put control on four islands and additional Japanese investments into Russia. Japan's support for Russia's membership in APEC and to the "political eight" (P8) was repaid by Russia's support for Japan's candidacy to permanent membership in the UN Security Council. 1997-98 summit meetings between Russia and Japan signaled a breakthrough in relations, subject to Russia's concern of not "putting all

[470] J. H. Miller, p. 7-2
[471] Panov in Rozman, p. 171
[472] Fukushima, p.31

their eggs in China's basket", and Japan's worry of China's "bellicose and unfriendly posture".[473] The fact that Prime Minister Hashimoto did not insist on territorial concessions as a precondition for Japanese economic assistance, had also brought relief to relations.

During the second informal meeting of Yeltsin and Hashimoto in Japanese town of Kawana, Japan made its 'Kawana proposal' to Russia, which in fact meant that Russia should recognize Japan's 'residual sovereignty' over the Kurile Islands.[474] For Russia this would signify actual recognition of the Japan's position on the territorial dispute and further transfer of the islands to Japan. Yeltsin could not go so far and in September 1997 claimed that the islands cannot be given to Japan unless Russian society accepts this decision.[475] In response to the 'Kawana proposal' Moscow offered its own proposal to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation by 2000, which will resolve border issue stage by stage in a long-term period. However, the Japanese side did not accept it, considering the proposal insufficient.[476] Although by 2000 Russia and Japan did not manage to conclude a peace treaty, their bilateral ties in 1997-1998 developed in a speed never seen before in the history of Russo-Japanese relations. For Russia normalization of relations with Japan, naturally with the resolution of the territorial dispute, would mean significant progress in strengthening its global position, especially in the Asia-Pacific.

3.1.1.3. Relations with the Koreas

Historically, the Korean Peninsula always represented an area of rivalry with Japan for Russia. This consciousness seemingly influenced Russian policy in the region during Yeltsin's administration, hence Russian geostrategists tried to counterbalance South and North Korea against Japan and use them "as a means of extending influence into the Asia-Pacific region".[477] Russia tried to develop relations with both Koreas in order to "benefit strategically from their eventual

[473] J. H. Miller, p. 7-3
[474] Panov in Rozman, p. 176
[475] **Ibid**, pp. 176-177
[476] **Ibid**, p. 177
[477] Buszynski, p. 201

reunification".[478] However, there were divergences between Yeltsin's administration and Foreign Ministry officials (namely specialists on foreign policy in Korea) on the need for balancing policy in the Korean Peninsula. Buszynski argues that Russian pro-Western policy-makers rejected the balance-of-power approach in the North-East Asia, since this would "justify and stimulate the nuclearization of the peninsula". They proposed notion of "North East Asian integrationism as a component of wider Asia-Pacific integrationism" by means of close security cooperation with the West, especially on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.[479]

Yeltsin's policy in the Korean Peninsula was oriented towards the West, and was often criticized for serving Western interests on account of Russia's interests, thus allowing the United States and China to take initiative in the region, leaving Russia at the sidelines. Russian geopoliticians argued that loss of influence over the Korean Peninsula was a result of Yeltsin's failure to hold balanced policy between North and South Korea: in fact Russia, which had diplomatic relations with both Koreas, had a unique position and advantage to strengthen its position on the peninsula, however, Yeltsin, just like Gorbachev, was prone to favor the South over the North.[480] Buszynski argued that if, on the one hand, geopolitical considerations made Moscow understand that it was tenable to hold good relations with both Koreas, then, on the other hand, integrationist logic, economic considerations and ideology drew Russia towards close relations with South Korea.[481]

Seoul was also relying on Moscow in its stance against the Northern neighbor, expecting Moscow to eliminate all its ties with Pyongyang and limit North Korea's nuclear potential. Justifying South Korea's expectations, Moscow claimed it was publicly supporting Seoul against North Korean nuclear program and sacrificed the 1961 Treaty of friendship with the North. In May 1995 in Seoul Defense Ministers Pavel Grachev and Lee Yang-ho signed a memorandum of understanding on increasing military ties, and Grachev sent a message to South Korea that Russia would soften its mutual defense treaty with North Korea which "no longer met the

[478] **Ibid**, p. 202
[479] **Ibid**
[480] **Ibid**
[481] **Ibid**, p. 204

realities of Moscow-Seoul relations".[482] For official Seoul the mere fact that Russia had stopped supporting Pyongyang had a high value.[483]

However, Russian military cooperation with Seoul, growing ties of Seoul with Beijing, and absence of Moscow's support to political regime of Pyongyang, induced North Korea to develop its nuclear armament program in 1993-94. Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT and refused to allow international inspections of certain cities, although Moscow numerously pressed Pyongyang to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Moreover, North Korea declared a 50-mile military zone in Japan Sea which clashed with Russian interests and was claimed illegal by the Kremlin. Pyongyang also declared in 1993 that it would block the projects involving Russia and the two Koreas, and deeply denounced Russia's discharge of nuclear waste in the Japan Sea.[484] In June 1994 Russia expelled five North Korean diplomats for attempting to obtain nuclear material.[485] All these developments caused anxiety in the Kremlin, which was concerned "with preserving the authority of Yeltsin" and reluctant to involve in international problems that did not touch Moscow's principal interests.[486] So, Russia left this issue to the efforts of the US.

3.1.1.4. Relations with India

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia's relations with India, especially on the political level, were practically frozen: Jain characterized these relations by confusion and skepticism.[487] India's growing ties with the United States in defence sector awakened suspicion in Russia. India, on the other hand, was disappointed by insufficient attention from Russia, for instance, during the visit of Indian defense minister to Moscow in March 1992, where he was unable to meet any senior Russian official. New Russian President, Yeltsin, followed the paradigm of

[482] Tsuneo Akaha, "Russia and Asia in 1995: Bold Objectives and Limited Means", **Asian Survey**, 36 (1), A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part I (January, 1996), p. 104
[483] Bazhanov and Bazhanov, p. 93
[484] **Ibid**
[485] Buszynski, p. 210
[486] Vasily Mikheev, "Russian Strategic Thinking toward North and South Korea", in Rozman, p. 193
[487] Jain, p. 380

Gorbachev's 'new political thinking' and decided not to have any special ties or partnership with India.[488]

This was a policy of 'de-ideologization' reflected in pragmatism and flexibility towards Russia's former allies.[489] Russian pro-Western politicians, Prime Minister Gaidar and Foreign Minister Kozyrev were 'cool' on India and kept policy of equilibrium between Delhi and Islamabad. From their point of view, Pakistan was important factor not only for Russia's relations with India, but also for Russian domestic policy, since Pakistan had effect on Russia's Chechen rebels through the Taliban and al-Qaeda. [490] Russian Foreign Ministry in general considered Pakistan, Iran and Turkey of higher priority than India due to their geographic proximity to Russia.[491]

Nevertheless, Yeltsin and majority of strategic thinkers in Duma and the military did not agree with Kozyrev and Gaidar's 'Euro-centric' notion; they believed that India was more important player in dealing with Islamic fundamentalism than Pakistan; moreover, they believed that "a strong India could offset the hegemonic status of the United States".[492] In January 1993 Yeltsin visited India, proclaiming friendship between the two states and stressing the imperative of a close strategic relationship between the two states, necessary for the emergence of "fair and rational multipolar world order".[493] So, since the mid 1990s Russo-Indian relations gained new political and strategic understanding. 1993 official visit of Yeltsin to India helped to improve the atmosphere in Russo-Indian relations and touched some economic issues. However, the security clause was missing in the new Indo-Russian Friendship Treaty, since Russia was reluctant to engage in South Asian intricate policies guided by historic animosity between India and Pakistan.

Russia and India had long history of defence cooperation. From 1991 to 1999, India represented almost 20% of Russian annually military export.[494] Within

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[488] Panov in Rozman, p. 169
[489] M. Jerome, **Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S. Policy in South Asia**, Conley, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2001, p. 58
[490] Jain, p. 393
[491] Jerome, p. 59
[492] **Ibid**
[493] Joseph P. Ferguson, "Russian Strategic Thinking toward Central, South, and Southeast Asia", in Rozman, p.217; Jain, p. 380
[494] Thomas W. Zarzecki, "Arming China or Arming India: Future Russian Dilemmas", **Comparative Strategy**, 18, 1999, p. 262

the framework of Indo-Russian defence cooperation established in 1993, having realized India's requirements in its aging defence sector and heavy dependence on Russian weapons, Yeltsin guaranteed supply of defence equipment for Indian army.[495] Economic weight of this cooperation for Russia was visible: Yeltsin and policy-makers in the Duma were sure that income source from arms sales to India was crucial for the process of Russia's transition to market economy.[496] In 1997 there was signed the Russo-Indian defense accord on extending defense cooperation for a 10-year period, until 2010.[497] Signing of 'monumental' ten-year $15 billion Russo-Indian agreement on military-technical cooperation in December 1998 marked further resurgence in bilateral military cooperation.[498] By the end of 1999, effectiveness of Indo-Russian military cooperation "had returned to a Cold War level with all three branches of the Indian military involved in major procurement programs with Russia".[499]

With emergence of the new Russia, relations between Moscow and Delhi became based on new realities: if during the Cold War period Moscow constantly backed India against the US and China considering it the most important strategic and ideological ally in the Third World, then during Yeltsin's administration Russia, while still recognizing India's geopolitical and economic significance, did not want to jeopardize relations with the US, China and even Pakistan because of India.[500] On the other hand, Russo-Chinese close military cooperation raised doubts in India which claimed that Beijing, thanks to troop reductions along its border with Russia and imports from Russia, was developing military potential to the South. Delhi also complained that the West reoriented financial aid from the Third World towards Russia and the former Soviet Union.[501] During 1993 visit to Delhi Yeltsin tried to assure India that Russo-Chinese rapprochement did not mean a choice between one or another country: "Russian-Chinese relations are part of the main channel of our Asian policy. The principle of squeezing some other country out of it is absolutely

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[495] Jain, p. 381
[496] Jerome, p. 59
[497] Zarzecki, p. 262
This accord placed high priority on naval cooperation including Russian support to India's submarine, surface, air and missile forces.
[498] Jerome, p. 64
[499] **Ibid**, p. 69
[500] Bazhanov and Bazhanov, p. 94
[501] **Ibid**, p. 95

unacceptable", said Yeltsin.[502] Although displeased by the loss of the Soviet ally, Delhi sought for new opportunities in the international arena, at the same time interested in Russia's stability and capability to play independent role in global affairs.

3.1.2. Fundamentals of the Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East during Yeltsin

Middle East represents one of the most important regions for Russia's foreign policy and national security: the fact that Russians call this region "Near East" reflects the level of its importance of Middle East for Russia in geographical sense. Middle East has been traditional sphere of influence for Russia since the Soviet era. This is explained by such factors as ethnic, religious and language groups of Middle Eastern origin living inside Russian borders, as well as shipping routes and energy resources of Middle Eastern region. Muslim factor has been important in Russia's dealing with Middle Eastern states since the time of imperial Russia. As Russians believed that Islamic states were "uncivilized" and could not create viable government, Russia had been seeking integration of Middle Eastern and CIS states around Russia and reduction of CIS states' sovereignty to reach political stability.[503]

In late years of the Soviet Union Moscow began loosing influence over the Middle East and played only peripheral role in the Kuwait crisis, feeling itself marginalized by the US dominance in the region. Nevertheless, Moscow tried to cooperate with Washington, supporting the US-led effort to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and peace talks between Israel and the Arab states in the early 1990s. Such a pro-Western path was initiated by Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and after the demise of the USSR prolonged by Yeltsin and Kozyrev: new Russia was no more supporting the extremism and revolutionary trend in Middle East, trying to build alliances with existing regimes.[504] Russia tried to participate in regional affairs even though in ceremonial sense, being a shadow of the United States. For Washington, bringing Russia in probably made sense, because Clinton wanted

[502] Kuhrt, p. 15
[503] Stephen J. Blank, "Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy", **Orbis**, 40 (4), Fall 1996.
[504] Oded Eran, "Russia in the Middle East: The Yeltsin Era and Beyond", in Gorodetsky, p. 160

Yeltsin to develop economic reforms and, moreover, because it made sense to support Yeltsin and Kozyrev against their political opponents.[505]

Independence of former Soviet Asian and Caucasian republics put a geographical barrier between Russia and Middle East. Russia's "aggression against Chechen Muslims" and its support of Serbia against Muslim Bosnia also put a distance between Moscow and Middle Eastern capitals.[506] However, later on, as Russia's orientation towards the West slackened due to NATO's eastward expansion, Moscow began to pursue independent foreign policy in Asia and Middle East, not forgetting "rogue states shunned by Washington".[507]

Indeed, there was no sense for Russia to try establishing influence in areas where the United States had already interfered, such as Saudi Arabia or Latin America; that's why Russia turned to Middle East, where a number of states – Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria – were boycotted by Washington and these states also turned to Moscow. According to Gresh, Russia's advantages in establishing domination in the Middle East were "tens of thousands Arabic-speaking former Soviet experts and growing regional anti-Americanism"; on the other hand, Muslims living in Russia had been becoming more assertive.[508]

Since 1993 Russia's foreign policy towards Middle Eastern states and the Persian Gulf became more assertive in special areas. One of major factors of renewed Russian interest in the region was potential of arms sales and development of trade. Hence, Chernomyrdin stressed these goals during his visits to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states in November 1994. In May 1998 in his address to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yeltsin emphasized the need to turn to "economic diplomacy", adding that "Russia should enter the world market where it can be most competitive: the armaments market".[509]

However, Russia's dependence on Western economic aid limited maneuvers in this field. Blank argued that Russia's only power in the region was its ability to offer arms and nuclear technology to the Middle Eastern states, yet economically it

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[505] Eran in Gorodetsky, p. 156
[506] Curtis, p. 35
[507] Gresh, pp. 67-77
[508] **Ibid**
[509] "President Yeltsin's Address to Russian Diplomats", **International Affairs**, 44(3), 1998, p. 1-6

could offer little.[510] So, while Russian defense ministry experts were eager to sell arms every state regardless strategic consequence, in other fields of economy Russia was less competitive and lacked money to invest in the Middle Eastern states. Moreover, using arms sales policy as an instrument of gaining influence in the Middle Eastern states was not effective strategy given not promising results, as put a number of scholars.[511]

With the appointment of Primakov to the post of Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1996, Russia came back to the Middle East. According to Blank, Russia's return to the Middle East represented "a reassertion of national … interests, a preventive policy to deter Islamic assertion by a blend of coercion towards Turkey and co-optation towards Iran, and the failure of the US policy to create a lasting and stable status quo".[512] Indeed, if in the early 1990s Washington attempted to draw "new regional order" in the Middle East by initiating peace process, isolation of Iraq and Iran via dual containment policy, sustaining Kurds in the northern Iraq, military commitment to the Gulf, and using Turkey as a political-economic model for Central Asian states; then towards the late 1990s the situation changed for the United States: the peace process fell under domestic opposition in Israel, stability in Syria and Lebanon seemed far away, Turkey proved inappropriate as a model state given its domestic conflict with Kurdish population and pressure of Islamic political parties, Iran still hold anti-American stance, and lastly, the United States failed to draw appropriate policy towards the CIS states which should be also included in the Middle East, supposes Blank.[513]

Primakov was known for promoting deeper foreign policy of Russia in the Middle East. He argued that Russia must play the role of the trustee of the rights of "rogue" states in the "oppressed East".[514] Thus, it can be concluded that Primakov adhered to principles of Eurasianism in foreign policy perspectives. Hence, at that period Russian diplomats asserted that Russia had a legitimate presence in the region

[510] Stephan Blank, "Russia and the Gulf", **Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs**, 1, December 1996-February 1996, pp. 6-7
[511] Blank, (Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy)
[512] Blank, (Russia and the Gulf), p. 7
[513] Blank, (Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy)
[514] Koulieri, p. 28

because "the Middle East is a region adjacent to Russia's vital strategic interests".[515] Russian Defense Minister Grachev implied that the North Caucasus was a reason for Russia's involving in the Middle East.[516] Blank argued that Russian foreign policy in the Middle East was based on traditional *realpolitik*: Russia proclaimed global Islamic threat and invoked a Russian domino theory which supposes that if Muslims gain freedom anywhere, this would put the CIS region at risk, too.[517]

Primakov's priorities for Russian foreign policy in the region were: to bring Russia toward a "truly equal partnership with the United States in the Middle East peace process"; to pursue a "colder" policy towards Israel; and to show more attention to Moscow's former Arab friends in Libya, Iraq, and Syria.[518] Primakov often stated that Russia must represent an alternative to the United States in the Middle East, and he often tried to bring that about. From his practical observations Primakov concluded that none of the Middle Eastern states wanted the only power keeping monopoly in their region, they preferred preservation of balance of power in the Middle East, of course with Russia as one of main actors. By trying to restrict the US monopoly on Middle East, Russia in fact aimed at stabilizing the region and preventing both unrest and Western influence from reaching the CIS area. In stabilizing Central Asia and Caucasus Russia relied on Iran, giving military assistance to Teheran in return. But first of all, Moscow aimed to project military power into Caucasus and Central Asia, then restoring its strategic position in the region, and as a result, all these steps allowed Russia to assert its power in the Middle East.

[515] Blank, (Russia and the Gulf), p. 6
[516] Blank, (Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy)
[517] **Ibid**
[518] **Ibid**

CHAPTER IV

WESTERN DIMENSION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING PUTIN'S ADMINISTRATION

In the fourth part of my thesis I shall analyze Russian foreign policy toward the West during Putin's administration which began on the threshold of the new millennium. It is important to compare how the foreign policy orientations changed from Yeltsin to Putin and if there were any commonalities or differences. In other words, I shall try to underline changes and continuities in Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin and Putin both in theoretical and practical senses.

When describing Russian foreign policy in the Western part of the world, I shall look through Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union. I shall put these relations in the framework of security and democracy fields. NATO and OSCE as security organizations will figure as key factors in Russia's security relations with the US and the EU, as well as triangle of these relations in some strategic areas of Eurasia. Terrorist attacks on the USA in 11th September 2001 represented the turning point in security agendas of both Russia and the US. Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, the US war in Iraq and Russia's invasion in Georgia, US missile defence plans in Europe, and double NATO enlargement were also decisive developments in Russian-American and Russian-EU relations during Putin. Russian relations with the EU in the field of democracy will entail Putin's policy of 'sovereignty democracy' and EU's perception of this policy, as well as Russian-EU cooperation on democratic issues as human rights, freedom, justice and the rule of law.

4.1. Western Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy during Putin

Following Primakov's political orientation, Putin directly moved toward engaging with the West in "a new global project".[519] Strategy of the new Russian President was similar to that of Gorbachev, who considered poverty, arms races and environmental destruction the main reasons of human crisis during the Cold War, but from Putin's point of view the main problem was the "global threat of terrorism."[520]

[519] Tsygankov (New Challenges), p. 156
[520] **Ibid**

In this field Putin tried to find joint solutions for the world problems with the West, engaging with Western states in a shared understanding. Yet the main orientation in foreign policy for Putin was preserving Russia's national interest and special characteristics, such as Russia's Great Powerness or tendency to be a 'normal great power', which was stressed earlier by Kozyrev and caught up by Putin. However, Putin's administration was bewaring of making too many concessions to the West, unlike Yeltsin's. According to Sakwa, Russia's positioning itself in a category of normal great power meant that it stationed itself apart from other European post-communist states and hence refused to accept the corresponding tutelage of Western institutions, such as the European Union's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), or Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) of NATO.[521] Russia's attempt to gain integration without membership proved unstable, since Western institutions were not ready to accept Russia which was still on the first stage on its way towards social transformation.

Skak argues that Putin managed to hold pro-Western foreign policy, contending that this was necessary for Russia's economic and general modernization.[522] But the main success in this process may be explained within the framework of Robert D. Putnam's notion of the 'two-level game'.[523] According to this notion, foreign policy is the game where the government tries to fit the audience consisting of domestic and international parts: in this sense, Putin tried to seem 'illiberal', neo-imperialist' and 'anti-American' for domestic audience, while for the international audience, Putin described Russia as liberal and tending to bandwagon with the USA.[524] In a wider, global level, Putin also pursued adaptive policy, for instance, being "European in Europe, transcontinental "strategic partner" when dealing with the United States, Asian and Eurasian in Asia, and cautiously integrationist in the CIS'."[525]

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[521] Richard Sakwa, "'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics", **International Affairs**, 84(2), 2008, p. 243
[522] Mette Skak, "The logic of foreign and security policy change in Russia", in Hedenskog, pp.81-107
[523] *See* Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., **Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics**, Berkeley and LA, California: University of California Press, 1993.
[524] Skak in Hedenskog, pp. 81-107
[525] Duncan, p. 293

From the very outset, Putin's vision of Russian modernization project was different from that of the West. During 1999 Millennium speech Putin claimed that Russia's Westernization would be the state's own-planned Westernization designed in its own way.[526] According to Putin, the experience of the 1990s showed that it was not useful to revive the country by means of applying "abstract models and schemata extracted from foreign textbooks."[527] Meanwhile, political circles at that period came to a broad consensus that Russia should become a 'capitalist democracy integrated with the West'.[528] Putin envisioned strong and democratic Russia as well, on the other hand insisting that it would not imitate the United States or the United Kingdom, in such way giving to understand that Russia would not follow western liberalization model.[529] Sakwa defines such a way to modernization as 'modernisation without modernity', that is Westernization "without the critical spirit, pluralism and political diversity."[530]

Putin's plan for Russia's modernization and development was similar to that of Alexander Gorchakov, Russian Foreign Minister of the second half of 19th century: just as Gorchakov who tried to rebuild Russia after Crimean War, Putin intended to develop post-Cold War Russia by strengthening the country domestically and gaining more visibility internationally.[531] One of the main aims in Putin's foreign policy agenda was to establish an image of strong and modern Russia in the world, especially in its Western part. Russian President constantly referred to Western intellectuals and media elites in order to promote his image campaign. Some of Western leaders were less receptive to Putin's addresses, especially the U.S. President George W. Bush, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Yet they still tried not to anger Putin, considering Russia a critical player in the field of energy security, nonproliferation, and "taming Iran".[532] In the mid 2000s Russia's political relations with the United States and Europe passed

[526] Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as a Great Power", in Hedenskog, p. 14
[527] Neumann in Hedenskog, p. 15
[528] Sakwa (Putin: Russia's choice), p. ix
[529] Ascher, p. 240
[530] Sakwa (Putin: Russia's choice), p. viii
[531] For Gorchakov's policy *See* Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 54(3), 2002, pp. 377-396
[532] Shevtsova, p. 40

through alienation, and some critics said that it was an obligate result of Russia's strengthening position.[533]

Many western commentators and policy-makers pointed to growing imperial ambitions in Russian diplomacy abroad under Putin's presidency. Brzezinski was one of such commentators.[534] The U.S. Council on Foreign Relations defined Russia as a "country that has not completely broken with its imperial past and refuses to play the role of a responsible stakeholder in the international system."[535] Indeed, imperial notes appeared in Russian media and political agenda during the first decade of 2000s. Russian Eurasianists continued stressing the need for more powerful Russia: as Alexander Dugin stated, "empire is the only form of natural existence for the Russian people" and the status of regional power would be disastrous for Russia.[536] Policy-makers, as Zyuganov, promoted the idea of uniting Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, presenting this as a "reunion of all Russian people".[537]

However, Russian official authorities never used the word "empire" considering Russia's interests abroad. Risk to face negative reaction from the West played important role in this cautiousness. In addition, Russia played the main role in disintegration of the Soviet Union, that's why, as Putin stated, "to hint that Russia wishes to regain the greatness of a superpower is simply nonsense".[538] Putin's Russia balanced between the prescriptions of the Eurasianists and the liberal Atlanticists, and it "never sought to follow the Eurasianists' prescriptions for constructing a counterhegemonic bloc".[539] Moreover, often Russia moved in quite the opposite direction, cutting ineffective investments overseas and calling off military presence in countries like Cuba and Vietnam. To commit, some American authors also stressed the fact that Russia did not behave as an empire: hence, editors of The American Conservative admitted that Russia was "not an expansionist, ideological

[533] Trenin (2008)
[534] *See* Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership", **Foreign Affairs**, 73(2), March-April 1994, pp. 67-82
[535] *See* Council on Foreign Relations, "Russia's Wrong Direction; What the United States Can and Should Do", **Independent Task Force Report**, 57, March 2006.
[536] Dugin in Feklyunina, p. 618
[537] Zyuganov in Feklyunina p. 618
[538] Feklyunina, p. 619
[539] Jeffrey Mankoff, **Russian Foreign Policy The Return of Great Power Politics**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2009, p. 82

empire"; but it was "a traditional, semi-authoritarian great power intent on preserving its influence in its own backyard and its prestige on the world stage".[540]

On the other hand, Russian critics were concerned with growing unilateral trends in the global politics. If in 1997 Russian foreign policy concept mentioned threats of unilateral trends in international arena without openly naming the actors, then Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, on the other hand, described unipolarity as a "structure based on domination by developed Western countries … under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions."[541] Besides the threat of unilateral world system, Putin stressed growing "tendency for the international agenda to reflect the wishes of Western bodies with a limited membership rather than the wider community of states that was represented in the United Nations."[542]

The expansion of NATO into the Eastern Europe and its intervention in Kosovo that followed almost immediately thereafter have been among the most important events in Russia's relations with the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation.[543] But the most important development was the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States which allowed Putin to link cooperation with Washington on 'war on terrorism' with Russia's 'fight in Chechnya.'[544] Since then many scholars, such as Lo, observed emergence of 'Westerncentrism' in Russia's foreign policy matters. This was expressed in Putin's willingness to cooperate with Washington on security in Central Asia and desire to make Russia stronger by promoting ties with the EU and integration into economic institutions.[545] On the other hand, some critics as Pravda stressed that much of the political elite in Russia were critical of Putin's giving away Russia's interests to the West, and that public was also skeptical on new foreign policy.[546] Shevtsova believes that "it was his [Putin's] authoritarianism that enabled him to move Russia towards the West".[547] Whatever they say, Putin's strategy was quite logical and worth of respect: in attempt to rebuild Russian power he treated the

[540] "From the TAC editors", *The American Conservative*, October 6, 2008, p. 8
[541] Light, p. 50
[542] White, p. 186
[543] Zimmerman, p. 213
[544] Duncan, p. 293
[545] Lo in Duncan, p. 293
[546] Pravda in Duncan, p. 293
[547] Duncan, p. 293

West in different ways at different times, depending on the needs and interest of Russia.

If we analyze Russia in relation to the two parts of the Western world: the United States and Europe, we can come to different findings. According to Trenin, Russia is in some sense more similar to the Untied States in its outlook and key characteristics than it is to the European Union. Post-imperial Russia is on the way of becoming a nation-state, which the United States is; role of religion is more prominent in Russia and the US than it is in the EU; Russia shares predilection towards using force in international disputes and has a "residual superpower mentality, now manifested in energy power."[548] Moreover, the role of money is dominant in Russia, and social democracy is not a major force like it is in Europe. Having these characteristics in mind, Trenin argues that Russia "will modernize and will become more Western, but it will not necessarily become European".[549]

4.1.1. Russian-American Relations during Putin

With Putin coming to the ruling of the Russian Federation, relationship with the United States started "from a clean sheet of paper", because Putin decided to put aside all the "mutual accusations that had accumulated between Washington and Moscow in the last years of the Clinton Administration."[550] In the early 2000s main topic at the agenda of Russian-American relations was strategic partnership. Nevertheless, Russian policy-makers did not turn away from cautious behavior. Hence, National Security Concept of February 2000 and Russian Military Doctrine of April 2000 stressed Russia's concern with new "strategic reconfiguration taking place on former Soviet territory and in the world."[551] These documents criticized US policy for increasing engagement in the post-Soviet space, namely Central Asia and Caucasus, by using such terms as 'multipolarity' and 'unipolarity'.[552]

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[548] Trenin (2007), p. 98
[549] **Ibid**
[550] Pushkov, p. 53
[551] Lena Jonson, "The Security Dimension of Russia's Policy in South Central Asia", in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., **Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century**, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 131
[552] Jonson in Gorodetsky, p. 131

In the United States political elites changed their strategy in relation to Russia, and opinion polls on the image of Russia became more positive than in Yeltsin's times. The U.S. President George Bush asserted that Russia and personally Putin had become friends of the United States. US policy-makers evaluated Russia also "as one of the potential counterbalances to the political and economic pressure of the super-gigantic EU and the Euro-zone".[553] This was expressed in military co-operation of Russia and the USA in Afghanistan, as well as in the attempts to redirect energy policy to Russia's sphere of acting.

Russia became a useful partner of cooperation for West in dealing with Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, US policy in the Middle East and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So, Russia kept presence in Central Asia and contacts with the former Northern Alliance in Afghanistan who opposed the Taliban; it had long-standing relations with Syria, as well as with Palestinians and the Lebanese factions and special relationship with Israel. And although each evaluated the war on terrorism through "very different lenses", the main objective of both the White House and the Kremlin was "collaboration against Islamist extremists."[554]

September 11, 2001 attacks on the US became the milestone of Russian-American cooperation on the war against terrorism and Islamist extremism. Earlier on, Putin tried to win back the status of a great power for Russia, however, Russian actions were generally ignored by the international society, until in 2001 there appeared a chance for Russia to show its presence to the whole world. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Putin took the side of his fellow president, George W. Bush, proposing Russian help in the US war against the terror. Russia did not mind the US military presence in Central Asia, one of Russia's main spheres of influence, and showed great solidarity to the US actions afterwards the terrorist attacks in New York. Another step toward rapprochement was Russia's decision in autumn 2001 to close its military bases in Cuba and Vietnam.

Bush, on his part, replied by offering Putin a new strategic arms treaty; changed policy on Chechnya from condemnation of Moscow's actions to "understanding" and calling it an internal affair; accepted Russia as a market economy (significant development for easing bilateral trade disputes); supported

[553] Merkushev, p. 365
[554] Trenin (2007), p. 102

Russia in its desire to enter the World Trade Organization, agreed for the first time in history to Russia's taking chair in the G8; and upgraded Russia's status in European security-making by offering Russian representatives a more equal footing in debates. Within the framework of this cooperation Russia and the US shared common understanding that the two states had common goals and problems and could deal with each other as equals. Kissinger called this kind of "understanding between great powers a 'moral consensus'." [555]

However, the mutual cooperation did not last long. After short cooperation with the US on fighting global terrorism, such developments as the Iraq War and Orange revolution in Ukraine made Putin and his colleagues realize that "Russia's relations with the United States (and the West in general) were inherently unequal and conflictual and that Russia would better serve its interests if it followed its own course."[556] As Trenin noticed, there came 'mutual weariness' in relations.[557] When awaiting a visit from his friend the US President George W. Bush in 2002, Putin, looking back to three years passed, realized that the USA in fact focused on their own interests, having bombed Serbia and occupying Kosovo, accusing Russia of war crimes in Chechnya, abrogating the ABM Treaty, establishing military presence in Central Asia, training Georgian armed forces, and concluding largest-ever expansion of NATO.[558] By 2003 Russia even more distanced itself from the United States when it stood by France and Germany against the US Iraqi campaign. Western academician Duncan proposed that Putin's efforts to cooperate with Bush on the war against 'terrorism' did not lead the West to accept Russia as equal partner, because of "increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism."[559]

Russian commentators had their own calculations on reasons and factors of failure of cooperation between the two powers. Pushkov deems that Putin undertook great political risk when offering full-fledged support to the United States after 9/11.[560] Not only Putin negated leading Russian policy-makers' advices of not helping America in its own war, but he also permitted US military involvement in

[555] Stephen Sestanovich, "What Has Moscow Done?", **Foreign Affairs**, 87(6), November-December 2008.
[556] **Ibid**
[557] Trenin (2008)
[558] Sestanovich
[559] Duncan, p. 277
[560] Pushkov, p. 53

Central Asia and logistic support, which was risky for Russia's hegemony in the region. Pushkov argues that by these steps Putin hoped that the United States would leave some priorities to Russia where America had no vital interest. However, in reality, Washington was pursuing its interests in all areas. As for Russian political elite, the Kremlin itself characterized foreign policy of the White House as a "problem for the Russian Federation" and "a threat for a global security", whereas the US military policy was considered ultimately directed against Russia.[561] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov admitted that Russian interests were at odds with US in at least ten issues, "ranging from the deployment of the ABM system in Europe to the fate of Kosovo".[562]

By 2007-2008 relations get even worse, when Russia turned more nationalist, with "clear anti-U.S. overtones", and the US public started seeing Russia "in an increasingly negative light".[563] With Medvedev coming to the ruling in March 2008, the Kremlin declared plans to issue a new Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine according to which Russia should defend its national interests in a non-confrontational way and pursue independent foreign policy, and where USA and NATO represented main threat to Russia. [564]

According to Cohen, deterioration in Russian-US relations in the late 2000s largely owes to the triumphalist approach of the United States to Russia after the end of the Cold War. The United States treated Russia as a defeated nation, like Germany or Japan after the World War II, "a nation without full sovereignty at home or autonomous national interests abroad."[565] Such a behavior produced backlash in Russia; it happened under Putin's ruling, "but it would have been the reaction of any strong Kremlin leader."[566] Many in Moscow treated such US policies as an "encirclement designed to keep Russia weak and to control its resources", and this helped reviving assertive Russian nationalism, destroy once strong pro-American lobby in Russia and produced conviction that any concession to Washington will be an "appeasement" and even "capitulationism". Cohen proposes that in order to

[561] Trenin (2008)
[562] Pushkov, p. 56
[563] Trenin (2007), p. 103
[564] Andrew Monaghan, "'An Enemy at the Gates' or 'from Victory to Victory'? Russian Foreign Policy", **International Affairs**, 84(4), 2008, pp. 717-733
[565] Stephen F. Cohen, "The Missing Debate", **The Nation**, May 19, 2008, p. 8
[566] Cohen, p. 8

prevent a new Cold War, Washington must treat Russia as "a sovereign great power with commensurate national interests", to stop NATO expansion before it accedes Ukraine, and to review plans on missile defence system in Europe.[567]

4.1.1.1. Fundamentals of the Russian-American Relations

Putin put security among the first priorities in Russia's foreign affairs. According to Feklyunina, pursuing Russia's traditional 'special mission in the world', Putin's Russia was serving the world by leading the fight against terrorism and acting as a barrier to drugs and criminals on the way to Europe.[568]

The new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted in January 2000, identified two developing trends in global politics: one that stressed 'unilateral power actions' bypassing UN Security Council and another that pointed to the domination in the international arena of the Western countries led by the USA.[569] Later in April 2000 the new Military Doctrine was approved, which acknowledged that "large-scale war had become less likely, but internal and external threats to Russian security still persisted."[570] As Lo had emphasized, with Putin coming to the ruling, strategic feature of Russian foreign policy had been its 'securitization', that meant primacy of political-military over economic priorities.[571] Hard security issues and key features of geopolitics, such as zero-sum games, balance of power and spheres of influence, stayed at the top of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agenda. Monaghan also asserted that democracy approaching to Russian borders, promoted by West, was not worrying Russians as strong as security issues.[572]

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[567] **Ibid**
[568] Feklyunina, p. 622
[569] Marcel de Haas, "Putin's Security Policy in the Past, Present and Future: An Analysis of the Security Documents of 2000 Compared with the Defence White Paper of 2003", **Baltic Defence Review**, 12(2), 2004, p. 40
[570] Haas
[571] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., **Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century**, London: Frank Cass, 2003, p.13
[572] Monaghan, pp. 717-733

4.1.1.1.1. 9/11 Attacks and Afterwards

Situation changed sharply after September 11 attacks on US in 2001. The undefined geo-political situation of the 1990s ended with this event which defined a new geopolitical scenario where the state-actor was threatened by non-state actors. Moscow was so ardent in its effort to gain Washington's favor, that the Russian Foreign Policy Council offered Putin to completely drop the "multipolarity emphasis" from foreign policy agenda and "acquiesce to the U.S. position on missile defense".[573] The council stressed that balancing the American power would be "too costly and unpragmatic" for Russia. There was a hope that US-Russian alliance would bring Russia a number of advantages, such as easing-off some of its Soviet-era debts and even providing Russia a necessary leverage to join NATO, which the council believed would develop "into a universal organization of European and international security and shed its destabilizing features."[574]

In the course of following two years, Putin's Russia managed to become a highly visible player in European security. As Neumann noticed, this happened without any major shifts in Russia's power (except for some material shifts in economic and military policy), that means Russia had been and persisted to be a nuclear power.[575] But what was the reason of such sudden shift in Russia's position in Western security? Neumann explains situation by the concept of 'securitization', which means "idea that something typically becomes a question of security when it is lifted out of the general political agenda and made into a question of life and death". [576] So, immediately after 11 September attacks, terrorism was securitized. The most important here is the fact that securitization and 'violization' of terrorism in the USA after 9/11 mirrored the securitization and violization of terrorism in Russia over the Chechen issue.[577] Nygren affirmed this argument, proposing that Russia managed to acquire strong position in security field due to the opportunity that Russian interest in Chechnya coincided with the US interest in campaigns in Afghanistan.[578] At that

[573] Turner, p. 165
[574] **Ibid**
[575] Neumann in Hedenskog, pp. 17-18
[576] **Ibid**, p. 18
[577] **Ibid**
[578] Nygren in Hedenskog, p. 16

period Russia and the United States prioritized matters of hard security and state sovereignty over all-European principles of human rights (rights of war prisoners in this case), integrity of civil society and other multilateralist and liberal norms. Meanwhile, Putin's cooperation with Bush in the war against the Taliban did not mean that Russia was finally taking the West's side: rather it was pursuing its own economic interests.[579] Hence, cooperation with the USA on the war against terrorism provided Russia with expanded trade access to the U.S. market and investment opportunities. Besides, development programs helped Russia with cleaning up nuclear materials, ecological repair and reconstruction of public health system.[580]

4.1.1.1.2. 2003 War in Iraq and After

Meanwhile, since March 2003 Washington changed its focus point from Afghanistan, where it proclaimed its success, to Iraq, pressuring existing regime there. In its fight against terrorism, the US pursued evident unilateralism, putting this like those who were not on the US side, were on the side of terror. Remaining neutral seemed impossible for other countries in such a state of affairs. In this framework the US often passed around international organizations. The serious split in international society appeared regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns of the United States: while the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain supported the US decision to invade Iraq due to their mutual transatlantic relations, Germany and France took the opposite side. This development represented a way of action for Russia, which as a traditional balance of power player was waiting for an opportunity to catch any sign of the transatlantic clash.[581] Putin decided to join Germany and France in refusing to support the US invasion of Iraq and US demanding for the UN inspections to control the existence of weapons. This allowed Putin "to avoid a confrontation with the West as a whole"[582] and to leave a room for maneuver in its complicated alliance with the

[579] Duncan, p. 293
[580] Stephen J. Blank, "Russia and the U.S. War on Terrorism", **Defeating Terrorism**, Strategic Studies Institute, available online at http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/doc-153.pdf
[581] Neumann in Hedenskog, p. 17
[582] Duncan, p. 293

West. As Neumann stressed, "Russia was once more not only clearly visible but right in the European eye of power".[583]

Although the USA received much support from the UK and new members of NATO – Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia – and several of Russia's newly democratic neighbors, this support significantly waned after 2003. And while the United States justified its presence in Iraq by emphasizing the importance of establishing democratic regime in the Middle East, Russia constantly questioned US motives, namely Saddam Hussein's alleged possession of WMD and support for al-Qaida, and called for a withdrawal date. In autumn 2003 Russian Defense Ministry issued a White Paper that emphasized defense against the United States as a prime objective of the Russian armed forces and claimed that military reform project was over.[584] Putin's position on the issue was also intended for domestic consumption, argues Haas: his firm stand against USA pleased conservative representatives of Russian security elite and public in general. Nevertheless, the Kremlin did not deviate from dualistic approach to the West (cooperation with the West in order to develop Russian economy), and diplomatic speeches addressed to the US part were in a measured tone.[585] Meanwhile, Bush's administration declared in the aftermath of the Iraq war that while it intended to punish France and ignore Germany, Russia actually was to be forgiven.[586]

After re-election of Putin in 2004, Russia faced new challenges, such as destabilization of Central Asia, continuing terrorist activities in Northern Caucasus, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and refusal of some European states to participate in celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of victory over fascism.[587] Putin's Russia passed through an important test on pursuing strategy of great-power pragmatism, according to which Russia tried to be a normal great power and focused on cooperation with the West in economic and security fields. During the period of uncertainty, in the atmosphere of security threats such as terrorism, separatism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other dangers, Russia had to play a

[583] Neumann in Hedenskog, p. 17
[584] D. Trenin, "Conclusion: Gold Eagle, Red Star", **The Russian Military**, p. 223, available online at http://www.amacad.org/publications/russian_mil_conclusion.pdf
[585] Haas, p. 48
[586] "Russia", Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008, **Encyclopædia Britannica Online**, 8 October 2008. available online at http://search.eb.com/eb/article-230441
[587] Tsygankov (New Challenges), pp. 153-165

leading, pro-active role with a main principle of "prosperity and security through international interaction with the preservation of national identity".[588] Failure of the US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan signaled reduction of the US role in international arena, giving Russia an opportunity to clarify the Russian factor in global politics and to move from defensive role to the active one.

The Rose revolution in Georgia and Orange revolution in Ukraine pushed Russia toward a reconsideration of the Western threat. Russia adamantly opposed NATO membership of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan and criticized Western states of giving electoral and financial support to opposition in Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow observed with suspicion American efforts to "reshape the post-Soviet space", evaluating it as a "threat to its own influence in the region".[589] Generally, since the mid 2000s Russia and some CIS countries became more concerned with activities and influence of out-of-region actors in the post-Soviet area, which were characterized as "unfriendly, potentially dangerous or interfering with the interests of major regional players".[590] Eventually, Russia and several CIS members changed attitude toward such actors as USA and NATO exerting influence in Central Asia: so, in 2005 Uzbekistan expelled Western air-bases from its territory and in 2006 re-joined Moscow-centered Collective Security Treaty Organization; later in February 2009 Kyrgyzstan decided to shut down US air base in Manas. Election of Russian-friendly Ukrainian premier Viktor Yanukovych in 2006 also relieved Moscow in some sense.

4.1.1.1.3. Putin's Munich Speech – Open Opposition against the United States

Russia also responded sharply to criticism of Western states, namely USA, regarding curtailment of democracy in Russia during Putin's second term. The speech against Russia by the U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney in Vilnius in 2006 accused Moscow of "sending "mixed signals" over democracy and of using its

[588] Nikitin
[589] Tsygankov (New Challenges), p.158
[590] Nikitin, p. 15

energy resources as tools to "intimidate and blackmail" its neighbors".[591] Putin hit back by his famous "Munich speech" at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 2007, where he stressed the danger that was lying in the current unipolar world system; also that the United States was explicitly defying international law and "overstep[ing] its national borders in every way".[592] Putin's main argument was that the world ruled by one power was definitively undemocratic.

This exchange of mutual accusations marked political confrontation between the two sides. Russian political elite became convinced that "the Western powers were out to hold Russia back and prevent it from assuming its rightful place in world affairs"; Moscow also accused the West of applying double standards.[593] Russia was rethinking American system of values and its tendency to use force. There was even such a proposition that the USA encouraged "the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by regional powers", who armed themselves 'just in case'.[594]

According to Trenin, main goal of the Russian Foreign Policy after Munich Speech became the revision of the results of the Cold War.[595] First of all, Russia envisaged replacement or modernization of international institutions which were designed according to bipolar era and now were incapable of solving problems. Lavrov asserted that international affairs must be 'democratized' by allowing states to make sovereign decisions.[596] Lavrov declared that nothing has changed since Cold War: "Western alliance" imposed its own international relations system. Lavrov also stated that organizations like NATO, the OSCE, the CFE Treaty and others, were evolving into a means of reproducing a bloc policy.[597] In sum, after the Munich speech Russian diplomacy became more confident and coercive, although Moscow sent various proposals to Washington on cooperation, stressing that Munich spirit was not confrontational.

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[591] "Russia", Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008, **Encyclopædia Britannica Online**, 8 October 2008.
[592] Turner, p. 167
[593] Russia", Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008, **Encyclopædia Britannica Online**, 8 October 2008.
[594] Monaghan, p. 723
[595] Dmitri Trenin, "Vneshnaya Politika" (Foreign Policy), **Kommersant Vlast'**, 28 January 2008 available online at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=845861
[596] Lavrov in Monaghan, p. 729
[597] Monaghan, p. 723

4.1.1.1.4. 2008 Crisis in Georgia

Events in Georgia in August 2008 were in some sense an outcome of Russia's post-Munich speech assertive foreign policy. Russia's position toward Georgia was obvious: the Kremlin had always been against democratic revolutions in the former Soviet states or their entrance to NATO, and Georgia was not an exception. Besides Georgia's desire to enter NATO and the Rose Revolution of 2003, international community recognized the disputed areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of Georgian territory. According to Putin, after the precedent of recognition by Western powers of Kosovo's independence, Russia had a "moral right" to acquire these territories, but in reality Russia only did with agreeing a UN peacekeeping mandate to protect the citizens of these breakaway areas (most of whom were Russian). When the conflict erupted, Putin justified Russia's actions as a right to protect civil citizens and to respond against Georgian government's acts of 'genocide'.[598]

After 2008 war in Georgia, it became obvious that security problem was still the core issue in Russian-U.S. relations. This conflict made Russia "an unexpected flashpoint in the U.S. presidential campaign" and gave Russia a top place in agenda of the next White House administration.[599] The U.S. reaction was quick and harsh: immediately after Russia's invasion, President George W. Bush warned that "only Russia can decide whether it will now put itself back on the path of responsible nations, or continue to pursue a policy that promises only confrontation and isolation."[600] Russia's actions in Georgia aimed at breaking national sovereignty were evaluated by Western observers as an attempt to restore influence in the post-Soviet sphere; and these developments were likely to "change the national security calculations of virtually all the world's leading states".[601]

[598] Turner, pp. 179-180
[599] Sestanovich
[600] Turner, p. 179
[601] Sestanovich

4.1.1.2. Security Dimension of Russian-American Relations

Among the most actual fields in Russian-American security dialogue it is useful to look trough the issue of strategic disarmament, which continued in the line drawn on completion of the Cold War by Yeltsin and Clinton, as well as never-ending issue of NATO expansion, so meaningful for Russian security perceptions.

4.1.1.2.1. Strategic Disarmament and the Russian-US Relations

One of the areas where Putin had clear results was arms control. Immediately after becoming a president, overcoming serious opposition from the General Staff, he cancelled plans of upgrading Strategic Rocket Forces and persuaded Duma to ratify the START II agreement, which was awaiting its hour since it's signing in 1997. On the 6th of December 2001 Russia and US declared that they acquitted the START I obligations. As a further step in arms control cooperation, at a summit meeting in Moscow in May 2002, Russia and the US signed the new treaty on arms control – the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (SORT), which provided for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons by two-thirds by 2012 and replaced the second Russian-US Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT-2). SORT expressed a will for "genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, confidence, openness and predictability".[602] Russia and the US also agreed on crisis management in conflicts like between nuclear powers India and Pakistan, as well as draw a road map for peace between Israel and Palestine. However, in 2003, when Washington started operation in Iraq, Russian Duma postponed the ratification of SORT.

A bitter note to Russian-American relations in the beginning of Putin's presidency added the US's decision to build a National Missile Defense against so-called problem states and to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. The US administration explained its decision by the argument that "friends don't need

[602] Russian President, "Rossiisko-Amerikanskaia Vstrecha na Vysshem Urovne", [Top-Level Russian-US Meeting], 24 May 2002, available online at http://www.president.kremlin.ru/summit8, retrieved 31 May 2002

treaties"[603] and announced that the USA was not seeking a new treaty on nuclear reduction with Russia. Russia saw in this step a threat to strategic stability and to Russia itself and arranged an international campaign against this plan. However, during close cooperation against international terrorism, Russia pulled down its campaign against the US NMD programme, motivating this by arguments that firstly, the ABM Treaty actually allowed abrogation, and secondly, that Russia's strategic capability in fact was not seriously threatened.[604] So, Moscow ignored several international and domestic appeals to retaliate against the US unilateralism, yet it reserved right to withdraw from the START and to deploy ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) warheads. Russia also declared its intention to modernize its nuclear potential, at the same time continuing overall reduction.[605] After the official unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty on 13 July, 2002, Russia in response declared extinction of its obligations under the START II. Russian Foreign Ministry declared on the 14th of July that, due to the US actions, Russian Federation found no base for ratification of the START II and did not consider itself obliged by international law to refrain from any actions which might deprave this Treaty of object and aim.[606]

Another controversial issue in Russian-American security relations was the US plans to install missile defense equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic announced in January 2007. Washington claimed that this system was aimed as a defence against Iran and North Korea, but Russia did not buy it. In December 2007 Putin declared that "other states [were] taking advantage of Russia's peaceful nature to wage an 'arms race'"[607] and that Russia suspended its compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Russian officials also believed, despite Washington's denials, that US missile defence system planned to be deployed in Eastern Europe was "designed to neutralize Russia's strategic deterrent".[608] In order to prevent this, Putin and his cabinet believed, Russia had to deploy nuclear forces as

[603] Andrei Piontkovsky, "Analysis: End in Sight for Missile-Defense Absurdity", **The Russia Journal**, 41, November 2001.
[604] Ingmar Oldberg, "Foreign Policy Priorities under Putin: A tour d'horizon", in Hedenskog, p.30
[605] Karaganov, p. 223
[606] "START I and START II Treaties: an Inquiry", **Russian Information Agency (Rian)**, 8 April 2010, available online at http://www.rian.ru/spravka/20100408/219328070.html
[607] Sestanovich
[608] **Ibid**

much as necessary to reach a position equal to the US. One of instant examples of searching equality was Putin's decree to resume regular long-range patrols by Russian strategic bombers in August 2007 after 15-year break.

In spring 2007 Putin and Bush issued agreement on missile defense in Sochi. Putin stated that the conditions Washington had offered to place on the deployment and operation of its radars and interceptors in Eastern Europe would, if fully and sincerely put into practice, "assuage" Russia's concerns.[609] Later, when the United States and Poland announced their deal in August 2008, the Russian Government claimed "it would hurt U.S.-Russia relations."[610] In order to mitigate the tension, Washington proposed Russia to allow its military monitors at the U.S. missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, but the Czechs and the Poles opposed this plan, aggravating Russia's displeasure. On the other hand, Putin also pushed his own proposals to Bush, such as making available the Gabala radar base in Azerbaijan or creating a joint missile defence system with US and NATO participation, but these proposals were rejected by Americans. In response to such 'aloofness', Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov warned that Russia may deploy medium-range missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave, [611] adding that Western plans in Europe would "create a new dividing line, a new Berlin Wall".[612]

In 2005 Russia proposed to the United States to sign a new agreement instead of START, to be called 'Moscow Treaty'. For Russian part, this treaty was more advantageous than the failed START II, while some experts considered the Moscow Treaty decorative, addressed to the community which was struggling for peace in the world. [613] However, until late 2000s Moscow and Washington were unable to come to a serious official agreement on nuclear disarmament binding for both sides. During Russian-US summit in Sochi in April 2008, when strategic arms reduction treaties expected to be expired, the both sides again pledged to seek a legally binding successor to the START I agreement.

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[609] **Ibid**
[610] Yang Chuang, "An Uneasy Balance: Medvedev's Five Foreign Policy Principles Aim to Protect Russian Interests while Keeping the Peace", **Beijing Review**, September 25, 2008, p. 11
[611] Vladimir Socor, "Russia warns of missile forward deployment in Kaliningrad region", **Eurasia Daily Monitor**, 4(131), 6 July 2007.
[612] Interview with Igor Ivanov on Rossiya TV Channel, **AFP,** 8 July 2007.
[613] "Zachem SSHA Noviy Dogovor po SNV?" (Why does the USA Need a New Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction?), **Rosbalt**, 30 July 2007, available online at http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/07/30/402432.html

In December 2009 the START II expired, and in April new President of the USA Barack Obama and new President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev signed a framework agreement to the new strategic arms reduction treaty. During meeting in Moscow in July 2009 it was shaped into the form of Understanding on the issue of future reduction and limitation on strategic offensive arms.[614] It was planned to reduce amount of nuclear missiles to1500-1675 units and amount of warheads to 500-1100 units.[615] In May 2010 the new treaty was sent to the Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate.[616] Finally, on the 8th of April 2010, in Prague, the two sides signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty – START 3 which must set a limit of 1550 missiles and 800 warheads for the each signatory side.[617]

Washington's decision to renounce deployment of missile defence elements in Poland and Czech Republic in late 2009 evoked loud reaction, disappointment of Western commentators and claims that this was a "victory of Russian diplomacy".[618] However, later it appeared that the United States in fact was developing a new project based on naval forces, and immobile elements on the European soil were plainly unnecessary to Americans. Nevertheless, Washington was awaiting responsive steps from Russia, such as changing position on Iran and more active cooperation in Afghanistan.

The issue of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran was also actively figuring in Russian-American security agenda. Initially Moscow reassured U.S. fears that Iran may use Russian technology in developing secret nuclear weapons. But at the end of 2005 Moscow began pressing Iran to return to Russia all spent nuclear fuel and to accept inspections from the IAEA. In 2009 Moscow also supported Washington in its tendency for toughening sanctions against Iran.

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[614] "START I and START II Treaties: an Inquiry", **Russian Information Agency (Rian)**, 8 April 2010, available online at http://www.rian.ru/spravka/20100408/219328070.html

[615] "Noviy Dogovor ob SNV" (A New Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction), **Lenta: Rambler Media Group**, 4 August 2010, available online at http://lenta.ru/story/start/

[616] "Rossiysko-Amerikanskiy Dogovor o SNV Ushel v Senat" (Russian-American Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction Had Passed to the Senate), **Lenta: Rambler Media Group**, 14 May 2010, available online at http://lenta.ru/news/2010/05/14/senate/

[617] Viktor Kremenyuk, "SNV-3 i Dalshe. Kuda imenno?" (START 3 and Further. Where exactly?), **Nezavisimaya Gazeta**, 12 April 2010, available online at http://www.ng.ru/courier/2010-04-12/9_snv.html?insidedoc

[618] Natalya Serova, "Russian Foreign Policy has Grown up", **Utro.ru**, 28 December 2009, available online at http://www.utro.ru/articles/2009/12/28/862476.shtml

However, when the concern became a possibility of US pre-emptive strike on Iran, Russia's reaction was controversial. In 2007 Pushkov admitted that Moscow would not support US military strikes in Iran if this decision was taken only by Washington; similarly it would be equally meaningless to expect Washington to "withdraw support from a pro-American and pro-NATO Ukrainian leader simply because that would please Moscow".[619] Trenin believes that Russia would not sign anything at the UN Security Council that would allow use of force towards Iran. As Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov claimed, "Russia will not make the mistake it made in 1914 when it became involved in other peoples' war (World War I) and lost everything".[620] Russian policy-makers argue that preventive war against Iran is even worse than a nuclear Iran, and will lead to political crisis, radicalization and 'Muslim-Western confrontation'.[621]

Washington's main policy towards Russia is to "take care not to encroach on Russia's hoped-for sphere of influence in its neighborhood in exchange for Russia's help in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons".[622] Although some American realists point to enormous leverage Moscow possesses over Tehran, they cannot explain how. In fact, the United States has far more leverage – military, economic, and diplomatic – with which to influence Iranian policy.[623]

4.1.1.2.2. NATO in Russian-American Security Relations Agenda

NATO-Russia relationship in the post-Cold War period was much more a 'stand-off', not really a partnership.[624] One of the reasons was that Russia was still cautious about the alliance. Russian National security Concept of 2000 stressed the threats posed to the Russian Federation, where there was mentioned "the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all the expansion of NATO eastwards".[625] The Concept also stressed NATO's practice of using force outside its zone of responsibility and without the UN sanction. The Russian President

[619] Pushkov, p. 56
[620] Trenin (2007), p. 102
[621] **Ibid**
[622] Sestanovich
[623] **Ibid**
[624] Tomas Valasek, "The Agenda before NATO and Russia", **Demokratizatsiya**, 10(4), Fall 2002, p.528
[625] Haas, p. 42

was also skeptical about NATO. Putin's attitude to NATO before 9/11 may be expressed in his words from the press conference on 18 July 2001:

> We do not consider NATO an enemy organisation or view its existence as a tragedy, although we see no need for it. It was born as the antipode to the Warsaw Pact, as the antipode to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Now there is no Warsaw Pact, no Soviet Union, but NATO exists and is growing.[626]

Putin accepted existence of NATO as an 'inescapable fact', but that did not oblige Russia to 'learn to love' it, argues Lo. Russia's relation to NATO was limited and 'calibrated': there was no broad common working between Russia and the alliance, but only cooperation on special areas, such as peacekeeping or joint operations.[627]

Nevertheless, NATO was an organization with which Russia sought to find understanding after long hiatus since the Kosovo conflict. NATO sought rapprochement with Russia both during Yeltsin and Putin's administrations by means of a number of joint initiatives and consultative bodies, as the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Interesting, during interview to the UK journalist Sir David Frost in March 2000, when asked what if Russia one day joins NATO, Putin answered: "And why not?", but on "equal terms"[628] and only if the alliance were "transformed into primarily political organization".[629] This was a serious political signal addressed to NATO members at the beginning of Putin's career, just as Yeltsin did in 1991 the same proposal. Similarly, Vladimir Lukin, head of the Duma foreign affairs committee, proposed that optimal solution would be "the widening of NATO to Vladivostok".[630]

Russian-NATO relations went parallel to security relations of Moscow and Washington. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 substantially improved relations of Russia with NATO. Both sides tried to find new arrangements within the framework of new cooperation. By 2002, outlines of new institutional framework emerged: Russia and NATO decided to create a new NATO-Russia Council, where Russia would participate in NATO deliberations from the beginning, rather than after

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[626] The Official Website of the Russian President, http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/07/28591.shtml
[627] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gorodetsky, p. 17
[628] G. Whittell, "Putin Uses Frost to Begin Thaw with West", **The Times**, 6 March 2000.
[629] N. Gevorkiian et al., "Ot Pervogo Litsa: Razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym" (Moscow, 2000) in Gorodetsky, pp. 56-57
[630] RFE/RL, **Newsline**, 3 July 2001.

the consensus is reached. By allowing the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, Russia in fact showed a more flexible stance on the broader influence of NATO in the CIS – "pragmatic flexibility".[631] Actually, even before the 9/11 attacks, Putin stated that Baltic States, like any others, may seek NATO membership, albeit adding that there was no objective reason for doing so.[632] Washington embraced NATO-Russian rapprochement and NATO enlargement because the United States no longer viewed the alliance "as primarily a fighting vehicle but rather as a political and security organization"; hence, a more political NATO would be able to easier incorporate with Russia.[633] Moscow also wished NATO to transfer from a military organization into political and even promised to reconsider its opposition to NATO if it realizes this wish. Putin declared that 11 September signaled "the urgent need for such an evolution, since the attacks had revealed the inadequacy of NATO as a security provider".[634]

The Iraq War in 2003 turned relationship other way. The Defence White Paper prepared by the Russian government in 2003 was very ambivalent in describing Russia's position toward NATO. If in the entries of the document it was stated that large-scale wars or nuclear conflicts between NATO members or the USA and Russia were no longer probable and Russia expected cooperation with the USA on ensuring stability; then further the document expressed growing concerns on the enlargement of the alliance and possible deployment of NATO forces on the territories of new members. The document also entailed expectations that anti-Russian entries would be removed from NATO's official documents and even the warning that if NATO was "preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine", cardinal changes would be undertaken in Russian military and nuclear strategies.[635]

Russia regarded critically to the US as hegemonic leader affecting NATO decisions. Article V of the Washington Agreement on collective defence which linked NATO decisions on collective consensus was evaluated by Russian

[631] Alex Pravda, "Putin's Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?", in Gorodetsky, p. 42
[632] Putin in Pravda, p. 42
[633] Valasek, p .529
[634] Pravda in Gorodetsky, p. 43
[635] Haas, pp. 45-46

commentators as impediment for NATO's further transformation. Zolotarev argues that if NATO had accepted a coalition of accordant and discordant when taking decisions, then there would be more chance for discordant states to affect NATO decisions, namely according the problem of Iraq, where Russia, together with Germany and France could have influenced trough Russia-NATO Council.[636] Since NATO was unlikely to give up Article V, there was possibility that the Alliance would at least neutralize the impact of this article in other security spheres with non-member but partner states such as Russia.

Meanwhile, NATO priorities widened, starting from promoting stability in Afghanistan, continuing with deep focus on reassuring new member states ("often by taking operational steps viewed in Russia as provocative") and finishing with moving closer to Russia's neighbours such as Ukraine and Georgia. Washington made diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's and Georgia's entry to NATO, but several European allies were against, so NATO accepted the entry but delayed it with no precise schedule being set.[637]

Although there were some positive steps in NATO-Russia Council's activity, such as Russia's accepting a joint NRC ministerial declaration that was instrumental in breaking the post-electoral political deadlock in Ukraine and support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, however, "countervailing trends were already gathering pace."[638] So-called "pragmatic development of mutual political assurances" in relations between NATO and Russia was lost in 2000s: Moscow believed that, running counter to Russia's interests, NATO unilaterally re-interpreted the disposition of forces of its members set earlier in the 1997 Founding Act.[639] Colton and MacFarlane also referred to the question of Russia versus NATO opposition in the Former Soviet Union, arguing that regional security was "nothing less than a zero-sum game between Transatlantic and Russian

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[636] Pavel Zolotarev, "Moskva plus NATO: Tolko Sovmestno s Severoatlanticheskim Alyansom Rossiya Sposobna Ukrotit' amerikanskiy Ggemonizm" (Moscow plus NATO: Only with the North-Atlantic Alliance is Russia Able to Manage American Hegemonism), **Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie**, 23 January 2004, available online at http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2004-01-23/4_nato.html

[637] Sandra Dias Fernandes, "Time to Reassess the European Security Architecture? The NATO-EU-Russia Security Triangle", **European Policy Institutes Network**, Working paper No. 22, March 2009, p. 4

[638] Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, "The Return of the Pan-European Security Question", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 8(1), July 2009, pp. 5-6, available online at http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2009/09/39347_en.pdf

[639] Brichambaut, pp. 6-7

interests".[640] According to Braun and Simon, strategy of sustaining the status quo and "tacitly acknowledging Russia's spheres of interest in the FSU" was not suitable for NATO and Western powers, since this was "likely to ensure durable peace only at the cost of freezing local conflicts".[641]

Since 2007 Russia shares land or sea borders with six NATO member countries. Eastern border of Estonia, NATO member, lies only 90 miles from St. Petersburg, Russia's ancient capital. Moscow became more and more concerned over "increasingly aggressive nature of NATO" as the alliance continued to grow, new members and candidates for NATO membership set territorial claims against Russia, glorified SS members and Nazis, practiced bias against Russian-speaking populations in the post-Soviet states, including other forms of human right infringements.[642] Primakov believed that NATO's expansion toward East "has affected Russia's security calculations' and buttressed Moscow's 'Cold War-era anxieties', pushing the country toward strategic isolation and encirclement.[643]

Fernandes argued that tensions between Russia and the West over missile defence in late 2000s were closely related to NATO's enlargement moves toward Georgia and Ukraine, as well as to START and the CFE treaty.[644] By 2009 many American political commentators began to assure that Russia should join NATO, which became an entirely new organization "adapted to the new geopolitical situation and … no longer a threat to Russia". While Russia, on its part, talked about NATO building new Berlin Wall in Europe (Putin in 2008) and the need for new security organization between Europe, Russia and North America (Medvedev and Lavrov in 2009).[645]

According to Western critics, relations between NATO and Russia are likely to be difficult in the twenty-first century "as long as the self-styled Eurasian superpower lacks commitment to the co-operative principles of the Alliance".[646] A

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[640] Aurel Braun, ed., **NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century**, New York and London: Routledge, 2008 (Reviewed by Timofey Agarin, in *Ethnopolitics*, 7(4), November 2008, p. 490)
[641] Braun, (Reviewed by Timofey Agarin, in *Ethnopolitics*, 7(4), November 2008, pp.490-491)
[642] Mikhail Kokeyev, "Russia-NATO Relations: Between the Past and the Future", **Russia in Global Affairs**, 2, April-June 2007.
[643] Yevgeny Primakov, "Intervention", Speech to North Atlantic Cooperation Council Ministerial Session, 11 Dec 1996, available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s9612115.htm.
[644] Fernandes
[645] **Ibid**, p. 2
[646] Braun, (Reviewed by Timofey Agarin, in *Ethnopolitics*, 7(4), November 2008, p.490)

road to NATO-Russian rapprochement is also blocked by some western commentators who use to assert that political regime of Russia, established by Putin since 1999 "lacks democratic credentials to be fully engaged in NATO's activities".[647] However, these difficulties do not mean that there must emerge a 'new cold peace': instead, "greater dialogue is required between the members of the Alliance on the potential repercussions of Russia's marginalization."[648]

4.1.2. Russian-EU Relations during Putin

In connection with changes in international arena and in Europe in the beginning of the 21st century, such as consolidation and expansion of the European Union and NATO, Russia and EU developed their relations toward a long-term strategy. Since the early 2000s Putin declared the "European choice"[649] of Russia. While not seeking Russia's joining to the Union, Putin repeatedly stressed that Russia was "an integral part of European civilization"[650] and that main interests of Russia in the EU were "modernization, participation, and multipolarity".[651] Most scholars admitted that Russian-EU relations in 2000s were based on pragmatism, or "pragmatic consideration of mutual needs"; this was a more realistic relationship than the "formalistic partnership" of the 1990s.[652]

4.1.2.1. Fundamentals of Russian-EU Relations during Putin

Russian political elites realized that Europe was on the first stage of Russia's priorities; however, there were divergences on the methods of implementation of this cooperation. The main problem laid in Russians' cautious approach to the European normative foundations; therefore Russia insisted on remaining outside the institutional framework of Europe. In fact, Russians were reluctant to admit that one

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[647] **Ibid**
[648] **Ibid**
[649] *See* D. Danilov, "European Choice of Russia", **International Affairs**, 5(51), 2005, pp. 144-158
[650] Vladimir Putin, "50 Years of the European Integration and Russia," 2007, available online at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/03/25/1133_type104017_120738.shtml
[651] Riester, p. 8
[652] Flenley

of the main obstacles to closer EU-Russian cooperation was a value and normative gap: Russians, for instance, were not as transparent and skeptical as Europeans, while Europeans did not understand the rules Russians played in economics and continuously pointed to the gaps in democracy or in human rights in Russia. As a result, Moscow began evaluating the EU not as the most significant strategic partner in common European integration, but just as one of economic-political associations of the modern world, as a partner-competitor of Russia. Doing so, argues Trenin, Russia risked losing the chance of rapid modernization and strengthening its geopolitical position by closer interaction with united Europe.[653] Similarly, EU officials, while declaring their readiness to get into strategic partnership with Russia, still had doubts about the content of Russia's 'European choice' policy and had no clear vision of how to deal with Russia. Mankoff stressed that Russia's post-Soviet Great Power ambitions put it at odds with the 'postmodern' and 'postimperial' Europe which emphasized values and institutions and took shape on its borders.[654]

Nevertheless, despite so different ambitions of Russia and the EU, Putin insisted that "Russia aspire[d] to not only increased cooperation, but also increased integration, at least in the fields of economics and trade, which Moscow hope[d] will be the centerpiece of a new PCA".[655] The PCA of 1994 continued in the 2000s, too, and there were proposals to substitute it with new and more complex EU-Russia agreements. Closer cooperation with the EU was important for fulfilling more than one objective of Russian policy. Firstly, economic cooperation would bring about growth of Russian economy which in turn would lift up Russia's international position. Secondly, closer ties with the EU, especially in further development of an independent European policy in parallel with Russia's own military power, might weaken relationship between EU and the USA. Moscow was naturally willing to benefit from the possibility of split in the Trans-Atlantic camp, because this would let Russia promote multipolarity and get stronger. For the EU, on its part, one of the most important objectives in the new millennium was to strengthen its position in the neighborhood, acting as a main actor in the region. And this included "the

[653] Trenin (2008)
[654] Mankoff, p. 148
[655] **Ibid**

indispensable collision in global policy with the Russian Federation"[656] which became its largest neighbor after 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The 2003 EU Security Strategy highlighted Russia as a "key player in geo-political and security terms at both the global and regional level".[657]

4.1.2.1. A "Big Start" for Cooperation

Moscow and Brussels arranged annual Russia-EU summits in Russian and European big cities and established high-level contacts. At the first Russia-EU summit in 2000 in Moscow Putin stressed that Russia "was, is and will be a European country by its location, its culture, and its attitude towards economic integration".[658] In 2003 EU signed agreement on building four 'Common Spaces'[659] with Russia and the creation of a Permanent Partnership Council. During 2002 Russia-EU summit, the two sides discussed such topics as defence and security cooperation (ESDP), international and legislative cooperation, the Kaliningrad problem,[660] issues on European economic space, including WTO, energy projects to transit gas from Russian North-West to Europe, environment and nuclear security.[661] On 11 November 2002 Moscow and Brussels signed agreement on a transit regime for persons, and in April 2004 – for goods;[662] the EU also applied Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) and other instruments in Kaliningrad. Among contemporary fields of Russian-EU cooperation are Common

[656] Hristofor Hrisoskulov, "Regional Integration and the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Black Sea Area", in Jan Martin Rolenc, ed., "Crucial problems of International Relations through the Eyes of Young Scholars", **International Conference of Young Scholars**, University of Economics, Prague, 2008, p. 122

[657] "EU and Russia: Overview of Relations" available online at http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_210.htm

[658] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 376

[659] Four 'Common Spaces" supposed deeper Russia-EU integration in economics and trade; internal security and justice; science, education and culture; and external security. Although road maps for realization of these spaces were vague and it would take at least two decades to build these spaces, they were nevertheless useful for the both sides, for the EU for its further integration with Russia, and for Moscow to fit its reforms to this framework.

[660] Kaliningrad is Russia's exclave surrounded by EU members Poland and Lithuania. While common sentiments point as a main problem the issue of transit between Russia and Kaliningrad, the key problem is "growing economic disparities between Kaliningrad and its neighbours". So, there are concerns that if economic disparity grows further, Kaliningrad may seek autonomy or even secession from Moscow. (Dmitri Trenin, "Russia, the EU and the Common Neighbourhood", **Centre for European Reform**, September 2005, p. 7)

[661] Likhachev, p. 56

[662] See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/kaliningrad_en.htm

European Economic Space (CEES), the Northern Dimension, dialogue on security and defense, international terrorism, environment, EU programs on chemical disarmament, inter-regional cooperation, Russia's accession to WTO, scientific cooperation, and other issues.[663]

Moscow emphasized multipolarity in relations with Europe, what was stressed in official documents such as Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine 2000 and official statements of policy-makers. In this sense Russia saw "the EU as another pole and as a step to hindering the US's current hegemony".[664] In 2005 Putin claimed:

> (w)e should not let bloc mentalities prevail in European politics, nor should we allow new dividing lines to appear on our continent or unilateral projects to be implemented to the detriment of the interests and security of our neighbours. [665]

Nevertheless, in consideration of zero-sum games, Russia's relations with Europe were characterized by division of Europe into two camps: Old vs. New Europe.[666] The 'New Europe' was represented by newly joined post-Soviet Central European and Baltic states who had been historically apprehensive of a Russia that was getting stronger and expressed consistently pro-American stand, supporting US actions in Iraq. They constituted conservative community in European Parliament and pushed forward the 'victim syndrome' with regard to the Soviet Union, equating the former USSR to the present Russian Federation.[667] The so called 'Old Europe', on the other hand, included France (especially under Chirac's administration), Germany and Belgium, who supported Russia in global affairs and joined Moscow in its stand against US during Iraq war of 2003.[668] New Europe was seen by the US neo-conservatives as a counterbalance to "the excessively Europe-centered military strategic ambitions of the 'old Europe'"; US neo-conservatives also criticized Russian cooperation with the Old Europe in their "economic flirting with the Axis of

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[663] Likhachev, p. 58
[664] Mommsen in Riester, p. 9
[665] Putin (2007)
[666] This concept was invented by the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and often used by European media which criticized political leadership of France and Germany for pro-Russian stance in international issues, especially during the US was in Iraq.
[667] Nadezhda Arbatova, "Russia and Beyond: Russia-EU Quandary 2007", **Russia in Global Affairs**, 2, 30 June 2006, p. 102
[668] Merkushev, pp. 363-364

Evil countries", namely Iran.[669] For instance, former candidate for President of the United States John McCain titled Putin 'the spoiled child of Europe' and insisted on Russia's exclusion from the G8.[670]

This division was also associated with Russia's tendency of designing policy in Europe on bilateral basis, in other words developing 'pan-European architecture'. As Trenin stressed, present-day Russia did not want to dominate Europe or become the part of a "common European home" like under Gorbachev, it rather treated Europe 'tactically', calculating the vulnerabilities inside the Union.[671] By the end of Yeltsin's administration, France and Germany were considered Russia's major allies in the European scene; Russia's new President, Vladimir Putin, added UK to this echelon. France attracted Russia because of its perceived independence from the USA policy, Germany "on account of its crucial geopolitical position in Europe" and economic potential, and the UK due to "its role as one of the leading world political and financial centres, as well as through its expected ability to preside over the regime-introduction of Russia … into the international scene".[672]

In 2004 the fourth significant enlargement took place when ten countries joined the EU all at once: the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), five Central and Eastern European states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and two Mediterranean mini-states (Cyprus and Malta). This was an unprecedented enlargement in terms of number of new members, their diversity and level of economic development.[673] The second enlargement in 2007 acceded two more states into the EU. Moreover, the EU engaged actively in the post-Soviet area by developing the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 2007 Strategy for Central Asia, the 2009 Eastern Partnership and appointing EU Special Representatives to Moldova, the South Caucasus, Georgia and Central Asia. These developments were a respond to increasing demand from these states for a greater role of the EU in the area, while the area of energy security became primary interest in EU's activism there. Russia observed rising EU assertiveness with consternation

[669] **Ibid**, p. 364
[670] **Ibid**
[671] Trenin (2007), p. 98
[672] Baranovsky, p. 454
[673] M. Peter Van Der Hoek, "The European Union: Eastern Enlargement and Taxation", **Atlantic Economic Journal**, June 2004, available online at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/118987155.html

and with troubles for its national interests in the post-Soviet space. As Trenin stated, for Russians "NATO and EU enlargement should stop at the Commonwealth of Independent States' doorstep".[674] Since 2004, Moscow became countering actively the EU in the "overlapping neighbourhoods"[675] (or common neighbourhood), which by the way Moscow preferred to name "regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders".[676]

4.1.2.2. 2003-2006 Period of Stagnation in Relations

By 2003-2004 Russian-EU relations began to deteriorate due to such developments as EU and NATO enlargements, disruption of energy supply by Russia because of tensions with its main transit neighbours – Belarus and Ukraine[677] and anti-Russian stance of some European states, especially newly accepted Baltic and Central European states. Karaganov et al argued that those successful relations set by Putin between Russia and the EU during 2002-2003 were loosing effectiveness, since some small European states like Denmark, Austria and other Central and Eastern European states became critically or negatively biased towards Russia. As a result, pro-Russian European leaders (of France, Germany and Italy) were unable to support Russian interests in the Union's decisions. More than that, mass media was pressuring European leaders pointing on some negative developments in Russia, causing further deterioration in relations between the two sides.[678]

A report prepared in Moscow 2005 by 23 scholars, bureaucrats and policy-makers stated that main problem of Russian policy towards Europe was the absence of strategic vision of Russia in common European context.[679] The authors of the

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[674] Trenin (2007), p. 98
[675] Derek Averre, "Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?", **European Security**, 14(2), June 2005, pp. 175-202
[676] **Ibid**, p. 183
[677] For more information on the gas disruptions issue between Russia, Ukraine and the EU *See*: "What Is behind Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute?", **Xinhua News**, 16 January 2009, available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/16/content_10665802.htm ;
"Russia, Ukraine Gas Dispute Turns Ugly", **RusNet**, 15 December 2005, available online at http://www.rusnet.nl/news/2005/12/15/currentaffairs03.shtml
[678] S. Karaganov, ed., "Otnosheniya Rossii i Evropeyskogo Soyuza: Sovremennaya Situaciya i Perspektivi" (Russian-EU Relations: Contemporary Situation and Perspectives), Moscow, 2005, p. 8 available online at http://www.svop.ru/upload/images/report2.pdf
[679] Karaganov (2005)

report cautioned Russia of signing formal agreements in frame of four components of EU policy towards Russia,[680] because this framework may imply some concessions from Russia. Report proposed instead to draw a new "big" Russia-EU agreement to substitute PCA of 1994. It also stated that there were no obvious obstacles to discussion of Russia's formal entrance into the EU; nevertheless, this question depended on further evolution of the Union itself (a "federal quasi-state" or "common market plus") and development of Russia ("authoritarian stagnation" or "developing democracy").[681] Russia was less interested to enter a quasi-federal EU.

There was also a problem considering strict criticism by European states of Russian conduct in Chechnya. In February 2005 the European Court of Human Rights obliged "the Russian authorities to pay compensation to six Chechen civilians whose family members had been killed by Russian forces."[682] The EU has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid in the region: "since the beginning of the conflict in Chechnya in autumn 1999 and including the €17.5-million funding decision for 2007, the EU has provided around €220 million in humanitarian aid"; EU also established a "special programme for economic recovery of the North Caucasus with a budget of €20 million for health, education and economic development".[683]

4.1.2.3. 2006-late 2000s: the Period of Depression

By 2006-2007 Russia and EU faced new controversies on geopolitical issues as independence of Kosovo, restrictions on Iran, missile defence system of US in Poland and Czech Republic and conflict in Georgia in September 2008, when the European Commission decided to pass a wide-range "audit" of Russian-EU relations. The actual impact of 2004 EU enlargement on Russia's position in Europe manifested in 2006-2007, when newly-comers to the EU began to pressure Russia on various issues through their presence in the EU decision mechanisms. In 2006 Poland

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[680] *See* "Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia", **Official Journal of the European Commission,** available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:157:0001:0009:EN:PDF

[681] Karaganov (2005), p. 4
Note: "common market plus" means a model of EU evolution where main fields of integration would be economy and social sphere.

[682] "Russia", Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 8 October 2008.

[683] http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/northern_caucasus_en.htm

opposed PCA to be extended for Russia because of dispute with Russia over meat export.[684] This issue, as well as issue on Russian export duties on timber sales to Sweden and Finland, made an obstacle for Russia's accession to WTO.

Russian officials complained on Europe's alienation from Russia: so, the deputy head of the presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov claimed: "Europeans 'won't accept us', resulting in Russia being 'a poorly understood periphery of Europe but not quite "Europe" with a capital E'".[685] Gutnik believed that the wave of 'Europessimism' and the cooling-off in Russia-EU relations occurred "due to the latest two-stage expansion of the European Union".[686] Besides official hostile attitude of Russian authorities, public opinion toward the EU had also changed.[687]

Nevertheless, strong business ties and inter-dependence in energy sector are likely to keep Russian-EU relations more stable than Russian-US relations, which are keeping deteriorating. In common, Russia and EU do not see each other as adversaries on the international stage; this can be seen in intentions to make positive steps even in conflicting situations by both sides. On the other hand, the "strategic partnership" which is officially used to term Russian-EU relations in reality is expressed by EU's intention to compete Russia in economic issues and EU's vision of Russia as potential objector to EU expansion.

4.1.2.2. Security Dimension of Russian-EU relations

Russia's security policy during Putin became more 'European' in compare to Yeltsin's 'Atlanticist bias'.[688] As Lo had noticed, Moscow found in European capitals more 'receptive audience' to its security concerns, such as strategic stability,

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[684] *See* "Warsaw Wants EC Involved in Talks on Russian Meat Embargo", **Rianovosti**, 26 November 2007, available online at http://en.rian.ru/world/20071126/89684378.html
"Polish Meat Row Part of Wider EU-Russia Divide", **EU Observer**, 23 April 2007, available online at http://euobserver.com/9/23910

[685] Rose and Munro, p. 52

[686] V. Gutnik, "Partnership at the Crossroads", **International Affairs** (Moscow), 53(4), 2007, p. 14

[687] A Levada Centre survey conducted across Russia in December 2006 found that 71% of the 1,600 respondents did not consider themselves European, that only 20% saw the country aligned with European culture and that 45% even believed that the EU posed a threat to Russian culture or its financial, industrial and political independence. ("In Focus: Russian-EU Relations", Monthly Report, December 2007, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, available online at www.eiu.com)

[688] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gorodetsky, p. 21

than in Washington.[689] Indifference of the USA towards Russia's security interest became even more clear after the change of Washington's security priorities due to 9/11 attacks. Hence, Moscow tried to join European powers in their attempts to build continental security, such as fighting against international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and transnational crime, peacekeeping and reconstruction in the Balkans, security in the Middle East, establishing a stable European security space, and so on. There had been established institutional mechanisms for political consultations at various levels, such as, for instance, the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), 'Common Spaces', or monthly meetings of the Russian Ambassador to the EU with the Political and Security Committee. The EU-Russia dialogue on security issues established a good basis for cooperation on the conflicts in the FSU area with a launch of a road map for a space of common external security in May 2005.

Although Europe did not possess "a military potential comparable to that of the United States", the expansion of both NATO and the EU had nevertheless significantly affected Russia's security interest in the region and fed Russia's "postimperial anxieties".[690] EU expansion deprived Russia of its strategic areas it gained at the end of the World War II and made Russia and Europe close, albeit uncomfortable neighbours. Further possible expansion of the Union, to include Turkey or some post-Soviet states as Ukraine or Georgia raised fundamental questions on "Russia's identity and role in Europe's security architecture".[691] Notwithstanding that NATO expansion was perceived as a primary threat by Russia, even more dangerous than the EU expansion, yet the EU enlargement posed potentially far more threat to Russian interests, particularly in relation to Kaliningrad. Having this in mind, Putin's administration tended to focus on security developments such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), West European Union (WEU) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), rather than on economy or social integration.[692]

Meanwhile, Putin's administration had put away the idea so popular during Yeltsin of "the OSCE as Europe's umbrella security organization"; the OSCE during

[689] **Ibid**
[690] Mankoff, p. 146
[691] **Ibid**
[692] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gorodetsky, p. 17

Putin was evaluated as "unwieldy and cumbersome, intrusive (notably vis-à-vis Chechnya), and incapable of serving as an effective instrument for promoting Russian strategic goals".[693] Conversely, NATO was evaluated by Putin as "by far the dominant security reality in Europe" and "that Russia has no choice but to adapt accordingly".[694] In 2005 Russia criticized the election-observation missions run by the OSCE for applying "double standards" and "pro-Western bias".[695] Moscow also set restrictive limits on OSCE observation of Russian elections in 2007.

Main security problems in EU-Russian security relations during Putin's administration were the unilateral initiative of the USA to install missile defence elements in Eastern Europe, Kosovo's independence, Russia's invasion in Georgia and the EU-accession aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. The question of Kosovo status and its possible independence became a critical point in Russia's evaluation of the OSCE, with Moscow trying to separate it from the United States and most members of the EU and NATO. These developments gave base for growing "reservations about the viability of the OSCE as a whole."[696]

Besides above listed problems, there were systematical problems in Russian-EU security cooperation: negotiations over the common spaces in security field were problematic; the PPC and consultative mechanisms were impeded by 'procedural difficulties' and "meetings have often lacked real content".[697] In other words, institutional framework was insufficient for common acting in a way towards establishing continental security, unless Russia and Europe develop a 'common security culture'[698] which meant to think and act together. Taking in mind such EU behavior as keeping minimal Russian involvement in the ESDP and limitedness of common spaces scope, Russia was more and more becoming isolated from the EU.

Russia's dissatisfaction with existing European security structures was expressed in its highest point by Russian President Putin at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007. Putin criticized the security situation in Europe,

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[693] **Ibid,** p.16
[694] **Ibid**
[695] "Russia," Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 8 October 2008.
[696] Brichambaut, p.6
[697] Averre, p. 176
[698] D. David, "Russie/UE: Une Culture De Securite´ Commune?", Paper at Conference **Die erweiterte Europaische Union und ihre neuen Nachbarn. Wirtschaftliche, politische und soziale Herausforderungen**, Vilnius, 14-15 October 2004, **available online at** http://www.oefz.at/fr/Vilnius_04/Interventions/David.pdf

particularly regarding the CFE Treaty and anti-missile defence system. The OSCE received the strictest criticism, being called by Putin a "vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries" and charged for losing the "balance in the geographic and the functional focus of its activities, with most activities occurring 'east of Vienna' and in the so-called Human Dimension".[699] In 2007 Russia suspended participation in the CFE Treaty, motivating this by the fact that no EU member ratified the modified 1999 Treaty. The Kremlin rejected the link made by the Western powers between ratifying the treaty and Russia's commitments on withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Transnistria. At that time, only few hundred of Russian troops remained in the Gudauta base in the breakaway Abkhaz region, and 1.300 in Transnistria.[700]

As for the anti-missile defence issue between Moscow and the Washington, for European powers it was a bilateral, not a multilateral issue "because of flaws in the existing security architecture".[701] And although at the Bucharest NATO summit in April 2008 the EU members voiced support for an anti-missile shield, they were concerned that this shield might be directed against Russia. According to Sakwa, when Washington took unilateral decision (without NATO approval) to deploy missile defence elements in Eastern Europe, Europeans proved unable to take responsibility for security on the continent. He argues that "the readiness of the 'New European' powers (now members of the EU and NATO) to act as willing accomplices to American actions", and to act as "nuclear and conventional pedestals for American power" had undermined Europe's claims to be a community with normative values.[702]

According to Gutnik, 2007 crisis in Russian-European relations stemmed from "an inability to understand and accept new conditions in which an effective cooperation can be realized".[703] There were also such factors as mutual distrust and reluctance to go to compromises. Each side tried to demonstrate its capability to dictate its will in certain issues what increased tension on both sides.

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[699] Brichambaut, p. 7
[700] Sakwa (New Cold War), p. 259
[701] Fernandes, p. 2
[702] Sakwa (New Cold War), p. 256
[703] Gutnik, p. 14

Nevertheless, in June 2008 Russia and the EU launched negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement. New Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, in his speech for a renewed dialogue on pan-European security, called for adoption of new security treaty which would reaffirm main principles of the Helsinki Final Act, including those critical for Russia, such as "indivisibility of security, reasonable sufficiency of armed forces, the sovereignty of states and inviolability of borders, as well as the non-recourse to force and peaceful settlement of disputes"[704]. In this proposal Russia called all relevant security organizations to involve: NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the CSTO and the CIS. This issue was debated at the Helsinki OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in December 2008, and in informal OSCE ministerial meeting in Corfu organized by the Greek OSCE Chairmanship in late June 2009 with participants as Sergey Lavrov, Hillary Clinton, the Turkish Foreign Minister and the EU High Representative. Russia's proposition had serious implications for many states in Euro-Atlantic area; the biggest worry was that this proposal meant institutionalization of Russian veto on future development of other security organizations, especially NATO.[705]

Meanwhile, PCA expired in 2007. In 2006 Putin proposed to substitute PCA with new strategic partnership agreement, however it had to be delayed because of Poland's veto concerning meat embargo.[706] Later in 2008 EU and Russia again proceeded on developing the new agreement, and on 4 July in Brussels the two parts agreed on the content of future agreement to include political dialogue, trade and economic cooperation, reforms in jurisdiction, culture, freedom, science and security.[707] The second round on the strategic agreement was hung up because of conflict in Georgia in September 2008, when the European Commission decided to pass a wide-range "audit" of Russian-EU relations. The EU also froze negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement.

In November 2008, the 22nd EU-Russia summit in Nice re-opened negotiations on strategic partnership of Russia and the EU. Financial crisis of 2008-

[704] Brichambaut, pp. 7-8
[705] **Ibid**, p. 8
[706] *See* "Putin Threatens to Widen Trade Embargo in Europe", **The New York Times**, November 24, 2006, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/24/world/europe/24russiansumm.html
[707] "Otnosheniya mejdu Rossiey i Evropeyskim Soyuzom (ES): Spravka" (Relations between Russia and the European Union (EU): Inquiry), **Russian Information Agency (Rian)**, 2 December 2008, available online at http://www.rian.ru/politics/20081202/156289310.html

2009 was the main topic in Russia-EU summit in Khabarovsk in May 2009, along with energy security and climate change.[708] In order to prevent future energy crises, the Council for the Commission gave a green light in December 2009 to negotiate a broad Nuclear Partnership Agreement with Russia in case of an energy crisis, which stressed peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Russian Federation.[709] There was also reinforced the Early Warning Mechanism to improve prevention and management in case of an energy crisis. In 2009 Russian President Medvedev, together with Foreign Minister Lavrov again proposed a new security treaty necessary for Russia, Europe and North America. This was a signal that Russia was seeking to reshape security relations and institutions in Europe. This was also related to the US plans on deployment of missile defence system in Europe.

4.1.2.3. Russian-EU Relations and Democracy

During Putin's administration Russia and the EU established cooperation in fields of human rights and civil society, as well as justice, freedom and security. "Supporting Russia's transition to an open society based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights"[710] was central objective in EU's policy toward Russia. Moscow was happy to sign up to these normative principles, however, interpreting it in its own way: Russia put the main accent on 'security' aspect of the Common Spaces, than to 'freedom' and 'justice' which depended on political will to carry out democratic reforms.[711]

Human rights issue was an essential element in Russian-EU relations; it was reflected in the concept of the four Common Spaces and the Common Space for Freedom, Security and Justice in particular. Since 2005, regular consultations on

[708] *See* "EU-Russia Summit on 21-22 May in Khabarovsk", available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/817&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
[709] *See* "Green light from the Council for the Commission to negotiate a broad Nuclear Partnership Agreement with Russia.", available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1990&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
[710] *See* "The Delegation of the European Union to Russia", available online at http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/fields_cooperation/human_rights/index_en.htm
[711] Averre, p. 185

human rights matters have been held. These Consultations also addressed specific human rights issues in the Russian Federation, particularly in the Northern Caucasus: the rights to a fair trial and the protection of people in detention; on the other hand Russia had an opportunity to defend right of Russian people living in the EU states. Besides, the EU had links with human rights defenders in Russia, sent observation missions to certain trials and supported international human rights initiatives in Russia in partnership with the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Russian human rights organizations received support from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights programme (the former European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights created in 1994) for over 250 projects.[712]

The other significant component of Russian-EU strategic partnership was cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security which increased since Putin's administration. The EU-Russia Common Spaces draw a roadmap for this cooperation field in May 2005. The six-monthly Permanent Partnership Councils on Justice, Freedom and Security set priorities and monitored progress. Other fields of cooperation were border management, control of trafficking of drugs and human beings and organized crime (within the TACIS framework), and Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters (with the support of the Council of Europe).

However, despite so huge efforts to cooperate in democratic field, the EU was dissatisfied with Russian records on democracy. Brussels' criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya, civil rights, media, and the Yukos affair [713] in mid 2000s raised negative attitudes towards the EU among Russian political establishment. So, while the EU continued is strategic partnership with Russia and approved the stability afforded by the second term for Putin, it had more skeptic approach to his

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[712] *See* http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/fields_cooperation/human_rights/index_en.htm

[713] The Yukos was the major oil company in Russia, when Putin's administration ordered an arrest of its CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, seizure of his shares of Yukos and subsequent resignation. Western critics pointed to several negative implications of this decision for Russia, such as "drying up domestic and foreign investment; undermining the rule of law; increasing the power of unelected bureaucrats from secret police and law enforcement; withering sources of funding to democratic parties and charities, and weakening civil society."(*See*: Ariel Cohen, **The YUKOS Affair: Protecting Democracy, Private Property, and the Rule of Law**, The Heritage Foundation, Executive Memorandum, 906, November 2003)

In April 2004 the Yukos representatives claimed to the European Court of Human Rights that the Russian government violated its rights under several Articles. In 2009 the Court declared the Yukos claim as admissible, and the hearing took place in March 2010. This was a really distinctive achievement, since only fewer than 5% of all applications are declared admissible in the ECHR.

administration's interpretation of the common values as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.[714] Alexander Litvinenko's death in London in 2006 added negative effect on Russia's image in Europe: more and more Putin was blamed of breaching democratic principles. Criticism on Russian domestic affairs was accompanied by growing troubles about Moscow's policy in the post-Soviet space, which was evaluated as "neo-imperial in nature".[715]

On the other hand, Moscow was critical of Europe imposing its democratic principles on Russia's neighbouring states as Ukraine or Georgia, as well as critical of the OSCE for "concentrating largely on monitoring human rights and democracy at the expense of its original role as a forum for political dialogue and decision-making on European security matters".[716] This showed Russia's growing reluctance to accept the imposition of norms by European organizations and Moscow's desire to get a leading role in creating these norms.

As Averre proposes, the "normative aspect of the EU's agenda", with all its political, legal and humanitarian aspects, is likely to stay highly problematic in relations with Russia which refuses to become "the object of the EU's 'civilising influence' and assertion of its own values and identity". As Putin claimed in his April 2005 address to the Federal Assembly:

> Russia, while observing generally accepted democratic norms, will itself decide how – taking into account its historical, geopolitical and other specific features – it can guarantee the realisation of the principles of freedom and democracy.[717]

It is important to note, that Putin was the first leader to exploit the concept of "sovereign democracy" into the practice of the Russian governing. Sovereign democracy represented a different model of economic and social development that was particularly relevant to states in the former USSR and Asia, and emerged in response to the West's 'democratic messianism' or 'export model of democracy'.[718] Monaghan discovered that the concept of 'sovereign democracy' was proposed by Vladislav Surkov among the supporters of the Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia)

[714] Averre, p. 176
[715] Feklyunina, p. 605
[716] Averre, p. 188
[717] **Ibid**, p. 194
[718] Monaghan, p. 729

party, "as a means of mobilizing and consolidating the population by projecting the picture of a Russia besieged by powerful enemies".[719] Putin built his popularity in part on the idea that foreigners had no right to judge Russia's political system. His slogan "sovereign democracy" offered a nationalist cover for arbitrary and centralized rule.[720] Western criticism may have strengthened Putin's appeal and helped him tar his domestic opponents as disloyal and subversive.[721]

The paradox of Putin's sovereign democracy was the fact that he continuously reaffirmed his commitment to democracy and civil freedoms in Russia and held democratic reforms, but at the same time "regularly and blatantly curtailed and undermined those principles and structures". Maybe, pursuing a kind of master plan or just acting pragmatically, he took control of every institution or 'power center' in Russia "capable of challenging the president's authority".[722] So since 2000 until 2008 Russian political system became "highly centralized and increasingly authoritarian".[723] Yet other Western observers saw Putin far from being a 'totalitarian ideologue'; they called him an 'economic nationalist', as the leaders of great powers traditionally have been.[724]

Putin's authoritarianism first of all was expressed in efforts to undercut economic and political power of Russian oligarchs, then tight control of the media and even forced closure of independent TV stations which did not fit his administration's requirements. When serving at Yeltsin's administration in the late 1990s, Putin realized the crucial role the media played in undermining political opponents, controlling various organizations and affecting the results of the voting. And he used this knowledge in practice. The most sounding example was the closure of the NTV in 2001, a station, controlled by Putin's rival, which exposed corruption, criticized the war in Chechnya and investigated social problems.[725] Newspapers uncontrolled by the government almost died out by 2008, reaching little audience of

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[719] **Ibid**, p. 727
See also Andrei Okara, "Sovereign Democracy: a New Russian Idea or a PR Project?", **Russia in Global Affairs**, 2, July-September 2007.
[720] Sestanovich
[721] Sestanovich
[722] Thompson, p. 374
[723] **Ibid**, p. 375
[724] "From the TAC editors", **The American Conservative**, October 6, 2008, p. 9
[725] *See* Michael Wines, "Court Gives Media Rival of Putin A Reprieve", **New York Times**, December 30, 2001.

200.000 readers in contrast to 35 million people who got information from the government newscasts every day.[726]

Another step to tightening the state control was restructuring relations between Moscow and Russian regions and autonomic republics. In early 2000s Russian President weakened positions of local governors in the Federation Council and won authority to remove elected governors when necessary. After the massacre in Beslan, on the pretext of reinforcing security at the local level, Putin began appointing the local governors himself, adding new "supergovernors" to seven large provinces of the Russian Federation.[727] Putin also limited activities of foreign-based non-governmental organizations in Russia working in such fields as environment, education, health and welfare, establishing restricting regulations on them.

Duncan states that in sum Russia's internal development during Putin was far from the Western model. Putin greatly suppressed the criticisms of the authorities, imprisoned businessmen who acted in independent manner, controlled the elections and media. Nevertheless, Putin continued to co-operate with the West to achieve economic and technological progress. On the other hand, "Russia's increasing authoritarianism was antagonizing its Western partners, who were ceasing to believe that Russia might soon evolve towards democracy".[728] Thus, if it might be summoned, Russia kept being economic and strategic partner of the West, yet it had not become the part of the Western world.

[726] Thompson, p. 375
[727] **Ibid**
[728] Duncan, p. 294

CHAPTER V
EASTERN DIMENSION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING PUTIN'S ADMINISTRATION

In the final part of my work there will be discussed how Russia's foreign policy was developing in the Eastern dimension during Putin's presidency. I shall handle Russia's relations with Eastern countries dividing the area to Asian and Middle Eastern regions. Asian vector will entail Putin's policy preferences in dealing with China, the Asia-Pacific region, the Koreas and India, as well as importance of the BRIC (Brazil Russia India China) alliance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other Asian economic and political organizations for Russian political perspectives in Asia. Relations with China will include multilateralism, economic relations, security considerations, and other fields. Analysis of Russian policy in the Middle East will especially describe geopolitical considerations on developments in nuclear and military security and energy fields and balancing of great powers like Russia and the United States and international community in the region.

5.1. Eastern Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy during Putin

Russian foreign policy towards Eastern states under Putin's administration expressed continuity with the path established during Yeltsin, although Putin's policy became more pragmatic and multi-vectored. As soon as Putin became a Russian President, he announced a new Foreign Policy Concept in June, 2000 where he called upon 'non-Western partners' to cooperate closely for creation of a "democratic, fair and equitable multipolar world order".[729] Putin intended to revive Russia's assertive stand in regional and global politics by reassigning 'strategic priorities' to Russia's old friends in the East, such as China or India. As early as in 2000 Putin visited both China and India and signed with them major arms-import and political-military agreements.

[729] Jain, p. 387; *Also see*: Vladimir Putin, "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", **Strategic Digest**, September 2000, pp. 1247-1256; Robert Legvold, "Russia's Unformed Foreign Policy", **Foreign Affairs**, September/October 2001, pp. 62-75

On the other hand, due to new challenges in 2000s, Russia was bound for an intense competition for its 'place under the sun" in the Orient, since its closest partners (as China, India and Central Asian states) and more distant partners (as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) all had their own strategic spheres of influence and interests which conflicted with those of Russia in some areas.[730] Predominance of energy and arms trade in its relations with Eastern states made Russia vulnerable to Eurasian balance of power fluctuations, where such giants, as China on the one hand and the EU on the other, held much more diversified foreign policies, based not only on energy issues.

With a new millennium coming, Russia also asserted its position in the Southern Seas which was framed in the "Global Ocean" plan, discussed during Yeltsin's ruling in the 1990s, but never implemented. Putin ordered the Russian naval leadership to return the "Global Ocean" to involve Russian economic and political interests. Incidents such as the interception and detention of the Russian tanker "Volganeft" by American fleet in the Persian Gulf changed the attitude of the Russian naval and political authorities.[731]

Russian foreign policy towards the Eastern dimension during Putin administration was framed by Neo-Eurasianism approach, promoted by more nationalist and anti-Western political circles. Main idea of this political approach was "to realign Russia away from (and even against) the West, and to ally Russia with other powers".[732] One of leading proponents of Eurasianism in 2000s Russia was Alexander Dugin, who promoted the stream further: using the ideas of Sir Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer, he determined that "there was an age-old conflict between the continental heartland, based on Eurasia, and the oceanic powers, primarily the British Empire and then the USA".[733] His workings were often used by the Russian General Staff Academy in geopolitical reasoning. Neo-Eurasianists, while stressing the aim of fighting against American global domination, proposed that Russia should cooperate with various powers in the East and in the West, since most states in the world were concerned with growing domination of the USA.[734]

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[730] Sergei Luzyanin, "Russia Looks to the Orient", **Russia in Global Affairs**, 2, April-June 2007.
[731] Koulieri, p. 30
[732] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 372
[733] Duncan, p. 288
[734] Shlapentokh, pp. 215-236

When advocating the need of "bringing Russia's Eurasianist identity to its logical policy conclusion", Putin emphasized economic interests rather than political or cultural:

> Russia has always considered itself to be a Eurasian (evroaziatskaya) country. We have never forgotten that a greater part of Russian territory lies in Asia. But frankly speaking, we have not always used that advantage. I think the time has come for us and the countries of the Asia-Pacific to go over from words to deeds, that is, to build up economic, political and other contacts. Russia has all the requisite possibilities for this now.[735]

Moreover, Putin did not apply Neo-Eurasianism to the practice of foreign policy in full scale: he rejected such radical proposals of Dugin, as alliance with Muslim and Asian states against the US and UK; while due to pragmatic considerations accepted Dugin's proposals to build "east-west and north-south land transport networks and the creation of a Eurasian Economic Community".[736]

Similarly, when considering multipolarity, Putin's notion of it was different from "a competitive or semi-confrontational" multipolarity of Primakov.[737] First, having in mind Yeltsin's experience, Putin realized that Russia could only encourage multipolarity in the world stage when it was itself an economically and politically stable country. Secondly, he adopted "ideas of cooperative balance similar to those embodied in the notion of a Concert of Powers", where the raison d'être was more flexible. The main feature of Putin's notion on multipolarity was not so much to counterbalance the United States, but "rather to obtain a broader status quo in which more or less 'equal players' moderated one another and restrained the assertiveness of the regional superpower, whoever that might".[738]

5.1.1. Fundamentals of the Russian Foreign Policy in Asia during Putin

Putin's policy towards Asian states was more consistent than that of Yeltsin, since Putin managed to reestablish Russian influence in the region, however some

[735] Putin in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 379
[736] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 382
[737] **Ibid**, p. 214
[738] Lo in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 215

scholars pointed out that "he was playing a weak hand" failing to open way for sustainable economic development and integration into the region.[739] According to Rozman, Putin's overall policy in Asia could not neglect two pivotal concerns: "(1) a dearth of globalization; and (2) over reliance on China and on Central Asian leaders who [were] failing to take advantage of opportunities".[740] Another feature of Russia's East-Asian strategy was a search for the optimal paradigm of relations with large powers and small countries of the Asia-Pacific region. This entailed management and development of "bilateral partnership nodes" with China, Japan, the Koreas and Mongolia.[741] Some of these partnerships, like Sino-Russian, had solidified, while some, like relations with Japan and North Korea, were complicated in some stages.

It is important to state, that when constructing relations with Asian states, Putin tried to escape overdependence on relations with one particular country, as China, and promoted a more "diversified and balanced policy than that under Primakov".[742] Hence, addressing East Asian audience, Putin described Russia as "both a European and an Asian state", which did "justice to European pragmatism and Asian wisdom alike ... so the foreign policy of Russia will be a balanced one".[743] Igor Ivanov, former Russian Foreign Minister, also stressed the Asian vector as one of the main priorities for Russian diplomacy and stated that 'multidimensional, mutually beneficial cooperation' was a distinguishing feature of relations with Asian states.[744] Russian scholar Karaganov called Russia for turning toward Asia, but warned that this did not mean a multipolar policy directed de-facto against the USA, and not a 'preservation of backwardness' or Eurasianism in a form of 'original path', but a moving towards rapid modernization, flourishing and democracy.[745]

In 2004-2006 Eastern policies of Russia stepped into a stage of resurgence. At the third Baikal Economic Forum (BEF) in 2004 Russia's Eurasianist course was expressed in following words:

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[739] Rozman, p. 4
[740] **Ibid**, p. 9
[741] Luzyanin
[742] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 215
[743] Putin in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 376
[744] I. Ivanov, "A New Foreign-Policy Year for Russia and the World", **International Affairs**, 2003.
[745] S. Karaganov, "XXI Vek: Kontury Miroporyadka" ("XXI Century: Contours of the World Order"), **Rossiya v Global'noy Politike (Russia in Global Politics)**, 3(5), September-October 2005, pp. 36-51

> The parallel co-development of Russia and Europe and Pacific Rim Asia, EC and APEC is the major course to help Russia fulfill *its historic Euroasian mission of a bridge (geo-political, infrastructural and spiritual) between two civilisations—the European and Asian ones.*[746]

When in 2005 Putin attended the first Russia-ASEAN and East Asian summits, Dugin commented this as a sign of "Russia starting to act as a full-fledged Eurasian power".[747] Also in June 2005 in Vladivostok took place the first independent meeting of the foreign ministers of Russia, India, and China; this was the firs step towards realization of the 'strategic triangle' proposed by Primakov in 1998. In July 2006 Putin again arranged trilateral summit in St. Petersburg between leaders of Russia, China and India which underlined strength of Moscow's strategic ties with these countries. Albeit some western scholars supposed this Moscow-Beijing-Delhi 'strategic triangle' to have no power in practice, because in nowadays international system the USA (which was tried to be counterbalanced) had "more comprehensive ties with Russia, China, and India than any two of them have between themselves".[748]

Contrasting change in Russian foreign policy towards Asian states in mid 2000s was explained by Rozman by means of four explanations: firstly, some blamed the United States and some NATO and the EU states for "aggressively expanding their presence in the former Soviet Union" which alarmed Russia to undertake counter measures; secondly, Putin's policy in Asia was a reflection of his domestic policy of security obsession supported by political control from above and "restricted foreign investment and integration with the outside world"; thirdly, some argued that Russian policy depended on contrasting behaviors of two major Asian powers: "Japan's rigid stance that alienated Russia's political elite" and "China's sustained wooing of Russian leaders"; and lastly, the wide view lied around the need to pursue national interest and that Putin only made available choices limited for Russian position.[749]

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[746] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 385
[747] **Ibid**
[748] Pant, pp. 311-328
[749] Rozman, pp. 3-4

The Pragmatic Eurasianism of Putin's policy was reflected in desire to connect Europe and Asia by plans on construction of railway links between the two Koreas and the Trans-Siberian Railway aiming at transporting goods to Europe cheaper and faster than the usual sea route. There were also envisioned projects on the construction of oil and gas pipelines from fields in Siberia and the Russian Far East to supply major energy consumers like China, Japan, and South Korea. Plans on diverting 30% of Russian hydrocarbons exports from the West to the East along with projects on oil and gas pipelines construction in Asia gave incentives for stable partnerships. Putin's proposal on "establishment of an Energy Club of the SCO, which will form a new Eurasian energy space embracing Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan" even had a potential to counterbalance the OPEC, as well as Western institutions, namely the European Energy Charter.[750] To some degree these plans were also an instrument for integrating Russia into the Asia-Pacific economy – a chance for the survival of the RFE.[751] Putin applied these plans by organizing Baikal Economic Forum in Irkutsk in September 2000 using Asia-Pacific strategy prepared by the Russian Far Eastern Institute (IDV). The Forum aimed at such pragmatic ends, as developing Russia's Far East economy, political participation and integration into the Asia-Pacific region.[752]

Rangsimaporn asserted that Russian elites used Eurasianist identity in instrumental way in order to "justify its [Russia's] perceived special right to play an influential role in Asia-Pacific affairs and to enhance its attractiveness as a partner to East Asian countries by virtue of its territorial presence in the region".[753] Thus, Russia just used Eurasianism to rationalize its 'Great Powerness' (derzhavnost') rather than sincerely desiring a friendship with Asian countries or becoming a member of their society.

By and large, Russia sought to participate in all East Asian developments, at the same time pursuing there its pragmatic, geopolitical and even civilisational interest. On the other hand, importance of East Asia for Russia lied in its usefulness as a counterbalance to Russian relations with the West, which was a part of Russian

[750] Luzyanin
[751] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 379
[752] **Ibid**, p. 384
[753] **Ibid**, p. 385

Eurasianist identity. Nonetheless, Russia's stand as a Great Power with an Eurasianist identity risked to remain unconvincing if Russia did not have capabilities to prove and strengthen this Great Power status. As Putin realized, Russia had first to "build up its power in order to be taken seriously in East Asia and globally".[754]

5.1.1.1. Russian Relations with China

At early stages of Putin's presidency, China was highly concerned with Russia's decision to strengthen ties with the West, namely the EU and NATO. The fact that Putin delayed his first visit to China, first visiting European states and even other Asian states before China, was a cause for displeasure. Moreover, Putin's unilateral offers to develop a joint missile defence system in Europe to NATO and the United States since summer 2000 puzzled China, who reminded Moscow of their common obligations considering security and the ABM Treaty.[755] Putin paid a visit to China only in summer 2001, when he held a summit in Beijing, after then passing to Pyongyang in order to restore bilateral relations with North Korea, Russia's former ally.[756]

Nevertheless, since 2001, Russian relations with China improved significantly. In May 2001 the Shanghai Forum was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and included Uzbekistan as the sixths member. The SCO focused on such issues as trans-border and intra-state security. In 2002 charter of the organization, the SCO members emphasized "the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability in the region in the environment of developing political multi-polarity and economic and information globalization."[757] Katz considers that Russia and China viewed the purpose of the SCO divergently: while Moscow saw the SCO as a developing 'politico-military alliance', Beijing rather envisioned it as an 'economic cooperation zone'.[758] Withal, Russia and China always

[754] **Ibid**, p. 386
[755] Umbach, p. 48
[756] **Ibid**, p. 47
[757] Turner, pp. 173-174
[758] Kartz in Turner, p. 174

asserted that the SCO did not pretend to be a military bloc.[759] On the other hand, SCO was used by Russia and China as a normative platform to count generally accepted principles of "Western-style democracy" and human rights and eliminate this normative unipolarity in international arena.[760] In 2007 Russia attempted to raise the status of SCO to that of NATO as a security organization by establishing mutually-binding security obligations and large-scale military trainings ("Peace Mission 2007") between the SCO members; however, these actions did not address common security threats as terrorism or drag trafficking, but addressed "state failure and foreign attack", showing that China and Russia rather tended to prove "their independent military strength to the US", rather than make SCO a forum for resolving common threats in the region.[761] It is important to note, that SCO posed a dilemma for Russia in economic sense, as Russia also sponsored Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). Rowe and Torjesen argued that if SCO will go ahead in economic development in the region, then China would dominate the market. Thus, Russian authorities claimed that "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not envision the formation of a single economic space, as [EEC] does."[762]

5.1.1.1.1. Russo-Chinese Relations in Terms of Multipolar Policies

On July 16, 2001, the leaders of Russia and China signed a twenty-year Friendship and Cooperation Treaty which was comparable with the one initiated by Stalin and Mao Zedong in 1950. The new agreement projected technology transfer, weapons sales, common front against Islamist forces in Central Asia, Russia's support for the "One China" policy and China's sovereignty over Taiwan and close cooperation against the U.S. hegemonism (although both sides denied that it was aimed against any third party).[763] Under this treaty Russia and China called for a multipolar world and establishment of "a just and fair new world order"[764] and opposed the US unilateral withdrew from the ABM treaty; the United States, on their

[759] *See* "'SCO Not Eastern Version of NATO': Organization Chief," June 8, 2006, available online at http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t257075.htm
[760] Bailes in Rowe and Torjesen, pp. 189-190
[761] **Ibid**, p. 190
[762] Rowe and Torjesen, p. 189
[763] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 378
[764] Turner, p. 163

part, became more alarmed by growing Russian arms and military technology exports to China that threatened "the delicate military balance in the Taiwan Strait".[765] Anxiety of Washington was expressed in 2001 Pentagon's defense report where Russia and China were classified as "global peer competitors".[766]

Despite West's preoccupation, the 2001 Sino-Russian treaty did not form any official or military alliance between Russia and China. Although both sides held talks on defence treaty aiming "to oppose US influence and to counter Pentagon's plans to create an anti-missile shield in America and a part of Asia", it will not be in a form of alliance, stated Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russian source).[767] Chinese officials also never used a term of an 'alliance' and often made it clear that their bilateral relations were "not alliance-type relations, are not directed against any other third party, and moreover, [did] not present a threat to other states".[768]

Meanwhile, Western commentators were not optimistic on emerging Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, pointing to its limitations.[769] Umbach argued that during first years of Putin's presidency, his pro-Western foreign and security policies have complicated bilateral Sino-Russian relationship.[770] He also stressed that new leader of China, Hu Jintao, represented new Chinese generation, which was not impacted by Soviet ideology and Russian education, and likely to become more "Chinese", even more Western, but less Russian.[771] Tomes asserted that China was "a major uncertainty in Russia's security environment and requirements"; he argued that although Russia had cooperation with China on border agreements and mutual troop reduction treaties, China's "current military build-up, geo-strategic situation and long history of territorial disputes with Russia and the USSR" made it impossible for Moscow to ignore threat scenarios form Beijing.[772]

In addition to the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, minor border disputes were resolved, joint military exercises were held in 2005, close cooperation was achieved in mutual interest in the UNSC, often opposed to the interests of the United

[765] Umbach, p. 44
[766] Turner, p. 171
[767] Umbach, p. 46
[768] **Ibid**, p. 49
[769] G. Rozman; S. W. Garnett; Z. Brzezinski; P. F. Meyer; and J. Andersen; in E. Wishnnick, "Russia and China: Brothers Again?", **Asian Survey**, 41(5), September/October 2001, pp. 797-821
[770] Umbach, p. 45
[771] **Ibid**
[772] Tomé, p. 41

States; trade and arms sales were expanded and scientific and technical exchanges were broadened. Border areas continued to stay on the forefront of both economic and security considerations. It was a question of "to what extent cross-border issues could be turned into opportunities for cooperation rather than merely coexistence"[773]. The need to strengthen Russian Far East economically became actual, since Russian military strength eroded and this weakness might be exploited by China. In 2005 Putin managed impressive achievement by signing an agreement on delimiting the 4,300 km border after decades of disagreement.

Russian foreign policy under Putin was based on flexibility in international relations and on avoiding excessive dependence on the West or East in the global level or on China in the regional. However, growing tensions in Russian-American relations, resulted from such developments as war in Iraq, US abrogation of the ABM Treaty, plans on missile defence system in Europe, etc., pushed Putin to revise Russian-American strategic partnership, and in May 2003 Russian and Chinese Presidents re-emphasized the development of a multipolar world, reaffirming it in a 2005 'Joint Statement on the International Order of the 21st Century', which was also circulated within the UN.[774] Combating "three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism" was also an issue at the SCO, of which Russia and China were the most active members.[775] Moreover, China shared Russia's concern over the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and opposed West's attempts to promote democracy in this region: as Stent asserts, both countries favored "stability and the existing authoritarian regimes in their shared neighbourhood".[776]

5.1.1.1.2. Trade Relations and Arms Sales to China

During Putin administration trade between Russia and China increased, recording $8 billion in 2000 (1.7% of China's total trade volume) and $12 billion in 2002. Although both sides were satisfied with common projects on energy trade and weapons deliveries from Russia, bilateral trade was rather disappointing, since

[773] Kuhrt, p. 8
[774] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 215
[775] Angela E. Stent, "Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 60(6), August 2008, p. 1100
[776] **Ibid**

China's trade with other states excelled that with Russia manifold, for instance, US-China trade in 2000 was 115 billion.[777] On the other hand, Russia's trade was also more active with the EU and CIS states, rather than its trade with China or Japan, which was less than 5%.[778] So, Moscow's intent to strengthen economic cooperation with Asian states remained only in words, far from reality.

Optimistic prospects for economic cooperation mainly included military-technological and energy cooperation. Compared with arms sales to China averaged $2 billion per year between 1996 and 2000, the new agreement raised this level to $20 billion between 2000 and 2004 – a double amount of previous annual sales.[779] During the period from 2001 to 2007, citing the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Russia exported "3,857 missiles and missile launchers, nine warships, and 120 aircraft" to China.[780] According to Putin, arms sales to China were important in order to consolidate "China's defense capabilities in establishing a multipolar world order."[781]

However, by 2007 the Chinese arms market became saturated, and Russian arms exports to China dropped to 63%; hence Chinese President's visit to Moscow in March 2007 no major arms deals were signed. Moreover, Russian military and security authorities seriously opposed arming China not only because of this would lessen Russia's military capability in the RFE, but also because of following reasons: "arming a future threat; Chinese re-exporting cheaper Chinese versions of Russian weapons systems thereby undercutting Russia in the global arms market; and resentment that Russia was arming China with equipment that even the Russian military did not possess".[782] Official stance of Russian government to this issue, however, was that China did not pose a military threat to Russia; this was also confirmed by then Defence Minister Ivanov.[783]

On the other hand, Russia had advantageous position in military power in relation to China, and since Russia was the leading state in the world arms exports, Moscow itself decided to whom sell which weapon; thus Russia possessed a check

[777] Umbach, p. 50
[778] **Ibid**
[779] Richard F. Starr, "Can Putin Pull It Off?", **World & I**, 16(12), December 2001
[780] Turner, p. 171
[781] **Ibid**
[782] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 223
[783] I. Cherniak, "Besedka. Ministr oborony Sergei Ivanov", **Komsomol'skaya Pravda**, 5 June 2002.

on Chinese military power. It is noteworthy, some Chinese experts blamed Russia for selling the most modern weapon systems to India.[784]

Although Putin's policy in China showed great achievements comparing with antagonism of the Soviet period, yet one should not exaggerate this rapprochement, since in reality it was only a *convenient and instrumental relationship* that served both parties in their interests in the international relations arena.[785] Even if both Russia and China are members of BRIC, it is China, not Russia, who is the world's rising economic power. China evaluates Russia as a 'junior', 'convenient' partner, and Russia, on its part, is concerned with China's future geopolitical and territorial ambitions. So, Putin was seriously concerned with Chinese immigration and the future of the RFE. As he stated on this issue in 2000: "the very existence of this region [RFE] for Russia is questionable. If we don't take concrete efforts, the future local population will speak Japanese, Chinese or Korean".[786]

Putin's policy was characterized by sober decisions on strategic relations with China. At the global level China was evaluated as a useful balance against the US, but only as one of many other states and not as an ally that would completely eliminate the need to cooperate with the US on some issues.[787] At the regional level China was useful in dealing with Japan and sustaining the position in the Korean Peninsula, albeit it was important to keep China away from regional dominance. And at the bilateral level Putin tried not to allow China to get advantageous position in economic integration or to access Russian Far East which may clash with Russia's national interests in future.

Indeed, in its relations with China, Russia tried to minimize risks such as ecological dangers in form of oil spills, illegal migration, the depletion of border rivers and especially China's growing economic power. Moreover, China is likely to become main rival of Russia in Central Asia, especially given its growing energy needs. So, while the Sino-Russian relationship during Putin's administration was "guided by co-operation and common strategic interests in specific economic and foreign policy fields", it was also "characterized by still existing mistrust as well as

[784] For instance, Ching Cheon in Umbach, p. 50
[785] *See* Bobo Lo, **Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics**, Chatham House and Brookings Institution, 2008.
[786] RFE/RL Reports, 1(2), 31 July 2000.
[787] Rozman, p. 22

strategic rivalry".[788] Eventually, despite Russia's ambivalence about its Europeanness, Russia has never viewed itself as Asian power[789], it has always felt itself closer to Europe, than Asia. Therefore, Sino-Russian relations under Putin were inherently limited.

5.1.1.2. Russia and Asia-Pacific Region

Russia's relations with other Asian players developed in a slower track, than those with China. Moscow realized the huge potential of the Pacific Rim in its intentions to reach the markets of the United States, as well as opportunities in the Canada to the north and Latin America and Australia to the south. Russia could no longer afford its Asia-Pacific policy to be secondary in its 'Euro-Atlantic dimension'.[790] Although Russian policy in Asia-Pacific was still prone to favor bilateral schemes, what deprived Russia of fully using opportunities and effectively managing its resources, a more general and wide approach to the region was slowly emerging.

Russian policy-makers often complained of being ignored in the region. States of Asia-Pacific region were also reluctant to admit Russia as a great regional power. So, Russia's application to participate in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), an inter-regional forum, was denied despite Russia's geographical presence in both Europe and Asia. Similarly, Russia was marginalized at the first East Asia Summit held in Malaysia in December 2005: Putin was invited there only in observer status, "despite Russia having fulfilled a key prerequisite by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN in November 2004 ('Ob uchastii', 2004), and also having a large geographical presence in north-east Asia."[791]

Nevertheless, Russia managed to join the main economic forum of Asian states – APEC. In May 2001 first significant arrangement of APEC in Russia was Business Advisory Council session in Moscow, which gathered about 100

[788] Umbach, pp. 43-62
[789] G. Rozman, "Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy", in R. Legvold, ed., **Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
[790] Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Asia Policy under Vladimir Putin, 2000-5", in Rozman, pp. 111-112
[791] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 380

representatives of APEC states' business elite. In 2002 ASEAN members met in Moscow and Vladivostok on a forum on innovational business and telecommunications. In October 2003 Putin presented a governmental concept on Russia's participation in APEC during the APEC summit in Bangkok. At his address Putin stated that the route towards future development of comprehensive cooperation with Asia-Pacific states was Russia's deliberate choice, a choice made due to growing global interdependence and due to the fact that this region became the most dynamically developing.[792] At the meeting held on November 19, 2006 in Hanoi, APEC leaders called for further development of global free-trade negotiations and condemned international threats as terrorism, also criticizing North Korea's nuclear tests. The United States and Russia signed at this meeting an agreement with a clause on Russia's plans on joining the WTO.

Despite progress in economic relations, political dead-end on territorial issue remained unsolved between Russia and Japan. With Putin becoming new Russian president, Japanese became reassured about their illusions to receive back the Northern territories to their country by 2000, what was implied by Yeltsin.[793] Putin dispelled all illusions on this matter. In fact, he tired to find a compromise, offering to Japan's Prime Minister Mori in 2001 in Irkutsk of his intention to apply the '1956 formula', that is to return two small islands to Japan in change for a peace treaty. Besides, Putin offered his colleague a large-scale economic cooperation both in the Kurile Islands area and in the Russian Far East as a whole. However, Mori reacted by claiming that Tokyo would not "accept any arrangement that excluded the other two islands".[794] Mori's own proposal to revive proposition of 1998, according to which Russia would have administrative authority during further 10-15 years, but during which Japanese sovereignty would be accepted by the two sides, was turned down by Moscow.

On the other hand, Russian public opinion was generally opposing the idea of returning the Kurile Islands to Tokyo: hence, if in 1999, 47 per cent said the islands

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[792] *See* The Official Website of APEC in Russia, available online at http://apec2012.ru/content/?a=325&s=168&p=1

[793] In 2001, 45 per cent of Japanese polled were 'not particularly hopeful' of an improvement in relations under Putin. (*See* surveys in D.V. Strel'tsov, "Obraz Rossii v Sovremennoi Yaponii: Factory Formirovaniya", in E.V. Molodiakov, ed., **Rossiya i Yaponiya: Sosedi V Novom Tisyacheletii**, Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2004, pp. 74-97, 91)

[794] J. H. Miller, p. 7-4

should stay Russian, by 2000 54 per cent said so; by 2005, this figure had risen to 67 per cent.[795] Russia's position on the Northern Territories under Putin remained to commit to the obligations of the 1956 Declaration, where it was stated that the two Island would be transferred to Japan, (and Russia was ready for this) but as the Kremlin asserted, there were not stated under what conditions the transfer should occur: when to transfer and whose sovereignty will extend to the territory.[796] Moreover, Moscow continued to ascertain that Japan had renounced its claim to the Kuriles under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Whereas Tokyo "insisted that the 'Northern Territories' were not in fact part of the Kuril chain".[797]

In 2001 Koizumi Junichiro became a Prime Minister of Japan. He brought back the 'traditional approach' to the territorial issue, which aimed at transfer or all the four islands to Japan with no room for maneuvers. This made the possibility of consensus impossible in near future, and the issue got frozen. Fuel to the situation was added by a scandal involving the Sakhalin-2 offshore hydrocarbon project.[798] One of the problems for the Russian side was also to ensure that Japan will not use the demarcation of borders with China in 2004 as a precedent for the Kurile Islands dispute. Also, as in Yeltsin's period, during Putin disputes over fishing periodically strained Russian-Japanese relations.

Although Russo-Japanese relations were strained because of territorial disputes and mutual historical dislike, there were some positive developments at the "subregional level", such as non-visa exchanges of visitors on the Kuriles Islands.[799] Moreover, President Putin and Prime Minister Koizumi produced an 'action plan' during their meeting in Moscow in January 2003, which set close bilateral relationship, mainly based on cooperation in developing Siberian energy resources.[800] Hence, being feared of overdependence on Chinese market in its energy routes to Asia, Russia decided to build a pipeline through Eastern Siberia and the RFE to the Pacific Ocean, as opposed to Daqing in China. One of important potential

[795] Cited in **Izvestiya**, November 2005, survey by Social Opinion Fund.
[796] Panov in Rozman, p. 180
[797] Kuhrt, p. 141
[798] For more information, *See* Irina Baranova, "Leaking Operations: Environmental Consequences of World Bank and EBRD Involvement in the Russian Oil Sector", **CEE Bankwatch Network**, 2001 or "Case Study: Sakhalin II" available online at http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/eu_russ/russia/documents/sakh2_leakop.pdf
[799] Kuhrt, p. 141
[800] J. H. Miller, p. 7-1

projects was construction of a pipeline linking Angarsk oil field with the Russian port of Nakhodka on the Japan Sea. Local authorities of the RFE were also concerned with Chinese monopoly in the region and favored the project with Japan. However, Russia was unable to receive massive financial funding from Japan even despite Putin's proposal in 2004 to return back two (smaller) islands to Japan as a compromise; but Tokyo remained intransigent, confident of its strong bargaining position. During almost two decades, Japan's investment has not exceeded 2 percent of total foreign investment in Russia. Miller argues that Russian Far East and Siberia seemed not attractive enough for Japanese investors because of such impediments as organized crime in Russia, 'inadequate infrastructure' and insufficient legal protection, as well as 'capricious' local governors.[801]

Meanwhile, closer economic cooperation between Moscow and Tokyo was advantageous for the United States in sense of providing economic stability and center control in the Russian Far East, by this way eliminating influence of neighbouring powers.[802] Pushing Russian foreign policy far from China (closer to Japan) was an opportunity for Washington to use Moscow in dealing with security issues in Asia, such as North Korea's nuclear programme.

According to Miller, Russo-Japanese relations represent one of examples of reversing antagonisms in the history of international relations, since these relations are not as hostile as those between Turkey and Greece, or India and Pakistan.[803] Russia and Japan are moving towards closer economic and political cooperation. Putin and Koizumi do everything to move in this direction. If Moscow and Tokyo move away from power-balance relations and address each other's interests, this relationship may develop into a stable cooperation, where Russia can utilize such advantages as Japan's resource demand or its potential for the economic revival of the RFE, and Japan may receive Russia's support for its UN Security Council membership, as well as "special economic and administrative provisions covering the territory that will not be transferred to Japan, and security collaboration".[804]

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[801] **Ibid**, p. 7-5
[802] **Ibid**, p. 7-4
[803] **Ibid**, p. 7-7
[804] Panov in Rozman, p. 121

As for Kuriles, these islands are overloaded with historical nationalist and patriotic staff, thus are unlikely to reach any solution beneficial for the both sides: so Russia and Japan are "prisoners of history", concludes Miller.[805] Panov believes that "territorial differences are not resolved simply on the basis of legal, historical, or geographical evidence": to achieve a compromise for Russia and Japan, it is necessary to come to mutual concessions by the motivation of additional economic, political, or strategic factors, as well as to overcome strong domestic political opposition in both states.[806]

5.1.1.3. Relations with the Koreas

Since Putin became a Russian President in 2000, Russia made active efforts to strengthen its ties with North and South Koreas in attempt to regain the clout it once had over the Korean peninsula. Moscow was seriously worried about continuing threat emanating from North Korea's nuclear plans. Unlike Iraq, Korean Peninsula is approximately 17 km close to the Russian Federation, which makes Russia vulnerable in the security space of the North-East Asia. Moscow was also worried by the flow of North Korean immigrants to the Russian Eastern part who escaped from the risk of collapse of the North Korean regime. On the other hand, possession of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang might "trigger a serial nuclear armament among potential nuclear weapon states – including Taiwan, South Korea and Japan – and consequently undermine the strategic security in Northeast Asia".[807] This, in turn, can provide the United States with a ground for developing a missile defence system and Japan to begin rearmament. So, the scope of possible risks was huge not only for the Russian Far Eastern region, but also for Russia as a state. As Losyukov, former deputy foreign minister of Russia admitted: "military conflict on the Korean peninsula runs counter to Russia's national interest".[808]

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[805] J. H. Miller, p. 7-7
[806] Panov in Rozman, p. 180
[807] Wan-Suk Hong, "Issues and Prospects Regarding Korea-Russia Cooperation", **The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,** XVIII(2), Summer 2006, p. 10
[808] "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Expresses Deep Concern about the Situation in North Korea," **ITAR-TASS News Agency**, January 19, 2003, available online at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yki26-12-2002.html

Although it appeared that the issue of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons might bring Russia and the United States into contention, the Russian government under Putin, after short hesitation, "joined the rest of the international community in expressing concern over North Korea's missile and nuclear tests in July and October [2000], and called for the resumption of six-party talks (China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the U.S.)." [809] In 2000 Putin visited North Korea, becoming the first Russian leader to do so. At this summit meeting Putin and Kim Jong II signed a Joint Declaration. Putin's administration also made efforts to facilitate inter-Korean dialogue by supporting the reconnection of railway lines between North and South Korea, and proposing to link the eastern Trans-Korean line with Russia's Trans-Siberian line, expecting to "reap commercial gains from this 'transport corridor'".[810]

On January 2003, after North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, Putin sent Losyukov as special envoy to North Korea, suggesting a 'package deal' (paketnoe reshenie) as a solution to the nuclear crisis, which entailed three principles: "1) denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 2) security for the North Korean regime, and 3) resumption of aid to North Korea".[811] Putin stressed the need to resume humanitarian aid to North Korea, showing that it was not sharing the U.S. position on imposing economic sanctions on Pyongyang. The peaceful solution of the Korean nuclear crisis was important for Moscow in order to remove "any U.S. justification for building missile defense systems".[812]

However, after Pyongyang claimed its decision to suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks, in October 2006, Russia, together with China, voted for the UN Security Council's Resolution which launched sanctions on Pyongyang. In May 2007 Putin issued a decree "prohibiting Russian state and government agencies … from exporting or transiting military hardware, equipment, materials, or know-how which could be used in the Communist state's [North Korea implied] nuclear or non-

[809] "Russia", Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008, **Encyclopædia Britannica Online**, 8 October 2008.
[810] Rangsimaporn (2009), pp. 232-234
[811] Hong, p. 11
[812] Rangsimaporn (2009), pp. 232-234

nuclear weapons programs".[813] At the end of 2006 North Korea claimed its intention to resume six-party negotiations, mostly with the help of bargaining between Washington and Pyongyang with a certain role of Beijing. The talks ended in the spring of 2007 by the agreement that Pyongyang would shut down its Yongbyon reactor in exchange for substantial financial, humanitarian, energy, and technological assistance from the other participants in the six-power negotiations.[814] Nevertheless, on 25 May 2009 Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear test. This action was strongly condemned by the international community, the United States, Japan, China, France, the United Kingdom and South Korea at the first flanks; and Russia, under Medvedev administration, joined them, afraid of a possible nuclear war because of North Korea. The UN Security Council issued a Resolution 1874 which condemned the nuclear test and tightened sanctions on North Korea.

Russia also kept close ties with South Korea in its policy toward establishing stability on the Korean Peninsula. In February 2003, the Roh administration, called the "Participatory Government," came to ruling in South Korea with the critical security task of resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis. This government closely cooperated with Russia on the issue, taking into consideration mutual geopolitical and security interest in the Peninsula. Main aims of this cooperation were to create a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and attain a peaceful unification of North and South Korea.[815] Moscow supported Seoul in its stand on a creation of a peace regime between the two Koreas: the main argument, supported by Putin, was that South and North Korea should sustain the truce agreement until the peace agreement would be signed. Russia went against North Korea's demand on bilateral solution between Pyongyang and Washington, which entailed use of force and threatened stability in the region. Such a solution would limit Russia's role in the Peninsula. When coming to the issue of unification of the two Koreas, Russia shared position of main players in the issue – Japan, China and the United States – that is to preserve the status-quo, preferring a divided Korean peninsula rather than radical changes. However, some South Korean and Russian scholars asserted that Russia in

[813] "Russia Makes U-turn, Joins UN Sanctions against N. Korea", **RIA Novosti**, 30 May 2007, available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2007/dprk-070530-rianovosti01.htm
[814] Thompson, p. 385
[815] Hong, p. 9

fact had no reason for objecting the unification, because: firstly, according to In-ho Lee, this would bring long-expected stability to the region and open a way for development of economic ties;[816] secondly, Bazhanov argued that Russia was probably the only country near the Peninsula which wanted Korean unification, since: "historically, China and Japan have blocked Russia's expansion into Asia. If Korea becomes unified, it will emerge as a force to compete with China and Japan instead of Russia, which is in Russia's geopolitical interest".[817]

5.1.1.4. Relations with India

Relations with India got renewed importance for Russia's strategic interest in the East (not only in South Asia, but in Central Asia and the Middle East as well) during Putin's administration. India, along with China, had entered the list of global economic powers, recording annual economic growth of 8% during last 10 years; withal this growth had been realized thanks to domestic, not foreign investments, as in case of China, what made Indian economy more stable. While stressing the need to revive and redefine bilateral ties that had been lost during the Soviet period, Putin also emphasized new priorities for Russia and India: "[I]t's clear that both we and our Indian partners have to take into consideration the fact that the world has changed, Russia has changed, the balance of forces in the world has changed and so have some of our priorities".[818] On its part, India supported Russia's promotion of multipolar world order, struggling against the U.S. unipolarity, and laid emphasis on a central role of the UN in international issues.

Taking in mind Pakistan's significance for the United States as a frontline state in its campaign against Al-Qaeda and Taliban regimes, as well as Islamabad's close ties with Central Asian and the Gulf states, Moscow tried to keep in with Islamabad. In 2002 Russia and Pakistan institutionalized a Joint Working Group on a shared commitment to combat terrorism anywhere.

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[816] Lee in Hong, p. 15
[817] Bazhanov in Hong, pp. 15-16
[818] "Putin Holds Talks with Vajpayee Today", **Dawn**, October 3, 2000, available online at www.dawn.com/2000/10/03/topl5.htm

After the accession of the Bush administration in 2001, India's ties with the U.S. began to develop in a fast track: New Delhi was one of few Asian states to support Washington's missile defence plans, to the discontent of Moscow. Russia found itself "constrained by its lack of economic and diplomatic resources in dealing with India".[819] Perhaps in despair, Moscow plunged into active arms trade and cooperation on nuclear technology with New Delhi. While for Russia arms sales to India was presupposed by poor monetary condition, for India Russia was a good choice for a number of factors: easy access to Russian-made weapons, requirements of the India's armed forces, and the quality and price balance of weapons (half-price of European prices).

Visits of Indian Foreign and Defense Ministers to Moscow in summer 2000 were focused on defence and strategic aspects of Indo-Russian relations. Indian and Russian leaders discussed the need for "strengthening the bilateral strategic partnership, India's defence requirements and its concerns over cross-border terrorism across the international boundary and line of control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir".[820] Putin paid a responsive visit to India in October 2000, which resulted in a signing of Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Russia's promise to deliver India military hardware worth $3 billion, including 320 T-90 Tanks, SU-30 fighters, the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft-carrying ship (as a free gift) and MiG-29 fighter aircraft. The new treaty meant alliance between Russia and India where India was figuring as a balance against Pakistan and other Muslim states in the region. [821]

In pursuing objectives of upgrading its defence system due to "the post-nuclear weapon test environment", Indian Defense Minister Singh during his visit to Russia signed a protocol with Russian side on strengthening defence cooperation to be worth $10 billion and take Russia's assistance in developing defence systems and "the 11-214 military transport aircraft, known as the Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA)".[822] Besides this, India and Russia tested a jointly developed supersonic cruise missile from the Chandipur test site on June 12, 2001. In autumn the same year Putin approved the proposal on a missile shield for India at the Commission

[819] Ferguson, in Rozman, p. 218
[820] Jain, p. 383
[821] Starr
[822] Jain, p. 384

meeting of Military-Technical Co-operation. In November 2001 in Moscow, a Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project was signed between the Chairman of the Department of Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar and the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev. Russia reiterated the importance of peaceful use of nuclear energy in India and assured that it did not violate international obligations under the Nuclear Supplier Group. The international community was concerned with possibility that India may use recycled fuel for nuclear weapon producing, but both Moscow and New Delhi ruled out such a possibility.

Russian and Indian officials often assured that their relations were not just an arms sales story, but progressed towards joint R&D, joint production and joint-ventures. In 2002, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes claimed that Russian-Indian relations were not limited by solely a "buyer-seller relationship", that they have gone beyond that stage towards mutual trust, as was evident from "joint design and production of weapons"; similarly, secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Vladimir Roushailo repeated that bilateral ties between Moscow and New Delhi were "time tested and immune to political vicissitudes".[823] During his visit to India in February 2002 Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stressed the need for consolidation of strategic ties between the two countries by developing common strategy on dealing with terrorism. Ivanov and Indian Defense Minister Singh "agreed that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf should translate his January 2001 speech regarding his commitment to fighting terrorism into concrete, on-the-ground results".[824] During his visit to India in 2002, Putin "warned the world community that Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction could fall into terrorist hand".[825] Yet, if in Indo-Pakistani relations Putin blamed Pakistan of not reciprocating India's 'friendly gesture', his stance on cross-border terrorism represented mixed reactions. So, Putin appreciated General Musharraf's efforts to constrain terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.[826]

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[823] **Ibid**, p. 385
[824] **Ibid**, p. 389
[825] Putin in Jain, p. 390
[826] **The Hindu**, December 1, 2002, p. 11; *See also*: K.K. Katyal, "Dealing with Washington and Moscow", **The Hindu**, December 16, 2002, p. 10

Another potential field of Indo-Russian cooperation was new energy and transport corridors, where the SCO's new Eurasian energy strategy was reflected. India's major oil company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), acquired stakes in Russian Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-3 projects. In 2005 the Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Ministry proposed to invest up to $25 billion into Russian oil and gas industry, as ONGC sought to get a stake in Russian Yuganskneftegaz (a part of Yukos).[827] In February 2005 the Indian government also expressed its interest in a gas pipeline project linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to India.[828] Russia also shared India's aspiration to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as well as granted India observer status in the SCO. This showed that India had common concerns with Russia on Chinese strategic policy in Central and South Asia.

However, by 2004 some analysts became pointing on declining of Russo-Indian relations: Russia was unable to conclude an agreement on Intellectual Property Rights with India to protect its defence and high-technology information transfer. Such an agreement was made between Washington and New Delhi. Moscow was also upset that "India, while insisting on no Russia-Pakistan defence deals, [bought] spares from countries that suppl[ied] defence equipment to Pakistan".[829] One positive development was that India gradually became to accept Russia as a market economy. However, bilateral trade was still low-leveled, stuck around $1.4 billions, while the main trade item, India tea, gave place to Sri-Lankan imports to Russia. On the other hand, India preferred to rely more on the Western states in receiving diplomatic support vis-à-vis Pakistan. Other problematic issues in Russo-Indian relations were: "the sudden price escalation in the cost of Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, the continuous problems of maintaining delivery schedule of contracted military hardware and lack of adequate after sales support".[830]

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[827] Ferguson in Rozman, p. 219
[828] **Itar-Tass**, February 25, 2005.
[829] N. Manoharan, "Putin's India Visit: Indo-Russian Relations towards a Pragmatic Phase?", **India & the World**, 1596, 22 December 2004, available online at http://www.ipcs.org/article/india-the-world/putins-india-visit-indo-russian-relations-towards-a-pragmatic-phase-1596.html
[830] "Russia-India Relations to Strengthen on Putin's Visit This Week", **8 AK**, 8 March 2010, available online at http://www.8ak.in/8ak_india_defence_news/2010/03/russiaindia-relations-will-strengthen-on-putins-visit-this-week.html

The positive trend in relations began in September 2009 with visit of President Pratibha Patil to Moscow, which was followed by several high-level visits by Indian Ministers to the Russian Federation and Russian Deputy Sobyanin's visit to India in November. During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with new Russian President Medvedev, the two sides signed "critical deals assuring uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to New Delhi, apart from resolving the long standing price issue of aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov".[831]

In common, Russia and India had no clashing interests or territorial ambitions, like in case of China or Japan for Russia. Thus, relations with India were stable under Putin, mainly based on cooperation in defence and strategic security fields. However, Russian objectives in India were realized rather narrowly, having in mind the U.S. competition after the lifting of international sanctions on India, as well as the fact that India's great economic growth had no positive impact on Russia's economic development and foreign policy preferences. [832]

5.1.2. Fundamentals of the Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East during Putin

Russian foreign policy in the Middle East during Putin was ambiguous and affected by a number of factors, such as the active presence of main global player, the USA, in the region, emergence of terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and adjacent regions which were close to Russia, Iran's claim to possess nuclear power, and continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, Russia had many reasons to cooperate with the Middle Eastern states: many of them were strongly anti-American, or their ties with the USA represented "alliance of convenience rather than societal/cultural compatibility".[833] On the other hand, states as Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and less likely Iran were likely to pose a security threat by supporting regimes or movements in Central Asia and Transcaucasus

[831] **Ibid**
[832] Trenin (2008)
[833] Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Alexander Dugin's Views on the Middle East", **Space and Polity**, 12(2), August 2008, pp. 251-268

which were directed against Russia or even to encourage "ethnic and religious separatism in the Russian Northern Caucasus and Volga regions".[834]

Putin's newly approved Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 outlined Russian objectives in the international arena in general and in the Middle East in particular. This concept was clearly different from the Soviet perspectives. The threat of international terrorism and "the direct attempt to move this threat inside the country" was evaluated as a major challenge to Russia's 'state sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity'.[835] The top political objective for Russia in the Middle East became "political stabilization for the purpose of forestalling the spillover of political and military crises endemic to the region into the volatile areas of central Asia and the Caucasus, inside Russia and out, in its 'near abroad'".[836] Economic interest in face of the richness of the area was also underlined as a perspective for Russian commercial considerations in the region.

Since 2001 Putin's government began active involvement in the Middle Eastern region, supporting Iran's nuclear program and releasing Syria 73% of its debts. Putin broke official Russia's policy of refraining from arm sales to Iran in 2000, three days before the U.S. presidential election. During 2000 Russia made arms sales amounting $7.7 billion, taking the second place after the United States in world arms transfers.[837] Actually, all seven states declared by the U.S. government as "state sponsors of terrorism" (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba) had been receiving arms from Moscow. Blank argued that although Russian leaders denied it, "the scope of Russian sales of dual-use and conventional technology and weapons" indicated that Russia was proliferating WMD to various Middle Eastern and Asian states in an indirect way, violating its arms control and proliferation agreements. The situation worsened by the presence in Russia of criminal organizations, officials, and 'maverick individuals' who had real opportunities to export these weapons abroad.[838]

Since 2006 Moscow changed its political strategy in the Middle East and other Eastern regions: if during Putin's first term Russia carelessly transferred

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[834] Tomé, p. 41
[835] Eran in Gorodetsky, p. 159
[836] **Ibid**
[837] Starr
[838] Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator", **Orbis**, 44(1), Winter 2000.

nuclear technology to Iran, made concession to Japan on the territorial issue and disregarded North Korea; then during the second term Putin began a 'complex double game' with Tehran and Pyongyang which applied restricting effect on their nuclear ambitions, treated Japan as a suppliant and began sales of nuclear power plant to Burma. As Rosefielde and Hedlund argued, "these actions weren't provocative in themselves", but signaled Moscow's path toward regional hegemony.[839] In 2006 Russia also positioned itself as a mediator in the Middle East, maintaining close ties with Syria and Egypt. For a long period Moscow tried to engage in military cooperation with both Israel and Syria. However, the levels of cooperation with the two states were 'inversely related' and enhancement of arms sales to Syria threatened to damage Russian relations with Israel. Putin continued the Soviet-era cooperation with the Syria on weapons sales, but since 2005 his administration tried to balance its relationship with both Syria and Israel.[840]

According to Khrestin and Elliott, despite earlier claims that Moscow and Washington had common values and were partners in the war on terror in the Middle East, by the second half of 2000s Western observers became claiming that Moscow had become an impediment both to the fight against Islamist terror and Washington's efforts to promote democracy and freedom in the Middle East.[841] While Russian officials denied this US criticism, "the Kremlin's coddling of Iranian hard-liners, its reaction to the "cartoon jihad,"[842] its invitation to Hamas to Moscow, and its flawed Chechen policy all cast[ed] doubt on Moscow's motivations".[843]

One of critical issues in the Middle East for Russia, the United States and international community in general was the Arab-Israeli conflict as in Yeltsin's period, as well as during Putin's presidency. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov participated in Moscow co-hosted the multilateral Middle East talks in February

[839] Rosefielde and Hedlund, p. 217
[840] Ariel Cohen, "Russia's New Middle Eastern Policy: Back to Bismarck?", **Jerusalem Issue Brief**, **Institute for Contemporary Affairs**, 6(25), March 20, 2007.
[841] Igor Khrestin and John Elliott, "Russia and the Middle East", **Middle East Quarterly**, XIV(1), Winter 2007, pp. 21-27
[842] On February 4, 2006, protests erupted in many Muslim countries against cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, which had been published months before in the Danish daily *Jyllands-Posten*. In Lebanon and Syria, mobs sacked the Danish embassy and, in Libya, they attacked an Italian consulate. But rather than stand up for free speech – as did many outside the Middle East – the Russian government sided with the Islamists.
[843] Khrestin and Elliott, pp. 21-27

2000 where he discussed the troubled peace process with the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Egypt and Syria. In 2002 Russia became a member of The Quartet on the Middle East established by the UN, the EU, the US and Russia to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Volatile situation occurred in the Middle East when in early 2006 the Hamas leadership came to power in Palestine and refused to renounce its positions on Israel. In addition to the Hamas problem, Middle Eastern security picture was deteriorated by unstable situation in Iraq and tensions caused by Iran's nuclear program. Russia pushed itself in the centre of these developments. Besides establishing links with Palestinian and Shiite movements in the region, in March 2006 Moscow hosted the highest-profile visit by Hamas which was in terrorist list of most Western states. This move met strong criticism by Western media and especially by Israel. On the other hand, Luzyanin argued that during the Middle Eastern crisis Putin managed to obtain new opportunities to influence separate Arab countries: he set bilateral relationships with several Persian Gulf states, including Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and cancelled $7 billion debt of Algeria.[844]

Putin's Russia also continued to play a key role in Iran's nuclear energy program. Continuing nuclear trade with Iran helped Moscow to ensure that Iran did not interfere in Chechnya and shared with Moscow a position that countries which were not a part of Central Asia should not involve in region's affairs. In exchange, Russia stood by Iran against the Western pressure. Iran was a "key element in the web of the anti-American empire and nuclear power", according to Russian Eurasianist Dugin, since it had never hesitated about its ardent anti-Americanism.[845] Dugin even argued that Iran was representing no danger to Russia economically, militarily (even with nuclear weapons), or demographically and that Russian should not be afraid of the spread of Iranian influence or its becoming a leading power in the Middle East. Moreover, he proposed to support Iran's decision to create a nuclear bomb, because India, Pakistan and Israel had this bomb, why should not Iran? Vladimir Sazhin, a specialist on the Orient, argued that revolutionary elite of Iran became more prone to 'nationalistic pragmatism' less interested in 'religious-political creed' and more on geopolitical issues. And as Iran became an important

[844] Luzyanin
[845] Shlapentokh (2008), p. 254

player in the Middle East, as well as in Afghanistan and Central Asia, it had a "geopolitical gravitation to Russia".[846]

However, although Russia had mutual benefits with Iran, such as cooperation on defense-related technologies and nuclear projects, common interests in dividing Eurasian markets for energy supply and multilateral agenda which had covert imply on anti-Americanism, Moscow also had to consider relations with other states and organizations, particularly its Russian-US partnership and relations with the EU, the UN Security Council and reputation in the IAEA. Blank asserted that besides producing risks in it relations with the United States, weapons sales to Iran "likewise poisoned Moscow's promising relations with Israel and contradict[ed] its stated interests in the Middle East, China, and South Asia in general"[847]. Moscow sold weapons not only to Iran, China, Iraq, and India; it was also discussing sales of light-water reactors to Cuba, Syria, and Libya, which was legitimate under international accords, but really annoying Washington and the Middle East.

So, it can be said that Russian foreign policy in the Middle East during Putin was mainly based on economic interest (what was actually stated in 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept) reflected in desire to sale weapons and military technology to the Eastern states and establish energy links, and these interest sometimes left behind geopolitical considerations and rules of international balancing (the example of Moscow arming Iran and Syria while pursuing economic cooperation with Israel). On the other hand, the factor of Islam and the Chechen issue also predominated in constructing Moscow's relations with Middle Eastern states, but cooperation against Islamic Fundamentalism with the United States did not last for a long time.

[846] Sazhin in Shlapentokh (2008), p. 255
[847] Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator", **Orbis**, 44(1), Winter 2000

CHAPTER VI
CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING YELTSIN'S AND PUTIN'S ADMINISTRATIONS

In order to summarize the findings of this thesis, it is necessary to draw the development trend of the Russian foreign policy in time-period. And more important is to give this trend in the framework of the leader-oriented analysis. That is, trying to answer such questions as: how did Russian foreign policy change during Yeltsin and Putin's presidencies due to personal decisions and individualities of this two persons, and whether it has changed or showed continuity; what were general continuities typical in both presidents' foreign policy-making style; regarding which international issues, regions or particular states did Yeltsin and Putin have similar or different political positions?

6.1. Continuities in Russian "Foreign Policy-Making" during Yeltsin's and Putin's Administrations

The heritage left for the first President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, was extremely complex: Boris Yeltsin faced the most complex task of initiating the huge democratic and economic transformation of the country both domestically and internationally, while Putin had to continue this transformation, which by the way had deviated from the original course and had a number of shortcomings. The international prestige of the former Soviet Union was shattered when Yeltsin became the first President of the totally new geographical and political entity – the Russian Federation. But in 2000, when Putin became the second President, Russia's international image was not brilliant either.

6.1.1. General Continuities in Domestic and Foreign Policy-Making

During their first terms at the Presidency, both leaders focused on domestic policy, although this focus had different grounds for them. Yeltsin's aims were to

shape the new government, reach stability, realize economic and democratic reforms, and to overcome governmental and economic crisis. For Putin, the focus point was to overcome the outcomes of the 1998 crisis; to improve Russia's great power image abroad: a strong government (gosudarstvennost) which Putin believed to be lost in the 1990s was a prerequisite for this image; and to develop independent foreign policy. If Yeltsin's task was more complex – to change the political system entirely, then Putin had only to shape it without undertaking cardinal changes.

The primacy of democracy was underlined in speeches of both Yeltsin and Putin. However, both of them "manipulated democratic processes and showed some authoritarian tendencies while blocking a totalitarian restoration".[848] So, Yeltsin was blamed for conspiratorial dissolution of the Soviet Union, forcible dissolution of the Parliament in 1993, electoral manipulations and undemocratic actions in Chechnya. The level of democracy during Yeltsin's administration can be summarized in Pushkov's terms: "a manipulative pseudo-democracy", which cloaked "Yeltsin's personal rule and the free reign given to the oligarchs and big bankers".[849] Under Putin democracy acquired quite new character: soft authoritarianism or state-controlled democracy (state primacy over society coupled with democratic institutions, elections and basic democratic freedoms".[850] Putin's undemocratic deeds were reflected in suppressing the media and business community, reducing authority of the Parliament, armed forces and regional leaders, on the other hand expanding authority of the FSB. Putin was also blamed for turning Russia into a 'petrostate'[851], where the state's economy was highly dependent on oil prices and all natural resources management was concentrated in the hands of the government. Meanwhile, during Yeltsin main control of domestic resources was in the hands of oligarchs.

Putin's foreign policy was the continuation of the Yeltsin's course on the one hand, on the other hand an attempt to overcome negative tendencies emerged during Yeltsin. Both presidents advocated strengthening the central role of the United Nations, commitment to international law, as well as importance of multilateralism

[848] David Foglesong and Gordon M. Hahn, "Ten Myths About Russia: Understanding and Dealing with Russia's Complexity and Ambiguity", **Problems of Post-Communism**, 49(6), November/December 2002, p.9
[849] Alexey K. Pushkov, "Putin and his Enemies", **The National Interest**, Winter 2004-05, p.52
[850] **Ibid**, 54
[851] Shevtsova, p. 35

and multipolarity.[852] Common aim of both Yeltsin and Putin was to integrate Russia into the world's greatest economic and political organizations as G7 (later G8 with Russia) or WTO and to reach privileged relations with NATO and the EU; and both of them made positive steps in this dimension. Hence, Vladimir Putin tried to bring Russia into the WTO and OECD as convinced and consistently, as Yeltsin strived for participation in the Council of Europe and G7.

During Yeltsin Eurasianism emerged in parallel with assertiveness in foreign policy that followed the 1993 parliamentary elections, when Atlanticist policies were actively criticized. That was when neo-Eurasianism or New Eurasianism arose among Russian policy-makers.[853] Yeltsin had a number of advisors who assured him to hold a more diversified policy instead of totally pro-Western; and these advisors often stressed the advantages of Eurasianist policy of balancing between the West and the East, Europe and Asia.[854] In practice, Eurasianism was used by Yeltsin during the Kosovo crisis and in the issues relating to the CIS, where the Pan-Slavism as a notion of Eurasianism was underlined. Whereas during Putin's administration the accent was made on autocracy, Orthodoxy and nation-mindedness – three features of traditional Russian Slavophilism (Eurasianism).[855] Both presidents used Eurasianism ideology as an instrument of geopolitics in order to strengthen Russia's positions in certain parts of the world and to justify involvement in international issues.

The integrity of the Russian Federation was on the frontline of Yeltsin's foreign policy in the beginning: Russia lost huge territories, stability was lacking and the need for strong ties with former Soviet members was obvious. Yeltsin emphasized political and economic integration with the former Soviet Union states by means of political, security and economic organizations as CIS, CSTO and common customs spaces. If analyzing Putin's position in this sphere, his first serious

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[852] Lo, pp. 66, 67; Casier, pp. 384-401
[853] *See* G. Smith (1999), pp. 481-494
[854] Among these advisors there were: Afanas'ev, Prokhanov, Dugin, Pushkov, Primakov
See: Yuriy Afanas'ev, "Chto Pozhinaem" ("What Do We Reap"), **Vek XX i Mir (Century and World)**, 33(5), 1990; J. S. Duncan, "Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West", **The Historical Journal**, 48(1), 2005; Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Dugin Eurasianism: a Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an Intellectual Ploy?", **Stud East Eur Thought**, 59, 2007; Aleksei Pushkov, "Rossiya v Novom Miroporyadke: Ryadom s Zapadom ili Sama po Sebye?", **Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'**, October 2000.
[855] Neumann in Lo, p. 15

political actions where undertaken in Chechnya – the Russian autonomous republic which claimed for independence by radical methods as terrorism. The Chechen issue was the heaviest part of the Yeltsin's heritage. Just as Yeltsin, Putin realized that without internal political stability Russia would not be able to move towards further development.

6.1.2. Continuities in Foreign Policy Course towards the West

What remained unchanged during Yeltsin's and Putin's presidencies is the domination of the Western dimension in Russian foreign policy agenda.[856] Both Yeltsin and Putin emphasized security dimension in relations with the West: Yeltsin started a process of constituent disarmament, despite contending voices from the Russian military. The first Russian president evaluated nuclear demilitarization as a good example for other former nuclear Soviet states on the one hand, and disposing of unnecessary economic expenditures for this expensive business, on the other. Putin was even more concerned with security in foreign policy-making: as Lo stressed this feature – Putin was prone to the 'securitization' of foreign policy, and this was most evident in Russia's building relations with the West.[857]

Yeltsin's attitude to NATO and its expansion was generally negative, but being unable to stop the expansion process and in some degree conforming Russian pro-Western stand, Yeltsin and Kozyrev made steps towards cooperation with the alliance, in exchange receiving various concessions from the West. Although Yeltsin and Putin continued cooperation with NATO on different issues, in the long-term trend they remained cautious about the alliance. Both Russian presidents repeatedly claimed NATO expansion illegal and condemned NATO's practice of using force outside its zone of responsibility and without the UN sanction. Neither Yeltsin, nor Putin were pleased with Eastern European and neighbouring post-Soviet states' loosing neutral positions.

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[856] Foglesong and Hahn dispersed the myth that "Russians are inherently anti-Western and anti-American".
See Foglesong and Hahn, pp. 9-10

[857] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., **Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century**, London: Frank Cass, 2003 pp. 8, 13; Monaghan, pp. 717-733

Both in the 1990s and during Putin's presidency the main challenges between Russia and the West remained such issues as Russia's military and nuclear equipment sales to Iran and other Eastern states,[858] NATO's eastward expansion and the geopolitical competition in the Balkans and the post-Soviet sphere. The last item was generally associated with the Great Game in the Black Sea region[859] (linked to the control of energy routes from the Caspian region to Europe) and got new prominence in the 2000s, when the West propagated colorful revolutions in post-Soviet states as Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. These events during the elections in several CIS states "were used by Russia as evident examples of Western attempts to influence the political map of Eurasia".[860] As for the Balkans, when Kosovo got independence in 2007,[861] this became a new precedent for the issue of self-determination of ethnic groups in the Balkans and especially in the South Caucasus (crisis in Georgia in 2008 after what Abkhazia and South Ossetia claimed independence was in some sense an outcome of the Kosovo incident and NATO expansion).

Positions of Russia and the West on major international problems identically diverged as during Yeltsin, as well as during Putin's period. The only difference is that under Yeltsin Moscow had little resources for advocating its interests, while during Putin these resources emerged. Notwithstanding, the disagreements between Russia and the West do not mean the confrontation: Moscow preferred to find compromises as under Yeltsin, as well as under Putin. Yet the conditions of the compromise are determined a bit differently now, as the balance of power has changed.

What was common in Russian relations with the EU is that both Yeltsin and Putin sought to "de-Americanize"[862] Europe; that is - to weaken or break the Transatlantic alliance and not let the United States dominate the European politics.

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[858] *See* Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator", **Orbis**, 44(1), Winter 2000.
[859] *See* O. Koulieri, "Russian "Eurasianism" & the Geopolitics of the Black Sea", **UK National Defence Minister's Staff,** October 2000, available online at http://www.da.mod.uk; Esra Hatipoglu, "The New Great Game in the South Caucasus and Central Asia: the Interests of Global Powers and the Role of Regional Organizations", **Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies**, 6, Annual 2006, pp. 85-127
[860] Bertil Nygren, **The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries**, Oxon: Routledge, 2008, p.30
[861] *See* Oksana Antonenko, "Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo", **The Institut Français Des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Russia/NIS Center,** 21, July 2007.
[862] Mitropolsky and Smirnov in Hudson, p. 238

Pursuing this aim, Putin and Yeltsin made accent on developing bilateral ties based on great power balancing with certain European capitals, such as Germany, France, Belgium and UK (benefited by Putin), who used to support Russia politically. Thus, promoting multipolarity in relations with Europe, Yeltsin and Putin, on the other hand, divided Europe into two camps: Old versus New Europe.[863] They also envisioned European security controlled not by NATO, but by OSCE or at least the UN, in which Russia is one of the members. Yet, Putin preferred to handle security issues with Europe by means of CFSP and PSC mechanisms.

Another continuity can be pointed regarding Russia's vision of the EU's role in bilateral relations. During Yeltsin, most of Russian authorities tended to see the EU on a par with other international organizations as the Council of Europe, NATO and the UN, in which individual states played a deciding role. Similarly, Putin's Russia evaluated the EU as just one of several modern economic-political associations, or as a partner-competitor.[864] Pragmatism, mutual benefits and common bindings arising from international treaties were the primary points of Russia's EU agenda both in the 1990s and in the 2000s. So, trade, technology exchange, environment, visa regulations and other secondary issues prevailed in Russian-European dialogue. Needless to say, none of the Presidents envisioned Russia to become a member of the EU. In a Medium-term Strategy on Russia's EU policy of October 1999 Yeltsin's administration clearly stated that Russia was a world power and had no interest in accession to the EU.[865] Similarly, Putin, despite repeatedly stressing that Russia was "an integral part of European civilization"[866], stated that Russia was not seeking joining to the Union.

6.1.3. Continuities in Foreign Policy Course towards the East

Russian foreign policy towards Eastern states under Putin's administration expressed continuity with the path established during Yeltsin, although Putin's policy became more pragmatic and multi-vectored. Turning to the East in search of

[863] Arbatova, p.102; Merkushev, pp. 363-364; Baranovsky, p. 454
[864] Trenin (2008)
[865] David Gowan, "How the EU can help Russia", **Centre for European Reform**, London, 2000, available online at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p203_russia.pdf
[866] Vladimir Putin, "50 Years of the European Integration and Russia," 2007, available online at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/03/25/1133_type104017_120738.shtml

opportunity of balancing the Western hegemony in the world is the continuous trend in Russian foreign policy, which was relevant for both Russian presidents. Yeltsin and Putin turned to the East, namely Asia in search of salvation whenever they felt isolated or marginalized by the West. Such a state of foreign policy conditioned by the West was stressed by numerous scholars who pointed that Russia in fact treated the East as an instrument for gaining respect from the West.[867] Superpower ambitions and tendency on constructing bilateral relations despite proclaimed multilateralism took place in Russian foreign policy practice in Asia and the Middle East, just like in European policies. And this is relevant for both Yeltsin and Putin.

Despite periodical changes in calculations, Russia's policy towards Asia showed significant continuity under Gorbachev's, Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations, based on such factors as: the extent of the US and European involvement in Asia; development of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and its implication on other Asian states' security position; reaction of Asian states to "distant appendage" of the Russian Far East; and, lastly, the level of opportunity for Russia to engage in great power relations dynamics of the Northeast Asia.[868] A political theory of Eurasianism was used as one of the ideological instruments or geopolitical legitimations in Russia's foreign policy in the Eastern dimension.

Asian vector in Eurasianist policies was important for Russia rather in material, than cultural sense. Russia was close to China, Japan, India or Korea more in geographical and historical considerations. Predominance of energy and arms trade in relations with Eastern states was actual for both Yeltsin and Putin. They were aware of huge economic and trade potential of the Eastern states, so both Presidents developed trade of military equipment and nuclear technology with India, China and Middle Eastern states despite risk of annoying the West. Yet, Intercivilisational or Civilisational Eurasianism was also used by Yeltsin and Putin in relations with East Asian states as an instrument to get access to Asian markets and involve in regional political affairs.[869]

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[867] Sarkisyanz, Rangsimaporn: Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia's Role in East Asia", **Europe-Asia Studies**, 58(3), May 2006, pp. 371-389
[868] Rozman et al, p.2
[869] Rangsimaporn (2006), pp. 372-373

Security importance of Asia-Pacific region was also a common feature in Yeltsin's and Putin's foreign policy agendas. Under Yeltsin's administration Russia participated in North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, and other regional security forums and organizations. Putin developed this active participation further, establishing economic and security forums in Russian Far East and participating in security forums of the Asia-Pacific and the international group on dealing with the North Korean nuclear proliferation.[870] Another common point for Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations was economic development of the Russian Far East considering growing intensity in trade relations with China and Japan. Besides opportunities for Far Eastern local governments in face of economic development and foreign investments, there was a demographical problem reflected in growing Chinese population in Eastern Russia.

Religious and ethnic radicalism in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, spreading to South and Central Asia, was the common problem of Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations. Middle East was important for Russia in this sense. Moscow tried to take active participation in regional issues, namely in regulation of Arab-Israeli conflict and political conflicts in Iraq, where it often cooperated with the West. On the other hand, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East was based on traditional *realpolitik*: Russia proclaimed global Islamic threat and invoked a Russian domino theory which supposes that if Muslims gain freedom anywhere, this would put the CIS region at risk. This threat was equally actual both in 1990s and 2000s.

On the other hand, Yeltsin's Russia did not refrain from providing Middle Eastern states as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya with military equipment and nuclear technology (to Iran). Putin's Russia also continued to play a key role in Iran's nuclear energy program, despite strict criticism from Washington. For Yeltsin and Putin this meant not only economic relations but in some degree to have a place for balancing the Western hegemony in the region: most of states, which Russia cooperated with on arms sales, had openly anti-American stances.

It is also important to stress, that the post-Soviet space (or the CIS region) always took the first place in Russia's geopolitical agenda as during Yeltsin, as well

[870] "Russia Makes U-turn, Joins UN Sanctions against N. Korea", RIA Novosti, 30 May 2007, available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2007/dprk-070530-rianovosti01.htm

as during Putin. Yeltsin considered his moral duty to save the post-Soviet space from degradation and bring the CIS states to integration and development. For Putin, this task became even more significant and more complex taking in mind new geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

6.2. Changes in Russian "Foreign Policy-Making" during Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations

When proposing Putin as a candidate for the president position, Yeltsin was aware of the fact that for achieving stability in the forthcoming twenty-first century new Russia needed strong, decisive and authoritative leader, and so he evaluated then the director of FSB, and later the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin. Although they had good personal relations, in policy-making the two leaders differed considerably. Apprehension that Putin is a political antipode to his predecessor, Yeltsin, is widespread among most of Russian people. This is more visible in terms of domestic policy: with Putin coming to the ruling, the oligarchs of Yeltsin's era faced strict measures from the government, and slow but steady fight against corruption was launched. Three main guidelines for Russia's development claimed by Putin were the sovereign democracy, strong economy and military power; although some critics evaluated these principles in deed as "autocracy, secret police, and state monopolies".[871] As against Yeltsin, who was busy with economic and democratic reforms and had no experience of correctly organizing governmental structure in accordance with new liberal conditions, Putin organized strict control over governmental institutions and civil organizations and took over all strategic sectors of Russian political and business life.

Putin's personality was obviously very different from Yeltsin's: if Yeltsin sometimes was perceived as embarrassing and ambiguous[872] due to such actions as forceful dissolution of the Parliament, contradictory statements on similar issues in different periods or continuously firing Prime Ministers, Putin behaved stable and always looked controlled and hard-headed in public. He made Russian people feel

[871] Aslund, p. 21
[872] Bobo Lo, **Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

good and confident about their future, let only psychologically. As Aslund noticed: "Putin is the master of good feelings".[873] But on the other hand, extremely high personalization and centralization of Russian political system made Russia dependent on Putin's person. This suggests the fear that while Putin is ruling – everything goes good, but when he leaves – this system may collapse.

6.2.1. General Changes in Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy

So far as concerns foreign policy, the difference here was less obvious than in domestic policy realm. This difference was evident rather in the style of foreign policy-making. What really changed is the general situation in the world stage. If we analyze the trend of changing perceptions of the world order by Russian (and Soviet) heads of the government, since the last years of the Cold War, we see the following picture.

On the threshold of the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev characterized the new world order by end of confrontation and need for peaceful coexistence, interdependence, pluralism, tolerance, freedom of choice, equal cooperation, "co-authorship" and "co-development".[874] Gorbachev began the process of mitigating relations with the West in a positive way, which would bring development by way of cooperation. During Yeltsin's first term the country's identity issues were on the back burner. The main focus was made on the argument that Russia must become an equal player, equal with the West. This was the optimal aim after the Cold War – to restore Russia's position as a great power and nuclear power. During his second term Yeltsin began declaring assertive position of Russia in the world by such postures as contesting NATO's expansion to the East, supporting Serbia against NATO, contending the US hegemony by building political alliances with Germany and France or with Eastern powers as China and India, and, lastly, counterbalancing the Western influence in the post-Soviet space.

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[873] Aslund, p. 21

[874] "Our Common Aim", Gorbachev's speech at UN Meeting 07/12/1988, **Politizdat,** available online at http://www.gorby.ru/rubrs.asp?art_id=21943&rubr_id=243&page=1

Putin also realized the weighty place of the West in Russia's world politics perception. During his first term Putin admitted that Russia was economically weaker than the leading world powers and even than second and third rate states. Having recognized the fact that Russian people were responsible for this backwardness themselves, new President aimed at making Russia first of all a strong state. This was realizable through economic integration with the world states and attracting foreign investments, as Yeltsin's administration in fact did, but in Putin's case Russia had to become a strong state with independent economy.[875] The distinctive feature of this strategy was the realization of Russian economic project by using foreign policy as an instrument. Hence, Putin's Russia tried to play a role of partner-competitor of America, Europe and China. Putin also emphasized Russia's role of Eurasian integration centre, mediator between East and West, North and South;[876] however, this was neither a multipolar world vision, nor the unstable pragmatism of oscillating between the East and the West. Putin expressed obvious vision of Russia as a European state.

6.2.1.1. Visions of Yeltsin and Putin on Russia's Modernization and Westernism

After long period of socialism ruling in Russia, in the period of 1990-1993, Atlanticist policy came to the center of Russian policy-making with Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev at the head. Yeltsin and his team emphasized the course towards modernization through democratic and economic reforms assisted and dictated by Western government and institutions. Yeltsin set the main objective: Russia must become the equal partner of the West and return to civilization by following the way of European progress. Eurasianist ideology was renounced in this period.

Putin inherited Russia which was under "trauma of rapid market development".[877] Similar to Yeltsin, he also focused on economic problems, Russia's external debts and domestic reforms towards democratization. And as Yeltsin, Putin also envisioned strong and democratic Russia. However, unlike Yeltsin, he did not

[875] Hedenskog et al, p. 15
[876] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 379
[877] Richard Sakwa, **Putin: Russia's choice**, Second edition, Routledge, Oxon, 2008, p. x

accept the Western liberalization model for Russia's development. Putin's Russia had to draw its own, self-contained path of modernization. Moreover, democratization process was also drawn by Putin in a different understanding: he conceptualized his own term – 'the sovereign democracy' – which was opposed to the model of democracy exported from the West.

6.2.1.2. Changes in Foreign Policy-Making Mechanism

Yeltsin's foreign policy in general was reactive and ad hoc.[878] Yeltsin had no clear approach to dealing with international issues; his policy lacked coherence and often puzzled international society. Yeltsin's administration acted relying on pragmatism and avoidance of risk. This can be explained by such factors as lack of trust on benign intentions of the United States, heterogeneity of Russian elites and lack of uniform foreign policy course.

Impact of individuals on Russian foreign policy-making during Yeltsin's administration was great, and consequently, politicization of foreign affairs took place in Russia.[879] Besides the paradigm of Yeltsin's personal, almost monarchical relations with the leaders of world powers, foreign policy agenda was also impacted by certain cross-sectional institutions and private interest groups. Policy-making style of Foreign Ministers Kozyrev and later Primakov, for instance, differed in a number of items, such as position towards the West, the CIS and the Middle East. Both of these personalities had substantial impact on Yeltsin's foreign policy decisions. So, not without Primakov's efforts to develop multilateral policy aimed at constraining US hegemony, Yeltsin issued the 1997 Russia's National Security Concept.[880] Therewithal, Russian military had impact on security issues in Russian foreign policy agenda.

Whereas under Putin's ruling this phenomenon was absent: in an attempt to centralize and formalize the foreign-policy making mechanism, the role of the Foreign Ministry was dominated by the Presidency. Putin's foreign-policy making was determined by two general principles: securitization and economization. He

[878] Lo, p.8
[879] **Ibid**, pp. 12-13
[880] Light, p. 50; Felkay, p. 163

made Security Council the main institution coordinating foreign policy decisions. Russia's steady economic growth owed to Putin's protectionism policy and high oil prices. Along with focus on liberal economy, Putin was known for his 'strong state' inclination, or as it is called in Russian, "*gosudarstvennost*".[881] In foreign policy Putin's Russia demonstrated power together with minimizing risks.

The foreign policy of Russia, inherited by Putin, was complicated: despite active diplomatic deeds, Yeltsin left no conceptual understanding for Russia's relations with the world states. The level of elite and people isolation was still high when Yeltsin left the seat to young Putin. Possibly, this was an outcome of Yeltsin's practice to focus mainly on domestic problems. He only rarely expressed activeness on certain international issues as the conflict in the Balkans or in the Baltic states, where often the patriotism was the moving force, while real roots of the conflicts were disregarded.

One of the shortcomings in Yeltsin's foreign policy-making was the 'Potemkinization' (illusion) – the difference between foreign policy principles, declared in the Russian foreign policy concept documents, and the real policy-making.[882] So, for instance, declared inclination toward multipolarity and UN primacy in international politics was in some sense far from reality, as in practice Yeltsin's administration continued to practice balance-of-power politics – the attribute of the nineteenth century concert of Great powers. Similarly, in the 2000s, the primacy of the UN in the dissolution of international conflicts was sometimes abused, like during the conflict in Georgia in 2008.[883]

Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's administration gained assertiveness and pragmatism mostly due to the rise of nationalistic policy since 1993 political conflict. Then even Liberal Westernists turned to more nationalistic policies. While under Putin Russia's foreign policy became more pragmatic in accordance to external developments, more responsive to problems and opportunities and gained relatively high level of continuity. Since Putin, Russia began strengthening its foreign policy position due to development of economy, growing importance of

[881] Feklyunina, p. 624
[882] Lo, pp. 66, 181
[883] Yet Russia presented the 'illegal use of force' against its peacekeepers as an act against the Russian Federation itself, justifying self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.
Russian letter to the UN Security Council, 13 Aug. 2008, available online at http://www.mid.ru

security in international agenda and personal diplomacy of Putin. Pragmatism of Putin's elite had some overtones of cynicism: if in Yeltsin's era Western values only evoked annoyance among Russian policy-makers, then in the 2000s these common values were evaluated by policy-makers as an exclusively Western instrument for achieving certain interests. Thus, norms of international law began being accentuated by Putin. He criticized the emergence of double standards in international politics and that state power became legitimating factor in international issues; Putin also stressed instrumentalization of democratic mechanism and of the democracy concept itself.

All these developments in the era of energy geopolitics represented an opportunity for Russian elites to strengthen the government's political position: if under Yeltsin's ruling Russia had no capacity to hold the effective foreign policy, then under Putin the government had a chance to hold that policy which it deemed to be correct. Meanwhile, geopolitics remained actual in foreign policy agenda during Yeltsin, although it was some sort of endeavor to substitute the communist ideology and a reflection of Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's "political subservience and frequent concessions to the West." [884] It is important that geopolitical debates of the 1990s mitigated radical geopolitical streams such as Russian nationalism or Neo-Eurasianism and Westernism, which were proposed to be substituted by more moderate and pragmatic policies of balancing with the world's great powers: the United States, Europe and China. During Putin's presidency geopolitics was expressed in reborn Russian globalism which was contrasted against "*semi-isolationism* and *self-restrictions* of the 1990s".[885]

6.2.2. Changes in Russian Foreign Policy towards the West

Yeltsin's role as a pioneer to set bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the United States was undoubtedly great. He set partnership relations with the Clinton's administration based firstly on cooperation on nuclear security and the US support to Russia in its democratic and economic transformation. This fundament built by Yeltsin was a good present to Putin. On the other hand, Yeltsin

[884] Solovyev, p. 90
[885] Nikitin, p. 7

and his team aimed at gradually bringing the country to the level where Russia would be an equal player in the international stage, namely equal to the United States. In this framework, Yeltsin not refrained from criticizing the West for challenging Russia interests in the CIS, marginalizing Russia's role in the settlement of Bosnian crisis or undermining the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.[886]

1993 Parliamentary crisis between Yeltsin's administration and Russian nationalists and communists figured as the moving point in the negative change of Russia's stance towards the West. Many of Yeltsin's critics pointed to Russia's over-reliance on the United States and to numerous concessions given to Washington. [887] Indeed, Yeltsin admitted in 1993 that Russia's independent policy started with the United States, which he considered to be a natural ally of Russia. Pro-Westernism was strong in the 1990s' Russia: Yeltsin and his team of young reformers realized the fact that Moscow needed Washington's support in order to develop. Accordingly, despite hardened rhetoric of foreign policy agenda since 1993, Russia's new pragmatic nationalism nevertheless envisioned a pragmatic partnership with the West, so it was not necessarily anti-Western.[888] Actually, Yeltsin was in mind of economic and military realities of the period.

Although both Yeltsin and Putin opposed NATO expansion, their attitude towards the alliance in fact differed. If in the early 1990s, aiming at consolidating Russia's pro-Western stance, Yeltsin proposed Russia to become a member of NATO (but received no concrete answer), then Putin was much more skeptical about the alliance and even questioned its necessity in the post-post-Cold War era. As economic situation in Russia was difficult in the 1990s, Yeltsin had to capitulate on further NATO expansion, receiving economic and political benefits instead. Consequently, Yeltsin was aware that domestic economic problems and social unrest in Russia was of more importance than foreign military threats. Again, he had to take into consideration contending voices of the military, Prime Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Ivanov and political opposition. Thus, in Russia's National Security Concept of 1997 NATO's expansion was still portrayed as a threat to the Russian Federation.

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[886] Felkay, p. 133
[887] Solovyev, pp. 85-96
[888] Kubicek, pp. 550-54

Yeltsin tended to gain the approval for his idea of CSCE (OSCE) to become the major security organization in Europe, which would supervise NATO, the EU and the WEU.[889] However, Putin put away this idea, evaluating OSCE as unwieldy, cumbersome, prone to pro-Western bias organization, incapable of serving as an effective instrument for promoting Russian strategic goals.[890]

The Bosnian crisis was a lesson of nationalism in Yeltsin's political career. The first Russian President realized all the seriousness of nationalists' pressure; moreover, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans could directly affect Moscow's ethnic policy in unstable CIS region. Although holding pro-Serbian position both in Bosnia and Kosovo and being strictly against NATO's operations without the UN or CSCE approval, Yeltsin nevertheless managed to balance Russia's nationalist position with desire to cooperate with the West by sending peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia and sending Chernomyrdin to mediate the conflict in Kosovo.

The events happened during the last years of Yeltsin's presidency, such as conflict in Kosovo and NATO's air attack on Yugoslavia, economic default of 1998, as well as scandals regarding corruption in Russia, left the long shadow on the Russian relations with Western capitals. When Putin came to the head of Russia, relations with Washington and Russia's image in the world dropped to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, during the first years as a president, Putin reassured assertions about his anti-Western inclinations: he continually claimed that Russia was a part of the European community and a part of the modern world; he disavowed Yeltsin's unfortunate anti-Western announcements such as reminder that Russia was 'still a nuclear power'; Putin also urgently called the Duma to ratify the START II which was a deadlock issue between Yeltsin and the Duma. The minimum task for the President during his first term was to avoid confrontation with the West. Later in 2001, thanks to his immediate reaction to the 9/11 attacks, Putin even managed to put relations with the United States to the path of cooperation, let it be only in security sphere. Having experience of serving at the Sankt-Petersburg administration, where in the early 1990s he was in charge of foreign economic relations, Putin worked out a pragmatic approach to relations with the Western states.

[889] Ivanov in Light, p. 55; M. A. Smith, (2006), p. 11
[890] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gorodetsky, p. 16

During his second term, Putin kept the line of cooperative security vis-à-vis the West, on the other hand, showing neo-imperialist policy and growing assertiveness in the world, especially in the CIS region. It is noteworthy to state, that under Putin's presidency, apart from individual policy preferences, changing trends in the world politics were shaping Russian foreign policy agenda. Western powers faced new challenges: the United States had serious tasks in the Middle East, while the EU was conceiving its new wave of expansion. All these developments, together with Russia's economic development by virtue of energy politics, made Russian elite confident of Russia's international power.

Relations with the EU were only in initial stage during Yeltsin, so it was Putin who did real and decisive steps towards Russian integration with the EU. Yeltsin had no systematic approach or a concrete policy vision regarding the EU. Nevertheless, Yeltsin put Russian-European relations on the liberal path and went far more than Gorbachev. However, main aims Yeltsin pursued in the EU dimension were, like in relations with the United States, delivering economic aid, gaining recognition of Russia's interests in the CIS and Central Europe and cooperation on common security issues. To put it another way, the main focus in Russian-EU security relations was made on "practical crisis-management cooperation".[891] Liberal and democratic norms were left on the back side. Analyzing the topic of common norms and values between Russia and the West, there emerges an interesting point. Western states treated Putin as Yeltsin: they considered Yeltsin to be of the same values, but not quite understanding how things should be done. But evaluating Putin in a similar way was a mistake: Putin was familiar with West and its values, but actually did not accept these values.

Taking in mind systematic changes in international arena and in Europe in the beginning of the twenty-first century, Putin developed relations with the EU toward a long-term strategy, declaring the "European choice"[892] of Russia in the early 2000s. Pragmatic approach of the second Russian President to relations with the EU represented a more realistic relationship than the "formalistic partnership" of the 1990s. Similarly, Russia's security policy during Putin became more 'European' in

[891] Forsberg, p. 251
[892] *See* D. Danilov, "European Choice of Russia", **International Affairs**, 5(51), 2005, pp. 144-158

compare to Yeltsin's 'Atlanticist bias'.[893] However, Russia's expectations from Europe were limited by "modernization, participation, and multipolarity".[894] Putin left Russia outside the institutional framework of Europe. Problems in energy transit from Russia to Europe, the CFE treaty issue, new waves of EU enlargement, as well as growing anti-Russian stands of new EU members (which impeded Russia's accession to the WTO and other developments) became the distinctive issues in Russian-EU relations during Putin's era. New geopolitical realities and developments such as Kosovo independence, Iran's nuclear programme, US plans to set missile defence system in Eastern Europe and war in Georgia added complexity to Russian relations with the EU. By his last years of the presidency, affected by late negative developments, Putin began expressing high dissatisfaction with existing European security structures, pointing to the US still dominating and exploiting European nations for its geopolitical interests.

6.2.3. Changes in Russian Foreign Policy towards the East

During his first term, Yeltsin's policy in the East was low-marked and lacked coordination and long-term strategy. This changed in 1996, when during his 1996 election campaign Yeltsin appointed more 'Eastern-leaning'[895] Primakov as a foreign minister. Importance of good ties with the East was apprehended not only by Russian nationalists and Eurasianists, but also by the pro-Western Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who stressed the need to improve relations with Asia-Pacific, Southern and Western Asia. His successor, Primakov, was known for his Middle Eastern inclination, he was a professional in diplomatic policy in this region where religious and political conflicts continuously erupted. Withal, he emphasized relations with China, Japan and ASEAN states. During Primakov's serving in Russian Foreign Ministry, Eastern dimension was handled within the framework of Pragmatic Eurasianism – an instrument of using the East as a counterbalance against the West. So, it can be said that during Yeltsin Russian policy to the East was in some degree conditioned by personalities of Foreign Ministers.

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[893] Lo in Gorodetsky, p. 21
[894] Riester, p. 8
[895] James Clay Moltz, "Russia in Asia in 1996: Renewed Engagement", **Asian Survey**, 37(1), A Survey of Asia in 1996: Part I (January 1997), p. 89

Due to new challenges in the 2000s, Putin's Russia was bound for an intense competition for its 'place under the sun" in the Orient, since its closest partners (as China, India and Central Asian states) and more distant partners (as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) all had their own strategic spheres of influence and interests which conflicted with those of Russia in some areas. Being a natural "*zapadnik*" (a Westerner), Putin did not ignore the significance of the Eastern dimension for Russia. He neither neglected the ties with China, Japan, India and Korea, nor inclined them to unite in an anti-Western coalition.

Yeltsin envisioned Eurasianism as not openly anti-Western policy, but a part of Russian 'double-headed eagle' policy: alternative of dealing with both Europe and Asia.[896] Whereas Putin's administration's foreign policy towards the East was framed by Neo-Eurasianism approach, promoted by more nationalist and anti-Western political circles. While using Eurasianism as a political instrument, Putin emphasized economic interest over political or cultural interests. Multipolarity notion of Putin was also different from "a competitive or semi-confrontational" multipolarity of Primakov.[897] Having in mind Yeltsin's experience, Putin realized that Russia could only encourage multipolarity in the world stage when it was itself an economically and politically stable country. The main feature of Putin's notion on multipolarity was not so much to counterbalance the United States, but "rather to obtain a broader status quo in which more or less 'equal players' moderated one another and restrained the assertiveness of the regional superpower".[898]

Russia's foreign policy in Asia in the 1990s had two main perspectives: the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific with Japan as the main player on the one hand, and the need to cooperate with China in order to gain control of both Asia-Pacific and Eurasia. So, Yeltsin's Russia acted in Asia according to Russia's self-perception of being a great power on the one hand, and perceptions of multipolar Asia, on the other.

Putin's policy towards Asian states was more consistent than that of Yeltsin, since Putin managed to reestablish Russian influence in the region; however some scholars pointed out that he failed to open way for sustainable economic

[896] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 375
[897] **Ibid**, p. 214
[898] Lo in Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 215

development and integration into the region. Two main concerns were determining Putin policy in this region: a dearth of globalization and risk of overreliance on China and Central Asian states who failed to use contemporary opportunities.[899] In order to diversify the foreign policy agenda, Putin sought to draw Russian policy in Asia by searching the optimal paradigm of relations with small and large powers of Asia-Pacific. He tried to escape overdependence on relations with one particular country, as China, for example. To give an example, Yeltsin put his successor into uneasy situation in Japanese dimension of foreign policy by promising to sign the peace treaty with territorial concessions.[900] But Putin initiated intensive contacts with Japan in order to find the strategic decision for the bilateral problem.

Another distinctive feature of Putin's policy in Asia was desire to use Russia's potential as an infra-structural link between Europe and Asia by building energy and transport (mainly railway) corridors in order to compete the US efforts in this field; and this desire is justified due to Russia's geographical position between Asia and Europe. To some degree these plans were also an instrument for integrating Russia into the Asia-Pacific economy – a chance for the survival of the RFE. At the same time, Putin realized that in order to prove Russia's stand in Asia as a Great Power and to prove its Eurasian identity, it is first necessary to build up power and to be taken seriously in East Asia and globally.

After the end of the Cold War, Yeltsin's Russia sought for increasing participation in the Middle Eastern affairs and used every opportunity for this, let acting as a shadow of the United States. However, during further development of foreign policy strategy in the region, Yeltsin began establishing influence in those states forgotten by Washington such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. One of priorities in dealing with these states was 'economic diplomacy' oriented to arms sales and development of trade. Prime Minister Primakov appointed in 1996 became the key figure in Russian Middle East politics, where Moscow began asserting its national interests. Primakov often stated that Russia must represent an alternative to the United States in the Middle East, and he often tried to bring that about. At that period Moscow acted in the Middle East mostly by legitimacy of Eurasianism, pursuing vital interest there.

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[899] Rozman, p.9

[900] "Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation by 2000"; Rozman, p. 176-177

Under Yeltsin Russia's relations with the CIS states and Asia became more differentiated and abstracted due to special position of newly independent states who continuously sought to press Moscow on various concessions, and due to the growth of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. For Putin, who began his active policy with fight against the Chechen separatism, the issue of Islamic extremism became the primary in Russia's relations with from Kosovo and Afghanistan to Kyrgyzstan and North Caucasus.

Islamic Fundamentalism gained new sense during Putin's ruling regarding Moscow's policy in the Middle East: the new feature was added, called 'international terrorism'. The threat of international terrorism was stressed as the major challenge to Russia's state sovereignty and territorial integrity. [901] Thus, one of the primary aims of Russia was to sustain stability in the region. During his second term Putin changed political strategy in the Middle Eastern dimension and, instead of carelessly transferring military technology to Iran and Iraq, he began acting in accordance with long-term strategy, playing different games with certain Eastern states: such as a 'complex double game' with Tehran and Pyongyang, selling nuclear power plant to Burma or positioning itself as a mediator in the Middle East, maintaining close ties with Syria and Egypt.[902] In the early 2000s Putin cooperated with Washington in its establishing stability and promoting democracy in the Middle East. However, by the second half of the 2000s, the Hamas problem, unstable situation in Iraq and tensions caused by Iran's nuclear programme made the US to doubt Moscow's motivations.[903]

Despite all the criticisms that thanks to Yeltsin's concessions Russia lost positions in main geopolitical spaces, the facts speak the opposite: by the end of the 1990s Moscow remained the avowed centre of the Former Soviet Union and was able to exert influence in almost every post-Soviet state. This was achieved by virtue of titanic efforts of Russian diplomacy of the 1990s. One of the motives here was Yeltsin's apprehension that Moscow took responsibility for preserving stability in the region by mitigating the conflicts in the CIS territory (such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia) and had to prevent them from spreading into Russia. The method

[901] Gorodetsky, p. 159
[902] Rosefielde and Hedlund, p. 217
[903] Khrestin and Elliott, pp. 21-27

of “freezing” the conflicts was correctly used by Yeltsin’s administration; at least this prevented eruption of wars.

Under Putin Moscow was not the centre of the post-Soviet space anymore; Russia’s influence has been conditioned by the only but strong instrument in the FSU region – the energy. Moreover, if under Yeltsin’s administration Moscow managed to bring its favorites into the ruling in the CIS states (Shevardnadze in Georgia in 1992, Aliyev in Azerbaijan in 1993, Kuchma in Ukraine in 1994), then during Putin’s presidency Russia’s attempts in the same field failed, just as during elections in Ukraine in 2004. Nevertheless, under Putin’s presidency Moscow for the first time began consistently maintaining its certain interests in the post-Soviet space. Putin declared strict stance regarding the debts for the gas supply to the CIS states, consolidated Russian position in the Caspian basin and tried to avoid excessive dependence on transit states.

CONCLUSION

This thesis had an aim of analyzing the development of Eastern and Western dimensions of Russian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War during Yeltsin’s and Putin administrations. The work tried to answer such questions as what were the main factors determining the evolution of the Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period?; during which periods and considering which issues Russian foreign policy stand was pro-Western or anti-Western?; considering which international issues and under which circumstances Russia turned to the East or to the West?; with which states did Russia cooperate in the long-term perspective?; which states Russia preferred to treat pragmatically?; was Russia pursuing bilateral or multilateral policy in the world and how these policies were used in constructing relations with various states in the Eastern and the Western part of the world?; what was the theoretical framework of Russian diplomacy during Yeltsin and Putin?.

During the complex analysis of Russian foreign policy there had been come to several conclusions. The clearest observance is that under Yeltsin’s presidency Russian foreign policy was generally pro-Western. This can be explained by several factors. Firstly, Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union was still in indefinite

situation considering domestic structure: it had lost huge territories, it had become a Federative state with new administrative and political division, it lost one-time military power and international prestige; moreover, it had to overcome a complex transition from the command economy to market economy. Thus, Russia relied on the US financial and political support for its rapid transformation to the market economy and for domestic democratic reforms. On the other hand, Russia sought to be approved by Western states as an equal great power in the post-Cold War international arena.

Since 1993 Moscow began to pursue more assertive policies in the CIS, Asia and in the Middle East. Pivotal factors in this change in the foreign affairs agenda were as following: firstly, Russia sought for maintaining stability in the CIS area where ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts emerged. The second and probably the main factor impacting Russian foreign policy in the 1990s was the pressure of domestic opposition on the Yeltsin's cabinet for decisions on external issues (after 1993 victory of communists and nationalists in parliamentary elections). As Eran stressed, the "story of Russian foreign conduct" since 1993 cannot be conveyed without appreciating the interaction between internal political constraints and external needs".[904] Other factors were: the Kremlin's concerns over growing assertiveness in West's behavior reflected in NATO expansion to the East, force operations in the Balkans; as well as Russia's geopolitical considerations according to which Russia sought to ascertain its role in the East and to gain economic advantages in face of investments by Asian great economic powers to Russian economy and energy transit through the Middle East and Transcaucasus to Europe.

In general, Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin was drawn around balancing between cooperation with the West on the one hand, and opposition to NATO expansion and reasserting Russia's hegemony in the post-Soviet area on the other. Yeltsin as a foreign policy actor was an ambiguous figure, this was observed by numerous commentators, one of them Lo.[905] As it was stated in the first chapter, Yeltsin's administration acted in most cases reactively considering foreign affairs, often puzzling international society. He changed his stance towards the West

[904] Eran in Gorodetsky, p. 156
[905] Bobo Lo, **Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

according to different international issues, probably affected by domestic opposition and his advisors in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Personalities, or Russian elites, also represented an important factor in forming Russia's foreign policy. Kozyrev, the first Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, had a great impact on the transformation of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s. He was pursuing generally pro-Western policy and rarely departed from this stand. Kozyrev was known as "Mister Yes" in the West.[906] Primakov, his successor, was more inclined towards the Orient; especially he prioritized the Middle East, which was the area of his occupation before becoming a Foreign Minister. Primakov promoted more nationalistic foreign policy, based on pragmatism, instrumentalism and balance of power notion. However, it is important to remember that the leadership of the state was depended on other conditions such as the distribution of power, state capacity and identity. According to Macfarlane, the context in which the leader makes his policy choice also constraints this leader's actions.[907] Besides the heterogeneity of elites in Russia, ambiguousness of Russian diplomacy under Yeltsin can also be explained by lack of trust on benign intentions of the United States, as well as lack of uniform foreign policy course in the 1990s.

The place of the West in Russian foreign affairs was also great during Putin's presidency. Putin agreed with Russian Liberal Westernists that Russia should become a capitalist democracy integrated with the West; however, his vision of modernization was different from the Western liberalization model. Just as during Yeltsin's ruling, Russia under Putin's ruling was interested in attracting foreign investment in its market. This required an image of strong and stable Russia, and Putin tried to give a signal of such an image. However, for Putin, stability did not necessarily implied democracy: he prioritized *gosudarstvennost*, or the strong state, and such a policy was often called 'authoritarianism' and 'autocracy' by Western critics. Meanwhile, among Russian authorities of the period there was a widespread belief that economic interest of the West in Russia would outweigh its concerns over the condition of Russian democracy.[908] This impeded the modernization process of

[906] Surovell, p. 232
[907] S. Neil Macfarlane, "Russian Policy in the CIS under Putin" in Gorodetsky, p. 117
[908] Feklyunina, p. 624

Russia. Thus, projected image of the Russian government was often different from Moscow's real policy.

Russian foreign policy during Putin was a 'balanced' one in official representation. The strategy of balancing between East and West remained the official position of Putin's administration, which was also stressed in its Foreign Policy Concept which stated: "a distinguished feature of Russia's foreign policy is that it is a balanced one …. predetermined by the geopolitical position of Russia as one of the largest Eurasian powers".[909] Nevertheless, Putin did not underestimate the strategic, economic, technological and cultural dominance of the US in global politics: this was reflected in Moscow's cooperation with Washington against global terrorism threat. Yet, Putin's decisions later, after Bush's invasion in Iraq, proved that he in fact pursued a 'cold-blooded pragmatism'.[910]

Putin as a leader prioritized security and economy dimensions in Russian domestic and foreign policy: he relied much on the country's natural resources and related economic growth of Russia with energy exports which brought the biggest part of Russia's income due to high oil prices outside. In contrast to Yeltsin's era, the elites' perception of the state's image in international arena was more unified; however it was still affected by diverging visions of more liberal, market-oriented policy-makers and those who were security-oriented (*siloviki* – members of Russian security structures). Siloviki had substantial impact on Putin, inasmuch as Putin himself was a former silovik (FSB officer). Moreover, Putin was an apprentice of former St. Petersburg's mayor Anatoly Sobchak who was known for his adherence to Russia's great power policy. Russian military and internal security services (which Putin was member of before becoming a president) were pursuing great power ambitions, emphasized geopolitics and promoted Russia's assertive stands in international affairs. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin did not suffer from pressure of domestic opposition, he nothing less than liquidated a possibility of such pressure by consolidating the state's power, gaining operative majority in the Duma and controlling the electoral process.

Ambiguity in personal aspects of Putin also was present, albeit not as striking as Yeltsin's. Some wonder why did Putin's administration take strong anti-Western

[909] Rangsimaporn (2006), p. 379
[910] Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", in Gorodetsky, p. 22

stance on such issues as Iraq and NATO expansion, while there was no perceived military threat posed by NATO? The explanation may be the fact that the NATO expansion issue in Russia had been related to the questions of prestige, status, identity, and domestic politics. As Shearman asserted, "political leaders who make policy do respond to the external strategic environment, but they do so on the basis of their own perceptions of the world and the realities of domestic politics." [911]

Russia never entirely followed Atlanticism or Eurasianism ideologies in its foreign policy: its geopolitical interests lied in both the East and West, or in other words balancing between the East and the West; those were the 'unique interests'.[912] Hudson argues that it would be wrong for Atlanticists to believe that any tension in Russian relations with the West or Russia's ambitions to assert its interests would hinder Russia's integration with the Western world. Similarly, some radical Eurasianists make a mistake by conditioning Russia's powerful position in the world to the need for authoritarian administration of the state. Obviously, a mid way between the two schools can be and was found in the practice. As Borodaj, a leading spokes-person for neo-Slavophile ideology, proposed:

> We have to seek our direction between the East and the West as it corresponds to our spiritual and geopolitical position in the world. Not Western individualism with its imposed sociality ... [n]or on the other hand, the Asiatic cults with monolithic sociality, where the individual is nothing ... We have to create the Orthodox confession and the corresponding life and economy. This is our third path. [913]

The balancing between the East and the West was familiar with a concept of pragmatism in Russian foreign policy, which became especially popular under Putin's administration. *Pragmatism* as a theoretical framework in foreign affairs came to Russia with Primakov as a Foreign Minister. Primakov emphasized Russia's role as a bridge between the West and the East (the very idea of Eurasianism in fact). Russia began pursuing more independent policy vis-à-vis the West, focusing on the country's rational national interests when generating decisions on this or that external issue. Withal, this independence did not mean an opposition to the West, nor the total isolation from the West, it was rather a comprehension that Russia needed diversification of external policy which must not be focused precisely on the West,

[911] Shearman, p. 257
[912] Hudson, p. 238
[913] Borodaj and Nikiforov in Graham Smith (1999), pp. 492-493

but also utilize advantages and opportunities in relation to Eastern states as China, India, Iraq and others. Under Primakov Russian foreign policy followed a principle of not having permanent enemies or friends, but permanent interests. Main national interests of Russia at that time were stability, territorial integrity, conflict management in the post-Soviet space and CIS integration.[914] Pragmatism was present both during Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations. Russian foreign policy changed from Liberal Westernism in 1991-1992 to "Pragmatic Nationalism" in 1993-1995, both orientations being challenged in each period by advocates of Fundamentalist Nationalism. So, Pragmatic Nationalism provided a stable centrist coalition which won most of former Liberal Westernizers and diminished the impact of Fundamentalist Nationalists.[915]

The '*dependency argument*' also took place in Russian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, as argued Reddaway and Glinski. So, if under Putin Russian external affairs greatly depended on the "pipeline economy", then both under Yeltsin and Putin "cultural and psychological dependency of Soviet and post-Soviet elites on the image of the West" continued to be observed.[916] On the other hand, the 'imperial syndrome'[917] was present in certain issues, especially in Russian foreign policy in its neighborhood. It can be also linked with Russia's prevailing Great Power ideology. Transitologists may argue that Russia is in transition towards democracy and market economy; however they ignore Russia's history, imperial past and its indigenous culture. As Kissinger stated, imperial past of Russia would throw it to pursue *imperial ambitions* in the future and Russia will seek to become a world power again.[918]

The Russian Federation was different from its predecessor, the Soviet Union. Russia was not a member of any military alliance, neither during Yeltsin's presidency nor during Putin's, because it had no major enemies or threats to its national security after the end of the Cold War. It had competitors. For instance, Iran and Turkey to the South were posing potential threat not to Russian national interest,

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[914] Lo, p. 123
[915] Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, **Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
[916] Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, "The Ravages of Market Bolshevism", **Journal of Democracy**, 10(2), 1999, p. 23
[917] Lo
[918] Kissinger in Shearman, pp. 253-254

but rather in geopolitical sense, and China and Japan were Russia's economic rivals in Asia.

Both Yeltsin (since his second term) and Putin assured that the Russian government pursued multilateralism in the East and in the international arena in general by official statements and governmental documents. Main feature of their multilateralism was the argument that Russia emphasized commitment to international law and primacy of the UN in the settlement of international issues. On the other hand, Russia in fact practiced bilateral-based, pragmatic relations when dealing with Eastern states as China, Israel, Arab States, Turkey, Iraq or Iran. Some aspects of Russian foreign policy in Central Asia were also "reminiscent of the 'great game' of power politics played by European powers in that region in the nineteenth century.[3] Moscow's opposition to NATO expansion and proposition to make the OSCE a main security organization in Europe were signs of pursuing balance-of-power policy by using balance between European and American parts of the Transatlantic camp. Another example of such balancing policy in Europe was Putin's utilization of Europe's division into 'New Europe' versus 'Old Europe' camps in such issues as US invasion in Iraq in 2003.

It can be concluded that, despite attempts to promote idea of a 'Common Europe' or a 'pan-European community', there has never been a real European community in its wider sense, except Western Europe itself, which alone has established common security and civic community. The other parts of Europe, for instance Central Europe (Baltic States and Slovenia) were only an 'emerging community', while the Eastern Europe, which entails Russia and Former Soviet States (the CIS and former Yugoslavia) in fact have never been the part of this "European Community". Thus, unification of Europe is impossible, especially in the sense of Russia and Europe. Smith suggests that the only 'realistic goal' for Russia and the West is development of partnership, which is, however, often contentious, since there has not established "a fundamental agreement between Russian and western leaders … on what 'partnership' actually means".[919]

Having been under Putin's administration during almost the decade, Russian foreign policy "is likely to be global, assertive, and driven by the national interest as

[919] M. A. Smith (2006), p. 26

defined by the country's elite".[920] It will continue to emphasize the universalist moral values and the primacy of international law, and probably will not be depended on the United States or the EU. It will be self-confident and unique in its capacity to deal with different cultures and mediate between them; Russia will continue its tendency of consolidating ties with Asian states, Latin America and the Muslim World. Russia will continue to move forward in attempts to take the upstanding place in the international stage. Yet, although the Kremlin envisions Russia as a 'modern great power',[921] they have to define what they mean by this concept and how they plan to get to this status. New realities and evolving interests may make Russia correct its trajectory in the long term.

[920] Trenin (2007), p. 98
[921] Trenin (2005), p. 8

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